Atieva, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 2, 2021

2020001375 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 2, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/194,527 02/28/2014 Yifan TANG 0210-097002 6832
53666 7590 03/02/2021
BRAKE HUGHES BELLERMANN LLP
Mark Bellermann
P.O. Box 1077
Middletown, MD 21769
EXAMINER
JOSEPH, DEVON A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2846
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/02/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brakehughes.com
uspto@brakehughes.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte YIFAN TANG
____________

Appeal 2020-001375
Application 14/194,527
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before JEFFREY T. SMITH, JEFFREY B. ROBERTSON, and
MONTÉ T. SQUIRE, Administrative Patent Judges.

SQUIRE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL1

Appellant2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 1–20, which are all the claims pending in this
application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 This Decision refers to the Specification filed Feb. 28, 2014 (“Spec.”);
Non-Final Office Action dated Oct. 4, 2018 (“Non-Final Act.”); Appeal
Brief filed May 6, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”); and Examiner’s Answer dated Sept.
20, 2019 (“Ans.”). There is no reply brief.
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Atieva, Inc. as the real party in
interest. Appeal Br. 1.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The invention relates to a vehicle torque safety monitor, which
includes a vehicle power estimator, an energy storage system power
estimator and limiter, and a vehicle power monitor. Spec. ¶ 3; Abstract.
Claim 1 illustrates the subject matter on appeal and is reproduced below
from the Claims Appendix to the Appeal Brief:
1. A vehicle torque safety monitor, comprising:
a vehicle power estimator coupled to receive an estimated
torque, rotational speed of a rotor and DC voltage from a motor
drive unit to estimate a first mechanical power of a first electric
motor and a second mechanical power of a second electric motor,
with the first electric motor coupled to drive at least one wheel
of a vehicle, and the second electric motor coupled to drive a
differing at least one wheel of the vehicle;
an energy storage system power estimator and limiter
coupled to receive one or more voltage and charge parameters
from an energy storage system to estimate electrical power
provided by an energy storage system, at least a portion of the
electrical power converting to the first mechanical power and the
second mechanical power; and
a vehicle power monitor coupled to the vehicle power
estimator and the energy storage system power estimator to
compare the first mechanical power, the second mechanical
power and the electrical power, and to indicate an inconsistency
in the first mechanical power, the second mechanical power, and
the electrical power with each other based on such comparison.
Appeal Br. 11.
REFERENCE
The Examiner relies on the following prior art reference as evidence
in rejecting the claims on appeal:
Name Reference Date
Tang US 7,739,005 B1 June 15, 2010
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REJECTION
On appeal, the Examiner maintains (Ans. 3) the following rejection:
claims 1–20 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by
Tang. Non-Final Act. 3.
OPINION
Having considered the respective positions the Examiner and
Appellant advance in light of this appeal record, we affirm the Examiner’s
rejection based essentially on the fact-finding and reasons the Examiner
provides in the Answer and Non-Final Office Action. We add the following
primarily for emphasis.
The Examiner rejects claims 1–20 under § 102(a)(1) as anticipated by
Tang. Non-Final Act. 3–12. In response to the Examiner’s rejection,
Appellant presents arguments for the patentability of claims 1–7 as a group,
claims 8–12 as a group, and claims 13–20 as a group, respectively, under
separate headings in the Appeal Brief (Appeal Br. 5, 11, 13), which we
address in turn below.
Claims 1–7
Appellant argues the patentability of claims 1–7 as a group. Appeal
Br. 5. We select claim 1 as representative of this group and claims 2–7 stand
or fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 should be
reversed because the passages of Tang the Examiner cites do not show or
disclose the limitation:
a vehicle power monitor coupled to the vehicle power estimator
and the energy storage system power estimator to compare the
first mechanical power, the second mechanical power and the
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electrical power, and to indicate an inconsistency in the first
mechanical power, the second mechanical power, and the
electrical power with each other based on such comparison.
Appeal Br. 5. Appellant contends the cited passages are silent as to the
above claim limitation and the Examiner “does not specifically identify the
claim elements ‘compare’, ‘indicate’, ‘inconsistency’, and ‘comparison’ in
Tang.” Id. at 5–6.
Appellant also contends the cited passages do not discuss mechanical
power and electrical power of certain of Tang’s components and are silent
regarding comparing mechanical power and electrical power and indicating
an inconsistency based on such comparison. Id. at 7, 9 (arguing “there is no
inconsistency in comparison of the two mechanical powers with the
electrical power” and “no indication of an inconsistency based on such a
comparison in this regard in Tang”).
Appellant further argues that the Examiner misconstrues Tang’s
disclosures regarding “wheel slip ratios” and “slip error ratios.” Appeal Br.
8. Appellant contends that, in contrast to the Examiner’s findings, Tang’s
wheel strip ratios and slip error ratios do not show comparison of the first
mechanical power, the second mechanical power and the electrical power
nor do they show indicating an inconsistency in the first mechanical power,
the second mechanical power and the electrical power with each other based
on such comparison. Id.
Appellant also argues that the Examiner’s interpretation of the
“inconsistency” and “indicate an inconsistency” claim terms is not the
broadest reasonable interpretation in light of and consistent with the
Specification. Id. at 9–10 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 33, 34).
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We do not find Appellant’s arguments persuasive of reversible error
in the Examiner’s rejection based essentially on the factual findings and
analysis the Examiner provides at pages 3–5 of the Answer and pages 3–4 of
the Non-Final Action, which a preponderance of the evidence supports.
Rather, on this Appeal record, we agree with the Examiner that Tang
does disclose “a vehicle power monitor coupled to the vehicle power
estimator and the energy storage system power estimator to compare the first
mechanical power, the second mechanical power and the electrical power,
and to indicate an inconsistency in the first mechanical power, the second
mechanical power, and the electrical power with each other based on such
comparison,” as claimed.
As the Examiner finds (Ans. 3–4; Non-Final Act. 4), Tang discloses a
torque control system for an all-wheel drive vehicle including a vehicle
power monitor (primary and secondary control modules 403, 405 together
with sensors 505–507 and sensors 509–511) coupled to the vehicle power
estimator (torque controller 407) and the energy storage system power
estimator (primary motor and assist motor energy storage systems 501, 503)
to compare the first power mechanical power (via transmission/differential
assembly 111), the second mechanical power (via transmission/differential
assembly 105) and the electrical power, and to indicate an inconsistency in
the first mechanical power, the second mechanical power, and the electrical
power with each other based on such comparison. Tang, Fig. 5, 1:41–45,
1:60–2:17, 5:50–7:18, 9:47–67.
Regarding the “compare,” “indicate an inconsistency,” and
“comparison” recitations, as the Examiner finds and explains (Ans. 4),
Tang’s torque control system receives vehicle parameters via electric motors
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103 and 109 and includes a traction control unit that computes (i.e.,
compares) speed, torque, and other ratios, which correspond to the vehicle’s
first and second axles. Tang, 1:60–2:6. As the Examiner further finds (Ans.
5), Tang’s system calculates the appropriate power to be supplied to each
motor, and thus the torque/power to be supplied to the individual wheels and
includes a variety of sensors throughout the vehicle that monitor vehicle
performance, the drive system, the condition and performance of the energy
storage system, and the power control electronics. See Tang, 6:8–21.
As the Examiner also finds (Ans. 4–5) Tang’s torque split unit, which
is part of torque controller 407, interpolates data from a look-up table and
computes an optimal primary motor flux command and an optimal assist
motor flux command when there is a difference (i.e., an inconsistency
indicated) between them, and that it was well understood by one of ordinary
skill in the art that the torque control unit (via the identified sensors) makes a
comparison between the two mechanical power units and makes the
necessary changes (i.e., determines the optimal torque split) due to any
inconsistencies identified. Tang, 2:12–17, 6:57–62 (disclosing the system
“can be used to determine the optimal torque split”).
Appellant’s arguments do not reveal reversible error in the Examiner
factual findings and analysis. Appellant’s contention that the cited passages
of Tang do not disclose “a vehicle power monitor . . . based on such
comparison” (Appeal Br. 5, 7–8) is not persuasive because it is conclusory
and, without more, does not show reversible error in the Examiner’s
findings. In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also In re
Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Board reasonably
interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive arguments in an appeal
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brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that
the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.”).
Appellant’s contentions that the passages of Tang the Examiner cites
are silent as to or do not discuss certain claim elements or aspects of Tang’s
system (Appeal Br. 5, 7) are equally unpersuasive because they too are
conclusory. De Blauwe, 736 F.2d at 705. To the extent Appellant’s argument
is that Tang’s disclosure does not use or include the same terms to describe
its system as the terms used in the claim, we do not find that argument
persuasive because a “specific limitation need not be disclosed in haec verba
in the reference.” In re Bode, 550 F.2d 656, 660 (1977); see also In re Bond,
910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (explaining that there is no ipsissimis
verbis test for determining whether a reference discloses a claim element,
i.e., identity of terminology is not required).
We also do not find persuasive Appellant’s argument that the
Examiner misconstrues Tang’s disclosures and Tang’s wheel slip ratios and
slip error ratios do not show the “comparison” or “indicate an inconsistency”
claim elements (Appeal Br. 8) because it appears to be based on Appellant’s
misinterpretation of the Examiner’s findings and analysis. Contrary to what
Appellant’s argument seems to imply, the Examiner does not rely solely on
Tang’s teachings regarding wheel slip ratios and slip error ratios for
disclosing the “compare,” “comparison, and “indicate an inconsistency”
recitations of the claim. Rather, as we discuss above, the Examiner’s
analysis includes and relies on other disclosures in Tang for disclosing those
limitations, including, for example, Tang’s disclosures regarding the torque
split unit.
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Appellant’s argument that the Examiner’s interpretation of the
“inconsistency” and “indicate an inconsistency” terms is not the broadest
reasonable interpretation in light of and consistent with the Specification
(Appeal Br. 9–10) is not well-taken because the portions of the Specification
Appellant identifies (Spec. ¶¶ 33, 34) describe non-limiting example
embodiments, and we decline to read the limitations of specific
embodiments from the Specification into the claims. See E-Pass Techs., Inc.
v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining that claims
must be interpreted “in view of the specification” without importing
limitations from the specification into the claims).
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–7.
Claims 8–12
Appellant presents separate argument for the patentability of claims
8–12 as a group. Appeal Br. 11. We select independent claim 8 as
representative and claims 9–12 stand or fall with claim 8. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Claim 8 recites:
A vehicle control unit, comprising:
a split torque command generator coupled to a first
electric motor and to a second electric motor, the first
electric motor and the second electric motor providing
motive power for an all-wheel drive vehicle, the split
torque command generator directs the first electric motor
to produce a first torque to drive at least one wheel of the
all-wheel drive vehicle and directs the second electric
motor to produce a second torque to drive a differing at
least one wheel of the all-wheel drive vehicle; and
a vehicle torque safety monitor coupled to the split
torque command generator, the vehicle torque safety
monitor comprises:
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a vehicle power estimator coupled to receive
an estimated torque, rotational speed of a rotor and DC
voltage from a motor drive unit to estimate mechanical
power produced by each of the first electric motor and the
second electric motor;
an energy storage system power estimator
coupled to receive one or more voltage and charge
parameters from an energy storage system to estimate
electrical power provided for conversion to mechanical
power by the first electric motor and the second electric
motor; and
a vehicle power monitor coupled to the
vehicle power estimator and the energy storage system
power estimator to compare the mechanical power and the
electrical power;
wherein the vehicle torque safety monitor
couples to the split torque command generator to alter at
least one of the first torque and the second torque, in
response to a discrepancy between the mechanical power
and the electrical power.
Appeal Br. 19–20 (Claims Appendix).
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection of claim 8 should be
reversed for reasons similar or analogous to the reasons Appellant presents
above for claim 1. Compare Appeal Br. 11–13 (claim 8) with, Appeal Br.
5–6, 10–11 (claim 1).
We do not find Appellant’s arguments persuasive of reversible error
in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 8 for principally the same or reasons
analogous to those we discuss above for claim 1. For example, as with claim
1, we find that Appellant’s contentions as to whether Tang discloses certain
limitations of claim 8 are conclusory and appear to be based principally on
the fact that Tang’s disclosure does not use or include the same terms to
describe the components of its system as the terms used in the claim.
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Based on the factual findings and analysis the Examiner provides at
page 5 of the Answer and pages 7–8 of the Non-Final Action, and similar
reasons or reasons analogous to those we discuss above for claim 1, we
determine a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner’s
determination that Tang discloses the limitations of claim 8 and anticipates
the claim.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 8–12.
Claims 13–20
Appellant presents argument for the patentability of claims 13–20 as a
group. Appeal Br. 13. We select independent claim 13 as representative and
claims 14–20 stand or fall with claim 8. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Claim 13 recites:
A method for monitoring power in an all-wheel
drive vehicle having a plurality of electric motors, the
method comprising:
calculating a first mechanical power, produced by a
first electric motor coupled to drive at least one wheel of
the all-wheel drive vehicle, using a vehicle power
estimator;
calculating a second mechanical power, produced
by a second electric motor coupled to drive a differing at
least one wheel of the all-wheel drive vehicle, using the
vehicle power estimator;
calculating electrical power provided for production
of the first mechanical power and the second mechanical
power using an energy storage system power estimator;
calculating commanded vehicle power, as
commanded to the first electric motor and the second
electric motor using the energy storage system power
estimator; and
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determining whether the first mechanical power, the
second mechanical power, the electrical power, and the
commanded vehicle power are consistent in comparison
with each other using a vehicle power monitor; and
reporting an inconsistency, in response to
determining the inconsistency among the first mechanical
power, the second mechanical power, the electrical power,
and the commanded vehicle power, based on the
comparison with each other, using the vehicle power
monitor.
Appeal Br. 21–22 (Claims Appendix).
In response to the Examiner’s rejection of claim 13, Appellant repeats
and relies on principally the same or arguments similar to arguments
Appellant presents above for claim 1. Compare Appeal Br. 13–16 (claim 13)
with, Appeal Br. 5–6, 10–11 (claim 1). We do not find these arguments
persuasive of reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 13 for
principally the same or reasons analogous to those we discuss above for
claim 1.
Based on the factual findings and analysis the Examiner provides at
pages 5–6 of the Answer and pages 9–10 of the Non-Final Action, and
similar reasons or reasons analogous to those we discuss above for claim 1,
we determine a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner’s
determination that Tang discloses the limitations of claim 13 and anticipates
the claim.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 13–20.
Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as anticipated by Tang.
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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. §  Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 102(a)(1) Tang 1–20

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED