Armco Steel Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 10, 1970

183 N.L.R.B. 207 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

ARMCO STEEL CORPORATION
Armco Steel Corporation and United Steel Workers
of America , AFL-CIO
Armco Employees ' Independent Federation , Inc. and
United Steel Workers of America , AFL-CIO.
Cases 9-CA-4210 and 9-CB-1392
June 10, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS
On February 19, 1970, Trial Examiner Paul E.
Weil issued his Decision in the above-entitled con-
solidated proceeding, finding that the Respondents
had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair
labor practices within the meaning of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommend-
ing that they cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action, as set forth in the at-
tached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the
Respondent Union and the Respondent Employer
filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision
and the Respondent Employer filed a supporting
brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's
Decision, the exceptions, the brief, and the entire
stipulated record in this case, and hereby adopts
the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of
the Trial Examiner.'
We find no merit in the Respondents' arguments
against our reaching the merits of this case. It ap-
pears to us that the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit is aware of the Board's posi-
tion, which was before it when the Respondent Em-
ployer sought to enjoin any further proceedings be-
fore the Board on the instant complaint. In denying
such an injunction, the court held that the Board
"has jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant un-
fair labor complaint subject to statutorily provided
procedures."2 Moreover, in order to allay certain
concerns of the court respecting "forum shopping,"
the General Counsel stated, on behalf of the Board,
that any petition for enforcement would be filed in
the Sixth Circuit and that if a petition were filed by
a party to the proceeding in another circuit, the
Board would support the transfer of the case to the
' As the record , exceptions , and brief adequately present the issues and
the positions of the parties , the Respondent Employer's request for oral ar-
gument is hereby denied
207
Sixth Circuit. We note that the court in its decision
indicated no displeasure with our proceeding with
this case. However, with all deference to the court,
we believe that the uniform administration of the
Act, for which we are responsible, requires that we
ultimately seek a final disposition by the Supreme
Court in order to resolve the conflict among the
various circuits on this important issue. Therefore,
we affirm the Trial Examiner's conclusion that the
Respondent Employer and the Respondent Union
violated Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(b)(I)(A) of the
Act, respectively, by maintaining in effect the
disputed no-distribution provision in their contract,
but we wish to make it clear that our affirmance is
intended as nothing more than respectful disagree-
ment with the view of the Sixth Circuit on the un-
derlying legal issue and an attempt to protect, until
the conflict in the circuits is resolved by the
Supreme Court, what we consider to be substantial
employee rights.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Armco Steel Corpora-
tion, Middletown, Ohio, and New Miami, Ohio, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, and the
Respondent, Armco Employees' Independent
Federation, Inc., Middletown, Ohio, and New
Miami, Ohio, its officers, agents, and representa-
tives, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Ex-
aminer's Recommended Order.
MEMBER JENKINS , dissenting:
Unlike my colleagues, I would dismiss the com-
plaint. In Armco Steel Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 344
F.2d 621, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's
Order in that case and held that the no-distribution
clause in the contract between the Company and
the Armco Employees' Independent Federation,
Inc., was a condition of employment and a proper
subject for collective bargaining. The Board did not
file a petition for certiorari to review the court's
decision and subsequently acquiesced in the court's
decision in Arnico Employees Independent Federa-
tion, Inc.;' which involved the identical clause
between the identical parties. I still remain firmly
convinced of the invalidity of the clause. However,
the instant case involves the identical clause
' At into Steel Corpirat,ont'. Ordman, 414 F 2d 259, 250 (C A 6)
155 NLRB 55 1, enfd 377F2d 140(CADC )
183 NLRB No. 26
209 ARMCO STEEL CORPORATION
period of 3 years which contained the same provi-
sion. That contract has now expired and the parties
have stipulated that a succeeding contract again
contain the same language.
The parties "updated" the record of the prior
proceeding by their stipulation and agreed state-
ment of facts. The facts contained therein show
that since the earlier case the unit has become
slightly smaller, shrinking from around 6,150 em-
ployees to around 5,835 employees. Certain plant
gates have been closed and certain others opened, a
new public thoroughfare has been created near
three of the entrances, and the places of residence
of the employees in the unit have remained sub-
stantially the same except that a few more em-
ployees live farther from the plant.
The appearance of the above facts in the stipula-
tion seems to be responsive to the decision of the
Circuit Court which can be considered to have
based its refusal to enforce the Board's order at
least in part upon the accessibility of employees to
the distribution of information by means other than
the distribution by employees of literature on plant
premises . In the Board's decision such evidence was
deemed irrelevant on the theory that the contrac-
tual clause interfered with employees in exercising
their basic rights under the Act.
Respondent3 raises a number of procedural issues
by way of defense. I shall consider them before I
reach the merits of the case.
First Respondent contends that "under univer-
sally understood and accepted principles of res ju-
dicata and collateral estoppel the prior judgments
and Board final orders upholding the validity of the
contract clause here in dispute bar the present
complaint." Respondent has reference to various
former cases which had to do with this issue. How-
ever, the only one of those cases that could raise
this defense is the judgment of the Sixth Circuit in
Armco Steel Corp. v. N.L.R.B., at 344 F.2d 621
(1965 ), which reversed the Board's decision re-
ported at 148 NLRB 1179 and set aside the order
of the Board.'
It is clear that the contract clause with which we
are dealing here is of precisely the same import as
that dealt with by the Sixth Circuit in the cited case
and there can be no doubt that the Sixth Circuit
held at the time it considered that case that the
contractual clause was valid. Thereafter, the issue
having been considered by various circuits, a dif-
ference of opinion has appeared among the circuits,
with the Ninth Circuit agreeing with the Sixth that
the clause is a valid exercise of the employer's and
the union's right by contract to place limitations
Hereinafter the designation Respondent refers to the position taken b5
Respondent Armco and concurred in by Respondent Independent
The other cases cited by Respondent do not in fact constitute final or-
ders of the Board or any court on the merits of the dispute with which we
are here concerned
N L R B v General Motors Corporation, 345 F 2d 516, and the Seventh
Circuit in the leading case on the issue N L R B v Gale Products, Dn tston
of Outboard Marine Corp , 337 F 2d 370 (1964)
upon the exercise of their organizational rights by
employees,5 while the Fifth Circuit held that the
right to distribute literature is a personal right
which cannot be waived by a union,' and the Eighth
Circuit agreed with the Fifth Circuit.?
The Board has held that it is the duty of the Trial
Examiner to adhere to Board precedents until the
Board indicates acquiescence in the contrary views
of a Circuit Court of Appeals or until the Supreme
Court of the United States has ruled otherwise.'
The Board met this precise procedural issue in the
second General Motors Corporation case at 158
NLRB 1723, and found no resjudicata or collateral
estoppel.
Respondent's attempt to distinguish the second
General Motors case on the ground that the charge
in that case was filed by a different party than the
charge in the original case must fail . A reading of
the case reveals that the Board distinctly decided
that under the authority of Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, the parties
are not bound by res judicata or collateral estoppel
where the second proceeding involved an instru-
ment or transaction "identical with but in a form
separable from the one dealt with in the first
proceeding." Accordingly the Board found the
parties were not bound by the result reached in the
previous General Motors case. The Board separate-
ly pointed out that the lack of privity between the
charging parties further barred the application of
the doctrine res judicata. There can be no doubt
from the Board's decision that either ground suf-
fices to bar the application of the doctrine res ju-
dicata . In its per curiani decision refusing to enforce
the Board's order the Ninth Circuit gave no ex-
planation whatsoever. Assuming that one could at-
tribute to the circuit the explanation that it did not
agree with the Board's decision with regard to the
argument of res judicata or collateral estoppel I am
aware of no action taken by the Board to indicate
its acquiescence in that decision nor of any decision
by the United States Supreme Court reversing the
Board. Accordingly I am bound, by the Board's ac-
tion in the General Motors case, to find in the in-
stant case that the doctrine resjudicata or collateral
estoppel is not applicable herein.
Respondent contends that "if the Trial Examiner
should feel ... that the Board's General Motors
case precludes him from dismissing on the basis of
argument II then he can and must dismiss on the
basis of argument III." The gist of argument III is
that the complaint must be dismissed because the
contract it attacks is no longer in essence but has
been renewed and "thus the estoppel the General
6 N.L.R.B. v. Mid-States Metal Products, Inc., 403 F.2d 702 (1968).
t International Assoctanon of Machuusts etc Distrut No 9 [McDonnell
Douglas Corporation] v N L R B, 415 F 2d 113 (1969), enfg 171 NLRB
No 35
"International Assoctanon of Maclutusti and Aerospace Wor/.en, District
No 9 (McDonnell Douglas Corporation), 171 NLRB No 35, and cases
there cited
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 208
between the identical parties, albeit in a different
contract. I think that considerations favoring "an
end to litigation " at some point-expense, effort,
prior decision of the same issue , lapse of time-all
impel us here to regard this issue, between these
parties, as finally determined and closed. Thus, as a
matter of policy and judgment, I cannot see that it
in any way effectuates the policies of the Act to
proceed with this case to a wholly predictable
reversal by the Court of Appeals which has previ-
ously determined the matter contrary to our views.
Accordingly, I would dismiss the complaint.
lation and Agreed Statement of Facts for the pur-
pose of avoiding a formal hearing on the complaint.
All parties filed briefs in support of their respective
positions. In its brief Respondent Armco reiterated
its arguments contained in its Motion to Dismiss
which have been ruled upon by Trial Examiner
Schneider.
After due, consideration of the Stipulation and
Agreed Statement of Facts, which are hereby
received, and the joint exhibits attached to the
stipulation and in contemplation of the briefs, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PAUL E. WEIL, Trial Examiner: On charges filed
March 6, 1967, by United Steel Workers of Amer-
ica, AFL-CIO, hereinafter called Steelworkers,
against Armco Steel Corporation, hereinafter called
Respondent Armco, and Armco Employees' Inde-
pendent Federation, Inc., hereinafter called
Respondent Independent, the General Counsel of
the National Labor Relations Board, herein called
the Board, by the Regional Director for Region 9
(Cincinnati), issued an Order Consolidating Cases,
Complaint and Notice of Hearing against Respond-
ent Armco and Respondent Independent alleging
that Respondent Armco violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act and that Respondent Independent violated
Section 8(b)( I )(A) of the Act by maintaining in
their collective-bargaining agreement a provision
prohibiting distribution or posting by employees of
literature upon company property except as ap-
proved by the Company. In its duly filed answer
Respondent Armco set up five affirmative defenses,
admitted all the facts alleged in the complaint but
denied the legal conclusions attendant thereto and
prayed for an order directing the General Counsel
to refrain from any further attacks upon the said
"no distribution" clause.
By its duly filed answer Respondent Independent
adopted the defenses set forth in Respondent Arm-
co's answer, complained that the complaint is
harassing and oppressive to it, requested dismissal
of the complaint, and joined in Respondent Arm-
co's prayer for further relief. Immediately
thereafter Respondent Armco filed a Motion to
Dismiss and for Affirmative Relief, couched in
hyperbolic terms, which in effect reiterated the five
affirmative defenses contained in the complaint.
The motion of Respondent Armco was opposed by
the General Counsel and an order denying said mo-
tion issued on May 13, 1969, signed by Trial Ex-
aminer Charles W. Schneider. Thereafter the
parties filed with the Chief Trial Examiner a Stipu-
I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT ARMCO
Respondent Armco is an Ohio corporation with
its principal office in Middletown, Ohio, and with
plants in Middletown and New Miami, Ohio, where
it is engaged in the manufacture, fabrication, and
sale of steel and related metal products. During the
past year, a representative period, Respondent
Armco had a direct outflow in interstate com-
merce of its products valued in excess of $50,000
which it sold and shipped from its places of busi-
ness directly to points outside the State of Ohio.
Respondent Armco is and has been an employer
engaging in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act at all times material
herein.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
Respondents Independent and Steelworkers are
both labor organizations within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
There are no facts in dispute in the instant case.
At all relevant times Respondent Independent has
been the collective-bargaining representative of
Respondent Armco's employees at the Middletown
and New Miami plants. Since 1944 the contract
between the two Respondents has contained a
provision that prohibits distribution or posting of
literature by employees upon company property ex-
cept as approved by the Company. It is clear that
the parties have enforced this provision at all rele-
vant times. The identical provision was considered
by the Board in 1964 and found under the rule in
Gale Products, Division of Outboard Marine Corp.'
to violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.' Enforcement
of the Board's order was refused by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
1965 (Armco Steel Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 344
F.2d 621). The then existing contract expired in
1966 and a new contract was entered into for a
1 142 NLRB 1246, enforcement denied 337 F 2d 390 (C A 7, 1964) 2 148 NLRB 1179
210 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Counsel seeks would not be mutual." Respondent
argues if the General Counsel is not bound by the
court's decision with regard to the earlier contract
because the doctrine res judicata has no applica-
tion, the Respondent could lawfully keep the clause
in the 1969-71 contract if they lost the litigation in
the instant case, just as the General Counsel could
lawfully attack the clause in the 1969-71 contract
if he lost in the instant case. Under these circum-
stances Respondent points out the prosecution of
the litigation of this, complaint is "a pointless exer-
cise in utter futility." Respondent complains that
Trial Examiner Schneider failed to come to grips
with the argument of no mutual estoppel in dealing
with its Motion to Dismiss the Instant Complaint.
Respondent states in its brief "[T]he argument is
that if the Board is not to be bound by an order ad-
verse to it because of a new contract the Board
cannot bind the parties beyond the term of the con-
tract by issuing an order adverse to them." Respon-
dent urges me, and the Board, to state explicitly the
no mutual estoppel argument in our decisions and
deal with it explicitly "and not by the invocation of
a double standard which permits the Board's order
to run past the term of the contract but not a
court's refusal to enforce that order."
As I view the argument Respondent is confusing
an act with the consequences that stem from it.
When the Board finds that an unfair labor practice
has been committed, whether by the entry into a
contract, as here, or the refusal to enter into a con-
tract, or perhaps a discharge of an employee, or by
any of a number of activities by which employers or
unions can violate the Act, the Board commonly
orders the parties to cease and desist from com-
mitting the unfair labor practice. In the circum-
stances that the unfair labor practice is embodied in
a contract such as in the instant case, the Board
commonly requires that the parties cease giving ef-
fect to the contractual provision. The Board's order
to that extent of course acts only on the then exist-
ing contractual provision. It does not by its terms
act on future contractual provisions since they are
not then in existence and a cease-and-desist order
cannot be effective with regard to a nonexistent
contractual provision. However, additionally, when
the Board has reasonable cause to believe that a
party whom it has found to have violated the Act is
liable to violate it again the Board issues a prospec-
tive order that the offending party should also
thenceforth prospectively not commit the unfair
labor practice found to have been committed in the
past. The prospective effect of such orders is
separate and distinct from the cease-and-desist
effect of such orders and they are considered as
such both by the Board and the courts. In fact the
breadth of prospective orders has been the subject
of a great deal of litigation and the Board is oc-
casionally required to trim its prospective order to
encompass only such unfair labor practices as the
record reveals Respondent to be prone to commit.9
Assuming the contract clause here in issue to be
violative it can scarcely be said that Respondent
has not shown a proclivity to commit this violation.
Respondent argues that the clause has been in
existence since 1944 and exists in its new contract,
the successor to the one here under discussion.
Thus the factors are present to warrant the Board
in not only ordering that Respondent cease and
desist from giving effect to the expired contract
but prospectively to cease and desist from giving
effect to any contract now or in the future contain-
ing the clause which the Board finds unlawful. The
mutual estoppel of which Respondent speaks runs
to the act; i.e., the contract clause in the instant
case. It is effective only with regard to the Board's
order, if such there be, to cease and desist from
giving effect to the contract clause in issue in the
instant case. But assuming the issuance herein of
a prospective order the doctrine of mutual estoppel
will require that both parties are estopped to re-
litigate the effect of the preceding contract. Ac-
cordingly the dilemma that looms so large in
Respondent's mind does not appear to me to exist.
The Respondent contends that the General
Counsel violated section 6(b) cf the Administrative
Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. Sec. 555(b)) and also the
spirit of Section 10(b) of the Act. This issue too was
raised before Trial Examiner Schneider in Respond-
ent's Motion to Dismiss. I agree with Trial Ex-
aminer Schneider in his disposition of this issue and
I shall adopt the language with which he treated it
as follows:
As we have seen, 21 months elapsed
between the filing of the instant charges and
the issuance of complaint. In view of the na-
ture of the issue and the previous litigation,
such a delay would on its face seem unreasona-
ble, warranting suspicion that the charge was
being preserve on the remote chance that fu-
ture events might make it useable. In such a
situation the motion for dismissal might per-
haps properly be granted for manifest preju-
dice. However, the facts show this not to have
been the case
At the time the instant charges were filed,
the Board had twice since the Court's first
Armco decision (in Mid-States Metal Products
and * in the second General Motors case) an-
nounced its disagreement with the principle of
law enunciated by the Court, and the Mid-
States case was then pending before the Fifth
Circuit for disposition. In such circumstances it
was not inappropriate for the General Counsel
to withhold action on the charges until the
s N L R B v Local 926 latemattona! Lnuon of Opeiatnng Enga,ee,
[Armco Drainage & Metal ProduUS, Inc 1, 267 F 2d 418 (C A 5)
ARMCO STEEL CORPORATION
Fifth Circuit had decided the Mid-States case.
See Bryant Chucking Grinder Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
389 F.2d 565 (C.A. 2, 1967). Indeed, it is dif-
ficult to see what other prudent course the
General Counsel could have followed in view
of the provisions of Section 10(b) of the Act.
Addressing myself to the merits of the case, it is
clear that the contractual provision with which we
:ire here dealing is substantially identical to con-
tractual provisions found by the Board in the cases
cited above.10 Respondent contends herein that the
Board has not met its burden of proving that the
clause is discriminatory in purpose or effect or that
it significantly hampers effective communication
with the employees by any union. Of course as the
Board has pointed out in each of these cases the
gravamen of the violation is not a possible dis-
criminatory effect nor the curtailment of effective
communication with employees by a union but
rather the limits to a union's power to waive the in-
dividual statutory rights of employees. The Board
views such a contractual provision as an attempt to
impair the freedom of employees to change their
bargaining agent. In the instant case, as in the
preceding cases, Respondent has presented no per-
suasive countervailing considerations. The Board
has held that the presumed benefit to the union and
the employer of a peaceful contractual relationship
is not such a countervailing consideration that it
justifies the union in thus attempting to waive such
guaranteed employee rights. A full discussion of
this issue is to be found in the Board's second
General Motors Corporation decision, supra, com-
mencing at 1726 Nothing would be served by my
quoting it at length or paraphrasing it, and I shall
not do so.
Respondent has presented no rationale under
which they can prevail in my opinion Accordingly I
find that as alleged the Respondent Employer is
guilty of a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and Respon-
dent Union of a violation of Section 8(b)( I )(A) by
their maintenance of the disputed provision in their
contract.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The unfair labor practices found to have oc-
curred as set forth above, occurring in connection
with the operation of Respondent Armco as
described in section I, above, have a close, inti-
mate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to
lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow thereof.
10 Gale Products, General Motors, /AM Dtctrici Au 9 (McDonnell
Douglac Corp . ation ), and the first Aicnc a case
11 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided b^ Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
V. THE REMEDY
211
Having found that Respondent Armco and
Respondent Independent have violated and are
violating Section 8(a)(1) and 8(b)( I )(A) of the
Act, respectively, by maintaining in effect a provi-
sion in the collective-bargaining agreement
described above, I shall recommend that, they be
ordered to cease and desist from maintaining, giv-
ing effect to, or enforcing such provision in the ex-
pired contract and prospectively that the Respond-
ents shall not by contract or otherwise interfere
with the right of employees to use the customary
and vital channel of communication proscribed by
the contract; i.e., the distribution of literature on
their own time in nonworking portions of the plant.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Armco Steel Corporation is engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
2. Respondent Armco Employees' Independent
Federation, Inc., is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent Armco and Respondent Indepen-
dent, by maintaining in effect a collective-bargain-
ing agreement prohibiting the distribution of litera-
ture during nonworking time in nonworking areas
of the Employer's property violated and are violat-
ing Section 8(a)(1) and 8(b)(I)(A) of the Act,
respectively.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and ;7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER"
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact
and conclusions of law and the entire record in this
proceeding, I recommend that Respondent Armco
Steel Corporation, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, and Respondent Armco Employees' In-
dependent Federation, Inc., its officers, agents, and
representatives, shall.
1. Cease and desist from maintaining, giving ef-
fect to, or enforcing any provision of a collective-
bargaining agreement which prohibits any em-
ployee from distributing literature on behalf of any
labor organization other than the contracting labor
organization or distributing literature in opposition
to any labor organization where, in either case, the
activity occurs in nonworking areas on nonworking
time.
findings , conclusions, recommenda ' ions, and Re-ommended Order herein
shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be
adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions , and order, and
all objections thereto shall be ueemed ssaived for. ill purposes
427-258 O-LT - 74 - 15
212 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. Take the following affirmative action which it
is found will effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Post at each of the employee bulletin boards
in Respondent Employer's plants in Middletown
and New Miami, Ohio, copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix. 11 1213 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 9, after being duly signed by representa-
tives of Respondent Armco and Respondent Inde-
pendent, shall be posted by them immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by them for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by both Respondents to insure that said notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this
Decision and Recommendation what steps have
been taken to comply herewith.''
" In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board " shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
" The record reveals that b} contract bulletin boards are maintained by
the Employer for the use of Respondent Union The intent of this provision
is that notices be posted both on the "Union's bulletin boards" and those
maintained by the Employer for its own use in posting notices to em-
ployees
" In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT maintain, give effect to, or en-
force any provision of a collective-bargaining
agreement which prohibits any employee from
distributing literature on behalf of any labor
organization other than the contracting labor
organization or distributing literature in op-
position to any labor organization where, in
either case, the activity occurs in nonworking
areas on nonworking time.
ARMCO STEEL
CORPORATION
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
ARMCO EMPLOYEES'
INDEPENDENT
FEDERATION, INC.
(Union)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu-
tive days from the date of posting and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or com-
pliance with its provisions may be directed to the
Board 's Office, 550 Main Street, Federal Office
Building , Room 2407, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202,
Telephone 513-684-3686.