Arthur L. Everhart, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Southeast Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 1, 2002
01991855 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 1, 2002)

01991855

02-01-2002

Arthur L. Everhart, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Southeast Area), Agency.


Arthur L. Everhart v. United States Postal Service

01991855

February 1, 2002

.

Arthur L. Everhart,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Southeast Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01991855

Agency No. 1H-391-1031-95

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The

appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. Complainant alleged

that he was discriminated against on the bases of his race (Caucasian),

reprisal (prior EEO complaints) and age (date of birth October 10, 1937)

when, on February 21, 1995, he was instructed to prep third class mail.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed

as a mailhandler at the agency's Processing and Distribution Center in

Jackson, Mississippi. Believing he was a victim of discrimination,

complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently filed a formal

complaint on May 4, 1995. At the conclusion of the investigation,

complainant was informed of his right to request a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge or alternatively, to receive a final decision by

the agency. Complainant requested a hearing, but withdrew the request

by letter dated August 6, 1998, and instead requested that the agency

issue a final decision.

In its FAD, the agency concluded that even assuming arguendo that

complainant had established a prima facie case of discrimination based on

the alleged purviews, there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for the challenged action. Specifically, prepping mail was part of

complainant's job. The agency further concluded that complainant failed

to demonstrate that reason was a pretext for discrimination.

On appeal, complainant restates arguments already made, and explains

that although mail prepping is in his job description, it is not one of

his assigned tasks. The agency requests that we affirm its FAD.

In general, claims alleging disparate treatment are examined under the

tripartite analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973); Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979)

(requiring a showing that age was a determinative factor, in the sense

that "but for" age, complainant would not have been subject to the adverse

action at issue). A complainant must first establish a prima facie case

of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably

give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited

reason was a factor in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). Next, the agency must articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its action (s). Texas Department of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). After the agency has offered

the reason for its action, the burden returns to the complainant to

demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's reason

was pretextual, that is, it was not the true reason or the action was

influenced by legally impermissible criteria. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253;

St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the

third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of

whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal

Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

Assuming, arguendo, that complainant established his prima facie case

of discrimination, the Commission turns to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Upon review

of the record, the Commission finds that complainant was instructed

to prep third class mail because it was part of his job description.

The named management official who gave complainant the challenged

instruction explains that mail prepping was the area where complainant

was most needed at the time, and additionally, he was selected for the

task because he was the junior mailhandler in the outgoing section.

Upon review of the record, the Commission finds that the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.

The burden returns to complainant to show that the agency's reasons

were pretext for discrimination. Complainant has submitted no evidence

to suggest that his age, race or prior EEO activity were considered as

factors in management's decision to assign him to the task of prepping

mail. Further, complainant admits that prepping mail is one of his job

duties, and despite his contention that it is not one of his assigned

tasks, we are not persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's reason for assigning him this task is pretextual.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we affirm the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

February 1, 2002

__________________

Date