Avaya Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 8, 2021

2020000483 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 8, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/486,001 09/15/2014 Neil O'Connor 414077-US-
NP/AVA106PA
9218
136582 7590 07/08/2021
STEVENS & SHOWALTER, LLP
Box AVAYA Inc.
7019 Corporate Way
Dayton, OH 45459-4238
EXAMINER
MITIKU, BERHANU
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2156
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/08/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
pair_avaya@firsttofile.com
pto@sspatlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte NEIL O’CONNOR, TONY MCCORMACK, and
JOHN H. YOAKUM

______________________

Appeal 2020-000483
Application 14/486,001
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, JOHNNY A. KUMAR, and
JAMES W. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judges.

Opinion for the Board filed by KUMAR, Administrative Patent Judge.
Opinion Concurring filed by DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection
of claims 1–7, 9–15, and 17–22, which constitute all pending claims on
appeal. See Final Act. 6–18. Claims 8 and 16 have been canceled. See

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2018). “The word ‘applicant’ when used in this title refers
to the inventor or all of the joint inventors, or to the person applying for a
patent as provided in §§ 1.43, 1.45, or 1.46.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant
identifies Avaya, Inc., as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2.
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Appeal Br. 20, 21 (Claims App.). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We REVERSE.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Disclosed and Claimed Invention
Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention relates to a system and
method for guiding agents of an enterprise to handle contacts with customers
of the enterprise. Spec. ¶ 2. One of the primary objectives of the enterprise
is to maximize the performance, efficiency, and profitability of the contact
centers charged with handling these customer contacts. Spec. ¶ 4. When a
customer is in contact with a contact center, their call is routed to the most
appropriate agent, based on information provided by the customer. Spec.
¶¶ 9–10. Further, the contact may extend over multiple calls between the
agent and the customer. Id. Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention
seeks to address shortcomings in the information provided to the agent
during this contact with the customer. Spec. ¶ 10. Claim 1 is illustrative of
the claimed subject matter:
1. A server comprising a contact manager system to
dynamically generate an aggregated context information, the
server comprising a processor and a memory, wherein the
processor executes programming code stored in memory to:
determine one or more communication contexts of a
customer interacting with a contact center during one or more
communication sessions;
determine one or more communication contexts of a contact
center agent assisting the customer;
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obtain customer context information from the one or more
determined communication contexts of the customer;
obtain agent context information from the one or more
determined communication contexts of the agent;
store the customer context information and the agent
context information;
generate aggregated context information from the
obtained customer context information and the obtained agent
context information;
dynamically modify the aggregated context information;
create an inference from the dynamically modified
aggregated context information; and
cause display of a result of the inference to an agent,
wherein the result comprises a dynamically generated control
resulting from the inference, which control is displayed to the
agent and activatable by the agent to transfer the customer to a
different agent.

Appeal Br. 19 (Claims App.) (emphases added).

The Examiner’s Rejections
Claims 1, 3–7, 9, 11, 13–15, 17, and 19–202 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Glass et al. (US 2015/0350444
A1; published Dec. 3, 2015) (hereinafter, “Glass”)3 and Ding et al. (US
2013/0297547 A1; issued Nov. 7, 2013) (hereinafter, “Ding”). Final Act. 6–
14; see also Ans. 3–7.

2 In the heading of the rejection, the Examiner lists claims 1, 3–11, and 13–
20 as being unpatentable over Glass and Ding. However, claims 1, 3–7, 9,
11, 13–15, 17, and 19–20 are the claims addressed in the body of the
rejection. Final Act. 6–14.
3 Glass claims the benefit of the Provisional Application No. 62/005,201,
filed on May 30, 2014 (Glass Provisional).
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Claims 2, 12, and 21–224 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Glass, Ding5, and Connolly et al. (US
2015/0350435 A1; published Dec. 3, 2015) (hereinafter, “Connolly”). Final
Act. 14–15 and 17–18; see also Ans. 3–7.
Claims 10 and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Glass, Ding6, and Govrin et al. (US 2014/0297268 A1;
published Oct. 2, 2014) (hereinafter, “Govrin”). Final Act. 16–17; see also
Ans. 3–7.

ISSUE
Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief (Appeal Br. 10–
17) and Reply Brief (Reply Br. 2–5), the following principal issue is
presented on appeal:

4 In the heading of the rejection on page 17, the Examiner lists claims 21 and
22 as being unpatentable over Glass, Aldrich et al. (U.S. 8,724,795 B1;
published May 13, 2014) (hereinafter, “Aldrich”), and Dezonno. However,
the Examiner did not rely upon Aldrich; it appears this is a typographical
error by the Examiner, and should list Ding in place of Aldrich. Moreover,
the publication number listed for Dezonno is identical to that of Connolly,
and nowhere in the record does another number appear for Dezonno.
Accordingly, we consider claims 21 and 22 to be rejected over Glass, Ding,
and Connolly.
5 In the heading of the rejection on page 14, the Examiner lists claims 2 and
12 as being unpatentable over Glass, Aldrich, and Connolly. However, the
Examiner did not rely upon Aldrich; it appears this is a typographical error
by the Examiner, and should list Ding in place of Aldrich.
6 In the heading of the rejection on page 16, the Examiner lists claims 10 and
18 as being unpatentable over Glass, Aldrich, and Govrin. However, the
Examiner did not rely upon Aldrich; it appears this is a typographical error
by the Examiner, and should list Ding in place of Aldrich.
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Does Glass Provisional provide adequate written description support
under 35 U.S.C. § 112 for those portions of Glass relied upon by the
Examiner in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103, as being
unpatentable over Glass and Ding?

ANALYSIS
With respect to claim 1, Appellant contends the Examiner erred in
finding Glass teaches the claimed subject matter because Glass is not prior
art to independent claim 1 of Appellant’s application. See Appeal Br. 10–
12.
According to Appellant,
Glass has a filing date of May 28, 2015 and claims the benefit of
U.S. Provisional Application No. 62/005,201 . . ., filed on May
30, 2014. The present application has a filing date of September
15, 2014, which is prior to the May 28, 2015 filing date of Glass
but after the filing date of the [Glass Provisional]. Any subject
matter disclosed in the Glass publication but not found and
supported by the [Glass Provisional] is not available as prior art
against the present application.
Appeal Br. 10. Appellant further contends:
[T]he final Office Action does not state or point out where the
following limitations from claim 1 are disclosed in the [Glass
Provisional]:
obtain customer context information from the one or more
determined communication contexts of the customer;
obtain agent context information from the one or more
determined communication contexts of the agent;
. . .
generate aggregated context information from the obtained
customer context information and the obtained agent context
information.
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Appeal Br. 10–11 (emphasis added). Appellant also notes that “[a]ll
references in the final Office Action to the above limitations from claim 1
are with respect to [Glass].” Appeal Br. 11.
In the Answer, the Examiner does not address Appellant’s contentions
regarding the above-emphasized limitations of claim 1. See Ans. 3–7.
Based on the Examiner’s mapping of the above-emphasized claim
limitations to Glass in the Final Action, the Examiner relies upon paragraphs
26, 37, and 45 of Glass.
In the Final Action, the Examiner cites paragraph 26 of Glass to teach
the limitation “obtain customer context information from the one or more
determined communication contexts of the customer.” Final Act. 7.
Paragraph 26 of Glass reads:
A context electronic device 108 may monitor, track and/or
store information pertaining to one or more user
communications and/or communications sessions such as, for
example, context information. A context electronic device 108
may maintain a session database 114 that tracks information
pertaining to users, user electronic devices, context information
and/or other information relating to communications as
discussed in more detail below. In an embodiment, a contact
center electronic device 106a-N and/or one or more agent
electronic devices may be in communication with a context
electronic device 108 over one or more communication networks
120, and may be able to access information from the session
database 114.
Glass ¶ 26 (emphasis added). Glass discloses “context information may
include a unique identifier associated with the initiating user such as, for
example, the user’s name, a username or screen name, a phone number, an
IP address, or other unique identifier.” Glass ¶ 36. Although this “context
information” of Glass appears to teach the claimed “customer context
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information” (see, e.g., Spec. ¶ 85), the Examiner has not established that the
above-mentioned teaching is supported by Glass Provisional, which appears
to be void of any related discussion of how context information is used in
subsequent steps.
The Examiner relies further on paragraph 45 of Glass to teach the
limitation “obtain agent context information from the one or more
determined communication contexts of the agent.” Final Act. 7. Paragraph
45 of Glass reads:
In an embodiment, a context electronic device may
determine an escalation action based on what action has the
quickest resolution timeframe. For example, if an escalation
action involves connecting a customer with an agent over a voice
communication, a context electronic device may determine
which agent will be available to speak with the customer the
soonest. Referring to the above example, an escalation action
may be to connect the customer with a sizing expert over a voice
communication. The context electronic device may access a load
database to determine the most lightly loaded queue serviced by
a sizing expert. The context electronic device may generate a
notification that includes one or more instructions for contacting
the identified sizing expert.
Glass ¶ 45 (emphasis added). Therefore, the “agent context information”
that is obtained in Glass is “an escalation action based on what action has the
quickest resolution timeframe,” and that the “escalation action may be to
connect the customer with a sizing expert over a voice communication
[after] determin[ing] the most lightly loaded queue serviced by a sizing
expert.” See Final Act. 7. However, the Examiner has not sufficiently
established that the above-mentioned teaching is supported by the disclosure
in Glass Provisional. Although item 5 on page 3 of Glass Provisional
teaches that the “Context Server . . . can recommend escalation” if it detects
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that the agent is not addressing the customer’s issue, and paragraph 4 on
pages 4–5 teaches that “[i]nformation gathered during the session can be
used to identify the most lightly loaded Contact Center queue serviced by an
expert agent and the call routed accordingly,” nowhere does Glass
Provisional support “determin[ing] an escalation action based on what action
has the quickest resolution timeframe,” “determin[ing] which agent will be
available to speak with the customer the soonest,” or “access a load database
to determine the most lightly loaded queue serviced by a sizing expert.”
Finally, the Examiner relies on paragraph 37 of Glass to teach the
limitation “generate aggregated context information from the obtained
customer context information and the obtained agent context information.”
Final Act. 7. Paragraph 37 of Glass reads:
Referring to the above example, the customer who is
interested in purchasing a pair of shoes may initiate a chat
session with a live chat agent to figure out what size is the best
fit. The chat session may be implemented over a communication
network between the customer's user electronic device and the
live chat agent's agent electronic device. But a proxy may
transmit the chat session to a context electronic device, which
may store context information pertaining to the chat session in a
session database.
Glass ¶ 37 (emphasis added). According to the Examiner, the “aggregated
context information” that is “generate[d] . . . from the obtained customer
context information and the obtained agent context information” is the
“context information pertaining to the chat session” that is “store[d] . . . in a
session database.” See Final Act. 7. Again, the Examiner has not
sufficiently established that the above-mentioned teaching is supported by
the disclosure in Glass Provisional. Although Glass Provisional discusses
the initiation of a chat session between a customer and a chat agent (see,
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e.g., ¶¶ 2–4 on pages 3–4), nowhere does Glass Provisional describe the
storing of “context information pertaining to the chat session in a session
database.”
Under the America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 102(d) governs whether a
published patent application, such as Glass, is effective as prior art as of the
filing date of a prior-filed application:
[f]or purposes of determining whether [an] application for
patent is prior art to a claimed invention under [35 U.S.C. §
102(a)(2)], such . . . application shall be considered to have been
effectively filed, with respect to any subject matter described in the
patent or application—
. . .
(2) if the patent or application for patent is entitled to claim a
right of priority under section 119, 365(a), 365(b), 386(a), or 386(b),
or to claim the benefit of an earlier filing date under
section 120, 121, 365(c), or 386(c) based upon 1 or more prior filed
applications for patent, as of the filing date of the earliest such
application that describes the subject matter.

35 U.S.C. § 102(d) (emphasis added).
Consequently, when relying in a rejection on the priority date of a
prior-filed application while applying a published patent application, the
prior-filed application must describe the relied-upon subject matter of the
published patent application. See MPEP § 2154.01(b) (“AIA 35 U.S.C.
102(d) requires that a prior-filed application to which a priority or benefit
claim is made must describe the subject matter from the U.S. patent
document relied upon in a rejection.”). There is no requirement that the
prior-filed application provide written support for the claims of the
published patent application. See MPEP § 2154.01(b) (“[T]he question of
whether a patent or published application is actually entitled to priority or
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benefit with respect to any of its claims is not at issue in determining the
date the patent or published application was ‘effectively filed’ for prior art
purposes. Thus, there is no need to evaluate whether any claim of a U.S.
patent document is actually entitled to priority or benefit under 35 U.S.C.
119, 120, 121, 365, or 386 when applying such a document as prior art.”).
Here, for Glass to be considered as having been effectively filed on
the date Glass Provisional was filed—for purposes of teaching or suggesting
the disputed recitations of claim 1—Glass Provisional must describe
(providing written description support for) the subject matter of the disputed
recitations. MPEP § 2151 (9th Ed., Rev. 10.2019, June 2020) (“a U.S.
patent document is effective as prior art as of the filing date of the earliest
application to which benefit or priority is claimed and which describes the
subject matter relied upon, regardless of whether the earliest such
application is a U.S. provisional or nonprovisional application”). Therefore,
we agree with Appellant that the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 is in error,
because Glass was filed after the present application and, although Glass
claims the benefit of Glass Provisional, Glass Provisional does not describe
the subject matter of paragraphs 26, 37, or 45 of Glass, as applied to the
disputed limitations of claim 1.7
In other words, the Examiner’s findings fail to show that the subject
matter of Glass pertinent to the disputed recitations has written description

7 We acknowledge that in Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc.,
800 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2015) the court held that for prior art purposes, “[a]
reference patent is only entitled to claim the benefit of the filing date of its
provisional application if the disclosure of the provisional application
provides support for the claims in the reference patent in compliance with §
112, ¶ 1.” Id. at 1381. Although the Examiner could apply the Dynamic
Drinkware test and determine whether the prior art reference’s claims are
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support in Glass Provisional. As such, Glass Provisional does not provide
§ 112(a) support for paragraphs 26, 37, or 45 of the Glass reference. Thus,
the Examiner has not shown that Glass is properly considered prior art to the
instant application. Accordingly, we are persuaded the Examiner reversibly
erred in rejecting claim 1, independent claim 11, which recites similar
limitations, and claims 2–7, 9–10, 12–15, and 17–22 dependent therefrom,
which are similarly rejected as obvious over, inter alia, Glass.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 1, 3–
7, 9, 11, 13–15, 17, and 19–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Glass in view of Ding. We also do not sustain the rejections of claims
2, 12, and 21–22 as being unpatentable over Glass and Ding, further in view
of Connolly, or of claims 10 and 18 as being unpatentable over Glass and
Ding, further in view of Govrin, because the Examiner has not identified any
teachings in the other applied prior art references to cure the above-
identified deficiency of Glass.

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed

supported by the provisional application, we observe that the issue on appeal
before us involves a rejection that relies on the disclosure of the non-
provisional application as prior art.

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1, 3–7, 9,
11, 13–15,
17, 19–20
103 Glass, Ding 1, 3–7, 9,
11, 13–15,
17, 19–20
2, 12, 21–
22
103 Glass, Ding,
Connolly
2, 12, 21–
22
10, 18 103 Glass, Ding,
Govrin
10, 18
Overall
Outcome
1–7, 9–15,
17–22

REVERSED

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DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judge, concurring.
I concur with the Majority in reversing the Examiner’s rejections of
claims 1–7, 9–15, and 17–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. I write separately
because I would reach the same disposition, but for different reasons,
discussed below.
In rejecting independent claim 1, inter alia, the Examiner relies on the
combined teachings of Glass and Ding. See Final Act. 6–8. Glass was filed
on May 28, 2015 (i.e., after Appellant’s filing date of September 15, 2014)
but claims the benefit of provisional application no. 62/005,201 (“the ’201
Provisional”), filed May 30, 2014 (i.e., prior to Appellant’s filing date). See
Glass [22], [60], ¶ 1.
As the Majority correctly states, under the provisions of the America
Invents Act—specifically, 35 U.S.C. § 102(d), a non-provisional application
that is relied on as a prior art reference and that is “entitled to claim” the
benefit of an earlier filing date of a provisional application “shall be
considered to have been effectively filed . . . as of the filing date of the
[provisional] application that describes the subject matter.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(d).
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 211.01(a) (9th
ed., Rev. 10.2019, June 2020) sets forth the requirements for a later-filed
application to claim the benefit of a prior-filed provisional application under
35 U.S.C. § 119(e). These requirements include that the non-provisional
application or international application be filed no later than 12 months after
the filing date of the provisional application. MPEP § 211.01(a)(1). As
discussed above, the ’201 Provisional was filed on May 30, 2014 and the
non-provisional application was filed on May 28, 2015. In addition, the
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prior-filed provisional application must name the inventor or a co-inventor
named in the later-filed international application. MPEP § 211.01(a)(2).
Here, both the ’201 Provisional and the non-provisional application identify
at least one common inventor (e.g., Kevin Glass). Additionally, the non-
provisional must contain a specific reference to the provisional application.
MPEP § 211.01 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)). Glass contains a specific
reference to the ’201 Provisional. See Glass ¶ 1.
As such, Glass is entitled to claim the benefit of the filing date of the
’201 Provisional (May 30, 2014) to the extent the ’201 Provisional describes
the subject matter relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting claim 1. See also
157 Cong. Rec. S1369–70 (Mar. 8, 2011) (noting that “an application that
meets the ministerial requirements of copendency and specific reference is
entitled to claim the benefit”) (emphasis added).
The ’201 Provisional describes that a single OmniChannel is
established by a rules-based context server “for all customer communication
and ensures that all context and information gathered is accessible to each
and every channel within the Enterprise Contact Center Infrastructure.”
’201 Provisional ¶ 5. The ’201 Provisional describes that “[t]he inventive
arrangements ensure that all contextual information for a particular customer
contact with the enterprise or host system is associated with a common
session identifier. The common session identifier is then used to aggregate
and share dialogues between disparate communications channels.” ’201
Provisional ¶ 6. In addition, the ’201 Provisional describes a software
toolkit that “facilitates a contact center infrastructure.” ’201 Provisional ¶ 9.
The toolkit includes (i) Proxy Frameworks to intercept dialogue between a
customer and agent; (ii) Observer Frameworks that allow the Context Server
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to be queried “for context relevant to a customer dialogue and [to]
share/retrieve the information;” and (iii) Application Plug-ins “to capture
relevant dialogue context and share it with the context server.” ’201
Provisional ¶ 9. The ’201 Provisional also describes a sentiment tracking
capability as a service that monitors a LiveChat session and can recommend
escalation to an expert agent, as appropriate. ’201 Provisional ¶ 9, see also
’201 Provisional, Example ¶¶ 3–4.
Figure 1 from the ’201 Provisional is illustrative and is reproduced
below:

Figure 1 of the ’201 Provisional illustrates the architecture for a
system that supports an OmniChannel customer engagement experience.
’201 Provisional ¶ 8.
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In view of my understanding of the ’201 Provisional, I respectfully
disagree with the Majority that the ’201 Provisional “appears to be void of
any related discussion of how context information is used in subsequent
steps.” See Maj. Op. 7.
I also respectfully differ with the Majority as to whether the ’201
Provisional provides adequate support for Glass, as relied on by the
Examiner to teach “obtain[ing] customer context information from the one
or more determined communication contexts of the customer,” “obtain[ing]
agent context information from the one or more determined communication
contexts of the agent,” and “generat[ing] aggregated context information
from the obtained customer context information and the obtained agent
context information.” See Maj. Op. 6–9.
As set forth in the rejection, the Examiner finds Glass broadly
discloses (i) a session database that tracks information pertaining to users
(citing Glass ¶ 26), which teaches obtaining customer context information;
(ii) a system determining a context of a service agent (citing Glass ¶ 45),
which teaches obtaining agent context information; and (iii) storing in a
session database context information related to a chat session (citing Glass
¶ 37), which teaches generating aggregated context information from the
customer and agent context information. See Final Act. 7. I find adequate
support in the ’201 Provisional for these relied upon portions of Glass. As
discussed above, I find the ’201 Provisional describes, in addition to plug-ins
and proxies for gathering customer and agent context information, a context
server for tracking and storing customer and agent context information from
a communication context. As such, I would find that Glass is prior art to
Appellant’s claimed invention for this subject matter.
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Although not addressed by the Majority, Appellant argues that the
’201 Provisional “does not teach generating a control resulting from an
inference created from dynamically modified aggregated customer and agent
context information, wherein the control is displayed to the agent and
activatable by the agent to transfer the customer to a different agent.”8
Appeal Br. 13.
The Examiner relies on paragraphs 45, 46, and 48 of Glass to teach
the display of a control that is activatable by the agent to transfer the
customer to a different agent. See Final Act. 7–8 (finding Glass teaches the
creation of a notification to provide assistance to an agent).
Paragraph 46 of Glass describes a context electronic device may send
a notification of a determined escalation to a current agent. Glass ¶ 46.
Glass describes that the notification recommend “that the live chat agent
connect the customer with the sizing expert having the shortest queue of
calls.” Glass ¶ 46. Glass further describes the notification may include a
web page, hyperlink, or a Uniform Resource Locator (URL). Glass ¶ 46.
Based on my review of paragraph 46 of Glass, I would find that Glass
teaches or reasonably suggests generating the claimed control activatable by
the agent to transfer the customer to another agent. That is, paragraph 46 of
Glass teaches an agent could activate a hyperlink (for example) to connect
(i.e., transfer) the customer to another agent.

8 The correct inquiry is whether Glass, as relied on by the Examiner teaches
the disputed limitation and, if so, is that subject matter supported by the ’201
Provisional.

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The next step in the analysis is to determine whether there is support
in the ’201 Provisional for the subject matter of paragraph 46, described
above, of Glass.
The ’201 Provisional describes a sentiment tracking service that
monitors a LiveChat session and can recommend escalation (see ’201
Provisional ¶ 9). Moreover, the ’201 Provisional describes that the
sentiment tracking service may invoke a rule “that recommends the
customer is offered the ability to talk directly to an agent.” ’201 Provisional,
Example ¶ 3. The ’201 Provisional explains that the sentiment tracking
service generates a chat message to the LiveChat agent, via the chat proxy,
and the LiveChat agent “offers the customer the [sic] ability to talk directly
to a topic expert.” ’201 Provisional, Example ¶¶ 3–4.
Although it appears that the ’201 Provisional describes the creation of
a notification that recommends the customer transfer to another agent, it is
the LiveChat agent that offers the customer the ability to transfer to another
agent. The disclosure falls short of describing a control being activatable by
the agent to effectuate a transfer of the customer.
Because the ’201 Provisional does not provide adequate support for
paragraph 46 of Glass, as relied on by the Examiner, to teach the recited
control activatable by the agent to transfer the customer, Glass is not entitled
to the benefit of the earlier filing date of the ’201 Provisional. As such,
Glass does not qualify as prior art to Appellant’s claimed invention.
For the reasons discussed herein, I concur with the Majority’s
decision reversing the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–7, 9–15, and 17–22
under 35 U.S.C. § 103.