ARM IP LIMITED

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 11, 2022

2021000776 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/107,757 06/23/2016 Andrew Pritchard 4729.195WOUS01 8468 24113 7590 02/11/2022 PATTERSON THUENTE PEDERSEN, P.A. 80 SOUTH 8TH STREET 4800 IDS CENTER MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55402-2100 EXAMINER SCHMIDT, KARI L ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2439 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/11/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): efsuspto@ptslaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ANDREW PRITCHARD and GABOR BALINT Appeal 2021-000776 Application 15/107,757 Technology Center 2400 Before JEAN R. HOMERE, ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, and LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges. HUME, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-13, 15, 17-20, 22, and 23, which are all claims pending in the application. Appeal Br. 4-12. Claims 14, 16, 21, 24, and 25 are cancelled. Id. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as ARM IP Limited. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2021-000776 Application 15/107,757 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE2 The claimed subject matter is directed to “control of data provision with a personal computing device.” See Spec. (Title). Appellant’s disclosed embodiments and claimed invention relates to “the control of the provision of data within data processing systems.” Spec. ¶ 1. Exemplary Claim Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on Appeal (emphasis added to contested prior-art limitation): 1. A method of controlling provision of data comprising: receiving, at a personal computing device from a first device in wireless communication therewith, a request to authorize a second device to access said data stored at a third device, said request identifying said data and a policy to be associated with said data; determining, at the personal computing device, an authorization state of the personal computing device and when the personal computing device is in an authorized state; determining with said personal computing device if said request is a permitted request by comparing said request with permission data stored within the personal computing device, the permission data specifying which requests will be authorized and 2 Our decision relies upon Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed July 7, 2020); Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Sept. 1, 2020); Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed Feb. 12, 2020); and the original Specification (“Spec.,” filed June 23, 2016). No Reply Brief was filed. Appeal 2021-000776 Application 15/107,757 3 (i) if said request is a permitted request, then authorizing, by said personal computing device, said second device to access said data stored at said third device; and (ii) if said request is not a permitted request, then not authorizing said second device to access said data. Appeal Br. 30 (Claims App.). REFERENCES The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence: Name Reference Date Wiegel US 6,484,261 B1 Nov. 19, 2002 Crafford et al. (“Crafford”) US 8,527,468 B1 Sept. 3, 2013 Flowerday et al. (“Flowerday”) US 9,294,912 B1 Mar. 22, 2016 Kane et al. (“Kane”) US 2005/0010780 A1 Jan. 13, 2005 Ivanovic et al. (“Ivanovic”) US 2005/0071773 Al Mar. 31, 2005 Aarts et al. (“Aarts”) US 2005/0076233 A1 Apr. 7, 2005 Kawai et al. (“Kawai”) US 2009/0164566 A1 June 25, 2009 Benedetti et al. (“Benedetti”) US 2013/0104243 Al Apr. 25, 2013 Boelter et al. (“Boelter”) US 2014/0173752 Al June 19, 2014 Kursun US 2015/0035643 A1 Feb. 5, 2015 Appeal 2021-000776 Application 15/107,757 4 REJECTIONS R1. Claims 1-4, 6, 22, and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Aarts, Kursun, Kawai, and Kane. Final Act. 11. R2. Claim 5 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Aarts, Kursun, Kawai, Kane, and Crafford. Final Act. 19. R3. Claims 7 and 8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Aarts, Kursun, Kawai, Kane, and Wiegel. Final Act. 21. R4. Claim 9 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Aarts, Kursun, Kawai, Kane, Wiegel, and Ivanovic. Final Act. 22. R5. Claims 10, 12, 13, and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Aarts, Kursun, Kawai, Kane, and Flowerday. Final Act. 23. R6. Claim 11 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Aarts, Kursun, Kawai, Kane, and Benedetti. Final Act. 27. R7. Claims 17-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Aarts, Kursun, Kawai, Kane, and Boelter. Final Act. 28. Appeal 2021-000776 Application 15/107,757 5 CLAIM GROUPING Based on Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 13-28) and our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal of the obviousness rejection R1 of claims 1-4, 6, 22, and 23 on the basis of representative claim 1. We address the remaining dependent claims 5, 7-12, 13, 15, and 17-20 rejected under rejections R2-R7 and not separately argued, infra. 3 ISSUE Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 13-27) the Examiner’s rejection R1 of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being obvious over the combination of Aarts, Kursun, Kawai, and Kane is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue: Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination teaches or suggests “[a] method of controlling provision of data” that includes, inter alia, the steps of “receiving, at a personal computing device from a first device in wireless communication therewith, a request to authorize a second device to access said data stored at a third device,” and “determining . . . (i) if said request is a permitted request, then authorizing, by said personal 3 “Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the failure of appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the patentability of any grouped claim separately.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). In addition, when Appellant does not separately argue the patentability of dependent claims, the claims stand or fall with the claims from which they depend. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Appeal 2021-000776 Application 15/107,757 6 computing device, said second device to access said data stored at said third device,” as recited in claim 1? PRINCIPLES OF LAW “[O]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where . . . the rejections are based on combinations of references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). “The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at 425. In KSR, the Court stated “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill. . . . [A] court must ask whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions. Id. at 417. Further, the relevant inquiry is whether the Examiner has set forth “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the Appeal 2021-000776 Application 15/107,757 7 legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (cited with approval in KSR, 550 U.S. at 418). ANALYSIS In reaching this decision, we consider all evidence presented and all arguments actually made by Appellant. To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We disagree with Appellant’s arguments with respect to claim 1 and, unless otherwise noted, we incorporate by reference herein and adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s arguments.4 We highlight and address specific findings and arguments regarding claim 1 for emphasis as follows. Appellant contends “The proposed combination fails to disclose or suggest receiving . . . from a first device in wireless communication therewith, a request to authorize a second device to access data stored at a third device.” Appeal Br. 16. Appellant specifically argues Kawai’s requestor terminal 110 does not access data from data stored at a third device 140. Appeal Br. 18. Appellant also argues Kane does not teach a “first 4 See Icon Health and Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc., 849 F.3d 1034, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“As an initial matter, the PTAB was authorized to incorporate the Examiner’s findings.”); see also In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1564 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (upholding the PTAB’s findings, although it “did not expressly make any independent factual determinations or legal conclusions,” because it had expressly adopted the examiner’s findings). Appeal 2021-000776 Application 15/107,757 8 device” because Kane’s requestee device 101 (personal computing device) receives the request directly from the requestor device 103 (second device) and not from another “first device.” Appeal Br. 19. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument, because Appellant is arguing the references separately when the rejection is for obviousness based upon what the reference combination would have taught or suggested to a person of ordinary skill in the art. “[O]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where . . . the rejections are based on combinations of references.” Keller, 642 F.2d at 426. Appellant does not address the Examiner’s specific findings in Rejection R1 related to the other cited references. Final Act. 11-17. The Examiner cites Aarts for teaching or at least suggesting the limitation “receiving, at a personal computing device from a first device with wireless communication wherewith, a request to authorize . . . access said data, said request identifying data and policy to be associated with said data.” Ans. 4. The Examiner further finds Kawaii teaches or at least suggests the disputed limitation “receiving ... from a first device in wireless communication therewith, a request to authorize a second device to access said data stored at a third device” by finding and mapping Kawai’s data processing device (“first device”), response device (“personal computing device”), Requester Terminal (“second device”) and storage device (“third device”). Ans. 4-5, citing Kawaii Figs. 1, 2, ¶ 262. The Examiner explains Kawai’s requester terminal (mapped to “second device”) inputs a request for information, which is from the storage device (mapped to “third device”). Ans. 5. The Examiner further explains that Kawai’s responder device (“personal computing device”) receiving from the data processing device Appeal 2021-000776 Application 15/107,757 9 (the “first device”) a request to authorize the requestor terminal (“second device”) with access to the storage device (“third device”) teaches or at least suggests the disputed limitation “receiving . . . from a first device in wireless communication therewith, a request to authorize a second device to access said data stored at a third device.” Ans. 5, citing Kawaii Fig. 1, ¶¶ 149, 153, 154, 156. The Examiner additionally explains that Kawai’s provisioning of data is a form of authorizing a second device to “access said data” at a third device and someone of ordinary skill in the art would understand it as such. Ans. 5; Kawaii ¶ 262. Appellant contends: “The proposed combination fails to disclose or suggest determining if a request is a permitted request, then authorizing, by a personal computing device, a second device to access data stored at a third device.” Appeal Br. 19. In support, Appellant argues that Kawai’s requester terminal 110 will only receive data from the data processing device (the first device) because the requester terminal 110 does not have access to data in the storage device 140. Appeal Br. 19-20. Appellant further argues Kane’s determination of token legitimacy does not teach authorizing by the requestee device, to access data stored at the database from a request from the first device. Appeal Br. 20. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. We do not find the Examiner erred in finding the combination of the cited references teaches or at least suggests the disputed limitation “receiving . . . from a first device in wireless communication therewith, a request to authorize a second device to access said data stored at a third device” because we agree that someone of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Kawai’s provisioning of data Appeal 2021-000776 Application 15/107,757 10 as authorizing a second device to “access said data” at a third device. See Kawaii ¶ 262. We also are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because, as the Examiner finds, one of ordinary skill in that art would find Kawai’s responder input device receiving the input of instruction information indicating whether or not the provision candidate data, obtained as the detection processing result, is to be provided, teaches or at least suggests “determining if a request is a permitted request, then authorizing, by a personal computing device, a second device to access data stored at a third device.” See Kawaii ¶ 262; Ans. 6-7. Moreover Kane’s determining if the token is legitimate and only if it is then passing the information to the asset request manager also teaches or at least suggests the disputed limitation. See Kane Fig. 4, ¶ 44. Appellant also argues the Examiner failed to articulate a reasoning to combine Arts and Kursun with the method of Kawai and Kane. Appeal Br. 21-27. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because the Examiner has provided a rationale for combining the references to which Appellant has not responded. Ans. 7-11. Moreover, Appellant does not traverse the Examiner’s specific findings as the Examiner has articulated rationales for combining Kursun and Aarts (See Final Act. 14), and for combining Kawai with Aarts and Kursun (See Final Act. 15), and also with Kane (See Final Act. 16-17). Appeal 2021-000776 Application 15/107,757 11 We further note Appellant does not respond to the Examiner’s clarifications and additional findings in the Answer by filing a Reply Brief. Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Therefore, , on this record, we find a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner’s finding that the combination of Aarts, Kursun, Kawai, and Kane teaches or at least suggests the disputed limitation of claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection R1 of independent claim 1, and grouped claims 2-4, 6, 22, and 23, which fall therewith. See Claim Grouping, supra. We also sustain the Examiner’s rejections R2-R7 of dependent claims 5, 7-12, 13, 15, and 17-20, which were not argued separately with specificity. CONCLUSION We AFFIRM the Examiner’s rejections. More specifically, Appellant has not persuasively argued that the Examiner erred with respect to the obviousness rejections R1-R7 of claims 1-13, 15, 17-20, 22, and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the cited prior art combinations of record, and we sustain the rejections. Appeal 2021-000776 Application 15/107,757 12 DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References/ Basis Affirmed Reversed 1-4, 6, 22, 23 103 Aarts, Kursun, Kawai, Kane 1-4, 6, 22, 23 5 103 Aarts, Kursun, Kawai, Kane, Crafford 5 7, 8 103 Aarts, Kursun, Kawai, Kane, Wiegel 7, 8 9 103 Aarts, Kursun, Kawai, Kane, Wiegel, Ivanovic 9 10, 12, 13, 15 103 Aarts, Kursun, Kawai, Kane, Flowerday 10, 12, 13, 15 11 103 Aarts, Kursun, Kawai, Kane, Benedetti 11 17-20 103 Aarts, Kursun, Kawai, Kane, and Boelter 17-20 Overall Outcome 1-13, 15, 17- 20, 22, 23 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED