Arlette W,1 Complainant,v.Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 27, 2018
0120180584 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 27, 2018)

0120180584

03-27-2018

Arlette W,1 Complainant, v. Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area), Agency.


U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

Arlette W,1

Complainant,

v.

Megan J. Brennan,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(Pacific Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120180584

Agency No. 1F904004117

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) from the Agency's decision (Dismissal) dated October 25, 2017, dismissing her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Mail Handler M-04 at the Agency's Los Angeles Network and Distribution Center facility in Bell, California. On September 22, 2017, Complainant filed a formal complaint alleging that the Agency subjected her to discrimination on the bases of sex (female) and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity under an EEO statute that was unspecified in the record when:

1. On February 4, March 22, and December 29, 2016, and in January 2017, Complainant was subjected to a "seniority by-pass";

2. On April 30, 2017 Complainant received no response to her request for a copy of the Agency's sexual harassment policy; and

3. On an unspecified date management displayed unspecified inappropriate behavior of a sexual nature.

The Agency dismissed the claims, finding that the allegations raised in claim 1 were untimely and that the allegations raised in claims 2 and 3 failed to state a claim. With regard to claim 2, the Agency found that Complainant was not aggrieved because she could have obtained the information herself from the Agency's website or from other sources. With regard to claim 3, the Agency found that Complainant failed to provide enough specificity to state a valid claim.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.105(a)(1) requires that complaints of discrimination should be brought to the attention of the Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor within forty-five (45) days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of a personnel action, within forty-five (45) days of the effective date of the action. The Commission has adopted a "reasonable suspicion" standard (as opposed to a "supportive facts" standard) to determine when the forty-five (45) day limitation period is triggered. See Howard v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05970852 (February 11, 1999). Thus, the time limitation is not triggered until a complainant reasonably suspects discrimination, but before all the facts that support a charge of discrimination have become apparent.

EEOC Regulations provide that the agency or the Commission shall extend the time limits when the individual shows that he was not notified of the time limits and was not otherwise aware of them, that he did not know and reasonably should not have known that the discriminatory matter or personnel action occurred, that despite due diligence he was prevented by circumstances beyond his control from contacting the Counselor within the time limits, or for other reasons considered sufficient by the agency or the Commission.

Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that a complainant alleging a hostile work environment will not be time barred if all acts constituting the claim are part of the same unlawful practice and at least one act falls within the filing period. See National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 122 S. Ct. 2061 (June 10, 2002). The Court further held, however, that "discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges." Id.

In the instant complaint, we find that Complainant has not shown any of the claims to be part of the same unlawful practice. Complainant's allegations are quite vague and devoid of detail. In her informal complaint, Complainant alleged that on April 30, 2017 she requested a copy of the Agency sexual harassment policy but that she received no response from "management." Complainant did not specify who in "management" failed to respond to her request and therefore has not shown that the Agency official or officials who failed to respond to her request were the same official or officials who ignored her seniority or displayed unspecified inappropriate sexual behavior. Complainant's formal complaint provided even less detail, alleging merely "Given an unfavorable rating, being harassed, disparities in treatment, sexual harassment."

Because Complainant has not shown that the claims are all part of the same unlawful practice, she may not use the timely-raised incident in claim 2 to pull in the untimely-raised incidents in Claim 1. We note in this regard that an agency shall accept a complaint from any aggrieved employee or applicant for employment who believes that he or she has been discriminated against by that agency because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age or disabling condition. 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.103, .106(a). The Commission's federal sector case precedent has long defined an "aggrieved employee" as one who suffers a present harm or loss with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment for which there is a remedy. Diaz v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05931049 (April 21, 1994). When the complainant does not allege he or she is aggrieved within the meaning of the regulations, the agency shall dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1).

In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986), that harassment is actionable if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the complainant's employment. Thus, not all claims of harassment are actionable. Where a complaint does not challenge an agency action or inaction regarding a specific term, condition or privilege of employment, such as the complaint at issue here, a claim of harassment is actionable only if, allegedly, the harassment to which the complainant has been subjected was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the complainant's employment. Following a review of the record we find that claim 2 fails to meet this standard.

With regard to claim 3, Complainant has provided insufficient detail to determine whether or not the action involved a discrete or non-discrete act, or when the act occurred, or whether it was severe enough to alter the conditions of her employment. We note that, on appeal, Complainant indicates that the incident occurred "a few months" before she sent a letter about it to the Agency Human Resources department on October 15, 2017, but Complainant still fails to provide any detail about exactly what occurred. We therefore find Complainant fails to state a claim.

Finally, with regard to claim 1, we note that the most recent incident occurred in "January 2017" but Complainant did not contact an EEO Counselor until June 9, 2017, which is beyond the 45-day limit. Because claim 1 involved discrete actions and Complainant has not shown them to be part of the same unlawful practice as the timely-raised allegation in claim 2, see Morgan, supra, we find that they must be dismissed for untimely EEO Counselor contact.

CONCLUSION

The Agency's decision is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0617)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 � VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant's request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The agency's request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC's Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)

If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden's signature

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

March 27, 2018

__________________

Date

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website.

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