AUDI AG

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 2, 2020

15316066 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 2, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/316,066 12/02/2016 Michael Reichel 4557.0400001 1025
26111 7590 03/02/2020
STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX P.L.L.C.
1100 NEW YORK AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, DC 20005
EXAMINER
NGUYEN, NGA X
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3662
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/02/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
e-office@sternekessler.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
__________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
__________

Ex parte MICHAEL REICHEL and CHRISTIAN RÖSENER
__________

Appeal 2019-004987
Application 15/316,066
Technology Center 3600
__________

Before CHARLES N. GREENHUT, MICHAEL L. HOELTER, and
ANNETTE R. REIMERS, Administrative Patent Judges.

HOELTER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–12. Final Act. 1 (Office Action
Summary). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). For the reasons
explained below, we do not find error in the Examiner’s rejections of these
claims. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the Examiner’s rejections.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as “Audi AG.”
Appeal Br. 4.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The disclosed subject matter “relates to a method for operating a
driver assistance system for the automated guidance of a motor vehicle.”
Spec. 1.2 Method claim 1 and apparatus claim 7 are independent. Claim 1 is
illustrative of the claims on appeal and is reproduced below.
1. A method for operating a driver assistance system
for automated guidance of a motor vehicle, the method
comprising:
detecting environmental data relating to surroundings of
the motor vehicle using environmental sensors of the motor
vehicle and ego data relating to the motor vehicle using internal
sensors of the motor vehicle;
determining a plurality of trajectories that respectively
describe a possible future movement of the motor vehicle
depending on the environmental data and the ego data;
selecting a reference trajectory from the determined
plurality of trajectories by analyzing a plurality of evaluation
criteria, wherein at least one of the plurality of evaluation criteria
is a detection range criterion for analyzing at least one predicted
detection range of one of the environmental sensors or of a group
of the environmental sensors of the motor vehicle during a
predicted movement of the motor vehicle along the respective
determined trajectory; and
controlling vehicle systems in order to move the motor
vehicle along the reference trajectory.

REFERENCES RELIED ON BY THE EXAMINER
Hass et al.3 US 9,731,762 B2 Aug. 15, 2017

2 Appellant’s Specification lacks both paragraph and line numbering. We
thus reference Appellant’s Specification via page number only.
3 Throughout the Final Office Action and the Answer, the Examiner refers to
this reference as “Has” instead of “Hass.” See Final Act. 2, 7–9; Ans. 5–6.
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Oechsle et al.4 WO 2008/031662 A1 Mar. 20, 2008

THE REJECTIONS ON APPEAL
Claims 1–12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) and/or
102(a)(2) as anticipated by Fred. Final Act. 3.
Claims 1–12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) and/or
102(a)(2) as anticipated by Hass. Final Act. 7.
ANALYSIS
The above anticipation rejections, whether predicated on Fred or
Hass, are substantially similar such that they can be discussed together. We
note below those instances where a difference exists between the two.
With respect to each rejection, Appellant does not offer arguments in
favor of independent claim 7 or dependent claims 2, 4–6, 8, and 10–12
separate from those presented for independent claim 1. See Appeal Br. 8–
12, 13–16. We thus select claim 1 for review. Accordingly, the remaining
claims (i.e., claims 2, 4–8, and 10–12) stand or fall with claim 1. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appellant also presents separate arguments for
dependent claims 3 and 9 (which are argued together). See Appeal Br. 12–
13, 16–17. We discuss these arguments for claims 3 and 9 separately below.
Claim 1
Claim 1 requires detecting environmental data and ego data (see
below for clarification between the two). Based on such data, claim 1
requires the determination of a plurality of possible trajectories of the

4 Because both the Examiner and Appellant refer to this reference as “Fred,”
we shall do the same for consistency. Also, reference will be to the English
language translation thereof.
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vehicle, and thereafter, the selection of a reference trajectory therefrom.
Such selection is achieved by analyzing a plurality of criteria, one of which
is detection range criteria that analyzes a detection range of one or more
environmental sensors. This selection occurs during a predicted movement
of the vehicle along its determined trajectory.
Appellant’s Specification discloses that environmental data can be
derived from cameras, radar or other environmental sensors while ego data
pertains to data relating to the vehicle itself. Spec. 3, 7. The detection range
of an environmental sensor can be defined by its sensor range and opening
angle. Spec. 3.
Appellant contends that Fred does not teach or disclose the “selecting
a reference trajectory” limitation of claim 1. Appeal Br. 9–10; see also
Reply Br. 2–3. Appellant argues that “Fred does not analyze the predicted
detection range of its sensors over its avoidance trajectories and Fred does
not use this analysis in determining which avoidance trajectory to choose.”
Appeal Br. 10. Appellant makes similar arguments concerning the
disclosure of Hass. See Appeal Br. 14–15; see also Reply Br. 3–4.
To be clear, both Fred and Hass detect environmental data (i.e., Fred’s
“radar sensors” and Hass’ sensors “to generate an environmental model”).
See Fred Abstract, ¶¶ 2, 6, 7, 13, 15, 19, 20–22, Figs. 1–2; Hass Abstract,
3:1–3, 5:48–49, 7:18–19, Figs. 2, 3a–3b. Thereafter, Fred and Hass select a
trajectory based on such data. See Fred ¶¶ 6, 11, 23–24, Figs. 1–2; Hass
1:16–18, 2:47–50, 3:1–6, Figs. 2, 3a–3b. Fred further discloses using a
detection range criterion in making a selection of a trajectory. See Fred ¶¶ 6,
10 (both discussing “within the sensor detection range”), 11 (discussing
“within which the propagated avoidance trajectory is determined”), Abstract.
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Hass also discloses that it is known to use “the sensor detection range” in
selecting a trajectory. Hass 2:5–7. Additionally, Hass discloses that
“tolerance ranges” are important. Hass 8:10–25. Thus, Hass also discloses
using a detection range criterion in selecting a trajectory. In view of the
above, we agree with the Examiner’s assessment that “Appellant does not
provide any difference between Fred’s disclosure and the current
Application’s invention adequately.” Ans. 3. The Examiner expresses a
similar sentiment regarding Hass (which we also agree with). See Ans. 5–6.
Accordingly, Appellant’s contentions above are not persuasive of Examiner
error.
Appellant also takes issue with the Examiner’s finding that Fred
analyzes a plurality of evaluation criteria. See Reply Br. 2. However, claim
1 does not identify what constitutes evaluation criteria other than a detection
range criterion, and Appellant does not identify where Appellant’s
Specification limits such criteria to only certain criteria.5 As such, without a
more limited comprehension of the scope of “evaluation criteria,” we
understand that as long as evaluation criteria other than a detection range
criteria is also evaluated, then the recited limitation directed to a “plurality of
evaluation criteria” is satisfied. In this regard, we agree with the Examiner

5 For example, Pages 2 and 3 of Appellant’s Specification states:
In addition to the evaluation criteria that are generally analyzed
within the scope of the determination of a reference trajectory
and take into consideration, for example, dynamic driving
parameters of the motor vehicle, the distance of the motor
vehicle to other objects and similar, which are respectively
predicted for one of the trajectories, additional predicted
detection ranges of sensors or sensor groups are to be taken into
consideration.
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that because Fred discloses the use of other criteria, Fred thus analyzes a
“plurality of evaluation criteria.” Ans. 4; see also Fred ¶¶ 6 (“[t]aking into
account these current vehicle state variables and vehicle operating variables
. . . at least one avoidance trajectory is determined”), 10, 25. The same can
be said for Hass. See Ans. 6, Hass 3:1–3 (“the control device is set up to
receive sensor signals of at least one sensor, to generate an environmental
model from the received sensor signals”), 3:19–20 (“at least one camera
and/or at least one radar sensor”); see also Hass 3:26–32, Abstract.
In summation, and based on the record presented, Appellant does not
apprise us of Examiner error. Accordingly, the rejections of claims 1, 2, 4–
7, and 10–12 as being anticipated by Fred and Hass are sustained.
Claims 3 and 9:
Appellant contends that neither Fred nor Hass discloses the limitation
recited in claims 3 and 9, i.e., “determining a predicted detection range for
each of the plurality of trajectory points” because Fred and Hass, according
to Appellant, merely disclose the “longitudinal coordinate x” or “a parameter
on x coordinate of the vehicle.” See Appeal Br. 12–13, 16–17.
Appellant’s contention is not persuasive because both references
continue to monitor the situation along the path selected. Fred teaches
constant monitoring by “taking into account the current state of the vehicle.”
Fred Abstract; see also Fred ¶ 10 (“a trajectory tube is advantageously
determined not only for the vehicle itself but also for each participating
object within the sensor detection range covered by the surrounding sensor
system”). Likewise, Hass discloses determining an avoidance trajectory
“during an evasive maneuver.” Hass 2:64–3:1, 5:32–34. Thus, Appellant’s
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contention focusing on certain points along a selected trajectory path does
not apprise us of Examiner error.
For these reasons, the rejections of claims 3 and 9 as being anticipated
by Fred and Hass are sustained.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–12 102(a)(1) Fred 1–12
1–12 102(a)(2) Fred 1–12
1–12 102(a)(1) Hass 1–12
1–12 102(a)(2) Hass 1–12
Overall
Outcome
1–12
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).

AFFIRMED