Atlas Logistic Group Retail Services (Phoenix) LLC

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Feb 22, 2011

28-CA-023178 (N.L.R.B. Feb. 22, 2011)

JD(SF)-05-11
Tolleson, AZ
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
SAN FRANCISCO BRANCH OFFICE
ATLAS LOGISTICS GROUP RETAIL
SERVICES (PHOENIX) LLC
and Case 28–CA–23178
JOSHUA GRAVES, An Individual
Sandra Lyons, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Kelvin C. Berens and Jill L. Poole, Esqs.,
(Jackson Lewis LLP), of Omaha, Nebraska,
for the Respondent.
Joshua Graves, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
WILLIAM G. KOCOL, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Phoenix,
Arizona, on January 5, 2011. The charge and amended charge were filed by Joshua Graves on
September 10 and November 29, 2010,1 respectively and were served on Atlas Logistics Group
Retail Services (Phoenix) LLC (herein Atlas).2 The complaint was issued November 30, 2010.
The complaint alleges that Atlas violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining work rules that
restricted activity protected by Section 7 of the Act. The complaint also alleges that Atlas
violated Section 8(a)(1) by unlawful statements made by its supervisor, Tyler Biggs, to Graves.
Atlas filed a timely answer that admitted the filing of the charges, interstate commerce and
jurisdiction, labor organization status of the General Teamsters (excluding Mailers), State of
Arizona, Local Union No. 104, an affiliate of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (herein
the Union), and supervisory status. The answer denied the substantive allegations of the
complaint and also plead affirmatively that Atlas had remedied the work rule violations.
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and Atlas, I make the following

1 All dates are in 2010, unless otherwise indicated.
2 In its answer Atlas did not admit service of the charges, but it did not object to the
introduction into evidence of the formal papers and those papers show the charges were served
as alleged in the complaint.
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Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction
Atlas, a corporation, is engaged in the business of third party logistics warehousing at its
facility in Tolleson, Arizona, where it annually purchases and receives goods valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from points outside Arizona. Atlas admits and I find that it is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the
Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
A. Background
Atlas operates a warehouse of about 1.3 million square feet that houses goods and
products sold by Fry’s Food Stores. Atlas employs about 600 persons at that facility. Levi Abel
is general manager of the facility and is in overall charge of operations. At times material to this
case Tyler Biggs was supervisor of the freezer, deli, and meat department.
The Union represents the warehouse employees. Apparently the Union called a strike
against Atlas in 1999. Since that time relations between the Union and Atlas have generally
been amicable. They have been parties to successive collective-bargaining agreements and,
for the most part, they settle grievances before arbitration. Joshua Graves works for Atlas as a
reach driver. Graves is also a union steward. The perception is that Graves has filed more
grievances than other union stewards. Graves also filed an earlier charge with Region 28. That
charge was deferred to the grievance-arbitration procedure. Graves later withdrew the charge
after Atlas assured Graves that the matters alleged in the charge would not occur again.
B. Credibility Observations
The General Counsel presented the testimony from Graves, Carlos Lamadrid,
Richard Colley, David Gan, and Joseph Gaona. All were still employed by Atlas at the time they
testified. The last four were long-term employees, having worked for Atlas for 18, 15, 5, and
9 years, respectively. In addition, the General Counsel presented the testimony of
Frank Mendoza, president of the Union. All these witnesses impressed me as credibly
attempting to relate the facts as they knew them. All gave testimony concerning statements
made by Biggs. Importantly, Atlas did not call Biggs to rebut their testimony. I infer that Biggs’
testimony would not have been helpful to Atlas’ case. I therefore generally credit the testimony
of the General Counsel’s witnesses. These witnesses generally corroborated each other. To
the extent there are differences in the testimony, I credit Graves’ testimony. Based on my
observation of the relative demeanor of the witnesses, I conclude that Graves was the most
likely to remember and relate the details of the conversations he had with Biggs and others. In
its brief Atlas challenges the credibility of these witnesses, but its arguments might have been
more persuasive had it presented Biggs as a witness, permitted him to be cross-examined, and
allowed me to assess his credibility.
Both the General Counsel and Atlas presented testimony from Levi Abel, Atlas’ general
manager. I conclude that his testimony was also credible and largely uncontradicted; I rely on it,
especially for background matters. Finally, Atlas presented the testimony of Andrew Marshall,
the Union’s secretary treasurer. Although Marshall did not present evidence that concerned the
core issues in this case, he did provide background information that I conclude is credible.
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C. Alleged Unlawful Statements
The complaint alleges on about May 24 that Atlas, through Biggs, unlawfully disparaged
the Union and union representatives. By way of background, Atlas has a policy of having
employees who commit certain errors undergo retraining for a week. A consequence of this is
that the employee is not eligible for incentive pay for that week. And, in order to get the
incentive pay back the following week, the employee has to reach 100 percent production with
no errors during that retraining week. On May 24, Graves was summoned to the office of his
supervisor, Scott Bryden; Biggs was also present in the office. After Graves inquired why he
was summoned, Bryden gave him a retraining week write-up. Graves then requested the
presence of a union steward. Bryden then summoned Carlos Lamadrid, another steward, to his
office. After Lamadrid arrived, he and Graves discussed the write-up. Biggs then said that it
was pretty sad when a union steward needs another union steward to represent him. Graves
replied that he just wanted to make sure that they followed the contract. Biggs replied that all
Graves did was represent liars. Biggs walked away; Graves signed the write-up and then
returned to work. About a week or two earlier, Graves had filed a grievance on behalf of an
employee who had allegedly asked for Graves to represent him but was denied that request.
Analysis
An employer’s disparagement of a union or its officials alone does not violate the Act;
rather the disparagement must be sufficiently serious to reasonably interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. Sears, Roebuck, and Co., 305 NLRB
193 (1991). For example, in Trailmobile Trailer, LLC, 343 NLRB 95 (2006), the Board held:
1. The judge found, inter alia, that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
making various statements to union supporters and officials that were degrading and
demeaning. Contrary to the judge, we find that these statements were not unlawful.
The record establishes that on October 14, 1999, the Respondent’s
manufacturing manager, Michael Thornton, approached a group of employees engaged
in handbilling and remarked that he could teach monkeys to weld, and that he could
replace all the painters within 10 minutes. In addition, Thorton told employee Jerry
Hardin that people in the Union were stupid, and Thorton told Union Steward James
Baker that the Union was “using” him, and that Union Representative Ronnie Crider was
“worthless and no good.” Thereafter, in mid-November, as Union Steward Verna
Haggins delivered grievance documents to Human Resources Manager Rick Sparks,
Sparks asked Haggins if she was International Representative Crider’s “messenger
boy,” and commented that he hoped that she was not doing something “underhanded.”
Sparks then asked Union Steward Lisa Fry, who was also present with Haggins, if she
was present because Haggins needed a bodyguard. Further, in December, about a
week before the election, Sparks commented in front of a group of employees that “fat
ass Ronnie Crider [was] living it up at the Holiday Inn on the employees’ dues.”
The judge found that these statements violated Section 8(a)(1) because they
were demeaning and conveyed the impression that the employees’ union activities were
futile. We disagree.
It is well settled that the Act countenances a significant degree of vituperative
speech in the heat of labor relations. Indeed, “[w]ords of disparagement alone
concerning a union or its officials are insufficient for finding a violation of Section
8(a)(1).” Sears, Roebuck & Co., 305 NLRB 193 (1991). Rather, “flip and intemperate”
remarks that are mere expressions of personal opinion are protected by the free speech
provisions of Section 8(c) of the Act. Id. Here, the comments of Thornton and Sparks,
while disparaging, did not suggest that the employees’ union activity was futile, did not
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reasonably convey any explicit or implicit threats, and did not constitute harassment that
would reasonably tend to interfere with employees’ Section 7 rights.4
________________________________________
4 In support of his finding that Thornton’s demeaning comments violated Sec. 8(a)(1),
the judge noted that in Bonanza Sirloin Pit, 275 NLRB 310, 311, 314 (1985), the Board
found that a supervisor’s reference to a union employee as a “piece of shit” violated Sec.
8(a)(1). The judge failed to note, however, that the supervisor’s comment in Bonanza
was immediately followed by an additional comment in which he vowed to get rid of that
employee. Here, Thornton’s comments were not made together with any threats to
terminate employees for their union activity, and accordingly are distinguishable from the
comment at issue in Bonanza.
The General Counsel cites Domsey Trading Corp., 310 NLRB 777, 793 (1993), but in that case
the derogatory comments were so severe that employees could reasonably seek to avoid them
by restricting their union activity.3 Nonetheless, that case does indicate that I should examine
the nature of the disparagement not in isolation but in its cumulative effect.
Biggs’ remarks on May 24 belittled Graves’ effort to seek union assistance in handling
the discipline he had been given. Biggs’ comments also indicated that he felt that employees
who sought Graves’ assistance were liars. Remember Biggs is a supervisor; employees could
reasonably wonder whether these harsh words would translate into subtle actions against them.
These were not comments of general disparagement about a union or union supporters; rather
they were directed at the exercise of the Section 7 right to have union assistance and therefore
may have a reasonably tendency to interfere with those rights. The Board, however, has not
made such a distinction. Rogers Electric, Inc., 346 NLRB 308 (2006). The cases cited above
compel the dismissal of this allegation.
Next, the complaint alleges that on about July 24, Biggs again unlawfully disparaged the
Union and its representatives, threatened employees by telling them that it would be futile for
them to seek to enforce the collective-bargaining agreement, and threatened employees with
unspecified reprisals if they attempted to require Atlas to comply with the terms of the collective-
bargaining agreement. On that day Graves was standing near the timeclock waiting to clock in.
Biggs was also in the area speaking with employee Richard Colley. Colley was complaining to
Biggs about a matter that was depressing his production level—and compensation. Biggs
replied that there was nothing he could do so Colley told Biggs “Don’t make me get my shop
steward.” Biggs replied “You don’t have any good shop stewards and your shop steward can’t
do anything.” Colley answered that they had plenty of good stewards. Biggs then looked at
Graves and then said “Hey, what’s up Josh.” Biggs then raised his hand and shook it, saying
that he shakes hands every time Graves came to his office. Later that same day some
employees complained to Graves that they were unfairly denied the opportunity to leave work
early; Atlas allows employees to do so when work loads are less than expected. So Graves
went to Biggs’ office and asked Biggs if there would be any early outs on that shift. Biggs
answered that there would not be, that he would give all the early outs to the next shift. Graves
asked that the early outs be split between the shifts so that the first shift employees would not
feel like they were getting screwed. Graves pointed out to Biggs that in the past they had let
floaters go home early before the full-time employees but the Union had protested that practice
and Atlas had then agreed to use seniority in deciding who was allowed to leave work early.
Biggs replied that he was going to let all the floaters go home and then tell the employees that it

3 In his brief the General Counsel quotes from the judge’s decision in Perth Amboy Hospital,
279 NLRB 52 (1986), but incorrectly attributes those remarks to the Board. In fact, the Board
expressly disavowed those comments and supplied its own rationale. Id, at 52, fn. 2.
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was their steward’s idea to do so. Graves answered that they had already solved that problem.
Biggs then said that he would only get another slap on the wrist (if he did so). Graves said that
if he had to go over Biggs’ head to make the slap a little harder that’s what he would do. Graves
returned to work after they exchanged more words. A few days later Graves raised this incident
with Abel.
During July 24 conversations Biggs disparaged the nature of the representation that the
Union provided to employees by telling Colley that there were not any good shop stewards. But
Biggs also indicated the futility of seeking the assistance of a union steward by saying that the
stewards could not do anything. Biggs heightened the sense of futility by repeating the mantra
that he could do as he pleased because he would only get a “slap on the wrist” from his
superiors. These statements went beyond merely making derogatory comments about the
Union or Graves; they threatened that the union activity on the part of employees to rectify
perceived wrongs in their working conditions would be futile. Atlas argues that Board law
requires proof of antiunion animus and that this element is missing in this case. Atlas is
incorrect on both points. The test in cases such as this is whether, under all the circumstances,
the conduct reasonably tends to interfere with the free exercise of the rights of employees under
Section 7. American Freightways Co., 124 NLRB 146, 147 (1959). While it is true that the
Union and Atlas have a mature collective-bargaining relationship at the higher levels of their
organizations, the same is not true at the frontline supervisory level, at least concerning Biggs.
Rather, the record conclusively shows Biggs’ animus towards the Union and toward the
exercise of rights accorded to employees under the law. And Atlas, at a minimum, tolerated
Biggs’ conduct. By denigrating the Union in a manner that impugns the Union’s
representational abilities and threatens that continued representation by the Union will be futile,
Atlas violated Section 8(a)(1). Regency House of Wallingford, 356 NLRB No. 86, slip op. at 5–6
(2011). The General Counsel also argues that Biggs’ comment that he would let the floaters
leave earlier and blame it on Graves was unlawful because:
A statement such as this threatens to turn employees against each other is extremely
coercive. Graves takes his position as shop steward very seriously, not only to for his
fellow employees but to enforce the Agreement. Here, [Atlas] is giving Graves a
choice—either he can enforce the Agreement and be retaliated against by the very same
people he is looking out for, or he can allow [Atlas] to ignore the Agreement and do as it
wishes. The totality of the circumstances in this case makes it obvious that [Atlas] is
threatening to use the Agreement as a weapon to cause strife between the employees
and Graves.
However, Biggs’ comments were the type of disparagement that the Board has held are lawful.
Trailmobile Trailer, supra. I dismiss this portion of the allegation in the complaint.
Continuing, the complaint alleges that on about August 24, Biggs threatened employees
with unspecified reprisals because they engaged in union activities. On that day the Union’s
engineer was at the facility to do a time study to ascertain the accuracy of the labor standards
set for employees by Atlas; Graves accompanied the engineer during portions of that time
study. Atlas did not pay Graves for the time he accompanied the engineers; instead the Union
paid him for that time. Among those also present were Atlas’ engineer and Frank Mendoza, the
Union’s business agent. The day before, August 23, Mendoza and Abel met to discuss the
impending time study; they agreed that Graves would participate in the time study process in
the reach area and other employees would participate in other areas of the warehouse.
However, they inadvertently omitted to designate anyone for the freezer area.
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During the time study Graves noticed a broken case on the floor and he told the reach
driver to pick it up. Atlas’ engineer objected to Graves’ instruction. Graves answered that if
they were going to do a time study, they should do an accurate one. Graves explained that it
was part of the job of a reach driver to remove the case: it was in their training packet and if a
supervisor would have walked by the supervisor would have instructed the reach driver to
remove it. Atlas’ engineer appeared upset by this interaction; he left the group and made a
telephone call. A few minutes later Biggs appeared and told Graves that he had 10 minutes to
clock in and get back to work. By this time they had completed the time study for the reach area
(Graves’ designated area) and were about to start on the freezer area. At this point Mendoza
told Biggs that Graves would continue to participate in the time study and would not be returning
to work. Graves and Mendoza went to the breakroom; the Union’s engineer was already there
as were all the order selecting employees. The employees, who were on their break, were
asking questions about the time study. Biggs then walked in and again told Graves that he had
10 minutes to clock in and get to work or there was going to be problems. Mendoza again
intervened and told Biggs that Graves was being paid by the Union and that Biggs should leave
Graves alone. Biggs again left. Mathew Hacker, a manager for Atlas, then arrived and he and
Mendoza spoke outside the breakroom. Abel then joined them. Mendoza explained the
situation and Abel said that Graves was not going to continue with the time study process as it
was moving into the freezer area and Graves was only supposed to do the reach area.
Mendoza asked why Graves could not continue into the freezer area; Abel responded that
Graves just could not do it, that he did not want it to look to the other employees like Graves
was getting his way. Abel said that Graves had to get back to work, but that Graves could do it
the following day. Mendoza protested that the next day was Graves’ day off, but Abel remained
adamant. Mendoza then came in the breakroom and informed Graves that he had to go back to
work and Graves did so. Graves came in the next day and completed the time study process.
On August 24 Biggs told Graves that there would be consequences if he did not stop
assisting the Union and return to work. Keep in mind that Graves was not on working time;
rather, he was being paid by the Union. And Atlas presented no evidence that there were
production related reasons why it was necessary for Graves to resume working rather than
continuing to assist the Union. In short, this was a threat to take action against Graves if he did
not stop engaging in union activity. Bay Area Los Angeles Examiner, 275 NLRB 1063, 1081
(1985). By threatening to take action against an employee if he continued to engage in union
activity, Atlas violated Section 8(a)(1).
D. Work Rule Allegations
The complaint alleges that certain work rules maintained by Atlas are unlawful.4 Since
on or about April 10, 2010, and prior thereto, Atlas has maintained the following work rules:
The following are examples of actions that the Company feels would necessitate
disciplinary measures up to or including termination. However, the Company reserves
the right to determine the appropriate level of discipline for any action, based upon the
individual circumstances.
The following are offenses that will normally result in immediate termination on the first
offense.

4 The General Counsel motion to withdraw allegations 5(b) and (d) from the complaint is
granted. There is no evidence in the record to support those allegations.
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Group I Rule 14: Possession of classified Company information without authorization or
revealing confidential information about the Company to unauthorized persons, or
removal of such information from the warehouse.
On or about November 12, 2010, Atlas promulgated, and since then has maintained, the
following work rule:
The following are examples of actions that the Company feels would necessitate
disciplinary measures up to or including termination. However, the Company reserves
the right to determine the appropriate level of discipline for any action, based upon the
individual circumstances.
The following are offenses that will normally result in immediate termination on the first
offense.
Group I Rule 14. Possession of classified Company information without authorization or
revealing confidential information about the Company to unauthorized persons, or
removal of such information from the warehouse. Information considered to be
confidential under this work rule includes customer lists and other information
concerning our customers, bid amounts, marketing strategies, financial information (such
as profits and losses), labor standards information, research and development
strategies, pending projects and proposals and employee medical information.
Since on or about April 10, 2010, Atlas has maintained the following work rule:
The following are examples which normally result in disciplinary action, but may lead to
immediate termination. In certain situations, however, depending upon all the
circumstances, the Company retains the sole right to determine whether immediate
termination is necessary.
Group II Rule 21: Entering or remaining on plant premises when not scheduled for work
or when not on Company-related business.
On December 20, 2010, Atlas revised these work rules. This time it did so in a manner
the General Counsel concedes does not violate the Act. At the same time Atlas posted the
following notice on its bulletin boards:
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO:
 Form, join, or assist a union;
 Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf;
 Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection; and
 Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these rights. More particularly:
WE WILL NOT promulgate or maintain Written Work rules prohibiting you from:
(1) Discussing wages, hours and working conditions. We will continue to have a
work rule that prohibits you from possessing classified Company information
without authorization or revealing confidential information about the
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Company, that does not relate to wages, hours and working conditions, to
unauthorized persons, or removal of such information from the workplace.
(2) Entering or remaining on plant premises when not scheduled to work or when
not on Company related business. We will continue to have a work rule that
prohibits you from entering or remaining in the interior of the warehouse or
other work areas when not scheduled for work; or
(3) Conducting personal business during breaks or meal times. We will continue
to have a work rule that prohibits you from conducting personal business
during working time of any employee. “Working time” does not include
breaks or meal times.
WE WILL rescind and give no effect to the rules described above, and WE WILL post
the revised Written Work Rules that do not contain the unlawful rules, and provide the
language of the lawful rules.
ATLAS LOGISTICS GROUP
RETAIL SERVICES (PHOENIX)
LLC
The notice was dated and signed by Levi Abel as General Manager.
Atlas argues that it has effectively remedied the allegations in the complaint concerning
the work rules. I agree. Passavant Memorial Area Hospital, 237 NLRB 138 (1978). Atlas
revised its rules so that they now comply with the Act and it properly notified the employees that
it had done so and assured them of their rights under the Act as they pertained to the rules.
The General Counsel argues that Atlas’ remedial action was not timely. It is true that the
allegedly unlawful rules were maintained for a long period of time. But I note that there is no
evidence that the rules were ever enforced. And the challenge to their legality was first brought
to Atlas’ attention in the first amended charge filed in this case by Graves on November 29.
Taking into account the task of revising the rules, publishing the revised rules, and posting the
notice, Atlas’ remedial action was reasonably prompt. The General Counsel also contends that
the remedial action did not occur in a context free of unremedied unfair labor practices. While
this is true it is not dispositive. The unremedied unfair labor practices described above are
entirely unrelated to the work rules at issue. They are not of a nature that would tend to
undermine the assurances that Atlas gave to employees concerning the work rules. Employers
should be encouraged to undertake voluntary remedial action of the type that Atlas has taken in
this case. Accordingly, I dismiss these allegations of the complaint.
Conclusions of Law
Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act by
1. Denigrating the Union in a manner that impugns the Union’s representational abilities
and threatens that continued representation by the Union will be futile.
2. Threatening to take action against an employee if he continued to engage in union
activity.
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Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended5
ORDER
The Respondent, Atlas Logistics Group Retail Services (Phoenix) LLC, OF Tolleson,
Arizona, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Denigrating the Union in a manner that impugns the Union’s representational
abilities and threatens that continued representation by the Union will be futile.
(b) Threatening to take action against employees if they continue to engage in union
activity.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Tolleson, Arizona,
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”6 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 28, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice
to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since
July 24.

5 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
6 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the
notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
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(b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a
sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the
steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. February 22, 2011
____________________
William G. Kocol
Administrative Law Judge
JD(SF)-05-11
Tolleson, AZ
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to
post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT denigrate the Union in a manner that impugns the Union’s representational abilities and
threatens that continued representation by the Union will be futile.
WE WILL NOT threaten to take action against employees if they continue to engage in union activity.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
Atlas Logistics Group Retail Services (Phoenix) LLC
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor Relations
Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it investigates and
remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a
charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may
also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
2600 North Central Avenue, Suite 1800
Phoenix, Arizona 85004-3099
Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
602-640-2160.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT
BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE
OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE
OFFICER, 602-640-2146.