Atlanta Woolen Mills

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 11, 1936

1 N.L.R.B. 316 (N.L.R.B. 1936)

In the Matter of ATLANTA WOOLEN MILLS and LOCAL No. 2307,
UNITED TEXTILE WORKERS OF AMERICA
Case No. C 13. Decided March 11, 1936
Cotton Textile Industry-Wool Textile Industry-Company-Doniinoted Union:
discrimination in favor of ; sponsorship ; participation in affairs ; disestablished
under finding of violation of Section 8(1) -Discrimination : discharge ; non-
reinstatement following temporary lay-off-Reinstatement Ordered-Back Pay:
awarded.
Mr. Thomas I. Emerson for the Board.
Spalding, Sibley, Troutman cf3 Brock, by Mr. P. F. Brock, of
Atlanta, Ga., for respondent.
Mr. Frank Constangy, of Atlanta, Ga., for Local No. 2307, and
Mr. Charlton Ogburn, of Washington, D. C., for American Federation
of Labor (Amicus Curiae).
Mr. A. Lee White, of Atlanta, Ga., for Good Will Club.
Mary Lemon Schleifer, of counsel to the Board.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF CASE
On November 8, 1935, Local No. 2307, United Textile Workers
of America (hereinafter referred to as Local No. 2307), by I. E.
Perkins, President, and Frank Sanders, Vice President, filed a charge
with the Regional Director for the Tenth Region against the Atlanta
Woolen Mills, Atlanta, Georgia (hereinafter referred to as the
respondent), charging the respondent with violations of Section 8,
subdivisions (1), (2) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act,
approved July 5, 1935 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). On
November 29, 1935, a complaint and notice of hearing, signed by
Charles N. Feidelson, Regional Director for the Tenth Region, were
issued and duly served upon the respondent and upon Local No.
2307. The complaint charged respondent with violations of Section
8, subdivisions (1), (2) and (3) of the Act because of the discharge
of and refusal to reinstate 12 employees for the reason that they
joined and assisted Local No. 2307 and failed or refused to join the
Good Will Club, a labor organization, and because the respondent,
by various acts, has dominated and interfered with the adminis-
tration of the Good Will Club and contributed support to it. On
316
DECISIONS AND ORDERS 317
December 5, 1935, an amended notice of hearing was issued and duly
served. Pursuant to the amended notice of hearing, a hearing was
held on December 11, 12, 13 and 14, 1935, at Atlanta, Georgia, before
Benedict Wolf, duly designated Trial Examiner, at which hearing
full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses
and to introduce evidence bearing on the issue, was afforded to all
parties. The respondent, by counsel, participated in the hearing.
Before testimony was taken, respondent made a motion to dismiss,
a plea to the jurisdiction and in abatement, and a motion to dismiss
on the merits. At the time these were made, the motions and pleas
were all denied by the Trial Examiner in so far as they were based
on the alleged unconstitutionality of the Act, and were subsequently
denied by him in so far as they were based on the alleged inap-
plicability of the Act to the respondent's business. The rulings of
the Trial Examiner are hereby affirmed.
At the hearing the complaint was amended by adding the name
of Corinne Smith as an employee who had been discharged because
she had joined and assisted Local No. 2307 and failed or refused to
join the Good Will Club.
By order of the National Labor Relations Board, dated December
16, 1935, the proceeding was transferred to and continued before
the Board in accordance with Article II, Section 35 of National
Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations-Series 1.
Upon the evidence adduced at the hearing and from the entire
record now before it, including the transcript of the hearing and ex-
hibits introduced, the National Labor Relations Board makes the
following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The respondent is, and has been since 1896, a corporation or-
ganized under and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of
Georgia, engaged in the manufacture and sale of textile products.
The mill of the respondent (hereinafter referred to as the mill) is
located at Atlanta, Georgia, and is divided into two principal units,
a cotton mill and a woolen mill. The respondent employed approxi-
inately 350 persons at the time of the hearing.
2. The cotton used by the respondent in the manufacture of cotton
yarn is purchased in Atlanta both directly from growers and also
from brokers having their sole or branch offices in Atlanta. The
evidence indicates that most, if not all, of this cotton is grown in
Georgia. All of the cotton is delivered by trucks, none of which
are owned or operated by the respondent, to the respondent's ware-
house in Atlanta. Approximately 3,000 bales of cotton are purchased
annually by the respondent, the cost of the amount purchased in
the month of July, 1935, being approximately $130,000. Twenty-five
318 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to fifty per cent of the cotton yarn manufactured by the respondent
is retained by it to be used in the manufacture of textile fabrics.
The balance of the cotton yarn so manufactured is sold to Southern
Mills, Atlanta, Georgia, who in turn manufacture it into laundry
supplies which are sold, shipped, and distributed throughout the
United States.
3. In the manufacture of woolen suitings and other textile fabrics,
the principal materials used are the cotton yarn manufactured by the
respondent and wool by-products. Wool by-products are purchased
entirely outside the State of Georgia from dealers located princi-
pally in the east and midwest sections of the United States. About
one to one and one quarter million pounds of wool by-products are
purchased annually, the cost of such purchases in the month of July,
1935, being approximately $300,000. Twenty-five per cent of the
wool by-products so purchased are sent to the mill f. o. b. the point
of shipment. The woolen suitings and fabrics manufactured by the
respondent are sold to manufacturers who in turn manufacture gar-
mnents from them. Sales to manufacturers are made by representa-
tives located in various centers, particularly in and about New York,
who are paid on a commission basis. About seventy-five per cent
of the fabrics so manufactured are sold to manufacturers outside
of the State of Georgia and throughout the United States. The goods
so sold by the respondent are shipped f. o. b. Atlanta, Georgia.
4. Coal used for heating, dyeing and finishing; dyes and chem-
icals; and parts for equipment are purchased by the respondent en-
tirely outside the State of Georgia.
5. The aforesaid operations of the respondent constitute a continu-
ous flow of trade, traffic and commerce among the several States.
6. The Good Will Club (hereinafter referred to as the Club) is
a labor organization which was formed among the respondent's em-
ployees in the early part of 1935. The constitution and by-laws of
the Club state that one of its purposes is to act as a collective bar-
gaining agency. Representatives of the Club requested Mr. Vaughn
Nixon, President and Treasurer, and Mr. William Nixon, Vice Presi-
dent, of the respondent, to enter into a closed shop agreement with
the Club. - The request was refused. None the less, the following
notice appeared on several bulletin boards in the mill in the latter
part of July :
"We, the undersigned Officers and Board of Directors, of the
Good Will Club of the employees of the Atlanta Woolen Mills
in compliance of a signed petition do hereby declare the Atlanta
Woolen Mills a Closed shop-giving employment only to mem-
bers of the Good Will Club.
" re would suggest that all employees, who have not yet joined
'the Good Will Adjustment Club, get in touch with the applica-
DECISIONS AND ORDERS
tion committee and make application
Club Before Monday, August 5th.
(signed)
"Executive Council:
W. A. Lester
Zollie Hauey
Sue Emerson
319
for membership in the
"Board of Directors :
L. W. Webb
E. G. Guthrie
V. B. Blalack
Eula La Fay
Fred La Fay"
The notice remained posted for several days. Mr. William Nixon
admits having been asked by an employee whether he had seen the
notice. He testified that he walked over to one of the bulletin
boards to see it, but that it was not on the board at that time, and
that he made no further effort to ascertain whether such a notice
had been or was subsequently posted. Mr. Vaughn Nixon and the
respondent's two superintendents, Mr. Pryor and Mr. Ray, denied
that they had ever heard that such a notice had been put on the
bulletin boards or that they had-ever seen it. These denials, as
well as the similar denials of the respondent's foremen and over-
seers, set forth below, are difficult to credit. The presence of the
notice on the bulletin boards is clearly established by competent and
uncontradicted testimony; the Nixons, the superintendents, foremen
and overseers pass these bulletin boards many times a day; the bul-
letin boards are used to show weekly dockings, to indicate changes
in the type of work to be done, and other matters pertaining to the
operation of the mill; and, finally, no notices may be posted on the
bulletin boards without the permission of the management.
7. There is evidence -throughout the record of affirmative acts on
the part of foremen and overseers in aiding the cause of the Club.
Mr. Gibson, now foreman in the finishing room, was one of the
organizers of the Club before his promotion. His continued interest
in the welfare of the Club after he became a foreman, although by
written resignation he had ceased to be a member, is ullderstandable.
The use of his position as foreman to secure members is a different
matter. Four witnesses still employed by the respondent, testified
that Gibson, as their foreman, discussed the Club with them. Gibson
himself admits advising three of these witnesses to join the Club,
but claims the advice was given as a friend and not as a foreman.
It cannot be supposed that an employee who, while at work, is asked
or advised by his foreman to join a labor organization is unreason-
able in assuming that an official demand is being made, especially
where, as here, the foreman has power to hire and discharge.
There was testimony that Jackson, foreman of the weaving room,
asked three employees to join, stating to two of them that they
320 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
must abide by the notice on the bulletin boards. Jackson does not
deny discussing the Club with employees . He admits hearing em-
ployees say that a closed shop agreement was in effect. He denies
that he ever asked anyone to join the Club, or that he saw, or referred
anyone to, the notice on the bulletin boards. In the light of Jack-
son's evasive testimony, and particularly in the light of his testi-
mony that he must, as a necessary part of his job, look at the
bulletin board every day, his denials are totally unconvincing and
entitled to no weight.
There was testimony that Mr. Whitmire, one of the overseers in
the spinning room, discussed the Club with two witnesses, advising
one to join if he wished to hold his job, and advising the other, who
had been discharged, to ask the superintendent if she could go back
to work if she joined the Club. Mr. Whitmire denies having made
these statements, but since all of his testimony was obviously evasive,
we cannot credit his denials.
Brown, also an overseer in the spinning room, admits discussing
the Club with one of the employees. The employee and Brown flatly
contradict each other as to the conversation that occurred. It is
obvious that Brown was sufficiently informed about the situation to
discuss it, although, strangely enough, he neglected to find out enough
about it to repudiate the existence of a closed shop agreement,,and
failed to call the attention of his superiors to a situation which he
must have known existed.
Fall, at the time he was foreman, is accused of asking an employee
if she had joined. Fall testified he may have spoken to the employee
about it but cannot recall what he said.
Wesson, overseer of the card room, admits discussing the Club with
one of the witnesses but denies the latter's testimony that Wesson told
him that a closed shop agreement would become effective on August 5.
Wesson, who then had a son working in the department, admits that
he heard employees talking about a closed shop and that he passes the
bulletin board at least a dozen times a day, but denies that he ever
saw the notice, or that he ever told anyone he would have to join the -
Club. As in the case of the foremen and other overseers, the conclu-
sion is inescapable that Wesson knew what was going on, and at least
did not, to any employee seeking advice, repudiate the existence of a
closed shop agreement.
The testimony of one witness to the effect that he secured a Club
membership card from one of the company offices and that after sign-
ing it, he returned it to a watchman on duty, is uncontradicted. The
evidence also shows that members of the Club solicited memberships
and contributions during working hours.
8. By August 10, 1935, all of the respondent's employees were mem-
bers of the Club. There is no doubt, from all the evidence in the case,
DECISIONS AND ORDERS 321
that without at least the tacit support of the officers of the respondent
and without the active support of the respondent's overseers and fore-
men, the Club could not have won so quick and unanimous a response.
There is even less doubt that the notice, with respect to which the
management must assume responsibility, precipitated the influx of
membership into the Club. Since all the management need have done,
if its hands were clean, was to repudiate the existence of a closed shop
agreement, no injustice is involved if responsibility for the effect of
the notice is placed upon the respondent..
9. The evidence shows that a deduction from the wages of certain
employees was made by the respondent to pay for a chicken dinner
given by the Club and that the respondent permitted one of its trucks
to be used to carry employees to a Club picnic. It may be, as the
Nixons testified, that similar services had been given to groups of em-
ployees upon prior occasions and that they were unaware that the
chicken dinner and picnic were Club functions. In view of the situa-
tion created by the posting of the notices, and by the acts set forth
in paragraph 7 above, the members of Local No. 2307 might well have
believed that these further acts of the respondent were discriminatory
and that the respondent was contributing support to the Club. How-
ever, we do not feel that such acts are serious enough in themselves to
warrant a distinct finding that the Act has been violated because of
them.
There is no evidence that the suggestion that the Club be formed
was made by the management of the respondent and not sufficient
evidence to warrant us in finding that the management dominated or
interfered with its administration.
10. Local No. 2307 is a labor organization which is a local of
United Textile Workers of America, affiliated with the American
Federation of Labor. It was organized by the respondent's em-
ployees in September, 1934, during a shut-down of the respondent's
mill due to participation of its employees in a general strike in the
textile industry at that time. At the time the Club was being organ-
ized, many employees of the respondent were members of Local No.
2301. When an intensive membership drive to secure members for
the Club was started in July, 1935, I. E. Perkins, President of Local
No. 2307, on the advice of officers of the United Textile Workers of
America, advised all employees of the respondent who were members
of Local No. 2307, except Arthur Brown and Hubert Brown, to join
the Club in order to retain their positions. There is no evidence that
employees on becoming members of the Club were required to, or did,
resign from Local No. 2307. Foreman Gibson admits, however, that
the undisclosed purpose of the Club's organization was to "replace
the union". That the formation and activities of the Club were
almost successful in achieving this purpose, is shown by the testimony
322 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that the average attendance at meetings of Local No. 2307 prior to
July 1, 1935, was between 50 and 80; that the average attendance
after July 1, 1935, was from 8 to 10; and that no meetings had been
held since September, 1935.
11. Upon the rehiring of employees following the strike in Sep-
tember, 1934, and at all times since, every person employed by the
respondent has been required to fill out an application blank which,
among other things, requires the applicant to state whether or not he
is a member of a union. These application blanks are retained by
the respondent and are accessible to any officer or employee of the
respondent who wishes to consult them. There is also other evidence
in the record that most, if not all, of the officers and supervisory em-
ployees of the respondent knew from other sources which of the
employees were members of Local No. 2307.
12. With respect to the employees whom the respondent is alleged
to have discharged and refused to reinstate, no evidence was pre-
sented as to Hulette Moore, Marvin Moore and Harold Perkins. The
evidence shows that another employee, Olie Moon, was reinstated
prior -to the time of the hearing. The complaint as to these four
persons will be dismissed.
13. Woodrow and Truman Perkins, discharged on July 12, 1935,
by Foreman Gibson, are the sons of I. E. Perkins, President of Local
No. 2307. I. E. Perkins was an employee of the respondent at the
time of the strike in September, 1934, but was not reinstated after
the strike because of the management's resentment against him for his
part in calling the strike. Although both Woodrow and Truman had
been employees prior to the strike, they were not reinstated until
February and April, 1935, respectively. Both are members of Local
No. 2307, Truman being Recording Secretary. He began working
for the respondent in 1929 and was operating a drier at the time of
his discharge. Woodrow had been employed for over 'two years and
was a washer at the time of his discharge. Woodrow testified that
at the time of his discharge, Gibson told him that he was sorry to
let him go, that his work was satisfactory but that his father was
an enemy of the company. Truman testified that Gibson in discharg-
ing him said there was nothing wrong with his work but that he,
Truman, knew why he was being fired. Gibson, on the contrary,
testified that he was made a foreman for a thirty-day trial period to
see whether he could eliminate the bad work being done in the
department in which the Perkins boys worked. He also testifies that
he discharged both of them for poor work and that the department
began to improve in the quality of work produced immediately after
their discharge.
Gibson's testimony as to his reasons for knowing that the Perkins
were the ones producing the bad work is no more convincing than
DECISIONS AND ORDERS 323
his testimony in regard to his knowledge of the Club's activities.
As to Truman, he says that he was told by Lester, the employee who
conceived and founded the Club, that Truman had been scuffling on
the floor with another boy while his machine was running. Gibson
admits that this occurred some time prior, to the discharge, that he
never checked Lester's story nor asked Truman if it was so, and
never tried to find out who the other person was who was scuffling
with Truman. As to Woodrow, the evidence shows he had a helper
on the drier, that they both worked together doing the same work,
and that the helper who was junior in time of service was not
discharged.
It is apparent that the true reason for the discharge of the Perkins
boys was their own union activities and their relationship to I. E.
Perkins.
14. Mrs. M. E. Green (referred to in the complaint as Lizzie
Green), a member of the organizing committee of Local No. 2307,
had been employed by the respondent for eight to nine years. She
was working as a spinner on the evening shift at the time she was
laid off on July 17, 1935. There had been no complaint about her
work, and she had not previously been laid off in eight years. She
was told by Mr. Ray, superintendent, that she was being laid off
because the mill had a surplus of yarn. A helper, Nina Frazier, was
also laid off at the same time. However, the shift was started up
two nights after the lay-off and Nina Frazier was re-employed but
Mrs. Green was not. The respondent alleges that it would have put
Mrs. Green back to work if she had made application. The evidence
shows that the policy of the respondent was to notify laid-off em-
ployees to return to work. The explanation given by Whitmire, one
of the overseers in the spinning room, that he intended to call her-
back but had no way to send for her is also unconvincing. There is.
no reasonable explanation of the failure to re-employ Mrs. Green
except the fact of Cher union affiliation and activities.
15. Frank Sanders, Second Vice President of Local No. 2307, had
been employed eight to nine years and had been regularly employed
as a twister since 1932. On July 12, 1935, Wiley, who was a twister
and whom Sanders had been helping, was discharged for bad work.
Frank Sanders was given his position and a new employee was put
on as a helper. One week later, on July 19, Frank Sanders was dis-
charged for alleged bad work also and his helper retained. Wiley
was subsequently taken back though Frank Sanders was not. When
Mr. Whitmire was asked at the hearing how he knew who the person
responsible for the bad work was, his very revealing reply was, " I
could tell by looking at Frank when he idled away from his job talk-
ing union, that was why the work was getting by." He also ad-
mitted that he did not really know that Frank was "talking union"
324 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
but insisted that he believed he was. The testimony clearly indicates
Whitmire's attitude which, in conjunction with the circumstances
surrounding the discharge and Sanders' satisfactory employment
record, leads to an irresistible conclusion that Sanders was also dis-
charged because of his union affiliation and activities.
16. A. 0. Sanders, a member of Local No. 2307, had been em-
ployed by respondent for five to six years as a fixer. He was dis-
charged July 22, 1935, by Mr. Ray, superintendent, who gave as the
reason a desire to cut overhead and to employ one person to both fix
and run a frame. While it seems strange that Mr. Ray did not even
ask A. 0. Sanders whether he could do this nor seek to keep on an
employee of five to six years standing in some other capacity, there
is no positive evidence in the record to show that the management
had any particular antipathy towards A. 0. Sanders as a member
of Local No. 2307. The record does not justify a finding that the
discharge of A. 0. Sanders was because of his union activities.
17. Arthur Brown, warden of Local No. 2307, had been employed
by the respondent since 1921 as a weaver. Although asked by Jack-
son, his foreman, Harrison, manager of the company houses, and by
four employees to join the Club, he refused to do so. The last day
Brown worked in the respondent's mill was Monday, August 5, 1935,
the day given in the Club's notice placed on the bulletin boards be-
fore which employees should make application for membership.
When he reported to work the following day he was told that a
broken shaft would prevent operations and he would not be needed.
When he reported to work on August 7, he was told by Jackson
that he would not need him as the Draper loom he had been working
on was being taken out. Brown asked Jackson whether there was
any other work for him and Jackson replied there was not. The
evidence shows that although this loom was taken out, other Draper
looms are still being used and also that no opportunity was given
Brown to try to operate a Crompton-Bowles loom. This is not
understandable in the light of his work record except on the basis
that Jackson in his overzealous championing of the outcome of
the contest between the Club and Local No. 2307 discharged Brown
because of his refusal to join the Good Will Club and for his union
activity.
Hubert Brown had worked as a weaver for respondent for nine
years. He also had refused to join the Club. About one and one-
half months before his discharge, he was transferred from the sec-
ond to the third shift. Hubert worked the day of August 5 but
when he reported to work on August 6, was told that the third shift
was being shut down and that they had nothing else for him to do.
Jackson testifies that Hubert was not discharged but merely laid
off because the third shift was stopped and that he might have been
DECISIONS AND ORDERS 325
re-employed had he made application when the third shift again
commenced operation. As we have already stated, the policy of the
respondent was to send for employees who had been laid off. In
addition, the record shows that Hubert, after August 6, went back
to see Jackson to ask for a recommendation in order to secure other
employment. Jackson, therefore, knew that Hubert was unemployed
and gives no explanation of why if he desired to re-employ him
he did not offer to do so at that time.
The only logical explanation for the discharges of Hubert and
Arthur Brown was their refusal to join the Club and their union
membership and activities.
18. The evidence concerning the resignation of Bud Richardson on
September 10 does not clearly establish a discrimination in regard
to hire and tenure of employment. Richardson was a member of
Local No. 2307 and also a member of the Club. Although he had
been employed for about ten years by the respondent, the evidence
shows he had probably been guilty of careless workmanship. On
September 10. Jackson notified Richardson that he had been "docked"
eleven dollars on one piece of cloth for bad work. Rather than suf-
fer this deduction, Richardson resigned. Richardson testified that
he had been frequently "docked" before but that the amount had
never exceeded $1.50. The fact that Richardson chose to resign
rather than be subject to an eleven-dollar deduction would not neces-
sarily prevent a finding of discrimination against him. However,
in view of the evidence of his inefficiency, we do not feel justified
in finding that he was discriminated against because of his union
membership.
19. Corinne Smith had been employed for about six months as a
burler, when with the permission of the respondent, she and her
husband, also an employee, went on a vacation the first week in
July, 1935. Upon her return, she was not re-employed because,
according to Foreman Gibson, the respondent had decided to dis-
continue using burlers. Gibson admits he had been told by someone
that Mrs. Smith had been talking against the Club and calling
some of the employees "scabs". He also admitted talking to her
husband about this but denies that he told her husband she would
not be re-employed because she had been talking too much. Gibson
also testified that Mrs. Smith's acts did not influence him in dis-
charging her. He does not, however, satisfactorily explain why Mrs.
Smith's job as a burler was discontinued while other hurlers were
retained. We believe that her activity in opposition to the Club
was the cause of her being discharged. Inasmuch as Mrs. Smith
did not testify as to the exact date on,which she was refused re-
employment, for purposes of our order, we shall assume the date to
326 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
have been July 11, which, on the evidence, is the latest date on
which the refusal could have taken place.
20. By the discharges and refusals to reinstate, as above set forth,
the respondent discriminated in regard to hire and tenure of em-
ployment and thereby discouraged membership in Local No. 20307
and encouraged membership in the Club.
21. By the acts set forth in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the findings
of fact and by the discharges as above set forth, the respondent has
interfered with, restrained and coerced its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
22. The aforesaid acts of the respondent tend to lead to labor dis-
putes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the
entire record in the proceeding, the Board finds and concludes as a
matter of law:
1. Local No. 2307, United Textile Workers of America, and the
Good Will Club, are labor organizations, within the meaning of
Section 2, subdivision (5) of the Act.
2. The respondent, by its discharge of, and refusal to reinstate,
Woodrow Perkins, Truman Perkins, Mrs. M. E. Green, Frank San-
ders, Arthur Brown, Hubert Brown and Corinne Smith, and each of
them, has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices,
within the meaning of Section 8, subdivision (3) of the Act.
3. The respondent, by interfering with, restraining and coercing
its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act, has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices,
within the meaning of Section 8, subdivision (1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices
affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 2, subdivisions
(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. The respondent has not dominated or interfered with the ad-
ministration of the Good Will Club nor contributed support to it,
within the meaning of Section 8, subdivision (2) of the Act.
6. The respondent in the discharge of A. O. Sanders and in the
resignation of Bud Richardson has not engaged in unfair labor
practices, within the meaning of Section 8, subdivisions (1) or (3)
of the Act.
ORDER
Upon the basis of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
pursuant to Section 10, subdivision (c) of the National Labor Rela-
DECISIONS AND ORDERS 327
tions Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the
respondent, Atlanta Woolen Mills, and its officers and agents, shall:
1. Cease and desist :
a. From requiring from applicants for employment information
respecting their affiliation with Local No. 2307, United Textile Work-
ers of America, or with any other labor organization;
b. From in any other manner interfering with, restraining or co-
ercing its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in con-
certed activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining and other
mutual aid and protection ;
c. From in any manner soliciting or encouraging membership in
the Good Will Club, or permitting such soliciting in the mill during
working hours;
d. From discouraging membership in Local No. 2307, United Tex-
tile Workers of America, and from encouraging membership in the
Good Will Club, by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of em-
ployment or any term or condition of employment, or by threats of
such discrimination.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds
will effectuate the policies of the Act :
a. Offer to the employees listed in Appendix A, and each of them,
reinstatement to their former positions, without prejudice to any
rights and privileges previously enjoyed;
b. Make whole said employees, with the exception of Mrs. M. E.
Green and Corinne Smith, for any loss they may have suffered by
reason of their discharges, by the payment to each of them, respec-
tively, of a sum of money equal to that which each would normally
•have earned as wages during the period from the time they were dis-
charged to the date of such offer of reinstatement, computed at the
average weekly wage at the time of discharge, as set forth in Ap-
pendix A, less the amount which each, respectively, has earned sub-
sequent to the time of discharge and up to the time of the offer of
reinstatement; make whole Mrs. M. E. Green by payment, computed
in the same manner, for the period from July 19, 1935, to the time of
the offer of reinstatement; and make whole Corinne Smith by pay-
ment, computed in the same manner, for the period from July 11,
1935, to the time of the offer of reinstatement;
c. Post immediately notices to its employees in conspicuous places
throughout the ]Hill, stating that the respondent will cease and desist
in the manner aforesaid; that there is no closed shop agreement with
the Good Will Club; and that such notices will remain posted for a
period of thirty (30) days.
97571-36-vol. i-22
328 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
It is further ordered that the complaint is hereby dismissed: (a)
as to the allegations that the respondent has dominated and inter-
fered with the administration of the Good Will Club and contributed
support to it; and (b) as to the allegations of discriminatory dis-
charges of Hulette Moore, Marvin Moore, Harold Perkins-and Olie
Moon, without prejudice, and as to the alleged discriminatory charges
of A. O. Sanders and Bud Richardson.
APPENDIX A
Name
Average
weekly
wage at
time of
discharge
Wages received
from employ-
ment elsewhere
from date dis-
charged to De-
cember 12, 1935
Woodrow Perkins -------------------------------------------------------- $15 50 $43 00.
Truman Perkins ---------------------------------------------------------- 16 00 About 128 15 9
Mrs. M E Green -------------------------------------------------------- 12 40 25 00-50 00 9
Frank Sanders ------------------------------------------------------------ 15 50 1 50
Arthur Brown------------------------------------------------------------ 18 50 About 67 50.9
Hubert Brown ------------------------------------------------------------ 16 80 None
Corinne Smith------------------------------------------------------------ 14.50 About 81 00 4
9 Perkins testified that he had earned $7 . 50 per week from about the middle of August to within about
a month before the hearing and that he had earned $8 25 per week since
9 Mrs Green testified she has earned "somewhere around between $25 or maybe $50".
9 Arthur Brown testified he had received about $7 50 per week for "something like two months"
4 Mrs Smith testified she had earned 25 cents an hour, an average of about 24 hours a week for about
three months.
SAME TITLE]
SUPPLEMENTARY DECISION AND MODIFICATION OF
ORDER
June 10, 1936
On March 11, 1936, the Board issued its decision in this matter,
finding that the respondent had engaged in unfair labor practices, .
within the meaning of Section 8, subdivisions (1) and (3) of the
National Labor Relations Act, and finding further that the respondent
had not dominated or interfered with the administration of the Good
Will Club, a labor organization of its employees, or contributed
support to it, within the meaning of Section 8, subdivision (2) of
the Act. On March 23, 1936, counsel for Local No. 2307, United
Textile Workers of America, hereinafter called the union, filed a
petition with the Board praying that the latter conclusion be modi-
fied, and that the Board order the dissolution of the Good Will Club.
After due notice to all parties, counsel for the union argued before
the Board in support of his petition on April 9, 1936, and thereafter
he and counsel for the American Federation of Labor, amicus curiae,
filed briefs in support of the petition.
It has not been urged upon us that the findings of fact made by
the Board in its decision are erroneous or that they should be modi-
DECISIONS AND ORDERS 329
fled. Rather, counsel for the union argues that upon the findings
of fact the Board should have concluded that the respondent inter-
fered with the formation of the Good Will Club, and contributed
support to it, and counsel for the American Federation of Labor in
his brief argues that the proper conclusion should have been that
the respondent interfered with the administration of the Good Will
Club and contributed support to it. The findings of fact principally
referred to are the following :
6. The Good Will Club (hereinafter referred to as the Club)
is a labor organization which was formed among the respondent's
employees in the early part of 1935. The constitution and by-
laws of the Club state that one of its purposes is to act as a col-
lective bargaining agency. Representatives of the Club re-
quested Mr. Vaughn Nixon, President and Treasurer, and -Mr.
William Nixon, Vice-President, of the respondent, to enter into
a closed shop agreement with the Club. The request was re-
fused. None the less, the following notice appeared on several
bulletin boards in the mill in the latter part of July :
"We, the undersigned Officers and Board of Directors, of
the Good Will Club of the employees of the Atlanta Woolen
Mills in compliance of a signed petition do hereby declare the
Atlanta Woolen Mills a Closed shop-giving employment
only to members of the Good Will Club.
"We would suggest that all employees, who have not yet
joined the Good Will Adjustment Club, get in touch with the
application committee and make application for membership
in the Club before Monday, August 5th.
(signed)
"Executive Council : "Board of Directors :
W. A. Lester L. W. Webb
Zollie Hauey - E. G. Guthrie
Sue Emerson V. B. Blalack
Eula La Fay
Fred La Fay"
The notice remained posted for several days. Mr. William
Nixon admits having been asked by an employee whether he had
seen the notice. He testified that he walked over to one of the
bulletin boards to see it, but that it was not on the board at that
time, and that he made no further effort to ascertain whether such
a notice had been or was subsequently posted.. Mr. Vaughn
Nixon and the respondent's two superintendents, Mr. Pryor and
Mr. Ray, denied that they had ever heard that such a notice
had been put on the bulletin boards or that they had ever seen it.
330 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
These denials , as well as the similar denials of the respondent's
foremen and overseers , set forth below, are difficult to credit.
The presence of the notice ' on the bulletin boards is clearly es-
tablished by competent and uncontradicted testimony; the
Nixons, the superintendents , foremen and overseers pass these
bulletin boards many times a day; the bulletin boards are used
to show weekly dockings , to indicate changes in the type of work
to be done , and other matters pertaining to the operation of the
mill; and, finally , no notices may be posted on the bulletin boards
without the permission of the management.
7. There is evidence throughout the record of affirmative acts
on the part of foremen and overseers in aiding the cause of the
Club.
Mr. Gibson , now foreman in the finishing room, was one of the
organizers of the Club before his promotion . His continued in-
terest in the welfare of the Club after he became a foreman, al-
though by written resignation he had ceased to be a member, is
understandable . The use of his position as foreman to secure
members is a different matter. Four witnesses still employed by
the respondent, testified that Gibson , as their foreman , discussed
the Club with them. Gibson himself admits advising three of
these witnesses to join the Club, but claims the advice was given
as a friend and not as a foreman . It cannot be supposed that an
employee who , while at work, is asked or advised by his fo: eman
to join a labor organization is unreasonable in assuming that an
official demand is being made , especially where, as here, the fore-
man has power to hire and discharge.
There was testimony that Jackson, foreman of the weaving
room, asked three employees to join, stating to two of them that
they must abide by the notice on the bulletin boards. Jackson
does not deny discussing the Club with employees. He admits
hearing employees say that a closed shop agreement was in
effect. He denies that he ever asked anyone to join the Club,
or that he saw, or referred anyone to, the notice on the bulletin
boards. In the light of Jackson's evasive testimony , and par-
ticularly in the light of his testimony that he must , as a necessary
part of his job, look at the bulletin board every day, his denials
are totally unconvincing and entitled to no weight.
There was testimony that Mr. Whitmire, one of the overseers
in the spinning room, discussed the Club with two witnesses,
advising one to join if he wished to hold his job, and advising
the other, who had been discharged , to ask the superintendent
if she could go back to work if she joined the Club. Mr. Whit-
mire denies having made these statements, but since all of his
testimony was obviously evasive, we cannot credit his denials.
DECISIONS AND ORDERS 331
Brown, also an overseer in the spinning room, admits dis-
,cussing the Club with one of the employees. The employee and
Brown flatly contradict each other as to the conversation that
occurred. It is obvious that Brown was sufficiently informed
about the situation to discuss it, although, strangely enough, he
neglected to find out enough about it to repudiate the existence
of a closed shop agreement, and failed to call the attention of
his superiors to a situation which he must have known existed.
Fall, at the time he was foreman, is accused of asking an em-
ployee if she had joined. Fall testified he may have spoken to
the employee about it but cannot recall what he said.
Wesson, overseer of the card room, admits discussing the Club
with one of the witnesses but denies the latter's testimony that
Wesson told him that a closed shop agreement would become
,effective on August 5. Wesson, who then had a son working in
,the department, admits that he heard employees talking about a
-closed shop and that he passes the bulletin board at least a
dozen times a day, but denies that he ever saw the notice, or
that he ever told anyone he would have to join the Club. As in
the case of the foremen and other overseers, the conclusion is
inescapable that Wesson knew what was going on, and at least
,did not, to any employee seeking advice, repudiate the existence
of a closed shop agreement.
The testimony of one witness to the effect that he secured a
Club membership card from one of the company offices and
that after signing it, he returned it to a watchman on duty, is
uncontradicted. The evidence also shows that members of the
Club solicited memberships and contributions during working
hours.
8. By August 10, 1935, all of the respondent's employees were
members of the Club. There is no doubt, from all the evidence
in the case, that without at least the tacit support of the officers
of the respondent and without the active support of the respond-
ent's overseers and foremen, the Club could not have won so
quick and unanimous a response. There is even less doubt that
the notice, with respect to which the management must assume
responsibility, precipitated the influx of membership into the
Club. Since all the management need have done, if its hands
were clean, was to repudiate the existence of a closed shop agree-
ment, no injustice is involved if responsibility for the effect of
the notice is placed upon the respondent.
The Board has carefully reconsidered the conclusion which it
reached from these facts, and is impressed with the arguments of
counsel that Section 8, subdivision (2) of the Act should be inter-
332 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
preted to embrace this kind of employer activity; and if a similar
state of facts was again presented, the Board might broaden its-
interpretation of the meaning of Section 8, subdivision (2) of the
Act.
Be that as it may, we feel that the practical consideration govern-
ing the union in the presentation of the petition is its dissatisfaction
with the scope of our previous order; and apparently the arguments
concerning the proper interpretation of Section 8, subdivision (2)
are based upon the premise that before the Board can make an order
requiring the disestablishment of the Good Will Club, it must find
that this subdivision has been violated.
Without therefore attempting at this time to re-interpret Section
8, subdivision (2), the Board has reconsidered the order which it
made on the basis of the findings of fact set forth above. Although
the Board concluded that Section 8, subdivision (2) of the Act had
not been violated, it did conclude that the respondent had violated
Section 8, subdivision (1) of the Act by reason of the acts set forth
in such findings. In its order, the Board provided, inter, alia, that
the respondent should post notices to its employees "that there is no
closed shop agreement with the Good Will Club."
We now believe that this order did not go far enough on the facts
as found. It merely requires the respondent to make an announce-
ment that there is no closed shop agreement with the Good Will Club.
However, we found that if it had not been for the affirmative acts
of the respondent's officers and the respondent's failure to act with
respect to the closed shop notices on the bulletin boards, the Good
Will Club would not have succeeded in enlisting the membership of
most of the employees. The only effective remedy which will restore
the situation as it existed before the respondent interfered with the
self-organization of its employees is to require the disestablishment
of the Good Will Club. We feel that in going this far we are doing
no injustice to the respondent, inasmuch as it is clear on the evidence,
and we have so found, that before the respondent had interfered
in the manner set forth, the Good Will Club led merely a formal
existence. If we were right in concluding on the evidence that the
Club was feeble and insignificant as an organization representing
the employees before the respondent gave it life, we feel that we
are justified in requiring such action as will render the Club as
ineffective as it had previously been. We do not believe that the
posting of a notice stating no more than that there is no closed shop
agreement can achieve this result.
In basing an order that the Club be disestablished as a. bargaining
agency on a conclusion that Section 8, subdivision (1) of the Act
has been violated, and not, as is normally, the case, on a conclusion
DECISIONS AND ORDERS 333
that Section 8, subdivision (2), has been violated, we are not exceed-
ing the power granted to the Board in Section 10, subdivision (c)
of the Act wherein the Board is empowered to require the taking of
"such affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of this Act."
It is clear from this provision that in order to require the disestab-
lishment of a labor organization as a bargaining agency, it is not
essential that the Board conclude that an employer has violated Sec-
tion 8, subdivision (2) with respect to it. We construe Section 10,
subdivision (c) as empowering the Board to require the taking of
such affirmative action as will provide an appropriate and effective
remedy for any violations of any subdivision of Section S.
Inasmuch as objections have been made to the Board's conclusion
that the Good Will Club is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2, subdivision (5) of the Act, the Board wishes to take
this opportunity of pointing out that such a conclusion is made
merely to comply with the technical requirements of the Act. Sec-
tion 2, subdivision (5) defines a labor organization as "any organiza-
tion of any kind, or any agency or employee representation commit-
tee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the
purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment,
or conditions of work." This definition is clearly compresensive
enough to embrace an organization which is dominated or interfered
with, or to which an employer contributes financial or other support,
within the meaning of Section 8, subdivision (2).
In fact, from the legal point of view, the Board has no power to
find that an employer has violated that subdivision unless it also finds
that his illegal acts were taken with respect to a "labor organiza-
tion"; as used in Section 8, subdivision (2), the term has the mean-
ing given by Section 2, subdivision (5). A review of the decisions
thus far made by the Board will demonstrate that by making the
essential finding under Section 2, subdivision (5), the Board does
not intend to place the stamp of legitimacy upon organizations which
should be, and which have been, outlawed. (In the Matter of Penn-
sylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., Greyhound Management Company,
Corporations and Local Division No. 1063 of the Amalgamated As-
sociation of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees-
of America, Case, No. C-1; decided December 7, 1935. In the Mat-
ter of Wheeling Steel Corporation and The Amalgamated Associa-
tion of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers of North America, NRA Lodge
No. 155, Goodwill Lodge No. 157, Rod & Wire Lodge No. 158, Golden
Rule Lodge No. 161, Service Lodge No. 163, Case No. C-3; decided
May 12, 1936.)
334 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MODIFICATION OF ORDER
Paragraph 2 of the Order made by the Board on March 11, 1936,
is hereby modified as follows :
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
a. Offer to the employees listed in Appendix A, and each of them,
reinstatement to their former positions, without prejudice to any
rights and privileges previously enjoyed;
b. Make whole said employees, with the exception of Mrs. Al. E.
Green and Corinne Smith, for any loss they may have suffered by
reason of their discharges, by the payment to each of them, respec-
tively, of a sum of money equal to that which each would normally
have earned as wages during the period from the time they were
discharged to the date of such offer of reinstatement, computed at
the average weekly wage at the time of discharge, as set forth in Ap-
pendix A, less the amount which each, respectively, has earned sub-
sequent to the time of discharge and up to the time of the offer of
reinstatement; make whole Mrs. M. E. Green by payment, computed
in the same manner, for the period from July 19, 1935, to the time
of the offer of reinstatement; and make whole Corinne Smith by
payment, computed in the same manner, for the period from July
11, 1935, to the time of the offer of reinstatement;
c. Withdraw all recognition from the Good Will Club as repre-
sentative of its employees for the purpose of dealing with the re-
spondent concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment, or other conditions of work;
d. Post notices in conspicuous places in the mill stating: (1) that
the respondent will cease and desist in -the manner aforesaid; (2)
that there is no closed shop agreement with the Good Will Club; (3)
that the Good Will Club is so disestablished and that the respondent
will refrain from any recognition thereof; and (4) that such notices
will remain posted for a period of at least 30 consecutive days from
the date of posting.