Athens Manufacturing Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 18, 1946

69 N.L.R.B. 605 (N.L.R.B. 1946)

In the Matter Of ATHENS MANUFACTURING COMPANY and TEXTILE
WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, C. I. O.
Case No. 10-0-1767.-Decided July 18, 1946
Mr. M. A. Proivell, for the Board.
Weekes cf Candler, by Messrs. John Wesley Weekes and Murphy
Candler, of Decatur, Ga.; and Mr. Abit Nix, of Athens, Ga., for the
respondent.
Messrs. Kenneth Douty and George R. Jonrnard, of Atlanta, Ga., for
the. Union.
Mr. Harry W. Clayton, Jr., of counsel to the Board.
DECISION
AND
ORDER
On May 3, 1946, Trial Examiner Horace A. Ruckel issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices affecting commerce and recommending that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in
the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. The Trial
Examiner also found that the dismissal of Mattie Hollis was not a
violation of Section 8 (3) of the Act and recommended that the
allegations of the complaint respecting this matter be dismissed.
Thereafter, the respondent and counsel for the Board filed exceptions
to the Intermediate Report. On June 18, 1946, the Board heard oral
argument at Washington, D. C., in which the respondent and the
Union participated.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions of the respondent and counsel for the
Board, and the entire record in the case and hereby adopts the findings,
conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, with the
modifications and additions hereinafter set forth.
1. We agree with the Trial Examiner, and we find, that the re-
spondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning
of Section 8 (5) and (1) of the Act.
(;:9 N. L. R. R.. No. 75.
605
606 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In finding that the respondent has refused to bargain within the
meaning of Section 8 (5) of the Act, we do not rely upon the Trial
Examiner's concluding finding that
As has been found, the respondent, at the second conference,
insisted on its own form of proposed contract as a basis of dis-
cussion, thrusting aside the Union's request that the negotiations
proceed on the basis of the contract submitted by the Union al-
though the parties had already reached an agreement on several
of its provisions. The Union thereafter was in the position of
attempting to liberalize a contract drawn up from the standpoint
of the respondent's interests, by forcing into it certain provisions
of advantage to itself.
The respondent's counterproposal dealt with substantially all the
subjects of collective bargaining with respect to which the Union had
made demands, and in this connection there is no showing that the
respondent refused to discuss any of the Union's proposals. In fact,
the respondent made several changes in its proposed contract to meet
objections by the Union. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion
that the respondent's insistence upon its counterproposal as a basis
of discussion does not reflect lack of good faith.
In concurring in the Trial Examiner's conclusion that the respondent
has violated Section 8 (5) of the Act,' we do rely, however, upon the
remaining findings contained in the Intermediate Report and particu-
larly upon the following circumstances: (a) The statements of 0. D.
Grimes, the respondent's vice president and general manager, at the
conclusion of the first bargaining conference on September 1, 1944,
that, among other things, "I am going to tear up this union if it is
possible. It isn't to my interest that the Union be built. It is only
something to cause trouble and tear down the employees in the plant.
. . . If it is possible, I am going to destroy the Union. . ." 2
These remarks plainly were the antithesis of an intention to comply
with the obligation imposed by the Act to "enter into discussion with
an open and fair mind, and a sincere purpose to find a basis of agree-
ment." 3 (b) The unilateral action of the respondent in setting the
i The Trial Examiner has found that the respondent's refusal to bargain dates from
August 14, 1944. The complaint alleges, however, a refusal to bargain on and after
September 1, 1944, and the respondent first manifested its willingness to comply with its
duty under Section 8 (5) at the conference of this date. We therefore find that the
respondent failed and refused to bargain on and at all times after September 1, 1944, rather
than August 14, 1944.
2 The respondent has excepted to the Trial Examiner's finding that Grimes made the
statements quoted above on the ground, inter alla, that the Trial Examiner "failed to take
cognizance of or give credit to " testimony of Personnel Manager Carnes which corroborated
Grimes' denial that he had made these statements. Carnes testified that be did not hear
Grimes make these remarks . The lack of reference in the Intermediate Report to Carnes'
testimony does not establish that the Trial Examiner failed "to take cognizance of" it. In
any event, we have considered Carnes' testimony in connection with Grimes' denial and,
like the Trial Examiner, credit the testimony of White, which was corroborated by that
of Chambers, that Grimes made these statements.
3 Globe Cotton Mills v. N. L. R. B., 103 F. (2d) 91 (C. C. A. 5), enf'g 6 N. L. R. B. 461.
ATHENS MANUFACTURING COMPANY 607
week of July 4 as vacation week, when the parties were negotiating a
vacation clause upon which agreement had not been reached. We agree
with the Trial Examiner that such unilateral action by an employer on
a matter under negotiation constitutes, in itself, a refusal to bargain
collectively. (c) The action of the respondent in repudiating the
agreements of its representatives. In this respect, it appears, that the
respondent did not delegate to its representatives authority to bind it.
The power-of the representative is a factor which must be considered in
the light of other evidence in order to determine whether the respond-
ent made a good faith effort to-negotiate.' In the instant case, the re-
sponclent:'s president and its vice president and general manager
attended several of the bargaining conferences at these conferences the
respondent's side of the negotiations was conducted by counsel for the
respondent, a. representative who did not have the authority to bind the
respondent. Following these conferences, counsel for the respondent
drew up and submitted to the Union a contract to which the Union
agreed with the exception of a clause relating to vacations. , Shortly
thereafter, the respondent's personnel manager reached agreement with
the Union concerning a. vacation plan. Immediately following this,
however, Grimmes, the respondent's vice president and general manager,.
repudiated the ag)eement regarding vacations reached by the person-
nel manager and a few days later repudiated in substantial part the
proposed contract which the respondent's counsel had submitted to the
Union. In thus repudiating what the respondent's representatives had
done, Grimes himself made no effort to negotiate to the end that an
agreement might be reached. Indeed, as set forth in the Intermediate,
Report, when asked concerning the previous agreement regarding
a vacation during the week of July 4, Grimes states that "it was too
late to have a vacation on the July 4th week and that at this time he
could do nothing about it." Yet, as mentioned above, the respondent
thereafter unilaterally set the week of July 4 as a vacation week. In.
sum, the respondent designated as its representatives in negotiations
persons without authority to bind it; when such representatives reached
an agreement, the respondent's representative who possessed sufficient
authority repudiated the agreement, made no effort himself to reach
any agreement, and took unilateral action concerning a subject of
bargaining which had been under negotiation. We regard Grimes'
conduct as a clear manifestation of the lack of good faith which he
had expressed at the outset of negotiations, and we find that the method
outlined above of conducting negotiations by the respondent evidenced
its intention not to comply with its duty under Section 8 (5) of the
Act.
4 See Great Southern Truakrug Company v. N. L. R . B.. 127 F . ( 2(1) 180. 185 ( C. C. A. 4).
608 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. We agree with the Trial Examiner that "as an immediate result;
of this rejection [of the Union's offer before the National War Labor
Board] and of the respondent's unfair labor practices, the respondent's
employees struck" on August 29, 1945. We further find that the re-
spondent's unfair labor practices were the fundamental cause of the
strike which began on August 29, 1945, and of its prolongation there-
after.s
THE REMEDY
Having found that the respondent has engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, we shall order the respondent to cease and desist there-
from and to take certain affirmative action which will effectuate the
policies of the Act.
We have found that the respondent has refused to bargain collec-
tively with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees
in an appropriate, unit in violation of Section 8 (5) of the Act. We,
therefore, shall order that the respondent, upon request, bargain col-
lectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees
in an appropriate unit in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment.
We have found that the unfair labor practices of the respondent
caused and prolonged the strike which began on August 29, 1945. In
order to restore the status quo as it existed prior to the time the re-
spondent engaged in such unfair labor practices, we shall order that
the respondent : (1) offer reinstatement to their former or substantially
equivalent position, without projudice to their seniority and other
rights and privileges, to those employees who went on strike on August
29, 1945, or thereafter, and who have applied for and have not been
offered reinstatement, and (2) upon application offer reinstatement
to their former or substantially equivalent position. without prejudice
to their seniority or other rights and privileges, to those employees who
went on strike on said date, or thereafter, and who have not previously
applied for reinstatement.
The reinstatement of employees in categories (1) and (2) above
shall be effected by dismissing, if necessary,, all persons hired on or
after August 29, 1945, the date of the commencement of the strike,
and not in the respondent's employ on said date. If there is then not.
sufficient employment available for the employees to be offered rein-
statement, all available positions shall be distributed among such
employees without discrimination against any employee, because of his
union affiliation or activities, following such a system of seniority or
other non-discriminatory practice to such extent as has heretofore
°Matter of The Barrett ComPantt, 41 N. L. R. B. 1327, enfd N, L. R. B. V. The Barrett
Company, 135 F. ( 2d)'959 (C. C. A. 7), and cases cited therein.
ATHENS MANUFACTURING COMPANY 609
been applied in the conduct of the respondent's business. Those em-
ployees, if any, remaining after such distribution, for whom no em-
ployment is immediately available, shall be placed upon a preferential
list and thereafter offered employment in their former or substantially
equivalent positions as such employment becomes available and before
other persons are hired for such work, in the order determined among
them by the system of seniority or other non-discriminatory practice.
We shall also order the respondent to make whole those employees
who went on strike on August 29, 1945, or thereafter, and who have
applied for and have not been offered reinstatement, for any loss of
pay they may have suffered by reason of the respondent's refusal, if
any, to reinstate them, as provided above, by payment to each of them
of a sum of money equal to that which lie would normally have earned
as wages during the period from five (5) days after the date on which
he applied for reinstatement to the date of the respondent's offer of
reinstatement or placement on a preferential list, less his net earnings 6
if any, during such period. We shall order the respondent to make
whole those employees who went on strike on August 29, 1945, or there-
after, who have applied for and who have received reinstatement, for
any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the respondent's
refusal, if any, to reinstate them within five (5) days from the date
of such application, by payment to each of them of a sum of money
equal to that which he would normally have earned as wages during
the period from five (5) days after the date upon which he applied
for reinstatement to the date upon which he was reinstated, less his
net earnings, if any, during such period. We shall also order the
respondent to make whole those employees who went on strike on
August 29, 1945, or thereafter, and who have not previously applied
for reinstatement, for any loss of pay they may suffer by reason of
the respondent's refusal, if any, to reinstate there, as provided above,
by payment to each of them of a sum of money which he would nor-
mally have earned as wages during the period from five (5) days after
the date on which he applied for reinstatement to the date of the
respondent's offer of reinstatement or placement on a preferential list,
less his net earnings during such period.
As recommended in the Intermediate Report, we shall dismiss the
allegations of the complaint with respect to the discharge of Mattie
Hollis.
" By net earnings" is meant earnings less expenses, such as for transportation, room,
and board, incurred by an employee in connection with obtaining work and working else-
w1wre than for the respondent. which would not have been incurred but for his unlawful
discharge and the conseauent necessity of his seeking employment elsewhere. See Matter
of Crossett Lumber Company , 8 N. L. R. B. 440 . Monies received for work performed
upon Federal, State, county, municipal, or other work-relief projects shall be considered
ar earnings. See Repubiir Steel Corporation v. S. L. R. B., 311 U. S. 7.
70159'?--47--col. rill 40
610 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the respondent, Athens Manufacturing
Company, Athens, Georgia, and its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Textile Workers Union
of America, C. I. 0., as the exclusive representative of all production
and maintenance employees at its Athens, Georgia, plant, including
the employees at the warehouse and the hydroelectric plant and in-
cluding inspectors and watchmen, but excluding executives, techni-
cal employees, office employees, and all supervisory employees with
authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or otherwise effect
changes in the status of employees or effectively recommend such
action ;
(b) Threatening to shut down its mill before bargaining with
Textile Workers Union of America, C. I. 0., and urging or solicit-
ing employees to abandon their strike activity in disregard of the de-
cision of their bargaining representative,:,
(c) In any manner interfering with the efforts of Textile Workers
Union of America, C. I. 0., to bargain collectively with it.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Textile Workers Union
of America, C. I. 0., as the exclusive representative of all production
and maintenance employees at the respondent's Athens, Georgia, plant,
including the employees at the warehouse and at the hydroelectric
plant and including inspectors and watchmen, but excluding execu-
tives, technical employees, oflice employees, and all supervisory em-
ployees with authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or
otherwise effect changes in the status of employees, or effectively
recommend such action, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, and other conditions of employment
(b) Offer to those employees who went on strike on August 29,
1945, or thereafter, and who have applied for and have not been of-
fered reinstatement, immediate and full reinstatement to their former
or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their sen-
iority and other rights and privileges, in the manner provided in the
section of this Decision entitled "The remedy"; and place those em-
ployees for whom employment is not immediately available upon a
preferential list in the manner set forth in said section and there-
after, in said manner, offer them employment as it becomes available;
ATHENS MANUFACTURING COMPANY 611
(c) Upon application, offer to those employees who went on strike
on August 29, 1945, or thereafter, and who have not previously ap-
plied for reinstatement, immediate and full reinstatement to their
former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to their
seniority and other rights and privileges, in the manner provided in
the section of this Decision entitled "The remedy"; and place those
employees for whom employment is not immediately available upon
a preferential list in the manner set forth and thereafter, in said man-
ner, offer them employment as it becomes available;
(d) Make whole the employees who went on strike on August 29,
1945, or thereafter, and who have applied for reinstatement for any
loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the respondent's
refusal, if any, to reinstate them within five (5) days of their respec-
tive applications, as provided in the section of this Decision entitled
"The remedy," by payment to each of them of a sum of money equal to
that which he normally would have earned as wages during the period
from five (5) days after the date on which he applied for reinstate-
ment to the date of the respondent's offer of reinstatement or place-
ment upon a preferential list, less his net earnings, if any, during said
period ;
(e) Make whole the employees who went on strike on August 29,
1945, or thereafter, and who have applied for and received reinstate-
ment, for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the re-
spondent's refusal, if any, to reinstate them within five (5) days of
their respective applications, as provided in the section of this Decision
entitled "The remedy," by payment to each of them of a sum of money
equal to that which he normally would have earned as wages during
the period from five (5) days after the date on which he applied for
reinstatement to the date of his reinstatement, less his net earnings, if
any, during such period;
(f) Make whole the employees who went on strike on August 29,
1945, or thereafter, and who have not applied for reinstatement, for
any loss of pay they may suffer by reason of the respondent's refusal,
if any, to reinstate them, as provided in the section of this Decision
entitled "The remedy," by payment to each of them of a sum of money
equal to that which he normally would have earned as wages during
the period from five (5) days after the date on which he applied for
reinstatement to the date of the respondent's offer of reinstatement or
placement upon a preferential list, less his net earnings, if any, during
said period;
(g) Post immediately in conspicuous places at its Athens, Georgia,
plant, copies of the notice attached hereto and marked "Appendix
A." Copies of the notices to be furnished by the Regional Director for
the Tenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the respondent's
representative, be posted by the respondent immediately upon receipt
612 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
thereof and maintained by it for a period of sixty (60) consecutive
days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where re-
spondent customarily posts notices to employees. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material;
(h) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the
respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the allegations of the complaint respect-
ing the discharge of Mattie Hollis be, and they hereby are, dismissed.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
PtIrsuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with the efforts of
Textile Workers Union of America, C. I. 0., to bargain collec-
tively with us.
WE WILL NOT threaten to shut down our mill before bargain-
ing with the Textile Workers Union of America, C. I. 0., or urge
or solicit employees to abandon their strike activity in disregard
of the decision of their bargaining representative.
WE WILL BARGAIN collectively upon request with the above-
named union as the exclusive representative of all employees in
• the bargaining unit described herein with respect to rates of pay,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment, and
if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a
signed agreement. The bargaining unit is : all production and
maintenance employees at the Athens, Georgia, plant, including
the employees at the warehouse and the hydroelectric plant, and
including inspectors and watchmen, but excluding executives,
technical employees, office employees, and all supervisory em-
ployees with authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or
otherwise effect changes in the status of employees or effectively
recommend such action.
AVE WILL OFFER to those employees who went on strike on
August 29, 1945, or thereafter, and who have applied for and
have not been offered reinstatement, immediate and full rein-
statemeut to their former or substantially equivalent positions in
ATHENS MANUFACTURING COMPANY 613
the manner set forth in the Board's Decision , without prejudice
to any seniority or other rights previously enjoyed.
WE WILL OFFER , upon application , to those employees
who went on strike August 29, 1945 , or thereafter , and who have
not previously applied for reinstatement , immediate and full re-
instatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions
in the manner set forth in the Board 's Decision , without prej-
udice to any seniority or other rights previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make whole the employees who went on strike
August 29 , 1945, or thereafter , for any loss of pay suffered as a
result of our refusal , if any, to reinstate them in the manner set
forth in the Board's Decision.
ATHENS MANUFACTURING COMPANY
Employer.
By ---------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
Dated--------------------
NOTE : Any of the employees in the above categories presently serv-
ing in the armed forces of the United States will be offered reinstate-
ment upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Net
after discharge from the armed forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
Mr. M. A. Prowell, for the Board.
Weekes & Candler, by Messrs. John Wesley Weekes and Murphy Candler, of
Decatur, Ga., and Mr. Abit Nix, of Athens, Ga., for the respondent.
Messrs. Kenneth Donty and George R. Jonnard, of Atlanta, Ga., for the Union.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon an amended charge filed on March 7, 1946, by Textile Workers Union
of America, C. I. 0., herein called the Union, the National Labor Relations
Board, herein called the Board, by its Regional Director for the Tenth Region
(Atlanta, Georgia), issued a complaint dated March 7. 1946, against Athens
Manufacturing Company, herein called the respondent, alleging that the re-
spondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (1), (3) and (5) and Section 2 (6) and
(7) of the National Labor Relations Act. 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act.
With respect to the unfair labor practices the complaint alleged, in sub-
stance, that the respondent (1) on or about September 1, 1944, and thereafter,
failed and refused to bargain collectively with the Union although it represented
a majority of the respondent's employees in an appropriate unit; (2) on or
about August. 20. 1945. discharged and thereafter refused to reinstate Mattie
614 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Hollis because of her union membership and activity; and (3) since August 1,
1944, has warned employees against joining the Union, and threatened them
with loss of employment if they did so ; stated to employees that the respondent
would never sign a contract with the Union ; attempted to dissuade employees
from participating in a Strike caused by the respondent's unfair labor practices,
and otherwise interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the
exercise of the privileges guaranteed by the Act. Copies of the complaint,
together with notice of hearing thereon, were duly served upon the respondent
and the Union.
On March 18, 1946, the respondent filed an answer admitting some of the
allegations of the complaint but denying that it had engaged in any unfair labor
practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held from -larch 25 to 28, 1946, at Athens,
Georgia, before Horace A. Ruckel, the undersigned Trial Examiner duly appointed
by the Chief Trial Examiner. The Board, the Union, and the respondent were
represented by counsel and participated in the hearing. Full opportunity to be
heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bear-
ing upon the issues, was afforded all parties. At the close of the hearing counsel
for the Board moved, without objection, to amend the complaint to conform to
the proof in formal matters. The undersigned granted this motion. The parties
were advised that they might argue orally before the undersigned and might file
briefs with the undersigned within 10 days from the close of the hearing. None
of the parties argued orally. No briefs were filed.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from his observation of the witnesses,
the undersigned makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The respondent is a Georgia corporation, maintaining its principal office and
place of business at Athens, Georgia, where it is engaged in the manufacture, sale,
and distribution of cotton sheeting, tire cord, and rayon fabrics. During the year
1945, the respondent purchased for its Athens plant, raw materials valued in
excess of $1,000,000, of which more than 75 percent was purchased and shipped
from points outside the State of Georgia. During the same period, the respond-
ent manufactured and sold finished products valued in excess of $2,000,000, of
which more than 75 percent was shipped to points outside the State of Georgia.
The respondent admits that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
Textile Workers Union of America is a labor organization admitting employees
of the respondent to membership. It is affiliated with the Congress of Industrial
Organizations.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The refusal to bargain; other interference, restraint, and coercion
1. The appropriate unit and representation by the Union of a majority therein
On August 5, 1944, the Board issued a Decision and Order' finding that an
appropriate unit of the respondent's employees for the purposes of collective
In the Matter of Athens Manufacturing Company and Textile Workers Union of Amer-
ica, C. I. 0., 57 N. L. R. B. 1115.
ATHENS MANUFACTURING COMPANY 615
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act was constituted as
follows : All production and maintenance employees at its plant in Athens,
Georgia, including the employees at the warehouse and the hydroelectric plant,
and including inspectors and watchmen, but excluding executives, technical em-
ployees, office employees, and all supervisory employees with authority to hire,
promote, discharge, discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status of em-
ployees or effectively recommend such action. The unit found consisted of ap-
proximately 810 employees.
On August 31, 1944, following an election held on August 14, the Board certified
the Union as the collective bargaining representative of the employees within the
appropriate unit.
The undersigned finds that on August 14, 1944, and at all times thereafter,
the Union was the duly designated representative of a majority of the employees
in the appropriate unit, and that by virtue of Section 9 (a) of the Act, was, on
August 14, 1944, and thereafter, the exclusive bargaining representative of all
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours, and other conditions of employment.
2. The refusal to bargain
About September 1, 1944, Horace White, an international representative of the
Union, together with a shop committee headed by Ed Chambers, met with O. D.
Grimes, the respondent's vice president and general manager, Reese Carnes,
personnel manager, and others, and presented a proposed contract for discussion.
A tentative agreement was reached on a number of provisions. At the conclusion
of the meeting a conversation took place between White and Grimes, testified to
by the former as follows :
Q. Tell us what was said.
A. . . . So I said, "Well Mr. Grimes, I believe we are going to be able
to work out a contract here," and I said, "when will we have our next con-
ference?" .. .
And he said, "Well," he says, "it is your place to build the Union," but
he says, "I am going to be honest and we may as well lay the cards on the
table. I am going to tear up this Union if it is possible. It isn't to my
interest that the Union be built. It is only something to cause trouble and
tear down the employees in the plant." He says, "If it is possible I am going
to destroy the Union and if I do . . . if I do that . . . I am going to fire
the last one of the committee and I will start out with Ed Chambers," and
he laughed, pointing at him.
White's testimony was corroborated in its substance by that of Chambers.
Although Grimes denied making the statements above related, the undersigned
does not credit his denial, and finds that he did make them.
The next bargaining conference took place on September 14. This was at-
tended by Grimes and Ralph Williams, the latter an attorney who for several
months thereafter, until his withdrawal, represented the respondent in pro-
tracted negotiations, and by White and others on behalf of the Union. Williams
presented the union representatives with a proposed contract which he had
drafted, and which he termed "counter-proposals." Upon White's suggestion
that the negotiations continue from where they had left off at the first conference,
so that the progress already made might be conserved, Williams refused, stating,
according to White's uncontradicted and credible testimony, "anything which
may have tentatively been agreed upon in the last conference is herewith re-
pudiated . . . We are starting from scratch." With reluctance, the union
616 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
representatives agreed to continue the discussion on the basis of the "counter-
proposals."
At a third conference, on October 6 and 7, Williams submitted a "consolidation
of company counter-proposals," which embodied certain changes in the respond-
ent's original "counter-proposals" made to meet certain specific objections raised
by the Union at the second conference. Little further progress was made at the
third conference, the respondent's representative insisting, as he had done at the
second conference, that the "counter-proposals" serve as the basis for discussion,
and refusing to discuss the Union's proposed contract. As a result, the usual
collective bargaining roles were reversed. The representatives of the respondent
held the initiative, and the representatives of the Union were in the position of
seeking to force into the proposed contract, as submitted by the respondent,
provisions desired by the Union.
On October 16, 17, 18, and 19, 1944, further negotiations were undertaken,
which were joined by a conciliator from the United States Department of Labor.
At this series of conferences Williams, for the respondent, submitted still other
"counter-proposals" on contract provisions previously discussed but not agreed to.
By November 9, 1944, the parties had reached a point in their negotiations
where they were in agreement on certain provisions of a contract, but in admitted
disagreement on others, particularly a provision pertaining to vacations. These
issues the parties presented to the War Labor Board. On April 27, and May 1,
1945, after a hearing, that board issued certain directive orders which required
the parties to enter into ii contract containing certain provisions which the board
set forth. The provision relating to vacations was as follows:
(d) The Company shall provide one week's vacation with pay to each
employee who has been in the employ of the Company for one year. Vacation
(pay) for such employee shall be 2% of his total earnings during the previous
year.
After receipt of these directives, Williams drew up a contract which conformed
to them in all material respects, except as to vacations. On June 13 he wrote
Clara Kanun, a field representative of the Union, who succeeded White in the
negotiations, as follows :
I have finally completed the Contract and enclose a copy of it. I will
communicate with you again as soon as I hear from Mr. Grimes.
I am also enclosing a copy of a letter which I have written to Mrs. Martha
Taylor with reference to the Petition to Review one provision of the non-
wage issue Directive. This letter is, of course, predicated on our agreement
as stated in the letter.
On the subject of vacations the respondent, acting through Reese Carnes, its
personnel manager, on June 15 presented the Union with a proposal for vacation
pay for employees amounting to 2 percent of their earnings for the preceding 7
months, instead of for the preceding 12 months, as called for by the War Labor
Board's directive on the subject. The Union rejected this proposal, and, after
some discussion, Carnes and the shop committee reduced to writing and signed
a clause which substantially conformed to the War Labor Board's directive. In
addition, the clause as executed, provided that the vacation week for 1945 should
start on July 2.
On the day following the execution of the vacation clause Carnes phoned
Kanun and told her that it would have to be canceled because Grimes had
"changed his mind about the vacation date."' As a consequence, another meet-
3 Carnes testified that while Grimes had given him no authority to agree to a vacation
date, he believed that Grimes would accept the one agreed upon.
ATHENS MANUFACTURING COMPANY 617
ing of the parties took place on June 19, in Williams's office. The credible,
uncontradicted, testimony of Kanun as to this meeting was as follows:
Q. Tell us what took place at that meeting.
A. We opened the discussion by first of all taking up the vacation clause.
We told Mr. Williams that the clause in his original proposal retailed to
us in the contract under date of June 13, 1945, was unacceptable. We then
discussed several possibilities of a vacation, clause to be substituted. Mr.
Williams went so far as to dictate another proposal to his secretary.
When she brought in the proposal dictated by Mr. Williams before con-
tinning the discussion on that proposal, I asked Mr. Grimes whether if
we disposed of our differences on the vacation clause we could arrange a
date for the signing of the entire contract because at that time it was the
only issue in dispute.
Q. Just a minute. Before you go on, you say it was the only issue in
dispute. Was the Union in agreement with all points of this 13th of June
1945 proposal of the Company with the exception of vacations?
A. Yes ; we had advised the Company that we were.
Q. All right.
A. And we advised its attorney the proposal of June 13, 1945, with the
exception of the vacation clause had been completely defined by the War
Labor Board directive orders and therefore we were accepting it as it
was. We felt that the original vocation clause in that June 13, 1945 (pro-
posal) (lid not reflect the intentions of the War Labor Board in its order
on that issue and that is why we raised the objection originally.
When I asked Mr. Grimes whether lie would agree to it date to sign the
entire contract if we disposed of the vacation dispute, Mr. Grimes then
specifically stated at that time he wasn't ready to sign a contract which
contained a check-off of dues clause, union seniority or arbitration.
Trial Examiner RucxEL. Were those latter clauses which were in the
contract suggested on June 13?
The WITNESS. Yes. I then asked Mr. Grimes what lie was going to do
about the vacation with pay if he still agreed to giving a vacation to em-
ployees on July 4, 1945-that is, the week of July 4, and lie specifically stated
that it was too late to have a vacation on the July 4th week and that at
this time he could do nothing about it.
Following the abortive attempt of the Union to reach an agreement at the
meeting on June 19, Williams withdrew as counsel for the respondent, and his
place was taken by Murphy Candler.
On June 24. the respondent unilaterally, and without prior consultation with
the Union, took a vote of its employees as to what week they wanted for their
vacation. On June 26, it posted a notice on its bulletin boards announcing
that it majority of the employees polled voted for the week beginning July 4,
and that accordingly the respondent was adopting that period as a vacation.
3. The strike
Following the failure to reach an agreement on June 19, the relations between
the Union and the respondent steadily deteriorated. On August 8. 1945, a strike
vote was taken and a substantial majority of the respondent's employees voted
to cease work.
On August 23, a hearing was held before the National War Labor Board to de-
termine why the respondent had not complied with that board's directives of
the previous April and May. During the hearing the Union offered to resume
negotiations with the respondent for it period of 15 (lays, and at the end of that
618 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
time to submit any issues which remained unsettled to the National War Labor
Board for final determination . The respondent, at the suggestion of the Board,
agreed to consider this suggestion for a period of 5 days. On August 28,
Candler telegraphed the Union rejecting it.
On the following day, August 29, the respondent's employees went on strike
and threw a picket line around the plant. Both the strike and the picket line
were still in effect at the time of the hearing.
On the first day of the strike Grimes made a speech to a group of strikers
gathered at the mill entrance during which he said, according to his own ad-
mission, that the strikers would lose by the strike but that the representatives
of the Union from Atlanta, who were present, would probably get their salaries
raised $5 a week for calling it.
During the strike Swords, Townes, and other supervisory employees of the
respondent, by their own admissions , asked employees to abandon the strike
and to return to work. On September 17 two employees, Williams and Hollis,
called on Grimes in his office and discussed the possibility of the plant' s being re-
opened. Grimes told them, according to his own admission , that he "felt that
the law would compel (the respondent) to offer them their work if they de-
manded to go to work," and that "if there were as many as a hundred people
who wanted to go to work, why, then (the respondent) would try to open the
doors and offer them their jobs back." Grimes further acknowledged saying that
a petition would be the best evidence that a number of employees desired to go
back to work, and admitted furnishing Williams and Hollis with paper with
which to prepare such a petition. The petition, signed by approximately 100
employees, was delivered to Grimes later the same day. At Grimes' request
several local police were stationed at the mill gate, and when a group of em-
ployees gathered at the gate preparatory to entering the mill, Grimes told them
that their jobs were waiting for them and to "go to it." A substantial number
of employees forthwith resumed work.
During the strike the Union made several attempts to resume negotiations
with representatives of the respondent. These were without success until
December 15, when the first of another series of meetings took place, which con-
tinued to the date of the hearing without resulting in an agreement.
4. Other reported acts of interference, restraint, and coercion
During the contract negotiations, several of the respondent's foremen stated
to employees that the respondent would not sign a contract with the Union.
For example, Edna Martin, who was reinstated as an employee pursuant to a
stipulation and order in a previous unfair labor practice case against the respond-
ent, testified that on August 27, 1945, 2 days before the strike, Dalton, overseer
of the wholesale weaving room, asked her if she intended to strike, stating that it
would not be "right" for her to do so after Grimes had put her back to work and
had paid her back wages "of his own accord." Dalton added, according to
Martin, that Grimes would shut down the mill permanently before he would
sign a contract with the Union.
B. Al. Youngblood and R. S. Burgess testified credibly that on the day follow-
ing the strike vote Dalton said to Youngblood, within Burgess' hearing, that the
employees would be foolish to strike and that he believed that Grimes would
shut the mill down permanently before he would sign a contract. Burgess further
testified that about August 27, 1945, after he had returned from the hearing before
the War Labor Board in Washington, previously referred to, Dalton asked him if
a Case No. 10-C-1571.
ATHENS MANUFACTURING COMPANY 619
the Union was going to strike. Burgess replied that a strike depended upon the
respondent's reply to the Union's offer to negotiate for 5 days. Dalton rejoined,
according to Burgess, "If that is what you are waiting on, I can tell you now you
are going to strike." Dalton denied making the statements attributed to him
by Burgess, Youngblood, and Martin. The undersigned does not credit his
denial, and finds that he made them in substance as related.
John Johnson testified that during the strike, Swords, spinning room foreman,
attempted to persuade him to abandon the strike, stating that Grimes would
never sign a union contract, and Arbie Duane testified that Swords, on the day
previous to the strike, warned her to be careful because she was a widow with
children to support, and declared that Grimes would never sign a union contract.
Swords denied making these statements. The undersigned does not credit his
denial and finds that he made them in substance.
Conclusions
The undersigned is convinced that the respondent at no time intended to bar-
gain in good faith with the Union. Grimes' statement at the first negotiating
meeting that he was going to "tear up" the Union if it was possible, was borne out
by the respondent's subsequent conduct of the bargaining negotiations. As has
been found, the respondent, at the second conference, insisted on its own form
of proposed contract as a basis of discussion, thrusting aside the Union's request
that the negotiations proceed on the basis of the contract submitted by the Union
although the parties had already reached an agreement on several of its provisions.
The Union thereafter was in the position of attempting to liberalize a contract
drawn up from the standpoint of the respondent's interest, by forcing into it
certain provisions of advantage to itself. When, after numerous conferences
with respondent's representatives lasting several months, the parties were still
unable to agree upon all the terms of a contract, the matter was referred to the
National War Labor Board. In April and May 1945, that board issued its direc-
tives setting forth the various provisions which it ordered included in the contract
between the parties. Williams, on behalf of the respondent, and apparently
acting in good faith and in the spirit of the board's directives, drew up a contract
on which the parties were in agreement with the exception of the vacation clause.
At this point the respondent delegated Carnes, its personnel manager, to present
a form of vacation clause to the Union. When, after some discussion, Carnes and
the Union's representatives found themselves in agreement on such a clause and
had reduced it to writing and signed it, it was promptly repudiated by Grimes.
At the meeting in Williams' office on June 19, when it appeared that agreement
on a vacation clause might again be reached and a complete contract signed,
Grimes declared that even if an agreement on a vacation provision was arrived at
he would not sign the completed contract because be disagreed with provisions re-
lating to check off of dues, arbitration, and seniority, agreement on which had
already been reached.
The immediate result of the position taken by Grimes at the conference on
June 19 was the withdrawal of Williams as the respondent's bargaining repre-
sentative. From this time on the relations between the respondent and the
Union grew worse. When called before the National War Labor Board in August
to show why that board's directives had not been complied with, the respondent
gave no satisfactory answer. The sole gain from this hearing was the Union's
offer to negotiate for a 15-day period, at the end of which time the National War
Labor Board should resolve all matters not agreed upon between the parties.
The respondent agreed to consider this offer for 5 days. At the end of that time
620 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
it rejected the offer without making any suggestion of its own relating to the
resumption of negotiations. As an immediate result of this rejection and of the
respondent's unfair labor practices, the respondent's employees struck.
During the latter part of June, when the parties were negotiating a vacation
clause, the respondent unilaterally and without prior consultation with the Union
set the week of July 4fas vacation week. The undersigned finds that the respond-
ent's motive in thus setting a vacation period identical with that previously agreed
to in writing between the Union and Carnes, subsequently repudiated by Grimes,
was to deprive the Union of any credit which might have accrued to it if the
employees had come to know that vacations had been determined by collective
bargaining. Such unilateral action by an employer on a matter under negotiation
constitutes, in itself, a refusal to bargain collectively.
During the strike, the respondent, although finally acceding to the Union's
request that negotiations be resumed, at the same time initiated a "back-to-work"
movement and persuaded a number of its employees to break rank and return to
work in derogation of the authority of the Union and the desires of its employees
to act concertedly.
The undersigned concludes and finds that the respondent failed and refused at
all times after August 14, 1944, to bargain collectively with the Union, and by
soliciting individual employees during the strike to return to work in disregard of
the decision of their union and authority of the union leadership, by sponsoring
and supporting a back-to-work movement, by threatening to shut down its mill
before bargaining with the Union, and by the other facts and circumstances set
forth above, interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
B. Tlic discharge of Mattie Ilollis
Mattie Hollis had worked periodically for the respondent for approximately 17
years up to the time of her discharge on August 20, 1945. At that time she was
working in the spinning department under the foremanship of Swords. Hollis
joined the Union in the summer of 1944, shortly after its organization, but there
is no evidence in the record that she became in any wise active in its affairs.
The mill was closed on Wednesday and Thursday, August 15 and 16, 1945,
to celebrate the victory over Japan. On Friday, August 17, Hollis stayed away
from work, sending word to Swords that she would be absent that day on per-
sonal business. Swords sent Conley, the assistant foreman or second hand, to
Hollis' home, instructing him, according to Conley's testimony, to tell her to
report for work that day if she wished to continue to hold her job. Swords
denied while testifying that he said anything to Conley about Hollis losing
her job. The undersigned accepts the testimony of Conley as being nearer in
accord with the fact. The testimony of Conley and Hollis are in agreement
that Hollis told Conley, in reply, that she could not come to work because she
had certain personal business to transact.
When Hollis showed up for work on the following Monday, August 20, Swords
approached her and asked her why she had not reported for work the previous
Friday. Hollis replied that she had been absent on personal business and
Swords, according to Hollis' testimony which is denied by Swords but which is
credited by the undersigned, asked her if the business was union business.
Hollis' further credible testimony, denied by Swords, was to the effect that
when Swords wrote out her discharge slip he said: "take this and let the
anion get you it job."
The respondent's defense to Hollis' discharge is based upon her attendance
record which the record discloses to be poor, particularly during the last part
of her employment Hollis admitted that when the respondent discontinued the
ATHENS MANUFACTURING COMPANY 621
third shift in the fall of 1944, she quit work rather than go to work on the
second shift . The record shows that she applied for work again in January
1945 , received it, and continued to work until May 17 of that year when she
quit her job to go to California . She applied again on July 26 , 1945, the be-
ginning of her last period of employment. '
Swords' testimony , which the undersigned credits in this respect , was to the
effect that when lie employed Hollis the last time he told her that she would
have to work more regularly than she had while on the third shift. Swords'
credible testimony was that while on that shift Hollis seldom worked a full
work-week , laying off because of illness or for some other reason . Hollis ad-
mitted that during this period she had frequently been absent because of her
own ill health and that of her mother . Swords testified that Hollis, on the
occasion of her rehiring in July 1945 , promised that she would thereafter be
more regular in her attendance.
The first full week after Hollis' return to work on July 26 , she worked 3
of the 5 days the mill was then working . The second week she worked the
full 5 days. The third week, from August 13 to August 17, she worked on
Monday and Tuesday. On Wednesday and Thursday of that week the mill
was shut down . On Friday , as has been related , Hollis was again absent.
It is clear from the record that the respondent 's employees frequently absented
themselves from work because of illness, and not infrequently for other reasons.
While no records were introduced from which might be drawn a comparison
of Hollis ' attendance with that of the employees as a whole , Swords ' credible
testimony was that it was worse than average . Conley, no longer employed
by the respondent and whose testimony was friendly to Hollis, admitted that
about 2 weeks prior to Hollis ' discharge , Swords, at a meeting of the first and
second hands , declared that the employees were going to have to work more
regularly or else quit their employment , and named three or four employees
whom he directed Conley to warn. Hollis was not one of these . There is noth-
ing in the record to show what the results of Conley 's warning were, or whether.
thereafter , and previous to Hollis ' discharge , the attendance of these (other
employees improved.
Conclusions as to the discharge
It is fairly clear from Swords ' reference to the union at the time lie discharged
Hollis that he resented Hollis' membership in it . This fact, taken in connection
with the further fact that the attendance record of a few other employees had
for some time been at least as bad as that of Hollis , casts suspicion on the
respondent ' s motive in discharging her. Hollis, however, had been just recently
rehired with the warning that her attendance must improve . It is clear that
it remained bad. The undersigned believes that her failure to return to work
after a ':-day vacation led Swords to conclude that her attendance, if she were
to continue as an employee , would be no better than during her employment
on the third shift.
On the record as a whole, the undersigned believes and finds that Hollis
was discharged because of her poor attendance record rather than because of
activity in the Union , concerning which there is no evidence aside from the
were fact of membership.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the respondent set forth in Section III, above, occurring in
connection with the operations of the respondent described in section 1, above,
have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, tralftc, and commerce
among the several States and have led to a labor dispute burdening and ob-
structing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
622 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
V. THE IIEMEDY
Having found that the respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices
including threats to shut down its mill before bargaining with the Union, solicit-
ing Individual employees to abandon- the strike, and sponsoring a back-to-work
movement among its striking employees, all of which, when taken together
with the other facts and circumstances above set forth, demonstrate a hostility
toward the Union and a determination to destroy it as a bargaining agent of the
respondent's employees, the undersigned will recommend that the respondent
cease and desist therefrom and from in any other manner interfering with,
restraining or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
by Section 7 of the Act. He will further recommend that the respondent take
certain affirmative action which the undersigned finds will effectuate the policies
of the Act.
It has been found that the respondent has at all times refused to bargain
collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in
an appropriate unit. In order to effectuate the policies of the At, the under-
signed will recommend that, upon request, the respondent bargain collectively
with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in an appro-
priate unit in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours and other terms and condi-
tions of employment.
It having been found that the respondent did not discharge Mattie Hollis
because of her union membership and activity, the undersigned will recommend
that the complaint be dismissed in this respect.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record
in the case the undersigned makes the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Textile Workers Union of America, C. 1. 0., is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. All production and maintenance employees of the respondent at its Athens,
Georgia, plant, including the employees at the warehouse and the hydroelectric
plant and including inspectors and watchmen but excluding executives, tech-
nical employees, office employees, and supervisory employees-with authority to
hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status
of employees or effectively recommend such action, at all times material herein
constituted and now constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
3. Textile Workers Union of America, C. I. 0., was on August 14, 1944, and
at all times since has been, the exclusive representative of all the employees
in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9 (a) of the Act.
4. By refusing to bargain collectively with Textile Workers Union of Amer-
ica, C. I. 0., as exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit,
the respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8 (5) of the Act.
5. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act the respondent has en-
gaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the
Act.
6. The foregoing unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
7. By discharging Mattie Hollis the respondent has not engaged in any un-
fair labor practices.
ATHENS MANUFACTURING COMPANY
RECOMMENDATIONS
623
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law the
-undersigned recommends that Athens Manufacturing Company, its officers,
agents, successors , and assigns shall:
1. ('ease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Textile Workers Union of Amer-
ica, C. I. 0., as the exclusive representative of all production and maintenance
employees at its Athens, Georgia, plant, including the employees at the ware-
house and the hydroelectric plant and including inspectors and watchmen, but
excluding executives, technical employees, office employees, and all super-
visory employees with authority to hire, promote, discharge or discipline or
otherwise effect changes in the status of employees or effectively recommend
such action ;
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights to self-organization, to form labor organi-
zations, to join or assist Textile Workers Union of America, C. 1. 0., or any
other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed in Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the undersigned finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Textile Workers Union of America,
C. 1. O., as the exclusive representative of all production and maintenance em-
ployees at the respondent's Athens, Georgia, plant, including the employees of
the warehouse and of the hydroelectric plant and including inspectors and
watchmen but excluding executives, technical employees, office employees, and
all supervisory employees with authority to hire, promote, discharge or disci-
pline or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees or effectively ree-
onmiend such action.
(b) Post immediately in conspicuous places at its Athens, Georgia, plant,
copies of the notice attached hereto and marked "Appendix A." Copies of said
notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, shall, after
being duly signed by the respondent's representative, be posted by the respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for a period of sixty
(601 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places
where respondent customarily posts notices to employees. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
(c) File with the Regional Director for the Tenth Region on or before ten
(10) clays from the receipt of this Intermediate Report a report in writing
setting forth in detail the manner and form in which the respondent has coin-
plied with the foregoing recommendations.
It is further recommended that unless on or before ten (10) days from the
receipt of this Intermediate Report the respondent notifies the Regional Director
in writing that he will comply with the foregoing recommendations, the National
Labor Relations Board issue an order requiring the respondent to take the
action aforesaid.
It is further recommended that the allegations of the complaint respecting
\lattie Hollis be dismissed.
As provided in Section 33 of Article II of the Rules and Regulations of the
National Labor Relations Board, Series 3, as amended, effective November
27, 1945, any party or counsel for the Board may within fifteen (15) days from
624 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the date of the entry of the order transferring the case to the Board, pursuant
to Section 32 of Article II of said Rules and Regulations file with the Board,
Rochambeau Building, Washington 25, D. C., an original and four copies of
a statement in writing setting forth such exceptions to the Intermediate Report
or to any other part of the record or proceeding (including rulings upon all
motions or objections) as he relies upon, together with the original and four
copies of a brief in support thereof. Immediately upon the filing of such state-
ment of exceptions and/or brief, the party or counsel for the Board filing the
same shall serve a copy thereof upon each of the other parties and shall file a
copy with the Regional Director. As further provided in said Section 33, should
any party desire permission to argue orally before the Board, request therefor
must be made in writing within ten (10) days from the date of the order traua-
fei•ring the case to the Board.
IIOKAcF A. RUCKEL,
Trial Examiner.
Dated May 3, 1946.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALI. iv̀MPI.oYE1s
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
We will not in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees
in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organiza-
tions, to Join or assist TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, C. I. O.
or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. All our
employees are free to become or remain members of this union, or any other
labor organization.
We will bargain collectively upon request with the above-named union as
the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit de-
scribed herein with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment or other
conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached, embody
such understanding in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is: All
production and maintenance employees at the Athens, Georgia, plant, in-
cluding the employees at the warehouse and the hydroelectric plant, and
including inspectors and watchmen, but excluding executives, technical em-
ployees, office employees, and all supervisory employees, with authority to
hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status
of employees or effectively recommend such action.
ATHENS MANUFACTURING COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated-------------------- By ---------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must
not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.