Armour and Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 27, 1945

63 N.L.R.B. 1200 (N.L.R.B. 1945)

In the Matter of ARMOUR AND COMPANY and UNITED PACKINGHOUSE.
WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL UNION 15, C. I. O.
Case No. 17-C-1224.-Decided September 27, 1945
Mrs. Margaret L. Fassig, for the Board.
Messrs. Paul E. Blanchard, of Chicago, Ill., and Charles L. Camp-
bell, of Kansas City, Kans., for the respondent.
Mr. Ralph Baker, of Chicago, Ill., for the Union.
Mr, Mozart G. Ratner, of counsel to the Board.
DECISION
AND
ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge duly filed by United Packinghouse Workers of
America, Local Union 15, C. 1. 0., herein called the Union, the National
Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, by its Regional
Director for the Seventeenth Region (Kansas City, Missouri), issued
its complaint dated February 6, 1945, against Armour and Company,
herein called the respondent, alleging that the respondent had engaged
in and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 8 (5) and (1) and Section 2 (6) and
(7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called
the Act. Copies of the complaint accompanied by notice of hearing
were duly served upon the respondent and the Union.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged in
substance : (1) that the employees of the respondent at its plant at
Kansas City, Kansas, engaged in plant protection, including police,.
box pullers, and combination police and box pullers, but excluding
supervisory employees, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining; (2) that a majority of the employees in the
appropriate unit designated the Union as their representative for the
purposes of collective bargaining at an election conducted by the Board
on December 20, 1944; (3) that at all times since December 20, 1944,
3 The election was held pursuant to the Board's Decision and Direction of Election Irk,
Matter of Armour and Company and Packinghouse Workers of America, Local Union 15,.
CIO, 59 N. L. R. B. 783.
63 N. L. R. B., No. 188.
1200
ARMOUR AND COMPANY 1201
the Union has been the exclusive representative of all employees in
said appropriate unit; (4) that on or about January 10, 1945, the Union
requested the respondent to bargain collectively; and (5) that since
January 11, 1945, the respondent has refused to bargain with the
Union.
On February 7, 1945, the respondent filed a request that the repre-
sentation proceedings be reopened for further consideration of the
appropriateness of the unit. The respondent's request was denied on
February 17, 1945, "without prejudice . . . to the right of the parties
to adduce further evidence with respect to the appropriateness of the
unit" at the hearing in the instant case.
Pursuant to notice a hearing was held at Kansas City, Missouri,
on February 21, 1945, before Horace A. Ruckel, the Trial Examiner
duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The Board and the
respondent were represented by counsel, and the Union by an organ-
izer. Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses, and to introduce evidence bearing upon the issues was afforded
all parties. Further, evidence bearing on the appropriateness of the
unit was introduced by both counsel for the Board and the respond-
ent. During the course of the hearing, the Trial Examiner made
rulings on motions and on objections to the admission of evidence.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made dur-
ing the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed.
On March 28, 1945, the Trial Examiner issued his Intermediate
Report, copies of which were duly served upon the respondent and the
Union. He found that the respondent had engaged in and was engag-
ing in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (5) and
(1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, and recommended that the
respondent cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. On April 16,
1945, the respondent filed with the Board its exceptions to the Inter-
mediate Report.
On August 7, 1945, the Board heard oral argument at Washington,
D. C. The respondent participated in the argument; the Union did
not appear.
The Board has considered the respondent's exceptions to the Inter-
mediate Report, the supporting arguments, and the entire record in
the case , and, insofar as the exceptions are inconsistent with the find-
ings, conclusions , and order set forth below, finds them to be without
merit.
Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following :
1202 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Armour and Company is an Illinois corporation with its principal
place of business at Chicago, Illinois. The respondent's Kansas City,
Kansas, plant, at which it is engaged in slaughtering, processing, and
packing livestock products, is alone involved in this proceeding. Dur-
ing the calendar year 1944, the respondent processed products at this
plant valued in excess of $45,000,000, more than 75 percent of which
was shipped to points outside of the State of Kansas? During the
same period, an average of 70 percent of the plant's production was on
contract with various United States Government agencies, including
the War Department, Foreign Economic Administration, and other
Government agencies.
The respondent does not deny that it is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of the Act.
II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Packinghouse Workers of America, Local Union 15, affili-
ated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, is a labor organ-
ization admitting to membership employees of the respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The unit alleged as appropriate; representation by the Union of a
majority therein
The Board, in its Decision and Direction of Election 3 of December
7, 1944, found that all plant-protection employees of the respondent
at its Kansas City, Kansas, plant, including police, box pullers, and
combination police and box pullers, but excluding supervisors and
all other supervisory employees with authority to hire, promote, dis-
charge, discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status of em-
ployees, or effectively recommend such action, constitute a unit appro-
priate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning
of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
On December 20, 1944, an election was held pursuant to the Board's
Direction of Election. On January 1, 1945, following the designa-
tion of the Union by a majority of the employees in the election, the
Board certified the Union as the representative of the employees, in
the unit heretofore mentioned, for the purposes of collective
bargaining.
2 The above finding is based on a stipulation of the parties.
3 See footnote 1, supra.
ARMOUR AND COMPANY 1203
B. The refusal to bargain
On January 10, 1945, the Union wrote a letter to the respondent,
the text of which read as follows :
We have {been] certified by the National Labor Relations Board
as a bargaining agent for watchmen in your plant, and are re-
questing that you meet with us in the next few days to discuss
wages, hours, and working conditions for these employees.
No answer was received to this letter, and on January 17, 1945,
the Union filed the charge on which the complant in the present case
is based. On January 25, 1945, the respondent wrote the Board's
Regional Director for the Seventeenth Region in part as follows :
... it was our belief that plant protection employees, such as I
believe these employees to be, were not entitled to coverage of the
Act. Accordingly, I called for the record and directed Mr.
Campbell [the respondent's plant superintendent] not to do any
collective bargaining of any kind until he heard from me fur-
ther. .. .
The respondent admits that it has refused to bargain collectively
with the Union as the representative of the employees in the unit
found appropriate by the Board.
C. The duties and status of the guards
The respondent instituted its plant-protection system a number
of years before the war. The guards were militarized in August
1942. The record establishes that there has been no material change
in the duties of the respondent's plant guards since their militariza-
tion.' Now as then, their duties, briefly stated, consist of the pre-
vention and detection of fire, theft, sabotage, and disorder in the
plant. These functions are fulfilled by maintaining guards at points
of entrance and exit at the plant, for the checking and identification of
4 Gragg, a member of the guard force, called as a witness for the Board, testified as
follows :
Q. Has there been any substantial change in the duties that you performed after you
were militarized different from what you performed before you were militarized?
A. Very little. It would be about the same thing-exactly the same thing. They
wasn't quite so particular about people coming in , and they also allowed visitors
before the war unless they sent someone with them , and they don 't allow that now.
You have to get a pass now and "sign" in to get in the plant at all. You have
to have some business and we have to know what that business is, like getting
employment at the office or seeing the personnel agent or something like that.
You have to know what he wants to do there.
Q. Before you were militarized , you had been deputized and you had the authority to
make arrests in cases where you found people engaged in stealing the company's
property?
A. Yes.
Counsel for the respondent stipulated that if all the other guards were called as witnesses,
their testimony as to their duties would be the same as that of Gragg.
662514-46-vol. 63-77
1204 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
persons, packages, and vehicles entering and leaving the premises.
A patrol of two types is maintained. The first consists of a random
patrol of guards throughout the plant during working hours to observe
the conduct of the production and maintenance employees and to check
on safety conditions. The second consists of a call-box system by
which guards patrolling regular beats "pull" watch boxes in the plant.
All the guards perform substantially the same duties by a system of
rotation. "Box pullers" generally are not armed or uniformed while
performing their duties, but the same employees are both armed and
uniformed while serving on gates or making the random patrol of the
plant.
The guards wear the same type of uniform they did prior- to their
militarization, except that a shoulder patch has been added bearing
the words : "Auxiliary Military Police." Arms are carried, as
formerly, when performing the same duties, and the authority to carry
such arms apparently stems from deputization by civilian police au-
thorities. The authority of the guards to make arrests has not been
extended since their militarization, except for the power to arrest
without warrant under the Sabotage and Espionage Acts. Offenders
against the regulations are taken to the chief of the guards, a civilian
employee, for his action.
Although the guards upon becoming militarized received a limited
amount of instruction and drill from the Army, militarization did
not transfer control over the manner in which the guards perform
their duties from the respondent to the Army. Their orders continue
to come from their civilian superiors, agents of the respondent, to
whom they continue to report. There is nothing in the record to
indicate that the guards have ever received orders concerning their
daily duties from the Army.
D. The respondent's contentions
The respondent takes the position that it is under no- obligation to
bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of the em-
ployees in the unit previously found appropriate by the Board. The
respondent contends (1) that, because the plant guards are militarized.
and are subject to orders of the Army, they are not employees of the
respondent; (2) that, because the plant guards are empowered to
arrest and otherwise to impose physical restraints upon other em-
ployes, they may not constitute an appropriate unit for collective bar-
gaining; (3) that the obligation of loyalty to the Union assumed by
the guards upon joining it is incompatible with the guards' duty of
loyalty to the Government and that the policies of the Act would
therefore not be effectuated by a finding that they constitute an appro-
priate unit; and (4) that the Army, in its circular relating to the union
ARMOUR AND COMPANY 1205
activity of militarized plant guards, has prohibited the respondent
from bargaining with the Union. These contentions are hereinafter
considered.
1. The employment status of the guards
In determining whether the evidence shows the existence of an
employer-employee relation between the plant guards and the re-
spondent, we must, in this as in other cases, be guided by the basic
purposes of the statute. As set forth in Section 1, these purposes are
to encourage collective bargaining as the practice "fundamental to the
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences
as to wages, hours, or other working conditions" and to remedy the
individual worker's inequality of bargaining power. If the incidents
of a particular service relation are such as to permit collective bar-
gaining between those who receive services and those who render them,
for changes in the terms and conditions of performing the service, the
statutory objectives are capable of achievement and the relation may,
then be held to be one of employer and employee. N. L. R. B. v.
Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111; N. L. R. B. v. R. A. Blount, 131 F..
(2d) 585 (C. C. A. 8), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 791. Thus, wherever the
wages, or hours, or other conditions under which services are per-
formed are fixed by the recipient of the service, either unilaterally or-
as a result of bargaining with the workers individually, the statutory
objectives are capable of achievement, and unilateral or individual'
determination of such terms or conditions may appropriately be dis-
placed by collective bargaining. In deciding whether, therefore, the
plant guards are employees of the respondent for purposes of collective.
bargaining, we must look to see whether the respondent fixes terms,
or conditions under which the guards work. We find that it does,.
now, as in the past.
As has been noted above, the respondent, after, as well as before the,
guards became militarized, issued orders to the guards and supervised'
the manner in which they performed their duties. The militarization.
of the guards did not, moreover, affect the respondent's power to
determine their rates of compensation and their hours of employment;
nor did it remove from the respondent the power to' hire and discharge,
plant guards .5
We find that these terms and conditions under which the guards
work are subject to determination by collective bargaining with the
respondent, and that "all the conditions of the relation" between the
5 In a circular dated March 17, 1943 , over the signature of the Chief of Staff of the
General Staff Corps it was stated :
6 b (1) Basically , the militarization of plant guard forces does not change the existing
system Sf hiring , compensation , and dismissal, all remain primarily a matter between,
the guards and the plant managements . Guards in the employ of a private employer
may, as heretofore , be dismissed by that employer. . . .
1206 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
respondent and the plant guards, "require [the] protection" of the Act.
N. L. P. B. v. Hearst Petblications, 322 U. S. 111, 129-130. The re-
spondent's claim, therefore, that militarization has deprived it of full
and complete control of all aspects of the employment relationship is,
even if true, inadequate to establish its contention that it is no longer
the employer of the guards within the meaning of the Act. The
respondent exercises control over many important aspects of the
guards' employment and is, consequently, in a position to bargain
collectively as to such matters. We accordingly hold that the plant
guards are employees of the respondent within the meaning of the Act.
2. The appropriateness of the unit
The respondent contends that, because the plant guards are empow-
ered to arrest other employees and are authorized to require their
obedience to certain regulations, they are not to be deemed an appro-
priate unit within the meaning of the Act. We do not agree. The
duties and status of the respondent's plant guards, as set forth above,
do not materially differ from those of militarized plant-protection
employees in many other cases previously decided by the Board, ad-
versely to the respondent's position here.6 We find nothing in the
duties or the status of the plant guards that would justify denying
to this group of employees the benefits of the Act.
The respondent contends further that a finding that the guards
constitute an appropriate unit will not effectuate the policies of the
Act because of an asserted conflict between their duties as guards and
the obligation they assume upon becoming union members. In sup-
port of this contention the respondent cites the oath taken by guards
upon militarization. This oath appears as part of an individual agree-
ment with the United States, signed by each guard at the time of his
militarization, and provides, in part, that the guard will support and
defend the Constitution of the United States and "well and faithfully
discharge [his] duty as a "civilian auxiliary to the military police" 7
6 See, e. g, Matter of Dravo Corporation and International Union of Marine and Ship-
buildsng Workers of America ( C. 1. 0.), 52 N. L. R. B. 322, where the Board discussed
at length the duties and responsibilities of militarized guards, characterized their authority
as "monitorial" rather than "supervisory ," and found that they may constitute an appro-
priate unit , and that they are employees within the meaning of the Act. See 'also, Matter
of International Harvester Company, 61 N. L. R. B. 912, and cases therein cited.
° The agreement reads as follows :
Agreement between the United States of America and ------------
Plant Guard
In order that the existing military forces of the United States may be most effec-
tively employed in combat activity against enemies of the United States, the United
States is approving the employment of certain guards as a civilian auxiliary to the
military police for the purpose of guarding and protecting war material , war premises,
and war utilities from injury or destruction liy the enemy or otherwise , including the
making of arrests, as peace officers for violations of Federal laws, as well as for
ARMOUR AND COMPANY 1207
[emphasis supplied]. With this oath the respondent seeks to contrast
the fraternal oath required of a union member, in which the member
undertakes to promote the mutual interests of his fellow members.s
We find no such divergent commitments in the two oaths as would
justify a belief that any duality of allegiance is created to the detri-
ment of the duties performed by the guards. Moreover, it is obvious
that if any conflict arose between the loyality owed by the guards to
the Government of the United States and their loyality to the Union,
loyalty to the Government would be their paramount obligation (see
note 10, infra). That the military authorities, who are most directly
concerned with the guards' faithful performance, have at no time been
disturbed by any such conflict of loyalty, is evidenced by the failure of
the Army to raise any objections to the organization of these or any
other militarized guards. We have refused in the past to hold that
"membership in a union tends to undermine the honesty of plant-pro-
tection employees or their competence to execute their duties satisfac-
torily" (Matter of Dravo Corporation, 52 N. L. R. B. 322, 327)-; we
now decline to hold that membership in a union tends to undermine
their patriotism.9
Finally, the respondent contends that, because the Union which
has been certified as the exclusive representative of the plant guards
is also the certified representative of the production and maintenance
employees, the Army has, in effect, forbidden it to bargain with the
violations of orders and regulations issued by military authority . The United States
requires that only persons physically fit, well trained in the use of arms and in
the duties incident to their position , and of unquestionable loyalty to the United
States be so employed.
Now, therefore , I ------------- who have been or am about to be employed by
_________ as a guard at ------------ premises , and war utilities , in consideration
of my employment or the continuation of my employment , do agree with the United
States of America that :
(1) I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all
enemies, foreign and domestic :
(2) I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the United States;
(3) I will well and faithfully discharge my duty as a civilian auxiliary to the mili-
tary police to protect war material, war premises , and war utilities against all
enemies, foreign and domestic , and will obey any orders issued in connection therewith
by the President , as Commander -in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and by his duly authorized officers.
(4) I acknowledge that the appropriate Articles of war have been read and
explained to me, and that in the performance of my duty to protect such war
material, war premises , and war utilities , I am subject to military law during the
period of my employment.
Signature of Plant Guard
8 The Union oath reads as follows :
I do sincerely promise, of my own free will, to abide by the laws of the union ; to
bear true allegiance and to keep inviolate the principles of unionism ; never to allow
myself to discriminate against a fellow worker on account of creed, color , or nation-
ality ; to defend freedom of thought, whether expresed by tongue or pen, to defend
on all occasions and to the extent of my ability the members of our organization.
e We note in this connection that the union constitution suggests as a prominent part
of the business of each meeting of a local union that the members in unison pledge
allegiance to the flag of the United States.
1208 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Union as the representative of the guard force. Certain circulars
,issued by the War Department pertaining to the duties of militarized
guards, introduced in evidence, are relied upon as supporting this
contentionle It will be noted that paragraph 3 of the Memorandum
requires that plant-protection employees "be represented by a bar-
gaining unit other than that representing the production and main-
-.tenance workers." It also states that the bargaining unit into which
the guards are grouped may be affiliated with the trade union local
to which the production and maintenance workers belong, "provided
`they are, in fact, separate bargaining units." This phraseology is
-somewhat misleading in that employees are not represented by a
"bargaining unit," but by a bargaining agent or representative chosen
by the employees in an appropriate unit. The wording of the mem-
orandum', however, clearly negatives the contention of the respondent
,that it has in effect been forbidden by the Army to negotiate with the
-representative certified by the Board. The War Department, the
.principal party in interest, has taken no such position in this case.
In accordance with our consistent practice, explained in the Dravo
-case, we found in the representation proceeding that a separate unit
iu The position of the Army as to the right of the Auxiliary Military Police to join labor
-organizations and bargain collectively was formulated in the light of established Board
policy with respect to such employees and was set forth in a circular , numbered 15,
dated March 17, 1943:
,6 (h). Labor Relationships
• * s
(2) Auxiliary Military Police are permitted to bargain collectively, but no such
:activity will be tolerated which will interfere with their obligations as members
of the Auxiliary Military Police. In view of recent decisions by the National Labor
Relations Board (see In re Lord Mfg. Co. & United Rubber Workers of America, CIO,
Case No. R-4826, February 1943), the Auxiliary Military Police should be represented
in collective bargaining with the management by a bargaining unit other than that
composed of the production and maintenance workers, although both bargaining
units may be affiliated with the same labor organization. Where the guards are not
now included in the same bargaining unit, this is mandatory ; where the guards are
included in such unit, serious consideration will be given to effect a change to con-
form to the foregoing policies.
-This position was clarified in the following memorandum of the War Department dated
duly 10, 1943:
MEMORANDUM FOR ALL COMMANDING GENERALS, ALL SERVICE
COMMANDS
Subject : Plant Guards.
1. It has been reported to this headquarters that labor officers are interpreting
Circular No. 15, this headquarters, 17 March 1943, subject "Auxiliary Military Police,"
as prohibiting membership of plant guards enrolled as Auxiliary Military Police in
the same trade union local as that representing production and maintenance workers.
2. Paragraph 6 (h) (2), Circular No. 15, presented applicable War Department
policy on plant guard labor representation. ,
3. In the event that plant guards enrolled as Auxiliary Military Police desire to
be represented in collective bargaining with the management, they should be repre-
sented by a bargaining unit other than that representing the production and mainte-
nance workers. However, in such event, both bargaining units may be affiliated with
the same trade union local, provided they are, in fact, separate bargaining units.
ARMOUR AND COMPANY 1209
of guards is appropriate. This finding fully meets the Army require-
ments. The evidence shows that the guards here have made it a
point to meet as a union group, separate and apart from any other
employees, and have chosen temporary officers from among their own
number. There is, moreover, reliable testimony that it is the purpose
of the guards to continue this practice of holding separate meetings,
and that the Union plans to establish a separate local, to be known as
Local Union 15A, for the employees in the plant guard unit. We are
satisfied that the separation of the plant guard group has been, and
will continue to be, one of fact as well as of form. Certification of the
Union as representative of the guards, though it may also represent
,other. employees in other appropriate units, is plainly consistent with
the requirements established by the Army for purposes of military
security.
We conclude that the unit set forth above, which we have previously
found appropriate, will insure to the employees therein the full bene-
fit of their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining, and
will otherwise effectuate the policies of the Act, and that it is therefore
a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within
the meaning of the Act.', We further find that at all times material
"The respondent, in its brief and in oral argument before the Board, relied upon the
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in N. L. R. B. v. B. C.
Atkins Co., 147 F. (2d) 730, setting aside, 56 N L. R. B 1056, on the ground that the
plant guards there involved were not employees within the meaning of the Act, and on
the decisions of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in N. L. R. B. v Federal
Motor Truck Co , and N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 146 F. (2d) 718, setting
aside. 54 N. L R. B 679 and 53 N L K B 1046, on the ground that the plant guards
involved in those cases did not constitute units appropriate for collective bargaining.
In its petition to the Supreme Court for writs of certiorari in all three cases, Nos. 1236,
1237, and 1238, October Term 1944, the Board set forth the reasons for its disagreement
with the views expressed in the Court opinions. On June 4, 1945, the Board's petition
was granted ; the judgments of the Circuit Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits were vacated ; and the cases were remanded to those courts for reconsideration.
Since the decisions have been vacated, they cannot, of course, be regarded as precedents.
In the oral argument, counsel for the respondent nevertheless asserted that the opinions
of the Circuit Courts of Appeals in these cases are binding, not alone in the circuits which
issued them, but in all other circuits as well, and that, as a matter of law, they preclude
the Board and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in whose jurisdiction
,the respondent's Kansas City, Kansas, plant is located, from deciding this case contrary
to the views expressed by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. Even if we were to assume
that the authority of those opinions remained unaffected by the Supreme Court's action,
it is axiomatic that a decision is binding as precedent only in the circuit in which it was
issued Compare Republic Aviation Corporation v. N. L. R B , 142 F. (2d) 193 (C. C A 2),
aff'd, 65 S. Ct. 982, where the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, speaking
through Judge Learned Hand, noted that, although the Circuit Courts of Appeals for
five other circuits had decided the issue involved in that case contrary to the Board's
view, "we feel ourselves free to consider the question as res Integra," 142 F (2d) at 196.
See also, Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 147 F. (2d) 658, 662, N. 3 (C. C A.
10), certiorari granted, No. 61, this Term; Walling v News Printing Co., Inc, 148 F. (2d)
57, 59 (C. C. A. 3), certiorari granted, No. 63, this Term. If, as the respondent asserts,
the Board and other Circuit Courts of Appeals were bound to follow the decision of the
first circuit which decided a particular issue, there could never be a conflict of decisions
between the circuits ; the fact that such conflicts of decision constitute the largest field
for the exercise of the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction demonstrates the complete
lack of merit in the respondent's position. See Robertson and Kirkham, Jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court of the United States (1936), pp. 562-575.
1210 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
herein the Union was the duly designated bargaining representative
of a majority of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit and
that, pursuant to the provisions of Section 9 (a) of the Act the Union
was at all such times, and now is, the exclusive representative of all
the employees in the aforesaid unit for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and
other conditions of employment. We further find that the respondent
on January 10, 1945, and at all times thereafter, has refused to bargain
collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of its em-
ployees in the appropriate unit, and has thereby interfered with, re-
strained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in Section 7 of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF TIIE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
We find that the activities of the respondent set'forth in Section III,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of the respondent
described in Section 1, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial
relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and
tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce
and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices, we shall order that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act. Since we have found that the respondent has refused to bargain
collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of its
employees in an appropriate unit, we shall order that the respondent,
upon request, bargain collectively with the Union as such representa-
tive.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire
record in the case, the Board makes the following :
CONCLUSION OF LAW
I
1. United Packinghouse Workers of America, Local Union 15,
affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, is a labor
organization, within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. All plant-protection employees at the Kansas City, Kansas, plant
of the respondent, including police, box pullers, and combination
police and box pullers, but excluding supervisors and all other super-
visory employees with authority to hire, promote, discharge, dis-
cipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees, or effec-
tively recommend such action, constitute a unit appropriate for the
ARMOUR AND COMPANY 1211
purposes of collective bargaining, within the meaning of Section
9 (b) of the Act.
3. United Packinghouse Workers of America, Local Union 15,
affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, was on De-
cember 20, 1944, and at all times thereafter has been the exclusive
representative of all the employees in the aforesaid unit for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining, within the meaning of Section 9 (a)
of the Act.
4. By refusing on January 11, 1945, and at all times thereafter
to bargain collectively with United Packinghouse Workers of Amer-
ica, Local Union 15, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organ-
izations, as the exclusive representative of all of its employees in the
aforesaid appropriate unit, the respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section
8 (5) of the Act.
5. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the respond-
ent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices
affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7)
of the Act.
ORDER
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and upon the entire record in the case, the National Labor Relations
Board, pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations
Act, hereby orders that the respondent, Armour and Company, and
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with United Packinghouse
Workers of America, Local Union 15, affiliated with the Congress of
Industrial Organizations, as the exclusive representative of all its
plant-protection employees at its Kansas City, Kansas, plant, includ-
ing police, box pullers, and combination police and box pullers, but
excluding supervisors and all other supervisory employees with au-
thority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or otherwise effect
changes in the status of employees, or effectively recommend such
action ;
(b) Engaging in any like or related act or conduct interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bar-
gain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargain-
1212 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ing or other mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with United Packinghouse
Workers of America, Local Union 15, affiliated with the Congress
of Industrial Organizations as the exclusive representative of all its
employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit;
(b) Post at its plant at Kansas City, Kansas, copies of the notice
attached hereto, marked "Appendix A." Copies of said notice, to be
furnished by the Regional Director of the Seventeenth Region, shall,
after being duly signed by the respondent's representative, be posted
by the respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained
by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the respondent to insure that these
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material;
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Seventeenth Region in
writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps
the respondent has taken to comply herewith.
MR. GERARD D. REZLLY took no part in the consideration of the above
Decision and Order.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant.to a decision and order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby-notify our employees that :
We will not refuse to bargain with United Packinghouse
Workers of America, Local Union 15, C. I. 0., as the exclusive
representative of our employees in the bargaining unit described
herein ;
We will not engage in any like or related act or conduct inter-
fering with, restraining, or coercing our employees in the exercise
of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations,
to join or assist the above-named or any other labor organization,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. All our
employees are free to become or remain members of this Union,
or any other labor organization.
We will bargain collectively upon request with the above-
named union as the exclusive representative of all employees in
ARMOUR AND COMPANY 1213'
the bargaining unit described herein with respect to rates of pay,
hours of employment or other conditions of employment, and if
an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a
signed agreement. The bargaining unit is :
All plant-protection employees at our Kansas City, Kansas,.
plant, including police, box pullers, and combination police and
box pullers, but excluding supervisors and all other supervisory
employees with authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline,
or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees or effectively
recommend such action.
ARMOUR AND COMPANY,.
(Employer)
By ------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
Dated ------------------------
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof;.
and must not be altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.