Auto Workers Local 1853 (Saturn Corp.)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 13, 2001

333 N.L.R.B. 291 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

AUTO WORKERS LOCAL 1853 (SATURN CORP.) 291
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
& Agricultural Implement Workers of Amer-
ica, and its Local No. 1853 (Saturn Corpora-
tion) and Earl Lee. Case 26–CB–3508
February 13, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN AND WALSH
Upon a charge filed by Earl Lee, the Charging Party,
on November 25, 1996, the General Counsel of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board issued a complaint on
March 5, 1997, and an amendment to the complaint on
March 21, 1997, against the Respondents, International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural
Implement Workers of America (UAW) and its Local
No. 1853 (Local 1853) (separately and collectively, the
Union), alleging that they had violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act. Spe-
cifically, the complaint alleges that the Union violated
the Act by promulgating a policy requiring employees
who had “withdrawn dishonorably” from the Union,
i.e., resigned from the Union while remaining in bar-
gaining unit positions in which they continued to be
represented by the Union, to pay a fee equivalent to the
dues for the period of nonmembership if they should
seek to rejoin the Union, while allowing employees
who had “honorably withdrawn,” i.e., resigned from the
Union because they had taken a position outside the
bargaining unit, to rejoin without having to pay such a
fee. Respondent UAW and Respondent Local 1853
each filed an answer to the complaint and to the
amended complaint admitting in part and denying in
part the allegations in the complaint and the amended
complaint. On June 4, 1997, the General Counsel filed
a Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Respondents
filed a joint Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.1

1 In their Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, the Respondents
state that the General Counsel’s Motion for Summary Judgment fails to
note that in their respective answers to the complaint in this case, the
Respondents denied that they were both the recognized collective-
bargaining representatives of the unit employees and asserted instead
that the UAW alone was that representative. They also state that the
General Counsel’s Motion for Summary Judgment fails to note that
their respective answers deny the complaint allegation that they both
published the language at issue here. In this regard, the Respondents
assert that this is incorrect, that The Wheel, the newsletter in which the
language was published, is solely Local 1853’s publication and that the
UAW, in effect, is neither responsible for the language nor has adopted
it as its own. Finally, although the language appeared in a Local 1853
publication, “the Local does not concede that the article necessarily
represents an official policy of the Local.” In view of our decision to
grant the Respondents’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and
dismiss the complaint, we find it unnecessary to resolve these issues.
On June 5, 1997, the Board issued an order transfer-
ring the proceeding to the Board and a Notice to Show
Cause why the General Counsel’s motion should not be
granted. Thereafter, the Charging Party filed a brief in
support of the General Counsel’s Motion for Summary
Judgment and a brief in opposition to the Respondents’
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and the Respon-
dents each filed a response to the General Counsel’s
Motion for Summary Judgment.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment
The facts with respect to the motions are as follows.
Since 1985 Respondent UAW and/or Respondent Local
1853 have represented a bargaining unit consisting of
operating and skilled technician employees employed
by Saturn Corporation at its facility in Spring Hill,
Tennessee. Since Tennessee is a “right-to-work” state,
unit employees are not required to join the Union or to
pay any financial core fees to it.2 Respondent Local
1853 publishes a newsletter for the Saturn employees
entitled The Wheel. In the October 1996 issue of The
Wheel, Respondent Local 1853 published the following
article (emphasis added):
The Wheel has occasionally published the
names of those team members who have chosen to
withdraw from the Union for various personal rea-
sons when they have not been happy with member-
ship actions. Occasionally team members have
asked why only those team members who have
withdrawn while still performing bargaining unit
work have their names published and not those who
have gone to non-represented (non-rep) positions.
There are two ways to leave the union: one be-
ing an honorable withdrawal, the other being a dis-
honorable withdrawal. When a team member be-
2 Sec. 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act (29 U.S.C. § 164(b)) prohibits
the “execution or application” of union-security agreements in states
where such agreements are prohibited by law. Jurisdictions that have
outlawed union-security agreements are commonly known as “right-to-
work” states. Unless otherwise prohibited by State law, the first pro-
viso to Sec. 8(a)(3), set out at fn. 3 below, permits an employer and a
union to enter into a collective-bargaining agreement that requires
employees to become “members” of the union as a condition of em-
ployment. The proviso is the statutory authority for such union-
security agreements. In NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734, 742
(1963), however, the Supreme Court described an employee’s “mem-
bership” obligation under a union-security clause as “whittled down to
its financial core,” i.e., the payment of an amount equivalent to union
initiation fees and dues. Further, in Communications Workers v. Beck,
487 U.S. 735, 762–763 (1988), the Court concluded “that § 8(a)(3) . . .
authorizes the exaction of only those fees and dues necessary to ‘per-
forming the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in
dealing with the employer on labor-management issues.’”
333 NLRB No. 43
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 292
comes a non-rep at Saturn, they cease to perform
work, which belongs to the UAW. They are no
longer entitled to representation by the UAW.
They receive a card from the union which states
that they have honorably withdrawn and have left
in good standing with all dues paid up to the point
of their leaving the bargaining unit.
On the other hand, when a team member quits
the union while still performing work that the
UAW has negotiated, they withdraw dishonorably
and are no longer in good standing. If a team
member who has honorably withdrawn subse-
quently returns to the bargaining unit, they begin
paying dues only upon their re-entry, those who
have withdrawn dishonorably must pay all back
dues in order to return to a status of good standing.
From this edition on, the names of those who
are not in good standing will be published in every
edition of The Wheel. Hopefully that list will soon
be nonexistent, and we will have a local where
every person works to build the union from within
instead of destroying it by leaving.
The issue here is whether the Union violated Section
8(a)(1)(A) by maintaining this policy. The General
Counsel asserts that the Union’s policy coercively re-
strains employee-members from exercising their right
to resign from the Union,3 and is impermissibly dis-
criminatory because it applies only to employees who
continue to work in the bargaining unit and not to em-
ployees who have left the bargaining unit. For the rea-
sons set forth below, we find that the Respondents did
not violate the Act.
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act states:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents—
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: Pro-

3 The Supreme Court in Pattern Makers v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 104
(1985), held that a union violates Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) when it places restric-
tions on the right to resign, because such restrictions are inconsistent
with the policy of voluntary unionism implicit in Sec. 8(a)(3) of the
Act.
Sec. 8(a)(3) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employ-
ment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That
nothing in this [Act], or in any other statute of the United States,
shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a la-
bor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment
membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the be-
ginning of such employment or the effective date of such agree-
ment, whichever is the later[.]
vided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right
of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules
with respect to the acquisition or retention of mem-
bership therein[.]
In the Motion for Summary Judgment, the General
Counsel contends that the present case is effectively
controlled by “those cases which have found that it is a
violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) for a union to require
employees who have resigned from the Union to pay a
‘reinitiation fee’ when a financial core obligation arises
when a union-security clause springs into effect,” rely-
ing principally on California Saw & Knife Works, 320
NLRB 224, 247–248 (1995), enfd. sub nom. Interna-
tional Assn. of Machinists v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 1012 (7th
Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub. nom. Stang v. NLRB, 525
U.S. 813 (1998); Office Employees Local 2 (Washing-
ton Gas), 292 NLRB 117 (1988), enfd. sub nom. NLRB
v. Office Employees Local 2, 902 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir.
1990); Professional Engineers Local 151 (General Dy-
namics), 272 NLRB 1051 (1984). In California Saw,
the union informed former members that, as a condition
of continued employment, they were required to pay a
reinstatement fee when a new collective-bargaining
agreement with a union-security clause became effec-
tive. Similarly, in Washington Gas, the union de-
manded that an employee, who had resigned from the
union, pay a new initiation fee or be discharged under a
union-security provision, and in General Dynamics,
employees, who had resigned from the union, were re-
quired to pay new initiation fees, even if they did not
choose to become full members, or face having the un-
ion “take action against them” under a union-security
provision.4
We reject the General Counsel’s contention that those
cases—which pertain to union fees imposed in connec-
tion with the enforcement, or potential enforcement, of
a union-security provision as a condition of continued
employment—extend to the facts presented here.
Rather, we find that the absence of a compulsory union-
security clause here is determinative in analyzing the
legality of the Union’s policy, because employees face
no employment sanctions for any decision related to
4 The General Counsel also cites Ferro Stamping & Mfg. Co., 93
NLRB 1459, 1460, 1484–1486 (1951), in which the Board held that the
union violated Sec. 8(b)(5) of the Act by requiring certain employees in
the unit on the effective date of a union-security provision to pay a
higher initiation fee than newly hired employees. The Board further
found, however, that union membership requirements imposed before
the effective date of the union-security clause did not violate Sec.
8(b)(1)(A) because “[u]ntil such time as employees become contractu-
ally obliged to join, the admission fees that a union imposes, and the
basis in which such fees are imposed, . . . are matters lying outside the
purview of the Act or the scrutiny of the Board.” Id. at 1495.
AUTO WORKERS LOCAL 1853 (SATURN CORP.) 293
union membership. Employees may resign their union
membership, while continuing to work in the bargain-
ing unit, and are under no compulsion to continue any
form of membership. An employee’s decision to rejoin
the Union is, therefore, wholly voluntary. And because
the financial obligation under the Union’s policy can be
incurred only at the option of the employee, there is no
basis for finding that the Union’s policy would deter
members from resigning.5 Accordingly, in the absence
of a nonvoluntary sanction of any kind, the Union’s rule
is neither coercive in character, nor a restraint on resig-
nation.
Distinguishing between reinitiation fees in a union-
security context, and the context presented here, is con-
sistent with cases that recognize voluntariness of union
membership as a touchstone of Section 8(b)(1)(A). For
example, in upholding a union rule setting a ceiling on
the daily wages that members working on an incentive
basis could earn, and enforcing that rule by fines, the
Supreme Court in Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423
(1969), emphasized that the rule applied only to those
who “have chosen to become and remain union mem-
bers,” and that if the member did not want to be subject
to the limitation, the member “could leave the un-
ion. . . .” 394 U.S. at 435. See also id. at 429 fn. 5
(noting that although union and employer violate the
Act where employee is discharged for violation of a
union rule limiting production, “a union member, so
long as he chooses to remain one, . . . is subject to un-
ion discipline”). (Emphasis added.) Similarly, Section
8(b)(1)(A) does not prohibit labor organizations from
adopting a rule forbidding the crossing of a picket line
during a strike, and enforcing that rule against volun-
tary union members by a reasonable fine. See Scofield,
394 U.S. at 428, discussing NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 195 (1967). By contrast, un-
ions may not fine former members who choose to re-
sign and return to work during a strike. Pattern Makers
League v. NLRB, supra; NLRB v. Textile Workers Local
1029, 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
We also find that the policy’s imposition of a fee
only on those voluntarily rejoining the Union from a
bargaining unit position, rather than from a nonunit

5 The Charging Party contends that employees could interpret the
language in the union article, which requires payment of the equivalent
of back dues from those who “return to the bargaining unit,” as requir-
ing payment of back dues simply to be able to return to the bargaining
unit, not to rejoin the Union. We do not believe that language, viewed
in the context of the entire article, can be read as the Charging Party
suggests. Throughout the article, it is clear that the Union is addressing
members “who have withdrawn while still performing bargaining unit
work . . . .” The Charging Party’s additional speculative interpretations
are equally without basis.
position, is not discriminatory. Former members who
have left the bargaining unit entirely have been unrep-
resented by the Union during the withdrawal period.
By contrast, those who have remained in the bargaining
unit have continued to receive the benefits of union
representation at all times. In these circumstances, we
find that, in the absence of an employment-related sanc-
tion, the union policy at issue here reflects a legitimate
distinction between bargaining unit employees and
nonbargaining unit employees, and is not discrimina-
tory as applied to former members who have remained
in the unit and who voluntarily elect to rejoin the Un-
ion.6
Finally, in addition to our finding that the Union’s
policy is not coercive or discriminatory, we also find
that the policy constitutes a legitimate exercise of the
Union’s right under the proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A)
“to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisi-
tion or retention of membership therein(.)”7
Here, the Union is exercising its right to conduct its
own internal affairs with respect to the “acquisition” of
membership in its organization, by establishing a rea-
sonable requirement for individuals who, having chosen
to leave the Union, voluntarily seek to rejoin. The Un-
ion’s policy meets the test set forth in Scofield. The
Union clearly has a legitimate interest in establishing
criteria for voluntary union membership. Indeed, we
have recognized that, in vindication of union interests
protected by the Section 8(b)(1)(A) proviso, unions can
protect their members from “compelled association”
with those who have chosen to leave the union.8 The
6 Significantly, the payment of back dues by former members who
have remained in the bargaining unit and who contemplate a voluntary
return to union membership is no greater in amount than the dues al-
ready paid by fellow bargaining unit employees who retained their
union membership. Thus, the fee itself is not punitive since it is pre-
cisely equivalent to the dues paid by nonresigning unit members who
also have received the benefits of representation. Although the Union
could not compel the payment of back dues through coercive means for
periods when there was no legal obligation to pay such dues, the deci-
sion to pay the back dues here is not compelled and is entirely the
product of a voluntary decision to rejoin the Union.
7 As the Scofield Court explained:
§ 8(b)(1) leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted rule which
reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has
imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced against union
members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule. 394
U.S. at 430.
8 Food & Commercial Workers Local 81 (MacDonald Meat Co.),
284 NLRB 1084, 1086 (1987). There, we held that a union may law-
fully expel or suspend employees who resign union membership and
return to work during a strike, recognizing that the union’s right to
expel or suspend was the “logical corollary of a member’s unrestricted
right to resign.” Thus, just as “we have protected resigning employees
from compelled association with other union members, so, in vindica-
tion of the interests protected by the proviso, we should protect the
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 294
Union’s policy vindicates that interest by establishing a
noncoercive, nondiscriminatory, and nonpunitive option
for the reacquisition of membership by former members
who, as bargaining unit employees, continued to be
represented by the Union, and who elect to rejoin under
no compulsion and subject to no employment sanction.
In our view, this policy is consistent with both the Sec-
tion 7 right of an employee to resign voluntarily from
the Union and to remain a nonmember and the Union’s
right under the Section 8(b)(1)(A) proviso to prescribe
its own rules for those who may voluntarily seek to
acquire or reacquire union membership.

union members who chose to stay from compelled association with
those who choose to leave.”
Accordingly, we find that the Union’s policy neither
restrains nor coerces members in the exercise of their
Section 7 right to resign from the Union and is privi-
leged by the proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A). It follows
that the union policy at issue here is not violative of
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. We shall therefore deny
the General Counsel’s Motion for Summary Judgment
and grant the Respondents’ Cross-motion for Summary
Judgment.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that the General Counsel’s Motion
for Summary Judgment is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Respondents’
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and
the complaint is dismissed.