Atlantic Creosoting Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 14, 1979

242 N.L.R.B. 192 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL. LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Atlantic Creosoting Company, Inc. and United Steel-
workers of America, AFL-CIO. Case 10-CA-12436
May 14, 1979
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, MURPIIY, AND TRUESDALE
On October 7, 1977, Administrative Law Judge
Robert Cohn issued the attached Decision in this pro-
ceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and
a supporting brief and a motion to reopen the record
and receive additional evidence, and the General
Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief and a
response to Respondent's motion to reopen the record
and receive additional evidence.'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge, as
modified below, and to adopt his recommended Or-
der.2 as modified herein.
We agree with the Administrative Law Judge that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act by conditioning reinstatement of economic strik-
ers upon their execution of work application forms
and by placing a time limitation upon their applica-
tions,3 and violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by tak-
ing such action without notification to or consultation
with the Union.4 However, as set forth below, we do
not adopt the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion
that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
Respondent has moved to reopen the record and receive additional evi-
dence for the purpose of explicating the status of employee Prince Jackson.
Jr. However, inasmuch as we have found, as fully set forth below, that the
issue of whether Respondent unlawfully refused to reinstate employee Jack-
son was not timely raised or fully litigated, we deny Respondent's motion.
2 In his recommended Order, the Administrative L.aw Judge uses the nar-
row cease-and-desist language. "in any like or related manner." Respondent
here has committed violations which go to the very heart of the Act. We
shall, therefore, require Respondent to cease and desist from in any other
manner infringing upon the rights guaranteed employees by Sec. 7 of the
Act. N.L.R.B. v. Entwirtle Mfg. Co. 120 F.2d 535. 536 (4th Cir. 1941):
Electrical Filings Corporation a subsidiary of I-T-E Imperial Corporation.
216 NLRB 1076 (1975),
On November 17 and 18. 1976, Respondent hired replacements for the
strikers. The Administrative Law Judge found, and we agree. that the re-
placements were permanent and that Respondent did not violate the Act by
replacing the strikers prior to their unconditional offer to return to work.
4 Although the Administrative Law Judge cited no precedent for the find-
ing that by this conduct Respondent violated Sec. 8(aS) of the Act. we note
that the Board has held that the imposition of notification and registration
requirements on former strikers constitutes a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing. Food Service Company, 202 NLRB 790. 804 (1973) There is an obliga-
tion to bargain even with regard to the unilateral and unlawful implementa-
tion of changes in employment conditions. Aero-Motive Manufacturing
Company, 195 NLRB 790, 792 (1972).
the Act by failing and refusing to reinstate employee
Prince Jackson, Jr., on November 22. 1976.5
Respondent has excepted to the finding that the
failure to reinstate Jackson was unlawful, contending,
inter alia, that there was no allegation, either in the
complaint or at the hearing, that the status of any
individual employee presented a unique issue: coun-
sel for the General Counsel raised Jackson's status as
an issue for the first time in his posthearing brief to
the Administrative Law Judge: the issue, accordingly.
has not been fully and fairly litigated by the parties
nor timely raised; and the Administrative Law
Judge's reliance on Los Angeles Chemical Compan,
204 NLRB 245 (1973), in finding this additional vio-
lation, is misplaced. We find merit in Respondent's
contentions.
On October 1. 1976, approximately 63 bargaining
unit employees commenced an economic strike which
lasted until November 22, 1976, when, as the Admin-
istrative Law Judge found, the strikers made uncondi-
tional offers to return to work. Prior to the strike,
Jackson and employee Abraham Moran cleaned the
office, mowed the grass, and raked leaves. Jackson
honored the picket line, while Moran did not.
As Respondent contends, there was no allegation
in the complaint. and no amendment to the com-
plaint at the hearing, that would put Respondent on
notice that there was a separate issue regarding the
reinstatement of Jackson or any other individual
striker.6 Indeed, the only discussion involving Jackson
at the hearing was the following exchange between
counsel for the General Counsel and Respondent's
plant manager, Steyaart:7
Q. Do you know a man named Mr. Prince
Jackson?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Why hasn't Mr. Jackson been reinstated?
A. We discovered that Mr. Abraham Moran,
Respondent's motion to reopen the record states that Jackson was rein-
stated to a laborer's position at a date subsequent to the hearing herein arid
prior to issuance of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision.
I It is true, as our dissenting colleague points out. that Jackson was one Af
the strikers named n the complaint However, as we have emphasized. there
was nothing raised in the complaint or at the hearing that would have pat
Respondent on notice that there was a peculiar or unique issue as to the
reinstatement of any striker. including Jackson.
It is clear from Steyaart's testimony that the considerlionv which nra'i-
iated Respondent not to reinstate Jackson were discovered during the strike.
And it was on this fact that the Administrative L.aw Judge based his conclu-
sion (albeit erroneous) that such failure was unlawful. Our dissenting cl-
league states that Steyaart testified that Moran "performed the work n r-
mally done by Jackson." and finds this contradictory of subsequent
testimony to the effect that during the strike Moran perfiormed janitorial
duties at a Respondent-owned facility away from the struck site. However.
Steyaart merely stated that Respondent discovered. during the strike. that
Moran "was able to do both jobs." While Steyaart did not speclly how tie
discover) was made, the fact hat Moran was performing his janitoral duties
at a different location in no way precluded Respondent from concluding that
Moran could alone perform the tasks pre iousl) assigned to two individuals.
242 NLRB No. 35
192
ATLANTIC CREOSOTING COMPANY. INC.
who is I believe a porter, was able to do both
jobs.
Q. When did you discover this?
A. I believe it was during the strike, sir.
Q. What type of work were Mr. Moran and
Prince Jackson doing?
A. They clean up the office, rake the leaves,
mow the grass.
Q. Assuming that the employees hadn't gone
on strike, Mr. Moran and Mr. Jackson would be
working today? You would have had the two
men working doing this type of work?
A. That's an assumption, sir. Probably yes.
In his brief to the Administrative Law Judge, the
General Counsel urged for the first time in this pro-
ceeding that there was a separate issue as to Jackson
and that Jackson was entitled to reinstatement. The
Administrative Law Judge concluded that, because
the consolidation of the preelection duties of Jackson
and Moran was "based primarily on considerations
resulting from the strike" (citing Los Angeles Chemi-
cal Company, supra), Jackson was entitled to rein-
statement as of November 22, 1976. The Administra-
tive Law Judge accordingly concluded that
Respondent's failure to reinstate Jackson on that date
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. Even if we
were to reach the merits, we would find insufficient
evidence to support the violation.
In effect, the Administrative Law Judge concluded
that Jackson was unlawfully denied reinstatement be-
cause Respondent discovered during the strike that
employee Moran could perform the duties formerly
performed by Moran and Jackson, and that Respon-
dent's subsequent refusal, for that reason, to reinstate
Jackson at the end of the strike was, therefore, be-
cause Jackson went on strike. However, this is falla-
cious post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning. That Jack-
son's absence was due to a strike, rather than illness,
vacation, or some other cause, does not by itself lead
to a conclusion that Respondent's failure to reinstate
Jackson was unlawfully motivated.' The mere fact
that Respondent then discovered that one man could
do the work formerly done by two and, as a result,
combined the duties of the two men, thereby elimi-
nating Jackson's former position, does not, absent
evidence of unlawful motivation, afford sufficient ba-
sis for a finding that Respondent's refusal to reinstate
I As we point out below, Jackson's absence was the occasion for Respon-
dent's discovery that one employee could do the work of two. That such
occasion was due to employees' (including Jackson's) concerted activities
does not necessarily lead to a conclusion that Respondent's subsequent fail-
ure to reinstate Jackson was in retaliation for his participation in the strike.
With regard to Jackson, the Administrative Law Judge essentially found
only that, as a matter of law, the reason asserted would not serve as a defense
because it was based on "considerations resulting from the strike." Accord-
ingly, the crucial element of unlawful motivation neither has been explicity
found nor can be inferred from Respondent's conduct.
Jackson violated the Act. Certainly Respondent's
conduct with respect to Jackson does not carry with it
its own indicia of improper intent or warrant an infer-
ence that it was directed against Jackson because of
his union or strike activity. In this regard, we note
that the Administrative Law Judge found that the
General Counsel failed to establish that Respondent,
in replacing the strikers generally, was acting pursu-
ant to an unlawful plan to defeat the strikers' rights to
immediate reinstatement. Instead, as the Administra-
tive Law Judge found, Respondent "lawfully replaced
the economic strikers prior to their making an uncon-
ditional offer to return to work." And, with regard to
Jackson, the Administrative Law Judge made no
finding that Respondent's conduct was either unlaw-
fully motivated or that Jackson was treated dispa-
rately. In fact, the Administrative Law Judge did not
question the bonafides of Respondent's asserted busi-
ness justification for consolidating the duties of Mor-
an and Jackson.9
As has been noted, the Administrative Law Judge
found, and our dissenting colleague apparently
agrees, that Respondent, without unlawful motive,
permanently replaced approximately 62 striking em-
ployees with 80 laborers. The employees thus lawfully
replaced had occupied a variety of "job classifica-
tions" including, inter alia, sling crane operator, bore-
man, treating engineer, etc. The replacements, who
had been hired as laborers, were then trained to per-
form the jobs to which they were assigned.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Jackson
was in a "clean-up office" classification. In fact, Jack-
son's job classification is listed on Respondent's se-
niority list as "janitor." Respondent contends, how-
9 In these circumstances, the Administrative Law Judge's reliance on Los
Angeles Chemical Compani is misplaced. There the Board's finding of a vio-
lation turned on the fact that the respondent had not "sustained its burden of
proof of showing that [the] job had been eliminated." Here, there has been
no finding that Respondent failed to meet its burden of coming forward with
economic or businessjustifications for its failure to reinstate Jackson. Rather,
as we have noted, the Administrative Law Judge apparently credited Re-
spondent's reasons but found them unacceptable because they were discov-
ered during the strike. However, if an employer, attempting during a strike to
maximize its chances for economic survival by increasing its operating effi-
ciency, experiments with different staffing patterns and finds that certain
positions can be eliminated by redistrbuting the job functions previously
performed by striking employees, the employer's subsequent refusal. on that
basis, to reinstate a former striker to his or her former (and now nonexistent)
position would not be unlawful.
The Board so found in Pillows of California, 207 NLRB 369 (1973). Fur-
thermore. in N.L.R. B v, Fleetvood Trailer Company, Inc., 389 U.S. 375, 3,9
(1967). the Court noted that, while it did not consider such a defense in that
case because it was not presented by the facts, the Board had argued that
acceptable "legitimate and substantial business justifications" would exist
"when the striker's job had been eliminated for substantial and bona fide
reasons other than considerations relating to labor relations: for example.
'the need to adapt to changes in business conditions or to improve effi.
ciency.'" (Emphasis supplied.) Similarly, for economic reasons, an employer
leaves vacant a striker's position and fails to recall a striker to fill that posi-
tion, there is no discrimination. See Kenned & Cohen of Georgia. Inc., 218
NLRB 1175, 1176 (1975).
193
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ever, that prior to the strike, Jackson was a laborer'0
receiving laborer's pay, and that his janitorial duties
were encompassed within the contractual "laborer"
classification. The record is devoid of contrary evi-
dence. Our colleague observes that Jackson was not
included in the "laborer" classification on Respon-
dent's seniority list, and states that, inasmuch as all
replacements were hired as laborers, no replacement
for Jackson was ever hired by Respondent. Since no
one contends that Respondent did hire a replacement
for Jackson, we are perplexed by our colleague's ar-
gument in this regard. Rather, Respondent has simply
contended that Jackson's position was eliminated
during the strike. Furthermore, since the jobs of all
replaced strikers were filled by laborers, Jackson's
prestrike job classification is immaterial.
Our colleague would find, based primarily on bur-
den of proof considerations, that Respondent's failure
to reinstate Jackson violated Section 8(a)(3) and (I).
In the circumstances here, this amounts to an asser-
tion that, while Respondent's refusal to reinstate 62
strikers was lawful, its refusal to reinstate 1, Prince
Jackson, Jr., violated the Act. In other words our col-
league would find that, while Respondent has rebut-
ted any presumption of unlawful motive with regard
to its failure to reinstate the vast majority of strikers,
Respondent's failure to reinstate Jackson should be
presumed to be unlawfully motivated."
This strikes us as nonsensical, especially in view of
the total absence of evidence indicating that Jackson
had given his employer any reason to treat him differ-
ently from other employees. Prince Jackson was not,
apparently, an active or vocal union member. From
the record, the most that can be assumed is that he
merely went on strike with the other employees.
Moreover, as the Administrative Law Judge found,
Respondent lawfully hired "surplus" laborers in ex-
pectation of an initially high attrition rate. Presum-
ably, if Respondent had wished for any reason (e.g.,
to have necessary work performed or to avoid an un-
fair labor practice allegation) to fill Jackson's former
position with one of these laborers, it could have done
so. That it did not lends credence to the reason it
advanced for failing to reinstate Jackson. Thus, the
total circumstances of this case rebut any inference
0 Plant Manager Steyaart testified, without contradiction, that "laborer"
was a job classification under Respondent's expired collective-bargaining
agreement with the Union, and that laborers are "fairly statically assigned"
but are also transferred to other jobs as needed.
1I Moreover, as noted, Respondent's explanation of its reason for not rein-
stating Jackson, while brief, was neither controverted nor discredited. How-
ever, while our colleague has cast his dissent in different terms (i.e., burden of
proof) from those of the Administrative Law Judge, he has fallen into the
same post hoc fallacy by his agreement with the Administrative Law Judge
that Respondent unlawfully failed to reinstate Jackson after the strike be-
cause of considerations related to the stnke.
that unlawful motive played a part in Respondent's
decision not to reinstate Jackson.' 2
Accordingly, we find that there is insufficent evi-
dence to warrant consideration of Jackson's status
apart from that of any other striker, and we agree
with Respondent that the issue of Jackson's particular
reinstatement rights has not been timely raised or
fully and fairly litigated. However, on the state of the
present record, were we to make a finding on this
issue, we would find that Respondent's failure to rein-
state Jackson on November 22 was due to valid eco-
monic reasons. Accordingly, we do not adopt the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge's finding that the failure to
reinstate Jackson on that date violated Section 8(a)( 1)
and (3) of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or-
der of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified be-
low, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Atlantic
Creosoting Company, Inc., Savannah, Georgia, its of-
ficers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so
modified:
I. Substitute the following for paragraph (d):
"(d) In any other manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act."
2. Delete paragraphs 2(a) and (b) and reletter the
subsequent paragraphs accordingly.
3. Substitute the attached notice fr that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
MEMBER JENKINS, dissenting in part:
I join in all my colleagues' findings except their
failure to adopt the Administrative Law Judge's find-
ing that Respondent unlawfully refused to reinstate
employee Prince Jackson, Jr., on November 22, 1976,
in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
Ineed, I am perplexed by their enigmatic conclusion
that the issue of Jackson's reinstatement rights has
not been fully or fairly litigated or timely raised.
The reinstatement rights of unreplaced economic
strikers are controlled by the principles stated by the
12 Since, as pointed out in In. 9, supra, the Board has found that a refusal
to reinstate a striker ior "legitimate and substantial business justifications,"
i.e., economic, is lawful; Respondent claims it did not reinstate Jackson for
economic reasons;: and as evidence adduced on this issue supports its claim
of economic justification, we are puzzled by the dissent's argument that Re-
spondent's motive as to Jackson is "irrelevant." In these circumstances, any
presumption of illegality which may have existed with respect to Jackson's
situation appears to have been rebutted, and, thus. contrary to the dissent,
absent an unlawful motive, the mere fact that Jackson was not reinstated
though not replaced is insufficient to establish a violation.
194
ATLANrTIC CRFOSOrTING COMPANY, IN('.
Supreme Court in N... R. B. v. Flctvtoodt Trailer (..
Inc., 389 U.S. 375,. 378 (1967). as follows:
Section 2(3) of the Act . . . provides that an
individual whose work has ceased as a con-
squence of a labor dispute continues to he an
employee if he has not obtained regular and sub-
stantially equivalent employment. If, after con-
clusion of the strike, the employer refuses to rein-
state striking employees, the effect is to
discourage employees from exercising their
rights to organize and to strike guaranteed b § 7
and 13 of the Act ... Under § 8(a)(l) and (3) ...
it is an unfair labor practice to interfere with the
exercise of these rights. Accordingly. Iunless the
employver who refitses to rinstalte .strikers can shol1
that his action was hrie to legitimate anlt suh.sln-
tial huline.ss jlustffication, "he is guio' o'an utlfiir'
labor practice. R. ..I.. . Great Dane Tra 7 iler,
388 U.S. 26. 34 (1967). The rbureent of lroing juv-
tliicaion is on the emplo/over. [Emphasis supplicd.
Thus, the General Counsel establishes a prima i i
case by showing that: (1) the alleged discriminallee
participated in a lawful economic strike, and (2) upon
the employee's unconditional offer to return. the em-
ployer refused to offer the employee reinstatement to
his or her former position or its substantial equiv-
alent. The burden then shifts to the employer to prove
it had legitimate and substantial business justifica-
tions for failing to reinstate the employee. 3
In the instant case. the General Counsel established
a primea liwie case at the outset through the admis-
sions contained in Respondent's answer, and the hur-
den thereafter shifted to Respondent to establish that
it had legitimate and substantial business justitication
for failing to reinstate Jackson. 'Ihis. in opinion. Re-
spondent has failed to do.
Jackson was specifically named in the complaint as
a discriminatee, and the complaint alleged that Jack-
son and other employees engaged in a strike, and
thereafter sought reinstatement, which offer was re-
fused by Respondent. in violation of Section 8(a)(3)
and (I) of the Act. Respondent. in its answer, admit-
ted that the employees named in the complaint, in-
cluding Jackson, were engaged in a strike, and that
the striking employees were not reinstated. Respon-
dent contended, as an affirmative defense, that the
n The majority's statement that the3 find notnsensical" m position that
Respondent's failure to reinstate Jackson should he presumed unlawful is
puzzling. The quotation above from the Supreme ('olirt's opinion in
N. L.R.B. v. Fleeltood Trauetr ('o is clear: an employer who retuses I, rein-
state economic strikers is presumed guilty of in unfair labor practice. It is
the emploser's burden to oercome that presumption Moreoser. m cl-
leagues discussion of Respondent's motiise lor refusing to reinstate Jacksin is
simply immaterial, for it is ell settled. and until noru unquiestioned, that an
emploer's mtie fr failing to reinstate unreplaced econoilmic strikers is
irrelevant The l.adlal ('orporation. 171 N L.RB 1366 (1968, enfd 4 14 1 2d
99 (7th ir 1969). cert denied 397 t:.S 92(1 1970)
strikers were not reinstated for the reason that perma-
nent replacements fr such employees were hired dur-
ing the strike. However. during the hearing Respon-
dent's plant manager. Steyaart, testified that a
nonstriking employee, Moran. performed the work
normally done by Jackson. and Steyaart admitted
that probably Jackson would be working for Respon-
dent if the employees had not gone on strike. 4 Yet.
shortly thereafter. Stevaart further testified that Mor-
an did not even work at Respondent's plant during
the strike, bhut rather was transferred to work at a
tennis club and lodge so he would not have to cross
the picket line. and that only following the strike was
Moran transferred back to the plant. Thus. although
Stevaart testified that he believed it was during the
strike that he discovered that Moran was able to take
over Jackson's job duties as well as his own. he fur-
ther testified that Moran did not even work at Re-
spondent's plant during the strike. This equivocal tes-
timony. without further proof, does not establish that
Respondent had "legitimate and substantial business
justifications" for failing to recall Jackson.' and can-
not overcome the presumption established by the
General ('ounsel's prima 1f4ie case.
Nonetheless, Respondent contends. and the major-
it) finds. that the issue of Jackson's "particular" rein-
statement rights has not been fully or fiirly litigated.
or timely raised. In support of its finding. the majority
states that there was nothing which would put Re-
spondent on notice that there was a "separate issue"
regarding Jackson or an , other indi.idual striker. In
doing so. my colleagues ignore the point that the sole
fact distinguishing .lackson from the other alleged dis-
criminatees is the issue of Respondent's justification
for refusing to rinstate Jackson. an affirmative de-
tense on hich Respondent bears the burden of
proof. .. I.. R. v. heetlrood 7railer Co.. supra: New
Orlear Rosevelt ( orporatlion 132 NLRB 248 ( 1961 ).
Accordingly. it is irrelevant whether the General
Counsel advised Respondent that Jackson presented
any issue different from the other alleged discrimi-
natees. In any event. it was Respondent that refused
to reinstate Jackson and Respondent was therefore in
a better position than the General Counsel to come
forward and explain why it so refusedJ. If it indeed
failed to do so adequately. as the majority apparently
maintains. the inference should run against Respon-
dent's interest, not in its favor.
E qually specious is my colleagues' finding that
Jackson was properly classified as a laborer. rather
1u Ai no time did Respondent contend that Jackson had been replaced h
;Inslilc lother than Mran. including ans ol the permanent replacements
" See Slllril Bwi Sncrti. 11i, 210 NI[RB 63 (19741; Is 4ngele ('hernl-
cal (.ipreii 2(4 NlRB 245 1973).
i See 'i ()rclLIni R,.i..l h (',r[iralii.L. uptri
195
I)ECISIONS OF NA'IONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
than in a "clean-up office" classification as found by
the Administrative Law Judge. This proposition,
which was first advanced in Respondent's "Motion to
Reopen Record and Receive Additional Evidence"
attached to Respondent's exceptions to the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's Decision, is without support in
the record, and indeed contradicts Respondent's own
seniority chart, which Respondent introduced into
evidence at the hearing. That chart, entitled "Senior-
ity List by Job Classification," contains 22 job classi-
fications, including one marked "laborers" and one
marked "clean-up office." Jackson's name appears
under the "clean-up office" classification, with the job
of 'janitor."' 7 The only other employee listed in the
"clean-up office" classification is Moran, whose job
appears as "porter." Additionally, the chart shows
that Jackson had not been replaced as of November
22, 1976, even though the same chart shows that Re-
spondent had hired 16 more laborers than it needed
to replace those laborers who had participated in the
strike. Under these circumstances, I am unable to
conclude, as my colleagues apparently do, that Jack-
son should be included within the "laborer" classifi-
cation.
Thus it is clear that Jackson was not in the "la-
borer" classification and it is therefore undisputed
that no replacement for Jackson was ever hired by
Respondent, inasmuch as all replacements were hired
as laborers and were so classified by Respondent. Ac-
cordingly, I must conclude that, as Respondent never
replaced Jackson, and failed to carry its burden to
show that it had legitimate and substantial business
justification for failing to reinstate him, Respondent
has failed to rebut the prima facie case established by
the General Counsel.
Thus, it is apparent to me that my colleagues have
misconceived the nature of the pleadings, the evi-
dence, and the respective burdens of proof herein.
The violation is clear, and I would affirm the Admin-
istrative Law Judge's finding that Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by refusing to reinstate
Prince Jackson, Jr.
1 My colleagues' assertion that Jackson's job classification is listed on
Respondent's seniority list as "janitor" is incorrect An examination of the
seniority list reveals that Jackson's job classification was "clean-up office."
while his position inside that classfi(ation was "janitor."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPI.OYEF.S
POSTED BY ORDER OF T-IE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Act, as amended, gives
all employees the following rights:
To organize themselves
To form, join, or support unions
To bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing
To engage in concerted activity for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection
To refrain from any and all such activities.
WE WILL NoI discriminate against our em-
ployees because of their activities on behalf of
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or
any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT require our striking employees
to execute any form or document containing a
time limitation on their right to reinstatement as
a condition to their right to reinstatement to
their former jobs or positions.
WE WILL NOT require striking employees to ex-
ecute any document, or otherwise alter the hire
or tenure of employment or conditions of em-
ployment of our employees without notice to and
consultation with United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica, AFL-CIO, as their collective-bargaining
representative.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the ex-
ercise of their rights guaranteed them in Section
7 of the Act.
ATLANTIC CR()OSO()IN(; COMPANY, IN(C.
DECISION
SIA1IMENI OIF 1HE CASE
ROBERT CoolN, Administrative Law Judge: This proceed-
ing, held pursuant to Section 10(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended (herein the Act). was heard at
Savannah. Georgia, on May 4 6. 1977, pursuant to due
notice. The principal issues to be resolved relate to the fail-
ure of Atlantic Creosoting Company, Inc. (herein the Com-
pany or Respondent). to promptly reinstate certain strikers
bollowing an economic strike called by their bargaining rep-
resentative. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO
(herein the Union). Also involved are allegations of certain
unilateral conduct engaged in by Respondent without con-
sultation with the Union. which allegedly constitutes viola-
tions of Section 8(a)(5) and (I) of the Act.'
Following the hearing, helpful posthearing briefs were
filed by counsel for the General Counsel and by counsel for
Respondent. which have been fully considered.
Upon the entire record in the case, including my observa-
tion of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following:
I The original charge was filed November 29. 1976: the complaint issued
on March 16, 1977.
196
A I ANI- I (REOSOlINiG (COMPANY. INC.
I-l\ l)l(;S ,\) ('IIX(I SIt)NS
Il. I (IDt\1\ I I ) t R I tR t'R\( 1( IS
A. 7he F't~ i
At all times material herein. the Respondent has been
engaged in the business of manutfcture and sale of pres-
sure-preserved lorest products on large tract of land near
Savannah. Georgia. For a substantial number of years prior
to the events here in question. the Respondent has been in
contractual relations with the Union as representative of its
production eniployees: the last contract prior to the strike
herein extended from September 1973 until September 2.
1976.1 Prior to the expiration of the aforesaid contract. the
parties engaged in collective-bargaining negotiations but
were unable to reach an agreement. whereupon the Union
called a strike which commenced on October . Substan-
tially all of the emplo)ees in the bargaining unit (whlich
numbered approximately 63) went out on strike: there is no
contention that the strike was other than economic in char-
acter.
The parties continued to negotiate following the strike
but remained unsuccessful in reaching an agreement.
Within several weeks following the October 29 meeting be-
tween the parties, at which time a Federal nediator w.as
unsuccessful in resolving the dispute between them, the
(Company reached a decision to commence hiring replace-
ments fr the strikers.4 To implement this decision. the
Company secured a hiring hall in downtown Savannah and
placed an advertisement in the local new spaper which ap-
peared on Wednesday and Thursday. November 17 and
18.' The Company interviewed and hired approximately 8()
applicants on those 2 days. and then closed the hiring hall.
Also, the Company bused the replacements from Sava;nnah
to its plant some 8 miles away on Thursday and Friday.
November 18 and 19. as well as on Mondal. November 22.
and for some period of time thereafter.
2 There is no issue as to the Board'sjurisdiclion or the status of the Charg-
ing Union as a labor organizatiln. The complaint alleges sufficienl facts
respecting direct utflow of gooids from the State of Georgia. which are
admitted by answer, and upon which I may. and do hereh,. find that the
Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec. 26) and (71
of the Act. It is a l alleged. and admitted. that the L nmon is a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the ct.
All dales hereinafter refer to the calendar year 1976. unless otherwise
indicated.
4 Prior to this point. the Comrany had made no determined eflrt to hire
replacements. It had remained in operation through the work of super isors
and a few strikers who had drifted back to work. The record also shows that
the Company had shifled some of its production to another location in Geor-
gia.
The advertisement read as follows:
JOBS A 11It lN I
Immediate emplosment with local
manufacturing firm. Appli at 32 Bull
Street hiring office at corner of' Bull
and Congress. 9:00 AM to 5 PM
weekdays Telephone Number
233 5217.
General Mechanics
Diesel Electric Crane Operators
Operators for large fork lilts
Laborers
Other Positions
Meanwhile, on the afternoon of Wednesday, November
17. Union Representative Buckley telephoned Compans
Attorney Lanquist and advised him that the Union wanted
a meeting for the purpose of reaching it contract and eniding
the strike. Lanquist responded that there was no need to
meet unless the Union was willing to alter its position sig-
nificantly. Buckley reiterated that the Union was inlerested
in getting a contract and ending the sItike. and tha it
would he willing to take such measures as would accom-
plish such end.
The parties met on the afternoon of Fridav. November
19. and reached an agreement based upon the Compan,'s
last offer. Buckley' asked Lanquist when he wanted the
strikers to report to work, and l.anquist responded that he
did not know what the Company wanted to, do about the
strikers- he presumed that the (onmpan) ,ouldl be willing
to accord the strikers whate er rights are pro\lided them
under the law. The tollowing day. the union committee no-
tified the strikers that the strike had been ailled ffl and the
picket signs would cotle dlon, and told all of them to re-
port for work the following Monday.
B. 7ie Reini,tat'tctl rS',, liAers
At approximatels 7:30 a.m. (starting time). (on MIondai.
November 22. substantiall all the strikers (except for the
few who had previously returned to work) reported at the
Compan 's gate. They were advised h ait compan guard
that none of them were allowed to come in until a repre-
sentative of the CompanN's management came down to
speak with them. Shortly thereafter. Assistant Plant Mal-
ager Cliett appeared with another Cormpany representatie
and spoke to the strikers who remained outside the gate.
Cliett brought with hinm some forms and advised the strikers
that they were required to complete such fornls so that the
Company would h;ae the names and addresses for the pur-
pose of knowilng how to contact them to come back to
work.? The strikers' spokesman a Mr. England was re-
luctant to have the strikers sign ansthing. at least until it
was learned how many would return to work. Therefore
Cliett contacted the plant manager and subsequentl gave
England the names of seven employees whom Respondent
' The form states as follows:
I herehy appl 5 tor reinslaltement to my tormer posimin wth itlanic
Creosoling (ompan. Port Wen\A orth. Georgia
I ill will nt (check ne) accept anolher position with Ihe ( ,nlrp. l1
if it is offered to me. (I understand that it could be .ia . er pri sig job
than the one I had belfre I
I can he contacled at the Iull,, ing a.ddress
Street
(it. State. Zip (ide
telephone Number,
Signed
It s understd tha; this application ill be consi dered is curren tor
a period of thirty (301 days.
197
I)('ISIONS ()1: NA I'()NAI. IABOR RIi .ATIONS B()ARI)
wished to return to work imnliediatel: howeer. that nunin-
her was all that the ('ormpan ' was prepared to reinstate itl
that time. he strikers refused to sign thie illrm until thex
could meet with [inion Respreseriilatise Buckle . At such
meeting the strikers ere apparently advised to sign the
fori. aiind they subsequentl did so.' The ('ompany's polics
was not to reinstate an)l striker who had not filled out the
fiorn.
TIhe ('omlpan did not hire any replacements subsequent
to Novembher 18. toweser. Plant M;lanager Steyaart testi-
fied that the ('ompan received more applications dlurinig
the 2-day hiring period (November 17 and 18) than the
expected. arid that the) hired approximately 18 more em-
ployees (laborers) than the ompany had positions lor.
This was one. according to Steyaart. because thes ex-
pected some of the newc employees to quit, not be able to
perform the work, or lease because of the existing strike
situation. Steaart ifurther testified that the ('ompan ein-
ploed all striker replacemlents i the general caetegors ofl
"laborei .- and roml this general caltegor the ('ollpall
would select those that thes elt were qualified or rainable
to perfoirm tiasks requiring greater skills.
The record is undlisputed that arin time that ;a striker e-
placement has left the (onilpais's emplo merit since No-
vember 19 for an reason, the openling is filled 'rom the list
of strikers. It is the ('ompa;n's polico that if there arlc sev-
eral strikers ithin a particular categors whonl the ('orn-
pan) seeks to reinstalte and the ('ompanv needs onl onile
such emploee. the mnlst senior miain is selected (assuning
equal pertorlrlltancc).
Stecaart i'irther testified that there had been onl to
strikers wIl, had retutiled to work at jobs palsirig a loer
wage rate thani tIheir rmle jobhs (Jailes I-oster alid Robbie
Jones). All the other strikers returned to their exact liornicr
position uhcll tilhe\ \Cr C\venlltu;ll recalled bh, the ('o11-
pan
All oip;ians oici;lls inlveid i the recruitinelit ot rc-
placements tor the strikers on Novemer r 17 ald 18X testified
that the applicants ere told that the jb io ' which thce
were applying wIs a pcIIrnanenit not a teilpora Prosi-
tion. lowever, the onls strike replacement to tstil; a tlhe
hearing w;as called ais a witness hb the (icera; l (ouLiscel arid
was not interog;lated specificall as to what hie was told i?
managemenllt reprleseltaltics t the tliTle he applied tor and
was hired to slrk lfr the ('olllpan.
Sometimie during Mlarch 1977. the plant malinaer distrih-
uted a forin among the striker replacements then working
for the (orlpany which stated as fillows:
1. . make the fillowing statement reel' and \sol-
Untarilv.
When I ;as hired C h Atlantic ('reosoting ('orlpai'
I Uwa told that I ias hbeing hired as a permiianent em-
pl)elc.
At ito time has anvline told nle that I was lot a
permianent employee anld nothinl has happened which
7 See testlrliiy so tingland h sled iIIha f e.l to the (rlllpian? ind
signed the ,ornm ii i tller dale alter he rumnd uit , it te Iri was ari d
was advised to sIgni ii
Al the i me if the hearing . sa hsubstantial nnher rof striker hd heen
recelied hs the ( nlpailn. bthi the rec ri des n ot relectl the exalt iinmbher
would make me heliese I was not a permanent em-
pl, ee.
Signature
Witnesses:
Steaart testified that he distributed forms to about two-
thirds ot' the new hires, that he read the ft'rm in its entiretv
and told them that it was a purely voluntary matter, and
that none of them refused to sign it.
Also on or about March 17. 1977, the ('ompany sent the
following better to all strikers who had either not been re-
called or had not kept their applications "current":
March 17. 1977
We note that ' 1ou do not hase a current application tor
reassignment to Sour Iformer (or some other) position
, ith Alantic ('reosoting ('onipans:.
In order for us to keep our records up to date. we
would ask that you complete the attached question-
naire alid return it to us in the envelope which we have
enclosed lt r otul r t COnVeicllCe. 9
Yours truls.
A''Il AN ' (RI ()SOIINCG CO.. IN('.
J. L. Steaart
Plant Manager
('. l1t,[ i alnd ( l /inting / 'ndolng'
It is ell settled that Ioll(oing a strike economic strikers
Who hIvde milde all uLncsinditionl;l oftter to return to work are
enlithi'd to their old jobhs unless. prior to such ofler. they
ha'ec been piimeilntl replaced h) their enployer. Al-
thoughl nither I the I nion nor the indi`idual strikers in this
ca e nlade an 1lrlcollditionail oller in haclc rerha, Plant Man-
acer Steaiari- testilied that tc execution b the strikers otf
the orm set orth abose (i. ('. xh. 2) constituted for the
('ompan the unconditiotnal offer to return to work. A criti-
cal question t be rsoled. therefre. is hether the re-
placements hired h the (ormpant on Nosremher 17 and 18
cr ere "pernlaient replacements" so as tol thwvart the strikers'
rieht at that time to their old jobs.
A,s presiousl noted. all of the testilnonl of Respondent's
w itnesses ho were involved in the hiring of the striker
replacements stated that such replacements were told at
that time that the jobs for which thes were being hired were
peCrllanlellt alId not temporary. I he one striker replace-
mcrit called is a witness bs the Cieneral Counsel did not
confirim this testinmonIl, but neither did he testift that he
was told tlHait the joh was temporary. Although the circum-
stalices are rendered so mewh;lt suspicious hb Respondents
' lhr atta.hced queslirlnnaire requesied the striker t indir;ale hether he
was still iterested in returning to, olrk fir the (onmpan and poided thai if
hle ; as still inlcresled. he requested Ihe ( omrpa ln It cnsider his applicalion
as current orit anolher 60 da,s the qestlrnllnairre als asked the striker o
irdi;lte I etlhecl tle ihad r haid nt ohbtained ther emplosnirent
198
ATLANTIC CREOSOTING COMPANY. INC.
conduct in March, when a fo:m was circulated among the
striker replacements to confirm the permanency of their
jobs, I find, after a consideration of all the evidence in the
record, that Respondent's intent was to hire striker replace-
ments who would permanently replace the employees on
strike.
The principal contention of the General Counsel on this
point appears to be that the replacements should not be
considered permanent because they were hastily hired and
were placed on the job without inquiry as to their experi-
ence and/or character: i.e., their references w'ere not
checked, nor were they given a physical examination as had
been the practice in the past. However. these factors do not
appear to detract from the issue of the permanency of the
replacements. As the Board said in HIot Shopper, In(c., 146
NLRB 802, 804 (1964):
There is no evidence that special skills or experience
were a prerequisite to being hired as a handler or
helper in the transportation department. And under
established Board precedent the fact that the replace-
ments lacked experience and required some training,
and that some did not remain permanently in Respon-
dent's employ, does not detract from Respondent's in-
tent at the time of hiring that the replacements become
the permanent replacements of the strikers [citing 4n-
derson Clayton & Co. Foods Division. 120 NLRB 1208.
1214].
Although some of the job classifications in the instant
case required some degree of training and experience, most
were unskilled or semiskilled jobs which could be learned
with a matter of a few days' training. Under such circum-
stances, I am of the view that this issue is controlled by the
above-cited precedents and that the striker replacements
hired by Respondent on November 17 and 18 were perma-
nent replacements, so as to thwart the right of the strikers to
their jobs upon their unconditional offers to return to work
on or about November 22.
In his brief. counsel for the General Counsel argues that
Respondent was acting pursuant to an unlawful plan to
defeat the strikers' right to immediate reinstatement. How-
ever, I find a lack of substantial evidence in the record to
support such contention. Thus, it is unrefuted that Respon-
dent embarked upon the decision to replace the strikers.
leased the hiring hall, advertised for replacements. and
commenced hiring-all before Buckley telephoned Lan-
quist on the afternoon of November 17 to request a meeting
to negotiate a contract and end the strike. Indeed. the infer-
ence might as easily be drawn the other way: i.e., that the
Union learned of Respondent's preparations to hire re-
placements and then made the telephone call.
However, it would appear that some of the conditions
imposed by Respondent upon the strikers ran afoul of the
principles laid down by the Board in the Laidl/a case.'0
Thus Laidlaw teaches that economic strikers who have been
permanently replaced remain employees and are entitled to
full reinstatement upon the departure of the replacements.
I0 The Laidlaw Corporation, 171 NIRB 1366(1968), enfd 414 F.2d 99 17th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 Ut.S. 920.
unless they have in the meantime acquired regular and sub-
stantially equivalent employment. In Brooks Research
Manul/rcturing, Inc., 202 NLRB 634, 636 (1973), the Board
rejected the contention that a time limitation could legiti-
mately be placed upon the reinstatement rights of economic
strikers. Here, the inclusion of the 30-day currency limita-
tion would seem to run counter to the Board's rule as pre-
scribed in Brooks, and it therefore constituted interference.
restraint, and coercion of employees' rights in violation of
Section 8(a)( ) of the Act.
Moreover. it would seem that requiring strikers to com-
plete the form before they would be considered hb Respon-
dent as making an unconditional offer to return to work
should be considered violative of that Section. That is to
say, it seems clear from the totality of the evidence that the
Union and the strikers intended, tollouing the consumma-
tion of the collective-bargaining agreement on November
19. that the strikers would apply for their old jobs as soon
as possible and they did so on the morning of November 22.
There is certainly no evidence that Respondent considered
that there were any conditions attached to their offer to
return to work.' Accordingly. for Respondent to impose a
condition that the employees fill out a tfrm as a condition
precedent to being considered as having made an uncondi-
tional offer to return to work constitutes an unlawful inter-
ference with the strikers' rights.'l
However, contrary to the contention of counsel for the
General Counsel. I find no authority which would prohibit
the Respondent from inquiring whether a striker would ac-
cept another position with the Company if it was offered
(with the understanding that it could be a lower pa`ing job
than the one he had before). The testimony in this case is
consistent that the employees understood that should they
accept such lesser position, it would be temporary pending
an opening in their ormer position.' l In any event, the rec-
ord shows that only two strikers (James Foster and Robbie
Jones) have returned to lower paying jobs, and there is no
evidence that Respondent has otherwise deviated from the
requirements of' Latll . That is to say, the Respondent has
hired no striker replacements since November 19 and has
filled all positions in the unit b recalling strikers when
striker replacements leave Respondent's emplo.
In sum, I find and conclude that the Respondent law fulls
replaced the economic strikers prior to their making an un-
conditional offer to return to work. However. the Respon-
dent imposed certain unlawful conditions respecting their
application, and admittedly did not consult with the Uliion
11 (liet teslified that he assumed from the fcl that the trikers appeared
at the gate. that the weere to come hack to work
T2 hat is not to saN that Respondent ma\ not have legillmatelt requested
the strikers Io ill out firms containing current ntormatlon respecting their
addresses and telephone numbers for purpose of facilitating uture contact
(Cf Elsing anuljcturing Co . 209 NLtRB 1089 (1974) sev er. it i e ident
that Respondent went much further than that in this case
t See testimon? of Rohhie Jones and Daniel Pov ell Cf. Elslg rtanufiw-
luring (, suprra at 1102, where the Administraiise L.aw Judge tated
The benefit nrmall derlsed h an emploee Im agreeing io accept
another jobh is a greater assurance orf hlaining reintrstellnenl irid a
speedier return to iork
199
I)0E(ISIONS 01 NATIONAL. LABOR RELATIONS BOARD)
concerning such conduct. in violation of Section 8(a) ). (3).
and (5) of' the Act.'"
Finally. the record presents an issue lr resolution pecu-
liar to one striker. Prince Jackson. Jr. Jackson was one of
the two employees assigned to the "clean-up office" classifi-
cation prior to the strike. Plant Manager Steyaart testified
that the reason Jackson has not been reinstated is that the
Company discovered, during the strike, that the other man.
Abraham Moran, was able to do both jobs (cleaning up the
office, raking the leaves. mowing the grass. etc.). Steyaart
further testified that if' the employees had not gone on
strike. both men would probably still be working for the
Company. In Lo. Angeles Chenictl Coniian.', 204 NLRB
245 (1973). the Board held that a striker (Patino) was enti-
tled to reinstatement since there was no evidence showing
that his job "would have been terminated if he had not
gone out on strike . .. [and] . . . the record shows the
reorganization was based primarily on considerations re-
sulting from the strike." I therefore find and conclude that
Jackson was entitled to reinstatement as of November 22.
Upon the basis of' the foregoing findings of fact, and
upon the entire record in the case. I make the following:
CONCLUSIONO 01 LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By unlawfully refusing to reinstate its employee.
Prince Jackson. Jr., as found herein. Respondent engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3)
and (I) of the Act.
4. By conditioning reinstatement of strikers upon their
execution of' a work application form, and by placing a time
limitation upon their application, in the manner aforesaid
Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (I) of the Act.
5. By engaging in the aforesaid acts and conduct without
notice to or consultation with the Union as their strikers
collective-bargaining representative. Respondent engaged
in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and
(I ) of the Act.
TlE REMmIl)Y
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I will recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action de-
signed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act by unlawfully failing and refusing to
reinstate Prince Jackson, Jr.. I will recommend that Re-
spondent immediately offer him full reinstatment to his for-
4 It is alleged in the complaint, and the General Counsel contends, that
the form distributed bhy the Respondent to the strikers on November 22
constituted an 'employment application." I disagree. It differs substantially
from the regular employ ment applications utilized by Respondent (see G. C.
Exhs 8 and 10) which contain various questions relating to the applicant's
marital status, physical history, criminal record education. past experience
or training. etc. None of these questions which are normally contained in
employment applications appear in the form distributed by Respondent on
November 22.
mrer position or, if that position no longer exists, to a sub-
stantially equivalent position. without prejudice to his
seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him
whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered
because of Respondent's discrimination against him. His
loss of earnings shall he computed as prescribed in F. W.
Woolwori C'ompanlltv. 90 NLRB 289 (1950)., plus interest as
set forth in lI.is Plumbing Hllealing C(o. 138 NLRB 716
(1962). and Floritda Steel Corporation. 231 NLRB 651
( 1977).1
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law.
and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act. I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER'6
The Respondent. Atlantic Creosoting Company. Inc., its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discriminating in regard to the hire or tenure of em-
ployment or any term or condition of 'employment in order
to discourage membership in United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica, AFL-CIO. or any other labor organization.
(b) Unilaterally requiring striking employees to execute
forms or documents containing time limitations upon their
application for reinstatement as a condition of their making
application for reinstatement to their former jobs or posi-
tions.
(c) Engaging in the conduct described in subparagraph
(b) above, without notice to or consultation with the above-
named Union.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining or coercing its employees in the exercise of self-
organization, to form, join. or assist United Steelworkers of
America. AFL-CIO. or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing. and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or mutual aid or protec-
tion, or to refrain from any or all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is de-
signed to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Prince Jackson. Jr.. immediate reinstatement
to his former or a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to his seniority or other rights previously enjoyed.
and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suf-
fered by reason of the discrimination against him, in the
manner described in "The Remedy" section of this deci-
sion.
(b) Preserve and, upon request. make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all pay-
15 In accordance with the Board's decision in Florida Steel Corporatrion.
supru, the current 7 percent rate of' interest still applies for periods prior to
August 25. 1977. in which the "adjusted prime interest rate" as used by the
Internal Revenue Service in calculating interest on tax pay ments 'was at least
7 percent. See Warren L. Rose Casing. Inc. d/h/a V & W Castings 231
NLRB 912 fn. 10(1977).
16 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board. the findings.
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and Order. and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
200
ATLANTIC CREOSOTING COMPANY, INC.
roll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records neces-
sary and relevant to analyze the amount of backpay due
and the rights of employment under the terms of this rec-
ommended order.
(c) Post at its Savannah, Georgia, plant copies of the
notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 10.
1" In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of
the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board."
after being duly signed by Respondent's representative,
shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to em-
ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within
20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dis-
missed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act other than
those found in this Decision.
201