Arthur R. Cordova, Petitioner,v.Dr. James G. Roche, Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 4, 2003
03a20077 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 4, 2003)

03a20077

03-04-2003

Arthur R. Cordova, Petitioner, v. Dr. James G. Roche, Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.


Arthur R. Cordova v. Department of the Air Force

03A20077

03-04-03

.

Arthur R. Cordova,

Petitioner,

v.

Dr. James G. Roche,

Secretary,

Department of the Air Force,

Agency.

Petition No. 03A20077

MSPB No. DE 0752000285-I-1

DECISION

On July 19, 2002, Arthur R. Cordova (hereinafter referred to as

petitioner) timely filed a petition with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (the Commission) for review of the Opinion and Order of

the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB or Board) dated June 21,

2002, concerning an allegation of discrimination in violation of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).<1>

The petition is governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Reform

Act of 1978 and EEOC Regulations, 29 C.F.R. � 1614.303 et seq. The MSPB

found that the Department of the Air Force (hereinafter referred to as

the agency) did not engage in discrimination as alleged by petitioner.

For the reasons that follow, the Commission concurs with the Board's

decision.

The issue presented is whether the MSPB's determination that petitioner

failed to prove that the agency discriminated against him based

on disability (hearing deficiency and mental disorders) when he was

removed effective April 21, 2000, constitutes a correct interpretation

of the applicable laws, rules, regulations, and policy directives and

is supported by the record as a whole.

In April 2000, petitioner filed an appeal with the MSPB challenging his

removal from the position of Engineering Equipment Operator, WG-10, for

medical inability to perform the essential duties of the position and

claiming, inter alia, that the agency discriminated against him based on

his disabilities. Following a hearing in September and October 2000,

an MSPB Administrative Judge (AJ) issued in Initial Decision (ID) on

November 30, 2000, sustaining the agency's removal action and finding

that the agency did not discriminate against him. On review, the full

Board sustained the agency's action but disagreed with the AJ's finding

that complainant is a person with a disability.

At the time of his removal, petitioner was an Engineering Equipment

Operator, WG-10, at Kirtland AFB (New Mexico). The duties of the

position included operation of engineering and construction equipment

in the maintenance of the grounds and roads, including work on the area

of the aircraft runways and taxiways. See Initial Decision, pp. 2-4;

Position Description, Tab 6, 4p and 4mm. In 1998, responsibility for

airfield maintenance was transferred from military to civilian staff

and was added to the duties of petitioner's position. The additional

duties included working on runways and taxiways (the �flightline�)

and �call back� duties when airfield work was necessary after hours.<2>

In June 1998, while working on the flightline, petitioner became �stuck�

between an active runway and taxiway and became fearful of working there.

He testified also that he had some hearing difficulty and could not

clearly hear all verbal directions from the Control Tower.<3> Beginning

in June 1998, he refused to work any flightline duties or take his

rotation for call back operations; in October 1999, petitioner requested

permanent removal from all flightline duties. However, in February

2000, the agency reminded petitioner that duties on the flightline were

an essential element of his position and that it could not accommodate

him by not assigning him to flightline duty. At that time, the agency

offered petitioner a transfer to the grounds unit with retained pay,

but he declined the transfer and was subsequently removed.<4>

The record contains several letters from his psychiatrist (Dr. E).

In August 1998, he diagnosed petitioner with social anxiety disorder and

obsessive-compulsive disorder, and in October 1999, he also diagnosed

petitioner with recurrent major depression. In a letter dated February

23, 2000, Dr. E stated that petitioner was unlikely to resume the full

duties of his position, and he recommended that petitioner accept the

transfer to the grounds unit.<5> The only documentation in the record

concerning petitioner's hearing is a report of a hearing test in November

1999 conducted by an agency audiologist that noted some hearing loss

and the presence of tinnitus. The report suggested that petitioner wear

protective devices while performing his duties.

In the ID, the AJ found that complainant was a person with a disability

limited in the major life activity of working due to his mental condition

and hearing difficulty. Nevertheless, she found that petitioner could

not be accommodated in his position because the duties could not be

restructured. The AJ found that petitioner did not show that a funded

vacancy existed and that the agency had met its obligation to search

for a reassignment. The Board, on review, concluded that petitioner

was not a person with a disability, because he did not show that he

was substantially limited in a major life activity, holding that to be

substantially limited in the major life activity of working, one must

be precluded from performing either a class of jobs or a broad range of

jobs in various classes.

Although petitioner did not file a statement in support of his request

that the Commission review the decision of the MSPB, in seeking review

by the full Board, petitioner argued, of relevance to our review, that

flightline duties were collateral and not an essential element of his job

assignment; that counsel had accepted the transfer offered to petitioner

in a letter dated March 28, 2000, notwithstanding petitioner's earlier

rejection; and that petitioner was never reassigned to flightline duties.

The agency disputed petitioner's statement of the facts and application

of laws and regulations.

The Commission must determine whether the decision of the MSPB with

respect to the allegation of discrimination constitutes a correct

interpretation of applicable laws, rules, regulations, and policy

directives and is supported by the evidence in the record as a whole.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.305(c). After considering petitioner's contentions and

thoroughly reviewing the record, the Commission concurs with the MSPB,

finding that the agency did not discriminate against petitioner.

The Rehabilitation Act and the Commission's regulations require federal

agencies to make reasonable accommodation to the known limitations of a

qualified individual with a disability, unless the agency can show that

accommodation would cause an undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(o);

29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(p). See, generally, EEOC Enforcement Guidance on

Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans With

Disabilities Act (October 17, 2002) (Guidance). As a threshold matter,

therefore, one claiming protection under the Rehabilitation Act must show

that s/he is an individual with a disability.<6> Although the Board

found that petitioner is not a person with a disability, for purposes

of further analysis, the Commission will assume, without finding, that

petitioner is a person with a disability.

Next, we consider whether petitioner was a qualified person with a

disability. In order to determine whether petitioner is �qualified,�

the fact finder must determine whether, with or without accommodation,

petitioner could perform the essential functions of any position which

he could have held as a result of job restructuring or reassignment.<7>

29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(m); see also 29 C.F.R. � 1630.3 (exceptions to

definition); see Hawkins v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Petition

No. 03990006 (February 11, 1999); Van Horn v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01960159 (October 23, 1998). Although petitioner

argued otherwise, the record shows that duties on the flightline,

including call back responsibilities, were an essential function of his

job.<8> Thus, the question of whether petitioner is a qualified person

with a disability turns on whether there was a vacant, funded position

at the equivalent pay or level (or lower) as his current job and to which

he could have been reassigned absent undue hardship. The petitioner has

an evidentiary burden in reassignment cases to establish that it is more

likely than not, i.e., by a preponderance of the evidence, that there were

vacancies during the relevant time period into which petitioner could have

been reassigned. Petitioner can establish this by producing evidence of

particular vacancies, or, in the alternative, petitioner can show that:

(1) s/he was qualified to perform a job or jobs which existed at the

agency, and (2) that there were trends or patterns of turnover in the

relevant jobs so as to make a vacancy likely during the time period.

See Hampton v. USPS, EEOC Appeal No. 01986308 (July 31, 2002).

In this case, because petitioner could not perform one of the essential

functions of his original position, the agency properly considered

reassignment to another position. To this end, the agency offered

petitioner an unfunded position in the grounds unit with pay retention at

his WG-10 rate, but, for reasons that remain unclear, petitioner initially

declined the agency's offer. When his attorney later accepted it on

his behalf, it was no longer available, and complainant did not meet

his evidentiary burden to show that any other position was available.

Thus, we find that the agency properly discharged its duties under the

Rehabilitation Act by offering petitioner an effective accommodation.<9>

See Maxwell v. Department of Veterans Administration, EEOC Appeal

No. 01960916 (June 5, 1998). For the above reasons, the Commission finds

that the agency did not discriminate against petitioner on the basis of

disability when he was discharged.

CONCLUSION

Based upon a thorough review of the record and for the foregoing reasons,

it is the decision of the Commission to CONCUR with the final decision

of the MSPB finding no discrimination. The Commission finds that the

MSPB's decision constitutes a correct interpretation of the laws, rules,

regulations, and policies governing this matter and is supported by the

evidence in the record as a whole.

STATEMENT OF PETITIONER'S RIGHTS

PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (W0900)

This decision of the Commission is final, and there is no further right of

administrative appeal from the Commission's decision. You have the right

to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court,

based on the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, within

thirty (30) calendar days of the date that you receive this decision.

If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the

complaint the person who is the official agency head or department head,

identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

_______________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

____03-04-03______________

Date

1The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in

the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination

by federal employees or applicants for employment.

2These duties included maintenance, cleaning, and sweeping of the runways

and taxiways, in addition to the areas adjacent to them, at all times.

Further, employees were subject to �call back� duties on a rotating basis,

at which time each worked alone.

3There was testimony from his superiors that instructions from the Control

Tower were infrequent, limited, and not necessary to the performance of

flightline duties.

4In a letter dated March 28, 2000, following issuance of the notice of

proposed removal, petitioner's attorney agreed to accept the position in

the grounds unit with some restrictions; however, the agency determined

that the vacancy no longer existed.

5After Dr. E retired, petitioner consulted Dr. S, also a psychiatrist.

Dr. S testified at the hearing and expressed her concern that petitioner's

mental conditions and any hearing difficulties, which she acknowledged

she was unable to address, might cause him to panic on the flightline.

6An �individual with a disability� is defined as one who: (1) has a

physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more

of the major life activities of such individual; (2) has a record of

such impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment.

29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g). Major life activities include, but are not

limited to, "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual

tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and

working." 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(i). The Interpretive Guidance to the

regulations further notes that "other major life activities include,

but are not limited to, sitting, standing, lifting, [and] reaching."

29 C.F.R. Part 1630 Appendix � 1630.2(i).

7The agency is advised that 29 C.F.R. � 1614.203(g), which governed and

limited the obligation of reassignment in the Federal sector, has been

superseded and no longer applies. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.203(b). The ADA

standards apply to all conduct on or after June 20, 2002, and emphasize,

among other things, a broader search for a vacancy. The ADA regulations

regarding reassignment can be found at 29 C.F.R. �� 1630.2(o) and 1630.9.

Additional information can be found in the Appendix to the ADA regulations

and in the EEOC's Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and

Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (October 17,

2001) at Questions 25-31. These documents are available on the EEOC's

website at www.eeoc.gov.

8The agency's assertion that flightline duties, that is, work on

the runways and taxiways in addition to the surrounding area, are an

essential duty of his position are supported by the Position Description

(PD), supra, in communications found in the file, and the testimony of

agency managers. The PD states that the main purpose of the position is

to operate equipment in the maintenance of �base roads and grounds.� The

duties of the position provide for operation of various heavy equipment,

including a �vacuum type sweeper [to] remove snow, debris and foreign

objects from the runways, taxiways, roads, and parking aprons and areas

as necessary;� it is the latter duties that require each employee

to be available for �call back� work. Further, the PD states that

all operations take place on the �roads, runways, taxiways, and ramps

throughout the Base.� Because the areas identified as the site of the

job duties are, in the main, the areas connected to aircraft operations,

i.e., the roads, runways, taxiways, and ramps, we find that duties on

the flightline are an essential function of the position.

9An agency need only provide petitioner an effective, reasonable

accommodation, not necessarily the accommodation s/he prefers.

See Guidance, Question 9.