Arthur Rogers et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 1, 2020

15476721 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 1, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/476,721 03/31/2017 Arthur O. Rogers 060861.00004 8857
27305 7590 04/01/2020
HOWARD & HOWARD ATTORNEYS PLLC
450 WEST FOURTH STREET
ROYAL OAK, MI 48067
EXAMINER
GALKA, LAWRENCE STEFAN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3715
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/01/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
IPDocket@HowardandHoward.com
dtrost@HowardandHoward.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ARTHUR O. ROGERS and GAVIN CLARKSON
Appeal 2019-006204
Application 15/476,721
Technology Center 3700
Before BARRY L. GROSSMAN, MICHAEL L. WOODS, and
RICHARD H. MARSCHALL, Administrative Patent Judges.
WOODS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–18. Appeal Br. 56. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Arthur O. Rogers
and Martha Atelia Clarkson. Appeal Br. 3.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The application is titled “System and Method for Providing Off-Site
Online Based Gaming.” Spec. 1. Claims 1, 9, 17, and 18 are independent.
Appeal Br. 57–63 (Claims App.). We reproduce claim 1, below, which is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A system, comprising:
a game server, located at a gaming facility, for playing an
electronic game, the game server for allowing wagers to be
made on the electronic game and for awarding a payout as a
function of an outcome of the electronic game, the gaming
facility being located at a predefined geographic location, the
predefined geographic location being within a larger geographic
area;
a database for storing account information associated
with a patron in a patron account, the patron being able to
deposit and withdraw funds from the patron account;
a remote device, located outside of the predefined
geographic location and within the larger geographic area; and
an agent server coupled between the game server and the
remote device, the agent server hosting a computer-based
software agent/player being configured to communicate with
the remote device and the game server, the agent/player being
configured to receive instructions from a patron via the remote
device to play the electronic game without interaction between
the patron and the game server, the agent/player being
configured to access the patron account and automatically
transfer funds from the patron account to the game server in
response to receiving instructions from the remote device to
participate in the electronic game on behalf of the patron, the
agent/player being configured to instruct the server to place a
wager in response to the agent/player having received the
instructions from the patron, the agent/player being configured
to receive the payout, if any, from the game server and
notifying the patron of the outcome and any payout, the
agent/player being further configured to ensure that no
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communication occurs over a border defined by the larger
geographic area.
Appeal Br. 57 (Claims App.).
REFERENCES
The evidence relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Graves US 5,830,067 Nov. 3, 1998
Carlson US 2009/0093312 A1 Apr. 9, 2009
Cocchi US 2010/0122539 A1 May 20, 2010
Buchheit US 2010/0169188 A1 July 1, 2010
Yacenda US 2012/0034963 A1 Feb. 9, 2012
Khal US 2012/0122539 A1 May 17, 2012
NAB Three webpages from
http://www.nabna.com/about.shtml
Webpages dated
March 25, 2015
BoA Three webpages from
http://about.bankofamerica.com/en-
us-our-story/where-we-are.html
Webpages dated
March 25, 2015
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REJECTIONS
The following rejections are before us on appeal:
Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis
1, 2, 5, 8–10, 13, 16 103 Graves, Carlson, Buchheit, Khal
17, 18 103 Graves, Carlson, Buchheit, Khal,
Yacenda
3, 4, 11, 12 103 Graves, Carlson, Buchheit, Khal,
Yacenda
6, 14 103 Graves, Carlson, Buchheit, Khal,
Yacenda, NAB
7, 15 103 Graves, Carlson, Buchheit, Khal,
Yacenda, BoA
Final Act. 4–16.
OPINION
I. Claims 1, 2, 5, 8–10, 13, 16 – Graves, Carlson, Buchheit, Khal
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 2, 5, 8–10, 13, and 16 as unpatentable
over Graves, Carlson, Buchheit, and Khal. Final Act. 4. Appellant presents
separate arguments for each of the rejected claims. See Appeal Br. 20–39.
We address these arguments separately.

a. Rejection of Claim 1
In rejecting claim 1, the Examiner relies on Graves for disclosing the
majority of the claimed limitations, citing in-part Graves’s Figure 1. See
Final Act. 7. We reproduce Graves’s Figure 1, below:
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Figure 1 depicts a functional block diagram depicting Proxy Player Machine
14 installed at game site 10, where the game is conducted. Graves 4:4–7.
Proxy Player Machine 14 interfaces through communications processor 16,
which is also located at game site 10. Id. at 4:7–9. Communications
processor 16 communicates with remote client location 12 via
communications link 13. Id. at 4:9–11.
The Examiner finds that Grave discloses a system comprising the
following elements:
1) a game server, located at a gaming facility, for playing an
electronic game, the game server for allowing wagers to be
made on the electronic game (Final Act. 5 (citing Graves
4:16–21));
2) the gaming facility being located at a predefined geographic
location (id. (citing Graves 1:41–52));
3) a database for storing account information associated with a
patron in a patron account, the patron being able to deposit
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and withdraw funds from the patron account (id. at 5–6
(citing Graves 2:60–63));
4) a remote device, located outside of the predefined
geographic location and within the larger geographic area
(id. at 6 (citing Graves 1:11–16));
5) and an agent server coupled between the game server and
the remove device, the agent server hosting a computer-
based software agent/player being configured to
communicate with the remote device and the game server,
the agent/player being configured to receive instructions
from a patron via the remote device to play the electronic
game without interaction between the patron and the game
server (id. at 6–7 (citing Graves 4:4–11));
6) the agent/player being configured to access the patron
account and automatically transfer funds from the patron
account to the game server in response to receiving
instructions from the remote device to participate in the
electronic game on behalf of the patron (id. at 7 (citing
Graves 5:34–41));
7) the agent/player being configured to instruct the server to
place a wager in response to the agent/player having
received the instructions from the patron, the agent/player
being configured to receive the payout, if any, from the
game server (id. at 7–8 (citing Graves 4:16–41)); and
8) notifying the patron of the outcome and any payout (id. at 8
(citing Graves 6:15–21)).
The Examiner acknowledges, however, that “Graves does not
explicitly disclose the agent configured to ensure that no communications
occurs outside the larger jurisdiction where that jurisdiction is a state.” Id. at
9. To address this limitation, the Examiner cites to Buchheit’s teaching that
“the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) of 2006
prohibits many online gambling activities. . . . Many of these acts explicitly
prohibit the transfer of negotiable funds from gambling earnings across state
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lines.” Id. (quoting Buchheit ¶ 32). The Examiner also cites to Carlson’s
teaching that “[t]o enable regulatory conformance of the gaming systems,
gaming device users must be geographically within an approved jurisdiction
and of legal age . . . . To ensure compliance with regulatory requirements, a
gaming system 100 may identify the geographic location of a remote player
device.” Id. (quoting Carlson ¶¶ 61–62).
In combining Graves with Carlson and Buchheit, the Examiner
reasons that a skilled artisan would have modified Graves
to ensure that all gaming activity occurred within a single
jurisdiction, such as a state, as taught by Carlson in order to allow
for regulatory requirements for gaming to be met because
Buchheit suggests said feature is desirable when providing
remote gaming as found in claim 1 in order to comply with
gaming regulations.
Final Act. 10.
The Examiner also acknowledges that Graves does not explicitly
disclose “the server for awarding a payout as a function of the electronic
game.” Id. To address this limitation, the Examiner relies on Khal’s
teaching of “a server allowing for play of an electronic bingo game that
awards a payout as a function of an electronic bingo game.” Id. at 10–11
(citing Khal ¶¶ 66, 67). In further combining the Graves with Khal, the
Examiner reasons that a skilled artisan would have modified Graves “to use
the centralized server for providing bingo games as taught by Khal . . . [to]
reduce manpower requirements thereby improving the operator
profitability.” Id. at 11–12.
In contesting the rejection of claim 1, Appellant presents numerous
arguments, which we address separately, below.
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First, Appellant asserts that not one of Graves, Carlson, Buchheit, or
Khal discloses
a remote device, located outside of a predetermined geographic
location and within a larger geographic area, and an agent server
hosting a computer-based software agent/player, the agent/player
being configured to receive instructions from a patron via the
remove device to play an electronic game without interaction
between the patron and the game server, the agent/player being
configured to ensure that no communication occurs over a border
defined by a larger geographic area.
Appeal Br. 29–30. In its Reply Brief, Appellant focuses its argument to be:
“Graves does not disclose a remote device, located outside of a predefined
geographic location and within a larger geographic area. The Examiner is
clearly wrong.” Reply Br. 2.
Appellant’s first argument is not persuasive as one cannot show
nonobviousness by attacking a reference individually where the rejection is
based on a combination of references. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d
1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425–26 (CCPA
1981). In the present case, and as discussed above, the Examiner relies on
Graves for disclosing a remote device, but acknowledges that Graves does
not explicitly disclose the agent configured to ensure that no
communications occurs outside the larger jurisdiction where that jurisdiction
is a state.. See Final Act. 9–10; see also Ans. 15 (“Carlson and Buchheit
were used for teaching that the remote device is within a larger geographic
area”). Appellant’s argument that neither Graves, Carlson, Buchheit, nor
Khal individually discloses a remote device “within a larger geographic
area” (Reply Br. 2) attacks the references individually and fails to respond to
the rejection before us, which relies on Graves, Buchheit, and Carlson to
satisfy the limitation.
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Second, Appellant argues that the Examiner has impermissibly
“resort[ed] to speculation, unfounded assumptions or hindsight
reconstruction.” See Appeal Br. 34 (citing In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011
(CCPA 1967). Appellant further contends that a skilled artisan would not
have modified Graves based on Carlson’s and Buchheit’s teachings. Id. at
34–35; see also Reply Br. 4 (“There is no factual basis which supports the
Examiner’s argument [that it would have been obvious to confine the remote
device within a larger geographic area] and the Examiner is clearly
wrong.”).
Appellant’s second argument is also unavailing. Buchheit teaches that
gaming regulations, such as the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement
Act, prohibit the transfer of funds from gambling earnings across state lines.
See, e.g., Buchheit ¶ 32. Carlson also teaches that gaming regulations may
require that users be within an approved geographic jurisdiction and, in
order to comply with these regulations, the gaming system may “identify the
geographic location of a remote player device.” See, e.g., Carlson ¶¶ 61–62.
Based on these teachings, we agree with the Examiner that a skilled artisan
would have modified Graves’s system “to ensure that all gaming activity
occurred within a single jurisdiction, such as a state, . . . to allow for
regulatory requirements for gaming to be met.” Final Act. 10. In other
words, a skilled artisan would have modified Graves to ensure that its
“remote devices” are confined within a state that permits Internet gambling,
as taught by Buchheit and Carlson. Appellant’s argument otherwise does
not identify error in the Examiner’s findings or reasoning.
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Third, Appellant argues that a skilled artisan would not have modified
Graves based on Khal’s teachings, as the Examiner has done. See Appeal
Br. 35.
We also disagree with Appellant’s third argument. Appellant’s
argument simply consists of a recitation of an irrelevant portion of Khal’s
disclosure without identifying error in the Examiner’s findings or reasoning.
See id.
Khal teaches a game of flashboard bingo from game server 710. Khal
Fig. 7, ¶ 66. Khal further discloses an electronic payout. See, e.g., id. ¶ 67
(“The associated pay table (or tables for combination or consecutive games)
is then used to compute prizes as represented by block 760.”). We agree
with the Examiner’s finding that Khal teaches “a server allowing for play of
an electronic bingo game that awards a payout as a function of an electronic
bingo game.” Final Act. 10. We also agree with the Examiner’s reasoning
that, based on Khal’s teaching, a skilled artisan would have further modified
Graves to “use the centralized server for providing bingo games . . . [in order
to] reduce manpower requirements thereby improving the operator
profitability.” Id. at 11–12.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s arguments do not apprise us of
error in the Examiner’s findings or reasoning in rejecting claim 1. As such,
we affirm the rejection of claim 1 as unpatentable over Graves, Carlson,
Buchheit, and Khal.

b. Rejection of Claims 2, 5, and 8
Claims 2, 5, and 8 depend from claim 1. Appeal Br. 58 (Claims
App.). Claim 2 further recites, “wherein the agent/player is embodied in
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software;” claim 5 further recites, “wherein the predetermined geographic
location is an American Indian Reservation;” and claim 8 further recites,
“wherein the patron directs the agent/player to play the electronic game via
the remote device . . . [and] is configured to play the electronic game and
report back to the patron results associated with the electronic game without
additional player involvement.” Id.
The Examiner finds that Graves discloses the additional limitations of
claims 2, 5, and 8. See Final Act. 12 (citations omitted).
Appellant argues that “Graves discloses a Proxy Player Machine 14
installed at a game site 10 where the game is conducted and . . . it uses a
human agent and does not teach the patron directs the agent/player to play
the electronic game via the remote device.” Appeal Br. 38. Appellant
argues that the “Graves reference does not teach or suggest the claimed
invention because a proxy player is a human agent and not a computer-
based software agent/player.” Reply Br. 5 (emphasis added).2
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive, as a reasonably broad
interpretation of the claimed “agent/player . . . embodied in software” is met
by Graves’s “proxy player machine.” Appellant’s argument is based on a
narrow interpretation of “agent/player” that is not supported by the claims.
Contrary to Appellant’s assertion (Reply Br. 5), we find that Graves’s
“proxy player machine” is a non-human agent of the player. Indeed, Graves
discloses, “Proxy Player Machine 14 . . . communicates with Order Entry
System 20 located at Game Site 10 and requests the type and number of

2 Although Appellant groups claim 5 along with claims 2 and 8, Appellant
does not appear to present separate arguments for claim 5. See Appeal Br.
38.
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chances to be purchased on behalf of the remote client.” Graves 4:18–22.
By requesting the “type and number of chances to be purchased on behalf of
the remote client,” we find that Graves’s “proxy player machine” is the non-
human agent of the client. Importantly, we agree with the Examiner’s
findings that Graves’s “remote client” is the claimed “patron” and Graves’s
“proxy player machine” satisfies the claimed “agent/player . . . embodied in
software,” as recited in claim 2. See Final Act. 12; see also Ans. 16. We
further agree with the Examiner’s finding that that Graves’s “proxy player
machine” is “configured to play the electronic game and report back to the
patron results associated with the electronic game without additional player
involvement,” as recited in claim 8.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s arguments to not apprise us of
error in the Examiner’s findings or reasoning in rejecting claims 2, 5, and 8.
As such, we affirm the rejection of claims 2, 5, and 8 as unpatentable over
Graves, Carlson, Buchheit, and Khal.

c. Rejection of Claim 9
Independent claim 9 recites a method and is similar to the system
recited in independent claim 1. Compare Appeal Br. 57 (Appeal Br.), with
id. at 59.
In rejecting claim 9, the Examiner relies on similar findings and
reasoning as relied on in rejecting independent claim 1. See Final Act. 12
(“Claims 9, 10, 13 and 16 are directed to a method implemented by the
system of claims 1, 2, 5 and 8 respectively and are rejected for the same
reasons as claims 1, 2, 5 and 8 respectively.”).
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In contesting the rejection of claim 9, Appellant contends that a
skilled artisan “would not be motivated to make the combination of Graves
in view of Carlson, Buchheit, and Khal and reasonably expect success in
doing so.” Appeal Br. 38; see also id. at 38–39.
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. As explained above (supra
Part I.a), we agree with the Examiner’s findings and reasoning that a skilled
artisan would have modified Graves in light of the teachings of Carlson,
Buchheit, and Khal. Accordingly, we affirm the rejection of claim 9 as
unpatentable over Graves, Carlson, Buchheit, and Khal.

d. Rejection of Claims 10, 13, and 16
Claims 10, 13, and 16 depend from claim 9 and are similar to
dependent claims 2, 5, and 8, discussed above. See supra Part I.b.
In contesting the rejection, Appellant presents the same argument
discussed above in connection with claims 2, 5, and 8, namely, that Graves
does not disclose a non-human agent. See Appeal Br. 39–40.
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. As explained above (supra
Part I.b), we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Graves’s “proxy player
machine” is “embodied in software” (claim 10) and “is configured to play
the electronic game and report back to the patron results associated with the
electronic game without additional player involvement” (claim 16).3
Accordingly, we affirm the rejection of claims 10, 13, and 16 as
unpatentable over Graves, Carlson, Buchheit, and Khal.

3 As to claim 13, which is similar to claim 5, see supra n.2.
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II. Claims 17 and 18 — Graves, Carlson, Buchheit, Khal, and Yacenda
The Examiner rejects independent claims 17 and 18 as unpatentable
over Graves, Carlson, Buchheit, Khal, and Yacenda. Final Act. 12. As
distinguished from independent claims 1 and 9, claims 17 (system) and 18
(method) further recite, “the patron being able to deposit and withdraw funds
from the patron account” and “wherein the wagers and payouts are made
with cash substitutions.” Appeal Br. 61–63 (Claims App.).
The Examiner relies on Graves for disclosing “a patron account for
funding wagering.” Final Act. 12–13 (citing Graves 2:60–63). The
Examiner acknowledges, however, that Graves fails to explicitly disclose
accounts “that can receive and disburse funds to facilitate wagering or using
cash or cash substitutes to payout.” Id. To address this limitation, the
Examiner relies on Yacenda for teaching “a patron account at a financial
institution that can receive and disburse funds to facilitate wagering.” Id. at
13 (citing Yacenda ¶ 99). In combining Yacenda with Graves, the Examiner
reasons that a skilled artisan would have modified Graves “to include the
improved player account of Yacenda . . . [as d]oing so would make it easier
to fund a wagering account thereby inducing more wagering activity.” Id.
In contesting the rejection of these claims, Appellant relies primarily
on the same unpersuasive arguments discussed above. See Appeal Br. 40–
53. Appellant further argues, however, that a skilled artisan would not have
modified Graves to include Yacenda’s account. Id. at 48.
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive, as it fails to identify any error
in the Examiner’s findings or reasoning. Yacenda discloses, “Accounts for
the use of playing lottery games may be credit card accounts or bank
accounts of the lottery players . . . . Such accounts may be stored in a
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database 51 of the banking server 50. The banking server credits the
accounts of the respective lottery players who own the winning tickets . . .
and debits the accounts . . . for the purchases of the lotter tickets.” Yacenda
¶ 66. Yacenda further discloses, “Requests for other information may be
required . . . in which the winnings may be taken, i.e. cash or credit,
payments or lump sum, etc.” Id. ¶ 67. Based on these disclosures, we agree
with the Examiner’s finding that Yacenda teaches an improved player
account to fund wagering activities, using cash. See Final Act. 13. We also
agree with the Examiner’s reasoning that a skilled artisan would have
modified Graves to include Yacenda’s improved player account for the
purpose of facilitating funding of Graves’s wagering account, thereby
promoting more wagering. See id.
Accordingly, we affirm the rejection of claims 17 and 18 as
unpatentable over Graves, Carlson, Buchheit, Khal, and Yacenda.

III. Claims 3, 4, 11, and 12 – Graves, Carlson, Buchheit, Khal, and
Yacenda
Dependent claims 3 and 11 recite, “wherein wagers and payouts are
made with cash,” and dependent claims 4 and 12 recite, “wherein wagers
and payouts are made with cash substitutes.” Appeal Br. 58, 60 (Claims
App.).
To address these limitations, the Examiner relies on Yacenda’s
disclosure that “[r]equests for other information may be required . . . for
example the form in which the winnings may be taken, i.e. cash or credit.”
Final Act. 14 (citing Yacenda ¶ 67). The Examiner reasons that a skilled
artisan would have modified Graves to include Yacenda’s teaching in order
to “make it easier to fund a wagering account.” Id. at 15.
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In contesting the rejection of dependent claims 3, 4, 11, and 12,
Appellant argues that a skilled artisan would not have modified Graves
based on Yacenda’s teachings. Appeal Br. 53–54.
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive, as it fails to identify error in
the Examiner’s findings or reasoning, as similarly discussed above. See
supra Part II. Accordingly, we affirm the rejection of claims 3, 4, 11, and 12
as unpatentable over Graves, Carlson, Buchheit, Khal, and Yacenda.

IV. Claims 6 and 14 – Graves, Carlson, Buchheit, Khal, Yacenda, NAB
Claims 6 and 14 depend indirectly from claims 1 and 9, respectively.
See Appeal Br. 58, 60 (Claims App.). These claims further recite, “wherein
the database is part of a financial institution located on the American Indian
Reservation.” Id.
To address these limitations, the Examiner relies on NAB’s teaching
of a Native American owned banking system and reasons that a skilled
artisan would have used “a financial institution located on a Native
American reservation in order to allow for different types of financial
institutions to provide banking services in different locations.” Final Act.
15.
In contesting the rejection, Appellant argues that “there is no
disclosure . . . that NAB has a native owned banking system that has a
financial institution located on an American Indian Reservation.” Appeal
Br. 54. Appellant further argues that claims 6 and 14 are not obvious. Id.
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. NAB is an abbreviation for
“Native American Bank” and Appellant’s argument does not identify error
in the Examiner’s reasoning that a skilled artisan would have used “a
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financial institution located on a Native American reservation in order to
allow for different types of financial institutions to provide banking services
in different locations.” Final Act. 15.
Accordingly, we affirm the rejection of claims 6 and 14 as
unpatentable over Graves, Carlson, Buchheit, Khal, Yacenda, and NAB.

V. Claims 7 and 15 – Graves, Carlson, Buchheit, Khal, Yacenda, and
BoA
Claims 7 and 15 depend indirectly from claims 1 and 9, respectively.
Appeal Br. 58, 60 (Claims App.). These claims further recite, “wherein the
database is part of a financial institution located off the American Indian
Reservation.” Id.
To address these limitations, the Examiner finds that “BoA teaches
banking systems have been located worldwide in locations not on Native
American reservations” and reasons that a skilled artisan would have used “a
financial institution located off a Native American reservation in order to
allow for different types of financial institutions to provide banking services
in different locations.” Final Act. 15–16.
In contesting the rejection of claims 7 and 15, Appellant argues that
“there is no disclosure . . . that BOA has worldwide locations that defines the
financial institution is located off an American Indian Reservation.” Appeal
Br. 55.
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. The Examiner cites to BoA
for teaching banking locations worldwide, many of which are not located on
American Indian reservations. Final Act. 16. We agree with the Examiner’s
reasoning that a skilled artisan would have modified Graves and the other
cited art to use financial institutions for providing banking services to
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locations outside of the United States, and outside of American Indian
reservations. Id.
Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error, and we
affirm the rejection of claims 7 and 15 as unpatentable over Graves, Carlson,
Buchheit, Khal, Yacenda, and BoA.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–18 are affirmed.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/Basis Reversed Affirmed
1, 2, 5, 8–
10, 13, 16
103 Graves, Carlson,
Buchheit, Khal
1, 2, 5, 8–
10, 13, 16
17, 18 103 Graves, Carlson,
Buchheit, Khal,
Yacenda
17, 18
3, 4, 11,
12
103 Graves, Carlson,
Buchheit, Khal,
Yacenda
3, 4, 11, 12
6, 14 103 Graves, Carlson,
Buchheit, Khal,
Yacenda, NAB
6, 14
7, 15 103 Graves, Carlson,
Buchheit, Khal,
Yacenda, BoA
7, 15
Overall
Outcome
1–18
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
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AFFIRMED