Arthur N. Gilman, Complainant,v.Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary, Department of Transportation, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 22, 2003
01A24271_r (E.E.O.C. Dec. 22, 2003)

01A24271_r

12-22-2003

Arthur N. Gilman, Complainant, v. Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary, Department of Transportation, Agency.


Arthur N. Gilman v. Department of Transportation

01A24271

December 22, 2003

.

Arthur N. Gilman,

Complainant,

v.

Norman Y. Mineta,

Secretary,

Department of Transportation,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A24271

Agency No. 2-01-2029

Hearing No. 100-A1-8021X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and

Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as

amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405.

The record reveals that complainant, an Air Traffic Controller at the

Baltimore-Washington International Airport Control Tower, filed a formal

EEO complaint on November 13, 2000, alleging that the agency discriminated

against him on the bases of race/color (Caucasian), disability, and age

(D.O.B. February 26, 1957) when in August 2000, the agency failed to

select him for the position of Air Traffic Controller at Reagan National

Airport.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy

of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a Notice of Proposed Summary

Judgement on March 21, 2002. On June 17, 2002, the AJ issued a decision

without a hearing, finding no discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainant failed to present any evidence that the

selecting official was aware of complainant's disability when he made the

selection. The AJ further concluded that complainant failed to present

any persuasive evidence that the agency's legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for not selecting him was pretext for unlawful discrimination.

The agency's final order implemented the AJ's decision.

The Commissioner's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact.

29 C.F.R. �1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is �genuine� if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equipment Corporation, 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is

�material� if it has the potential to affect the outcome of a case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, the

issuance of a decision without a hearing is not appropriate. In the

context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider

issuing a decision without a hearing only upon a determination that the

record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty

v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).

Complainant has alleged a claim of disparate treatment on the basis

of disability. In analyzing a disparate treatment claim under the

Rehabilitation Act, where the agency denies that its decisions were

motivated by complainant's disability, and there is no direct evidence of

discrimination, we apply the burden-shifting method of proof set forth

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this

analysis, in order to establish a prima facie case, complainant must

demonstrate that: (1) he is an "individual with a disability"; (2) he

is "qualified" for the position held or desired; (3) he was subjected

to an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances surrounding

the adverse action give rise to an inference of discrimination. Lawson

v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 245 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2001). The burden

of production then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. In order

to satisfy his burden of proof, complainant must then demonstrate by a

preponderance of the evidence that the agency's proffered reason is a

pretext for unlawful discrimination.

For purposes of further analysis, we assume arguendo without finding,

that complainant established that he is a qualified individual with

a disability and is entitled to coverage under the Rehabilitation Act.

We find that the agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for its action, namely that the selectee was chosen based on information

from the Baltimore Manager that the selectee could most quickly become

certified to perform air traffic control at the Washington, D.C. facility.

Further, we find that complainant did not sufficiently rebut this

explanation with evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could

conclude that unlawful discriminatory animus motivated the selection.

Therefore, after a review of the record in its entirety, including

consideration of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision

of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the agency's

final order, because the Administrative Judge's issuance of a decision

without a hearing was appropriate, and the preponderance of the record

evidence does not establish that discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

_December 22, 2003_________________

Date