AU Optronics Corporation

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 16, 2021

2020005212 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 16, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/659,790 07/26/2017 Jia-Show HO 67507-119 4248
65358 7590 12/16/2021
WPAT, PC
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ATTORNEYS
8230 BOONE BLVD. SUITE 405
VIENNA, VA 22182
EXAMINER
NGUYEN, JIMMY H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2626
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/16/2021 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JIA-SHOW HO, CHE-CHIA CHANG, and
MING-HUNG CHUANG
Appeal 2020-005212
Application 15/659,790
Technology Center 2600
Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, LARRY J. HUME, and JUSTIN BUSCH,
Administrative Patent Judges.
HUME, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–5, 7, and 9–12. Appellant has
withdrawn claims 6 and 8 from consideration as being directed to a non-
elected species. See Final Act. 2. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.

1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant
identifies the real party in interest as AU Optronics Corp. Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2020-005212
Application 15/659,790

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
The claimed subject matter is directed to “a pixel circuit, and in
particular, to a switchable pixel circuit.” See Spec. 1:5.
Exemplary Claim
Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
Appeal (emphasis added to contested prior-art limitations):
1. A pixel circuit, comprising:
a liquid crystal capacitor with a first end and a second
end;
a memory circuit, for storing a status signal;
a driving circuit, for receiving a data voltage from a data
line and outputting the data voltage to the liquid crystal
capacitor and a mode-switching circuit according to a scan
signal of a gate line;
the mode-switching circuit, for outputting the data
voltage to the memory circuit and outputting a display voltage
to the liquid crystal capacitor according to a mode-switching
signal; and
a control circuit, electrically connecting to the first end
of the liquid crystal capacitor via the mode-switching circuit,
connecting to the mode-switching circuit via a first node, and
connecting to the second end of the liquid crystal capacitor,
wherein the control circuit controls a voltage level of the first
node corresponding to the status signal, and outputting the
display voltage to the first end of the liquid crystal capacitor via
the mode-switching circuit when the mode-switching circuit is
ON.

2 Our decision relies upon Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
Feb. 6, 2020); Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed July 1, 2020); Examiner’s
Answer (“Ans.,” mailed May 1, 2020); Final Office Action (“Final Act.,”
mailed July 9, 2019); and the original Specification (“Spec.,” filed
July 26, 2017).
Appeal 2020-005212
Application 15/659,790

3
REFERENCES
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence:
Name Reference Date
Miyazawa et al. (“Miyazawa”) US 2001/0052890 A1 Dec. 20, 2001
Yokoyama US 2002/0036627 A1 Mar. 28, 2002
Nagai et al. (“Nagai”) US 2009/0141013 A1 June 4, 2009
REJECTIONS3
R1. Claims 1, 2, 5, and 9–12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Yokoyama. Final Act. 5.
R2. Claims 3 and 4 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Yokoyama. Final Act. 9.
R3. Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Yokoyama and Miyazawa. Final
Act. 11.
R4. Claims 1 and 9–12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)
as being anticipated by Nagai. Final Act. 12.
R5. Claims 2–5 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Nagai. Final Act. 15.
R6. Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Nagai and Miyazawa. Final Act. 19.

3 The Examiner withdrew the written description rejection of claim 4 under
35 U.S.C. § 112(a). See Ans. 3.
Appeal 2020-005212
Application 15/659,790

4
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
Based upon our review of the record, we find a preponderance of the
evidence supports particular arguments advanced by Appellant with respect
to claim 1 for the specific reasons discussed below. We highlight and
address specific findings and arguments regarding claim 1 for emphasis as
follows.
1. § 102(a)(1) Rejection R1 of Claims 1, 2, 5, and 9–12
Issue 1
Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 11–13; Reply Br.11–16) the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by
Yokoyama is in error. These contentions present us with the following
issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art discloses “[a] pixel
circuit” that includes, inter alia, “a control circuit, electrically connecting to
the first end of the liquid crystal capacitor via the mode-switching circuit,
connecting to the mode-switching circuit via a first node, and connecting to
the second end of the liquid crystal capacitor,” as recited in claim 1?
Principles of Law
Anticipation of a claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102 occurs when each
claimed element and the claimed arrangement or combination of those
elements is disclosed, inherently or expressly, by a single prior art reference.
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir.
2010). A reference inherently discloses an element of a claim “if that
missing characteristic is necessarily present, or inherent, in the single
anticipating reference.” Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., 339 F.3d 1373,
Appeal 2020-005212
Application 15/659,790

5
1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). “Inherency,
however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere
fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not
sufficient.” Therasense, 593 F.3d at 1332 (citing Cont’l Can Co. USA, Inc.
v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
Analysis
The Examiner finds Figure 1 of Yokoyama discloses “a control
circuit comprising an element 120, electrically connecting to the first end of
the liquid crystal capacitor 21 via the element 45 of the mode-switching
circuit, connecting to the mode-switching circuit via a first node [a node
between the element 120/121 and the element 45], and connecting to the
Vcom [signal A] line and the second end of the liquid crystal capacitor 21,”
as recited in claim 1. Figure 1 of Yokoyama is replicated below:

Appeal 2020-005212
Application 15/659,790

6
“FIG. 1 is a circuit diagram of a liquid crystal display device to which
this invention is applied.” Yokoyama ¶ 16.
Appellant contends:
Yokoyama fails to disclose or suggest, inter alia, connecting to
the first end of the liquid crystal capacitor (via the mode-
switching circuit) and connecting to the second end of the
liquid crystal capacitor, as specifically claimed. As claimed, the
liquid crystal capacitor has a first end connecting to the control
circuit via a mode-switching circuit and a second end
connecting to the control circuit. See, inter alia, FIG. 1, liquid
crystal capacitor (Clc), control circuit (180), and mode-
switching circuit (160).
Appeal Br. 11.
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 as being
anticipated by Yokoyama because the claimed invention “specifically
requires the control circuit electrically connecting to a first end of the liquid
crystal capacitor via the mode-switching circuit and the control circuit
electrically connecting to a second end of the liquid crystal capacitor, as
claimed” and Yokoyama does not show this in Figure 1 or in any other
figure, thus providing “a fundamental difference in structure from the
teachings of Yokoyama.” Appeal Br. 12.
The Examiner responds, “with respect to the comparison between
Fig. 1 of the current application and Fig. 1 of the Yokoyama on page 12 of
the [Appeal Brief], Examiner notes that the specification is not the measure
of invention. Therefore, limitations contained therein can’t be read into the
claims for the purpose of avoiding the prior art.” Ans. 4.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant contends “[t]he Office has made
technical errors mapping components to the claimed invention, and remains
Appeal 2020-005212
Application 15/659,790

7
deficient in showing this particular claimed feature.” Reply Br. 11.
Appellant specifically argues:
As claimed, the invention includes a liquid crystal
capacitor having a first end connecting to the control circuit via
the recited mode-switching circuit and a second end also
connecting to the control circuit. See, inter alia, FIG. 1, liquid
crystal capacitor (Clc), control circuit (180), and mode-
switching circuit (160). Appellant maintains that the Office fails
to show that Yokoyama connects to both sides of the liquid
crystal capacitor in the same way (i.e., using the same paths) as
the currently claimed invention.
The Office fails to address the argument that the
connection of the control circuit to the first end of the liquid
crystal capacitor must occur through the recited mode-
switching circuit. The Office equates the claimed mode-
switching circuit to transistors 42, 72, and 45 as disclosed by
Yokoyama, FIG. 1 (inter alia, Final Office Action, Page 5,
Lines 11–12).
The Office alleged that the Appellant mistakenly
analyses that Yokoyama's driving circuit does not electrically
connect to the first end of the liquid crystal capacitor via the
mode switching circuit and not electrically connecting to a
second end of the liquid crystal capacitor (Examiner's Answer,
page 4, 3rd paragraph). Appellant respectfully submits that the
Office seems to only focus and interpret the scope of claim 1 on
the electrical connection, and ignores the fact that the claim 1
explicitly calls the connections to both ends of the liquid crystal
capacitor with one connecting path via the recited mode-
switching circuit.
The control circuit (Yokoyama 120) does not connect to
the first end of the liquid crystal capacitor through these
components 42/72/45. While the control circuit connects to the
first end of the liquid crystal capacitor through transistor
component 45, there is no flow of signal through transistors 42
and 72; the transistors 42/72 connect directly to the equated
“memory circuit” (Yokoyama: 110), instead. Appellant
Appeal 2020-005212
Application 15/659,790

8
respectfully asserts that the Office has made incorrect
interpretation on the cited Yokoyama reference and in mapping
Yokoyama' s structures to the recited mode-switching circuit
along with other recited components, as claimed and described.
Yokoyama reference explicitly defines that the structures
40 (41, 42) and 43 (44, 45) as two separate switching circuits
for switching between analog and digital [display], the structure
110 (111, 112) as the retaining circuit (Yokoyama, paragraph
32), and the structure 120 (121, 122) as the signal selection
circuit to provide the signals for driving the liquid crystal
(Yokoyama, Fig. 1, paragraphs 30-35). Yokoyama discloses
alternating two modes by controlling whether the liquid crystal
capacitor 21 will receive signals from the structure 44 or the
structure 45.
Reply Br. 11–12. “The current invention specifically requires the control
circuit electrically connecting to a first end of the liquid crystal capacitor via
the recited mode-switching circuit and the control circuit electrically
connecting to a second end of the liquid crystal capacitor,” as claimed.
Reply Br. 15.
We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because, upon review of
the prior art and consideration of Appellant’s contentions, we find
Yokoyama fails to disclose “a control circuit, electrically connecting to the
first end of the liquid crystal capacitor via the mode-switching circuit,
connecting to the mode-switching circuit via a first node, and connecting to
the second end of the liquid crystal capacitor,” as required by claim 1, and as
argued by Appellant.
Accordingly, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are
persuaded of at least one error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior
art to disclose the disputed limitation of claim 1, such that we find error in
the Examiner’s resulting finding of anticipation. Therefore, we do not
Appeal 2020-005212
Application 15/659,790

9
sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of independent claim 1. For
the same reasons, we also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
dependent claims 2, 5, and 9–12, depending from claim 1 and also rejected
under Rejection R1.
2. § 102(a)(1) Rejection R4 of Claims 1 and 9–12
Issue 2
Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 15–16; Reply Br. 18–21) the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as being
anticipated by Nagai is in error. These contentions present us with the
following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art discloses “[a] pixel
circuit” that includes, inter alia, “a control circuit, electrically connecting to
the first end of the liquid crystal capacitor via the mode-switching circuit,
connecting to the mode-switching circuit via a first node, and connecting to
the second end of the liquid crystal capacitor,” as recited in claim 1?
Analysis
Similar to Rejection R1 of claim 1, supra, the Examiner finds Nagai
in Figure 1 discloses the same disputed limitation. Final Act. 13.
Appellant argues:
The Office alleges Nagai discloses a “control circuit”
(SW5, SW6) in FIG. 1. Similar to the discussion of Yokoyama,
above, this “control circuit” (SW5, SW6) only connects to
“liquid crystal capacitance” (LCC) 51 on a single side; the other
terminal of the LCC 51 is connected to the common electrode
52 (again, roughly corresponding to Vcom, disclosed in the
originally filed specification, inter alia, Page 5, Lines 16-23 and
FIGS. 1-7). Although the “control circuit” SW5, SW6 disclosed
Appeal 2020-005212
Application 15/659,790

10
by Nagai connects to a first end of the capacitor via (an alleged
equivalent) mode switching circuit SW2, SW4, this “control
circuit” SW5, SW6 does not connect to a second end of the
LCC 51.
Appeal Br. 15.
Figure 1 of Nagai is replicated below:

“FIG. 1 is an equivalent circuit diagram showing the configuration of
a pixel circuit of one sub-pixel in a liquid crystal display device according to
a first embodiment of the present invention.” Nagai ¶ 47.
In comparing the claimed invention to Nagai’s disclosure, Appellant
argues:
Parallel to the discussion of Yokoyama, no components
of the Nagai system connect to the common electrode 52 that
provides voltage to a second/opposite side of the LCC 51. Thus,
Appeal 2020-005212
Application 15/659,790

11
Nagai cannot be held to disclose that the control circuit, in any
form, connects to both ends of the LCC 51; the claimed and
described invention specifically includes a control circuit
specifically connecting to the first end of the liquid crystal
capacitor via the mode-switching circuit, and connecting to the
second end of the liquid crystal capacitor.
Appeal Br. 16.
We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred
because we find that Nagai fails to disclose a control circuit that connects to
both ends of liquid crystal capacitor (LCC) 51, as required by claim 1.
Accordingly, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are
persuaded of at least one error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior
art to disclose the disputed limitation of claim 1, such that we find error in
the Examiner’s resulting finding of anticipation. Therefore, we do not
sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of independent claim 1 and
claims 9–12 which depend from claim 1 and which are rejected under
Rejection R4.
3. § 103 Rejections R2, R3, R5, and R6 of Claims 2–5, and 7
In light of our reversal of Rejections R1 and R4 of independent
claim 1, supra, we also reverse obviousness Rejections R2, R3, R5, and R6
under § 103 of claims 2–5 and 7, which variously and ultimately depend
from claim 1. On this record, the Examiner has not shown how the
additionally cited secondary Miyazawa reference overcomes the
aforementioned deficiencies with Yokoyama and Nagai, as discussed above
regarding Rejections R1 and R4 of claim 1.
Appeal 2020-005212
Application 15/659,790

12
CONCLUSIONS
We REVERSE the Examiner’s rejections.
More specifically:
(1) Appellant has persuasively argued that the Examiner erred with
respect to anticipation Rejection R1 of claims 1, 2, 5, and 9–12 under 35
U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) over Yokoyama, and we do not sustain the rejection.
(2) Appellant has persuasively argued that the Examiner erred with
respect to anticipation Rejection R4 of claims 1 and 9–12 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(1) over Nagai, and we do not sustain the rejection.
(3) Based upon our reversal of Rejections R1 and R4 of claim 1,
we reverse obviousness Rejections R2, R3, R5, and R6 of claims 2–5 and 7
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the cited prior art combinations of record.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
References/
Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 5, 9–12 102(a)(1) Yokoyama 1, 2, 5, 9–12
3, 4 103 Yokoyama 3, 4
7 103
Yokoyama,
Miyazawa 7
1, 9–12 102(a)(1) Nagai 1, 9–12
2–5 103 Nagai 2–5
7 103
Nagai,
Miyazawa 7
Overall
Outcome 1–5, 7, 9–12
REVERSED