Arthur G. Banazek, Appellant,v.Rodney E. Slater, Secretary, Department of Transportation, (Federal Aviation Admin.), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 10, 1998
01981018 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 10, 1998)

01981018

12-10-1998

Arthur G. Banazek, Appellant, v. Rodney E. Slater, Secretary, Department of Transportation, (Federal Aviation Admin.), Agency.


Arthur G. Banazek v. Department of Transportation

01981018

December 10, 1998

Arthur G. Banazek, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01981018

v. ) Agency No. 4-96-122

) Hearing No. 220-97-5164X

Rodney E. Slater, )

Secretary, )

Department of Transportation, )

(Federal Aviation Admin.), )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

Appellant timely initiated an appeal to the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) from the final decision of the agency concerning his

allegation that the agency violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.; and the Age Discrimination

in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �621 et seq.

The Commission hereby accepts the appeal in accordance with EEOC Order

No. 960, as amended.

The issue presented is whether appellant proved, by a preponderance

of the evidence, that he was discriminated against because of

his race (Caucasian), color (white), sex (male), national origin

(European/non-Hispanic), reprisal (prior EEO complaint), and age (59) when

he was not selected for the position of Assistant Systems Management

Office Manager, GS-0301-15, at the Ohio Systems Management Office in

February of 1996.

On appeal, appellant's attorney contends that appellant was improperly

denied a hearing after having raised genuine issues of material fact.

Appellant further contends that all of the job candidates should have

been chosen from the Airway Facilities National Selection System National

Register (AFNSS), but that the agency violated its own policy by choosing

a candidate from the Merit Promotion Program (MPP). In response, the

agency points out that it revised its policy by memorandum dated July 1,

1994, to allow upper management positions to be filled from either the

AFNSS or MPP Registers. It further notes that appellant did not rebut

the reasons set forth by the selection panel for not recommending him

to the selecting official.

At the time of his complaint, appellant was employed by the agency as

a Manager, Technical Support Staff, GS-2101-13. Believing that he was

a victim of discrimination when he was not selected, appellant sought

EEO counseling and later filed a formal EEO complaint dated August 30,

1996, wherein he alleged that he had been discriminated against on the

above-referenced bases.

The agency complied with all procedural and regulatory prerequisites,

and on September 30, 1997, the EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) issued a

Recommended Decision (RD) without a hearing finding no discrimination

on any basis. Subsequently, the agency adopted the RD as its own final

decision.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the

AJ's RD summarized the relevant facts and referenced the appropriate

regulations, policies, and laws. We therefore discern no basis to

disturb the AJ's finding of no discrimination. In regard to appellant's

main contentions, we note as follows:

1. The AJ did not abuse her discretion in issuing a RD without a hearing,

as she found there was no genuine dispute as to material facts.

2. While appellant contended that he should not have been subject to

the cut-off score of the selection panel and that his name should have

been forwarded to the selecting official, it is not his prerogative but

rather the agency's to choose a system for evaluating job candidates

for a particular position, as long as the system is applied in a

nondiscriminatory manner or is not otherwise motivated by proscribed

factors. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1012, n.6 (1st

Cir. 1979). Here the rating score was based on how well each candidate

answered the interview questions, which were the same for all candidates.

3. Similarly, the agency was within its rights to pick candidates from

the MPP Register, as well as the AFNSS Register. Loeb, supra.

Doing so did not violate agency policy, as appellant contends, because

the policy was changed by memorandum stated July 1, 1994, well before

candidates were selected in 1996.

4. Although appellant argued that he was better qualified than the

selectee by virtue of years of agency service, years of experience do

not necessarily make an individual more qualified to meet the needs of

the organization, McGettigan v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal

No. 01924372 (Feb. 24, 1993); or automatically make one candidate more

qualified than another, Ford v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Appeal No. 01913521 (Decision. 19, 1991). While appellant's

management experience and skills were narrowly technical, the selectee

had broader management experience and skills and was a better fit for

the agency's requirements, as reflected in the interview rating scores

(34 for the selectee and 15 for appellant). While appellant contended

that he was rated lowest in retaliation for challenging the selection

process that allowed candidates from the MPP Register to complete, the

panel's interview notes showed that appellant's communication skills

were below average and that while he possessed knowledge of the program

areas, he had a negative attitude, rambled, and did not provide in depth

responses to the interview questions as to his management skills. Thus we

concur with the selection panel members that appellant's rating score

was justified based on his poor responses to interview questions.

5. Finally, the Commission finds no evidence that the selectee was

chosen in furtherance of affirmative action goals, as appellant asserts.

To the contrary, the selecting official testified that he was not

instructed to select a certain candidate because of affirmative action

goals and that he did not instruct the selection panel to recommend this

type of candidate. The preponderance of the evidence does not support

appellant's contention that diversity goals played a deciding role

in the selection decision. The deciding officials were able to point,

with great specificity, to the interview responses and achievements of

the selectee which resulted in their judgment that she was the better

qualified candidate. The Commission, therefore, concludes that appellant

has failed to prove that the reasons given by the agency for its selection

were a pretext to mask discrimination.

It is, accordingly, the decision of the EEOC to AFFIRM the agency's

final decision in this matter.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �l6l4.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS

OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42, U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

Dec 10, 1998

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations