Avaya Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 30, 2020

15086303 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 30, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/086,303 03/31/2016 George Erhart 4366-796 7484
48500 7590 04/30/2020
SHERIDAN ROSS P.C.
1560 BROADWAY, SUITE 1200
DENVER, CO 80202
EXAMINER
HOLWERDA, STEPHEN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3664
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/30/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cjacquet@sheridanross.com
edocket@sheridanross.com
pair_Avaya@firsttofile.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte GEORGE ERHART, DAVID SKIBA, and
VALENTINE C. MATULA
Appeal 2019-005255
Application 15/086,303
Technology Center 3600
Before JOHN C. KERINS, CHARLES N. GREENHUT, and
ANNETTE R. REIMERS, Administrative Patent Judges.
GREENHUT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–6 and 8–20. See Non-Final Act. 1.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Avaya, Inc. Appeal
Br. 2.
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Application 15/086,303
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a command and control of a user-provided
robot by a contact center. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. A system, comprising:
a network interface;
a data repository;
a microprocessor in communication with the network
interface, the microprocessor being configured to:
receive a request for the performance of a customer service
task at a service location;
in response to the request, access instructions selected in
accordance with the customer service task, from the data
repository;
communicate, via the network interface, with an
unconfigured robot, the unconfigured robot lacking the
instructions to perform the customer service task;
transform the unconfigured robot into a configured robot
comprising the instructions; and
signal the configured robot to execute the instructions and
perform the customer service task.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Reference Name Document ID Pub. Date
Ogilvie U.S. 6,324,650 B1 Nov. 27, 2001
Naka U.S. 2003/0187547 A1 Oct. 2, 2003
Blanc U.S. 2009/0157224 A1 June 18, 2009

REJECTIONS
Claims 1–6, 9–11, 13–17, and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(l) as being anticipated by Blanc. Non-Final Act. 2.
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Claim 82 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Blanc and Naka. Non-Final Act. 8.
Claims 12, 18, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Blanc, Naka, and Ogilvie. Non-Final Act. 9.
OPINION
The claims subject to the anticipation rejection are argued as a group
based on representative claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). The
Examiner withdrew the obviousness rejection of claim 7. Separate
arguments are not presented regarding the obviousness rejections of claims
8, 12, 18, and 20.
Appellant initially attempts to draw a distinction between
functionality being absent versus present and functionality being enabled
versus disabled. App. Br. 5 (citing Blanc para. 40). The Examiner has a
much stronger position on this issue:
it would be improper to interpret “enabled” in ¶39 and ¶40
without reference to “and downloaded to the controller” in ¶40
and without reference [sic, to] specific embodiments for
modifying the robot program as per “can be sent back to the
controller” in ¶48 and as per “the monitoring parameters are sent
to the robot side” in ¶49. In this context, “enabled” describes the
process by which the robot program stored in program memory
of the robot controller (see, e.g., ¶34) is modified by the service
center.
Ans. 5–6 (quoting Blanc paras. 39, 40, 48, and 49); see also para. 34
(regarding using the Internet and other forms of communication). Appellant
does not further dispute this point in the Reply Brief. We adopt the
Examiner’s analysis on this issue as our own. See, e.g., In re Paulsen, 30 F.

2 The Examiner withdrew the rejection against claim 7. Ans. 3.
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3d 1475, 1478 n. 6 (Fed. Cir. 1994) accord In re Cree, 818 F.3d 694, 698 n.
2 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 21, 2016).
The remaining issue, as it is crystalized in the Reply Brief, is the
broadest reasonable interpretation of the term “task.” The Examiner
reasonably characterizes “task” as referring to an act or activity or a series of
acts or activities. Ans. 4 et seq. Appellant does not appear to dispute this
characterization in any way.
The divergence of opinions between Appellant and the Examiner is
that Appellant would have “task” construed such that performing an act, or
series of acts, with a particular parameter of the nature described in Blanc,
such as torque, speed, or acceleration (see Blanc paras. 10, 41, 47, 48),
constitutes performing the same “task” as performing the act, or series of
acts, with different parameters. Reply. Br. 2–3. The Examiner, on the other
hand, takes the position that the term “task,” when read in the context of the
claim and the rest of the Specification, does not require such a narrow
meaning. Rather, performing an act or series of acts with different
parameters effectively changes the act or series of acts such that the
modified act or series of acts reasonably constitutes a different task.
To give a more concrete example, under the Examiner’s view, moving
from point A to point B with a particular speed or acceleration is reasonably
considered as performing a different “task” than moving from point A to
point B with a different speed or acceleration. Similarly, generating
sufficient torque to apply a force to a region or move a load is reasonably
considered as being a different “task” than generating more torque to apply a
larger force to that region or move a heavier load.
There does not appear to be any dispute that if the Examiner’s
proposed claim interpretation were adopted, Blanc would anticipate claim 1
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because Blanc, “in response to [a] request” goes from an “unconfirmed”
state “lacking the instructions to perform the [] task” to a “configured” state
“comprising the instructions.”
It is trite to say that the best place to look to gain an understanding of
the claim terms is the Specification to which the claims belong. In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he PTO applies to the verbiage of
the proposed claims the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their
ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the
art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or
otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in
applicant’s specification.”). Here, the Examiner is the only one who has
directed our attention to any relevant portions of the Specification. Ans. 4
(quoting Spec paragraphs 77, 78, 84, 94, 184). Appellant argues that
paragraph 77 does not provide a definition of “task.” Reply Br. 2–3.
Appellant does not direct our attention to, or propose, any specific definition
for the term “task.” We are mindful that in other places in the Specification
“task” is more closely associated with an overall goal such as “repair[ing] a
washing machine” as opposed to the specific tasks or acts necessary to
achieving that goal, such as tightening a bolt by applying a specified torque
while making that repair. However, our reviewing court “[has] cautioned
against reading limitations into a claim from the preferred embodiment
described in the specification, even if it is the only embodiment described,
absent clear disclaimer in the specification.” In re American Academy of
Science Tech Center, 367 F. 3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations
omitted).
If anything, the Examiner’s assertion that, based on paragraph 77,
“task” could reasonably be understood to refer to “one or more physical
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aspects or activities” involves employing an interpretation that is narrower
than is necessary, and not broader than is reasonable, because the language
in paragraph 77 is clearly only exemplary and non-limiting, indicating what
a “task may comprise” (emphasis added). Appellant does not direct our
attention to any evidence in the Specification or elsewhere, or provide any
reasoning to explain why the Examiner’s interpretation of “task” extends
beyond the ambit of reasonableness. Appellant presents only unsupported
arguments that one skilled in the art would not understand “task” in the
manner proposed by the Examiner. In light of the Evidence and analysis on
the record presently before us, for the reasons hereinabove and in the
Examiner’s Answer (pp. 3–5), we conclude that the Examiner has the better
position, and the Examiner correctly afforded the term “task” a construction
of reasonable breadth consistent with Appellant’s Specification.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection and the
Examiner’s rejections of those claims not separately argued.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are AFFIRMED.
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DECISION SUMMARY
Claims 35 U.S.C. § Basis/References Affirmed Reversed
1–6, 9–11,
13–17, 19
102(a)(l) Blanc 1–6, 9–11,
13–17, 19

8 103 Blanc, Naka 8
12, 18, 20 103 Blanc, Naka,
Ogilvie
12, 18, 20
Overall
Outcome
1–6, 8–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED