Atlanta Printing Specialties

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 4, 1974

215 N.L.R.B. 237 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

ATLANTA PRINTING SPECIALTIES
Atlanta Printing Specialties and Paper Products
Union Local 527, AFL-CIO (The Mead Corpora-
tion ) and Jerry Fred Fennel. Cases 10-CB-2312
and 10-CB-2323
December 4, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND
PENELLO
On June 21, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Ben-
jamin K. Blackburn issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and
has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclu-
sions of the Administrative Law Judge, as expanded
herein, and to adopt his recommended Order.
The pertinent facts, as established by the stipulation
of the parties and the findings of the Administrative
Law Judge, are as follows: The parties' collective-bar-
gaining agreement, which was scheduled to expire on
November 1, 1973, allowed each employee to execute
a form authorizing payroll checkoff of his union mem-
bership dues. Each form essentially embodied the re-
quirements of Section 302(c)(4) that the authorization
not be irrevocable for a period of more than 1 year, or
beyond the termination date of the "applicable collec-
tive-bargaining agreement," whichever occurred
sooner; and each form guaranteed a 15-day escape
period immediately preceding the anniversary date of
the authorization's execution, and a 15-day escape
period immediately preceding the termination date of
the "applicable collective-bargaining agreement." On
October 13, 1973, a new collective-bargaining agree-
ment was consummated, effective from October 15,
1973, to February 15, 1975. Between October 17 and
November 1, 1973, a number of employees gave notice
of revocation of their checkoff authorizations. Re-
spondent caused the Employer to dishonor many of
these notices as untimely.' It contended, as it now
contends in this proceeding, that the "applicable collec-
tive-bargaining agreement" was the new one rather
than the old one, and the 15-day escape period immedi-
ately preceding the termination date of the applicable
I The Respondent caused the Employer to honor other notices which
were timely filed within the 15-day escape period immediately preceding
the anniversary dates of certain employees' execution of their checkoff
authorizations
237
collective-bargaining agreement was therefore from
January 31 , 1975, to February 15, 1975, rather than
from October 17, 1973, to November 1, 1973. It argues
that hence its actions were proper under the statute,
and excepts to the Administrative Law Judge 's finding
that it violated Section 8 (b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.
We disagree with the Respondent 's contention, and
affirm the finding of the Administrative Law Judge. As
we read the Act, Section 302(c)(4) guarantees an em-
ployee two distinct rights when he executes a checkoff
authorization under a collective-bargaining agreement:
(1) a chance at least once a year to revoke his authoriza-
tion, and (2) a chance upon the termination of the
collective-bargaining agreement to revoke his authori-
zation . The Respondent 's interpretation of the statu-
tory phrase "applicable collective -bargaining agree-
ment," however, would enable it to negate the second
right forever by the simple strategy of always negotiat-
ing a new agreement prior to the contractually created
escape period , which here began 15 days before the
termination date . In our view , the most reasonable
identification of the "applicable" contract is the one
that had not yet expired when the new agreement was
executed and prematurely put into effect.
We do not believe that Congress , in enacting Section
302(c)(4), intended that the second of the two district
employee rights guaranteed thereby could be negated
by the device of such a premature contract renewal. If
we were to sanction the effectiveness of such a prema-
ture contract renewal , we would permit the parties to
entirely eliminate the statutorily guaranteed escape
period.2
It is true , as the Respondent contends , that the par-
ties are free to change the termination date or other
pertinent provisions of their agreement . But this does
2 The present case is distinguishable from American Smelting and Refin-
ing Company (Mission Unit), 200 NLRB 1004 (1972), precisely because of
this The checkoff authorization forms involved in American Smelting
stated, "This authorization shall be effective and cannot be cancelled
for a period of one (1) year from the date appearing above or until the
termination date of the current collective -bargaining agreement which-
ever occurs sooner ," and added, "I hereby voluntarily authorize you to
continue the above authorization in effect after the expiration of the
shorter of the periods above specified, for further successive periods of one
(1) year from such date " In that case, after the old agreement expired and
a new one was executed, a number of employees fil'd revocation notices
within an annual 15-day escape period immediately following the anniver-
sary dates of their authorizations' executions The union, however, caused
the employer to dishonor such notices as untimely, contending that accord-
ing to the above-quoted language in the authorization forms, the annual
escape period had shifted to the 15 days immediately following the anniver-
sary date of the old agreement's termination The Board found no violation,
concluding first that the union's action was taken in good faith and involved
a reasonable interpretation of the relevant language in the collective-bar-
gaining agreement and the authorization forms The Board then concluded
that, as so interpreted, the provisions of the agreement did not infringe upon
the exercise of employees' Sec 7 rights Unlike in the instant case, in
American Smelting, the union preserved both the right at least once a year
to revoke a checkoff authorization (even though it shifted the annual date
on which revocation could be made) and the right upon the termination of
the old agreement to revoke an authorization-whereas in the present case,
the Union negated the latter statutory right entirely
215 NLRB No. 15
238 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
not mean that they are at liberty thereby to extinguish
statutory rights or to escape the legislative mandate of
Section 302(c)(4) of the Act.
In changing termination dates, therefore, parties
must preserve the statutory right of the employees to
revoke their checkoff authorizations during the previ-
ously established escape period occurring before the
originally intended expiration date of the old contract.
For the above reasons and those advanced by the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge, we conclude that the Union
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by causing the
Employer to dishonor the employees' revocation no-
tices here in question, thus restraining and coercing the
employees in the exercise of their statutory right to
revoke their checkoff authorizations.' We further con-
clude that the Union violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act
by causing the Employer to discriminate against the
employees who gave notice of revocation of their
checkoff authorizations, thus encouraging membership
in the Union.4
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of
the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that
the Respondent, Atlanta Printing Specialties and Paper
Products Union Local 527, AFL-CIO, Atlanta,
Georgia, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall
take the action set forth in the said recommended Or-
der.
3 See John I Paulding, Inc, 130 NLRB 1035, 1043 (1961)
4 It is well settled that where an employee has validly revoked his checkoff
authorization, a union's causing an employer to continue deducting dues
violates Sec 8(b)(2) Industrial Towel and Uniform Services, a Division of
Cavalier Industries, Inc, 195 NLRB 1121 (1972), enforcement denied on
other grounds 473 F 2d 1258 (C A 6, 1973) The discrimination in the
instant case lay in the fact that the Employer deducted unauthorized sums
from the paychecks of employees who had properly given notice of revoca-
tion of their checkoff authorizations. The encouragement of union member-
ship lay in the fact that employees, seeing the futility of trying to revoke
their checkoff authorizations, henceforth would be discouraged from trying
to revoke their union membership absent a valid union-security clause We
note that Georgia, where Respondent's plant is located, has a right-to-work
law
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BENJAMIN K. BLACKBURN, Administrative Law Judge: The
charge in Case 10-CB-2312 was filed on November 9, 1973.
The charge in Case 10-CB-2323 was filed on January 9,
1974, and amended on February 7, February 21, and April
4, 1974. An Order Consolidating Cases and Consolidated
Complaint were issued on February 21, 1974. An Amend-
ment to Complaint was issued on April 24, 1974. Respondent
filed a Motion to Dismiss on March 5, 1974. Administrative
Law Judge Arthur Leff denied Respondent's motion on April
8, 1974. On April 22, April 24, and May 2, 1974, respectively,
Fennell, counsel for Respondent, and counsel for the General
Counsel executed a stipulation that:
The charge in Case No. 10-CB-2312, the charge and
the first, second, third and fourth' amended charges, in
Case No. 10-CB-2323, the Consolidated Complaint and
Notice of Hearing, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the
Consolidated Complaint, General Counsel's Response
to the Motion to Dismiss, the Order dated April 8, 1974,
by Administrative Law Judge Arthur Leff on said Mo-
tion, Respondent's Answer to the Consolidated Com-
plaint, the Amendment to the Consolidated Complaint
issued on April 24, 1974, and this Stipulation and its
attached exhibits constitute the entire record in this case,
and the introduction of any further or other evidence
before an Administrative Law Judge is expressly waived
The stipulation also provides that:
All parties waive hearing and agree that this matter
shall be submitted to the Chief Administrative Law
Judge of the Board, upon a motion by Counsel for the
General Counsel, for a decision by a duly designated
Administrative Law Judge, upon the record described
herein, provided that the parties shall have 21 days from
the date of the order granting such motion, or such
further period as may be allowed for good cause shown
to file briefs and proposed findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law with said Administrative Law Judge.
Counsel for the General Counsel so moved on May 3, 1974.
I was designated by the Chief Administrative Law Judge on
May 8, 1974.
Upon the record formulated in this manner and after due
consideration of briefs, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I JURISDICTION
The Mead Corporation, herein called the Employer, is, and
has been at all times material herein, an Ohio corporation,
with an office and place of business located at Atlanta,
Georgia, where it is engaged in the manufacture and sale of
boxes and cartons. The Employer, during the past calendar
year, which period is representative of all times material
herein, sold and shipped finished products valued in excess of
$50,000 directly to customers located outside the State of
Georgia.
II THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Facts
Respondent and the Employer were parties to a collective-
bargaining agreement, effective July 20, 1970, to expire
November 1, 1973, which provided in article II, inter alia, for
the payroll deduction and remittance to Respondent of Re-
spondent's membership dues upon the execution of an au-
thorization therefor to the Employer by an employee. (The
1 There is no fourth amended charge in the documents before me
ATLANTA PRINTING SPECIALTIES
language of said article has remained substantially unchanged
throughout successive agreements between Respondent and
the Employer since 1963.) The authorization for dues deduc-
tion involved herein provides-
This authorization shall be irrevocable for a period of
one year from the date of its execution or for the dura-
tion of the applicable collective bargaining agreement,
whichever occurs sooner.
The authorization provides for an annual escape period dur-
ing the 15 days preceding the anniversary date of the authon-
zation, and for an escape period during the last 15 days of the
applicable collective -bargaining agreement , during which no-
tice of revocation can be given.
In July of 1973, Respondent and the Employer began
negotiations which, on October 13, 1973, resulted in agree-
ment upon a new collective -bargaining agreement , which was
ratified on October 14, 1973, and by its terms became effec-
tive upon October 15, 1973, to expire February 15, 1975.
The 1967-70 agreement between Respondent and The
Mead Corporation, by its terms, was effective from Novem-
ber 1, 1967, to expire November 1, 1970.
The following employees, prior to October 15, 1973, au-
thorized the Employer to deduct Respondent's membership
dues from their wages each month, and to remit said amounts
so deducted to Respondent:
Virgill C. Allen
John F. Anderson
Noel T. Bryant
Charles E. Campbell
Lewis Carr
Ken Coryell
Donald E. Crow
Patsey Devorce
Barney Dowdell
James E. Durmire
Nina Everett
Jerry Fred Fennell
Wilburn Garrett
Wilma Garrett
W. C. Gaylor
W. A. Gnffey
Gordon E. Gurley
Lawrence Williams
James F. Hogan
Claudia Houston
Calvin Hughes
Julius Jackson
Gary Jones
James N. Kendrick
Donald A. King
Dale Marlow
Gwendolyn Nunnally
Alonzo Paulhill
Thomas L. Puzder
Andrew J. Sellers
Howard Slatan
Lucille Smith
Douglas F. Spinks
James Spivey
Ella M. Thomas
Between October 17, 1973, and November 1, 1973, a num-
ber of employees gave notice to the Respondent and to the
Employer, in proper form, to revoke their dues deduction
authorizations.
Some of such revocation notices were given within the
annual escape period of the individual authorization and were
therefore timely on that basis. Respondent caused the em-
ployer to honor these revocation notices.
Others of such revocation notices, including those given by
the employees listed above, were not given within the annual
escape period of the individual authorization, but were given
within the 15 days preceding the expiration date specified in
the old agreement. Respondent caused the Employer not to
honor these revocation notices given by the employees listed
above, so that these employees continued on dues checkoff
notwithstanding their attempted revocation.
239
The stipulation contains the following paragraph relating
to Respondent 's contentions:
Respondent contends that the new agreement . . . is
the "applicable collective bargaining agreement," that
the revocation notices of the employees listed [above]
were not given during the fifteen day annual escape
period nor during the fifteen days previous to the expira-
tion of the "applicable collective bargaining agreement"
and that such notices were not timely under the dues
deduction agreement (authorization) in effect between
each member and Respondent.
The stipulation contains the following further agreement
between the parties with respect to those paragraphs of the
complaint which allege that Respondent 's purpose in causing
the Employer to refuse to honor the revocations of the em-
ployees named above was "to encourage membership in Re-
spondent" and that Respondent's acts constitute unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within.the meaning of Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended:
With reference to paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Con-
solidated Complaint and Respondent's Answer thereto,
it is agreed that the violation alleged therein is predicted
upon the contention that the said revocations by the
employees were timely, and that the violation of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act as encompassed therein arose solely as
a consequence of Respondent's causing The Mead Cor-
poration to refuse to honor said revocations.
B. Analysis and Conclusions
In his Response to Respondent 's Motion to Dismiss and in
his brief to me counsel for the General Counsel relied on
Felterv. Southern Pacific Company, 359 U.S. 326 , and Inter-
national Union, United Automobile, Aircraft, Agricultural
Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO, et al. (John L
Paulding, Inc.), 130 NLRB 1035 (1961 ). In denying Respon-
dent 's motion , Administrative Law Judge Leff said:
Assuming as I must for purposes of this motion the truth
of the allegations of the consolidated complaint, and in
light of the decisions cited by the General Counsel in his
Response , I find no merit in Respondent's motion.
The only significant difference between Paulding, supra,
and this case is that there the employees involved had taken
action after the expiration of one contract and before execu-
tion of another , while here they took action during the escape
period provided at the end of one contract at a time when
another had superseded it. The Board had occasion to charac-
terize its holding in the case relied on by the General Counsel
in the third of a series of Paulding cases, 142 NLRB 296 at
299-300:
In the first of these cases, International Union, United
Automobile, Aircraft, Agricultural Implement Workers
of America, AFL-CIO (John I. Paulding, Inc.), 130
NLRB 1035, Respondents attempted to cause the dis-
charge of some 33 employees who had submitted resig-
nations from Respondents on or after the expiration of
the first contract and prior to the execution of the second
contract on January 11, 1960.
The Board found that , under the Act, these employees
had a right to withdraw their membership from Re-
240 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
spondents after the first contract expired and at any time
there was no contract in existence. The Board concluded
that these employees had, for purposes of the Act, effec-
tively terminated their membership prior to the date of
the second contract, and were not, therefore, on that
date members who were subject to the maintenance-of-
membership clause in the second contract, and accord-
ingly, Respondents' attempts to cause their discharge for
nonpayment of dues under that clause were unlawful.
Thus, the precise question posed in this case is whether Re-
spondent can abrogate employees' statutory right to cancel
their checkoff authorizations during an escape period pro-
vided at the end of the term of a collective-bargaining
agreement by eiiecuting a second collective-bargaining
agreement which takes effect earlier than the first day of
the escape period.
In the first Paulding ease the Board adopted the Intermedi-
ate Report of Trial Examiner Vicent M. Rotolo (except for
one aspect of his recommended Order and notice not relevant
here), including the statement that:
No restrictions or limitations imposed by either the
Company or the Union unilaterally or by agreement
with each other will be permitted to prevent the free
exercise of the employee's statutory right to revoke his
dues checkoff authorization at the termination of the
contract.
Respondent contends the principle enunciated in the
Paulding case is not controlling because of what it character-
izes as the Board's "continuity of union security" doctrine.
It cites as dispositive American Smelting & Refining Com-
pany (Mission Unit), 200 NLRB 1004. That case involved the
interpretation of a checkoff authorization form which read in
part:
This assignment and authorization shall be effective
and cannot be cancelled for a period of one (1) year from
the date appearing above or until the termination date of
the current collective bargaining agreement between the
Company and the Union, whichever occurs sooner.
In sustaining Administrative Law Judge Jerrold H. Shapi-
ro's conclusion that the Act had not been violated by the
interpretation agreed on by company and union, the Board
said:
Our dismissal of the complaint herein does not rest
solely on the finding that "Respondents acted reasona-
bly and in good faith in construing the authorizations
and the collective bargaining agreement ...." but also
on our conclusion that , as so interpreted, the provisions
of Respondents' agreement respecting the checkoff of
union dues did not infringe upon employees' exercise of
Section 7 rights.
Respondent contends American Smelting stands for these
three propositions:
(1) [T]hat the parties to a collective bargaining agree-
ment may provide for reasonable fifteen-day escape pen-
ods which are enforceable as limitations upon the right
to revoke a check-off authorization, (2) that the check-
off authorization is an agreement by the employee which
may limit his right to revoke a check-off authorization,
and (3) that a construction of dues check-off authonza-
tion which deprives an employee of a supposed oppor-
tunity to revoke does not necessarily violate his Section
7 rights. -
Assuming, without finding, that the Board intended its
decision in American Smelting to have this sweeping effect,
it does not follow that it is controlling here. The question
posed in this case, i.e., what does the word "applicable" mean
in the statutory guarantee that a checkoff authorization
"shall not be irrevocable. .. beyond the termination date of
the applicable collective agreement," was not considered in
American Smelting. While neither Paulding nor American
Smelting is on all fours with this case, American Smelting is
not, as Respondent contends, "more nearly like the present
case than any other " Paulding is. The third Paulding case,
142 NLRB 296 (1963), Hershey Chocolate Corporation, 140
NLRB 249, and National Lead Company, Titanium Division,
106 NLRB 434 (1953), cited by Respondent for its doctrine
of "continuity of union security," are even less apposite than
American Smelting. As Respondent points out, "they dealt
with union shop and maintenance of membership clauses,
rather than check-off clauses." Finally, the portions of the
legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act which Respondent
relies on do not require a different conclusion. They provide
no insight into what Congress meant by the use of the word
"applicable" in the situation presented here.
The employees listed above had a statutory right to revoke
their checkoff authorizations between October 16 and
November 1, 1973, because, by its terms, a collective-bargain-
ing agreement was due to expire on the latter date. The
Board, in Paulding, has held that nothing will be permitted
to prevent the free exercise of that right. The fact that Re-
spondent caused the Employer to dishonor the revocations
executed by the employees listed above is sufficient to bring
this case within the ambit of Section 8(a)(3) even though
Respondent has made no request and conditions of employ-
ment which would be discriminatory within the meaning of
that section of the Act. I find, therefore, that Respondent has
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act by causing the
Employer not to honor revocations of dues checkoff authori-
zations furnished to it by its employees during the period
from October 16 to November 1, 1973
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire
record in this proceeding, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Employer is, and has been at all times material
herein, engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondent is, and has been at all times material herein,
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. By causing the Employer not to honor revocations of
dues checkoff authorizations furnished to it by its employees
during the period from October 16 to November 1, 1973,
Respondent has violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the
Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law, and the entire record in this proceeding, and
ATLANTA PRINTING SPECIALTIES
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the fol-
lowing recommended:
ORDER2
Atlanta Printing Specialties and Paper Products Union
Local 527, AFL-CIO, its officers , agents , and representa-
tives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Causing The Mead Corporation not to honor revoca-
tions of dues checkoff authorizations furnished to it by the
employees listed in Appendix A during the period from Octo-
ber 16 to November 1, 1973.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Notify The Mead Corporation, in writing, that it with-
draws its request that said corporation not honor the revo-
cations of dues checkoff authorizations furnished to it by
the employees listed in Appendix A during the period from
October 16 to November 1, 1973, and send a copy of said
letter to each of the employees listed in said Appendix.
(b) Reimburse each of the employees listed in Appendix A
for the dues withheld from his wages by The Mead Corpora-
tion since November 1, 1973, plus interest, computing the
sum due each employee in the manner prescribed in F. W.
Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Isis Plumb-
ing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
(c) Post at its offices and meeting halls copies of the at-
tached notice marked "Appendix B."3 Copies of said notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 10,
after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall
be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof,
and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Mail signed copies of the attached notice marked "Ap-
pendix B" to the Regional Director for Region 10 for posting
at facilities of The Mead Corporation, provided said corpora-
tion chooses to post said notice.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith
2 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec
102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
3 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board "
APPENDIX A
Virgill C. Allen
John F. Anderson
Noel T. Bryant
Charles F. Campbell
Lewis Carr
Ken Coryell
Donald E. Crow
Patsey Devorce
Barney Dowdell
James E . Durmire
Nina Everett
Jerry Fred Fennell
Wilburn Garrett
Wilma Garrett
W. C. Gaylor
W. A. Griffey
Gordon E. Gurley
Lawrence Williams
James F. Hogan
Claudia Houston
Calvin Hughes
Julius Jackson
Gary Jones
James N. Kendrick
Donald A. King
Dale Marlow
Gwendolyn Nunnally
Alonzo Paulhill
Thomas L. Puzder
Andrew J. Sellers
Howard Slatan
Lucille Smith
Douglas F . Spinks
James Spivey
Ella M. Thomas
APPENDIX B
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
241
The National Labor Relations Board having found, after a
trial, that we violated Federal law by causing The Mead
Corporation not to honor revocations of dues checkoff au-
thorizations furnished to it by some of its employees dur-
ing the period from October 16 to November 1, 1973, we
hereby notify you that:
The National Labor Relations Act gives all employees
these rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or help unions
To bargain collectively through a representative of
their own choosing
To act together for collective bargaining or other
aid or protection
To refrain from any or all of these things.
WE WILL NOT cause The Mead Corporation not to
honor revocations of dues checkoff authorizations fur-
nished to it by its employees during periods when its
employees have a legal right to revoke their authoriza-
tions.
WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner, restrain
or coerce employees in the exercise of the above rights.
WE WILL notify The Mead Corporation, in writing,
that we withdraw our request it not honor the revoca-
tions of dues checkoff authorizations furnished to it by:
Virgill C. Allen James F. Hogan
John F. Anderson Claudia Houston
Noel T. Bryant Calvin Hughes
242
Charles E. Campbell
Lewis Carr
Ken Coryell
Donald E. Crow
Pat^ey Devorce
Barney Dowdell
James E. Durmire
Nina Everett
Jerry Fred Fennell
Wilburn Garrett
Wilma Garrett
W. C. Gaylor
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Julius Jackson
Gary Jones
James N. Kendrick
Donald A. King
Dale Marlow
Gwendolyn Nunnally
Alonzo Paulhill
Thomas L. Puzder
Andrew J. Sellers
Howard Slatan
Lucille Smith
Douglas F. Spinks
W. A. Griffey James Spivey
Gordon E. Gurley Ella M. Thomas
Lawrence Williams
during the period from October 16 to November 1, 1973, and
send a copy of said letter to each of these employees.
WE WILL reimburse each of these employees for the
dues withheld from his wages by The Mead Corporation
since November 1, 1973, plus interest.
ATLANTA PRINTING SPECIALTIES AND
PAPER PRODUCTS UNION LOCAL 527,
AFL-CIO