Ark Las Vegas Restaurant Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 16, 2004

343 N.L.R.B. 1281 (N.L.R.B. 2004)

ARK LAS VEGAS RESTAURANT CORP.
343 NLRB No. 126
1281
Ark Las Vegas Restaurant Corporation and Local
Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas, Culinary
Workers Union, Local 226, and Bartenders Un-
ion, Local 165, affiliated with Hotel Employees
and Restaurant Workers International Union,
AFL–CIO. Cases 28–CA–14228, 28–CA–14228–
2, 28–CA–14228–6, 28–CA–14228–7, 28–CA–
14376, 28–CA–14463, and 28–CA–14543
December 16, 2004
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND WALSH
On September 25, 2001, the National Labor Relations
Board issued its Decision and Order in this proceeding.1
The Board found, inter alia, that the Respondent, Ark Las
Vegas Restaurant Corp., violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by maintaining work rules forbidding its employees
from “[r]eporting to property more than 30 minutes be-
fore a shift is to start or staying on property more than 30
minutes after a shift ends,” and from “[r]eturning to the
Company’s premises, other than as a guest, during un-
scheduled hours.”
Subsequently, the Respondent filed a petition for re-
view of the Board’s Order with the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and the
Board cross-petitioned for enforcement. On July 11,
2003, the court denied enforcement of the Board’s order
with respect to the Respondent’s aforementioned rules
(rules 30 and 45) and remanded the case to the Board for
further proceedings consistent with its opinion.2
By letter dated December 11, 2003, the Board notified
the parties that it had accepted the remand and invited the
parties to file statements of position. Thereafter, the
General Counsel, the Charging Party, and the Respon-
dent filed position statements.3
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.

1 335 NLRB 1284.
2 334 F.3d 99 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The court enforced the Board’s order
in all other respects. The court affirmed the Board’s findings that the
Respondent committed numerous violations of Sec. 8 (a)(1) and vio-
lated Sec. 8(a)(3) by disciplining and terminating employees because of
their union support.
3 The Charging party has requested that we grant this case “related-
case” status” with New York New York, Case 28–CA–14519, et al,
which is also before the Board on remand from the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See 313 F.3d 585
(D.C. Cir. 2002). The Charging Party’s request is premised on the
Board’s need “to ensure that its decisions are consistent.” We find it
unnecessary to formally link these cases in order to ensure that our
decisions are consistent, and we therefore deny the Charging Party’s
request.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the court’s remand and the parties’ statements
of position and finds, for reasons explained below, that
the Respondent’s work rules violated Section 8(a)(1).
I. BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Facts
The Respondent is a tenant of the New York New
York Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas, Nevada. The Re-
spondent operates three restaurants, a food court, and an
employee dining room inside the New York New York
Hotel and Casino. At all material times, the Respondent’s
employee handbook included the following rules prohib-
iting early arrival, late departure, and returning to the
premises:
Rule 30. Reporting to property more than 30
minutes before a shift is to start or staying on prop-
erty more than 30 minutes after a shift ends unless
authorized by a supervisor.
Rule 45. Returning to the Company’s premises,
other than as a guest, during unscheduled hours
unless authorized in advance by management.
The handbook indicated that violation of the rules was un-
acceptable and could lead to disciplinary action “up to and
including termination.”
B. The Board’s Original Decision
In its original decision, the Board adopted, without
comment, the judge’s finding that rules 30 and 45 vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The judge found that the
terms “premises” and “property” were unacceptably am-
biguous and, indeed, that the word “property,” in “con-
text appears to refer to the entire hotel, casino, outside
grounds and parking lot complex.” 335 NLRB at 1290.
Because of the terms’ ambiguity, and the failure of the
Respondent to establish “valid business justification” for
its rules, the judge concluded that, under Tri-County
Medical Center, 222 NLRB 1089 (1976), the rules con-
stituted an unwarranted intrusion on employees’ ability
to engage in Section 7 activities, in violation of Section
8(a)(1). 335 NLRB at 1290.4 The Board adopted the
judge’s finding and ordered Ark to rescind the off-duty
employee access rules. Id. at 1284, 1285.

4 Although the judge specifically addressed the meaning of the term
“property,” which appears in rule 45, but not 30, he apparently treated
“property” and “premise” as being synonymous. Indeed, as stated by
the court, “[t]he ALJ determined that the word “premises,” as well as
“the word ‘property’ in context appear[ ] to refer to the entire hotel,
casino, outside grounds, and parking lot complex.” 334 F. 3d at 109. As
discussed below, the parties likewise treat rules 30 and 45 as indistin-
guishable and address only whether they prohibited off-duty Ark em-
ployees’ access to areas outside Ark’s leasehold—including the sur-
rounding hotel, casino, and parking lot.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1282
C. The D.C. Circuit’s Decision
On July 11, 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit set aside the Board’s Order with respect to
the Respondent’s access restrictions and remanded this
issue to the Board for further proceedings. The court
agreed that if Ark’s rules 30 and 45 denied off-duty em-
ployees access to “the area outside Ark’s leasehold—
including the surrounding hotel, casino and parking lot,”5
Ark had not established a sufficient business justification
to support its access restrictions under Tri-County, and
such rules were unlawful. However, because other pro-
visions in the rules appeared inconsistent with such an
interpretation, the court found it “doubtful that Ark’s no-
access rules actually barred off-duty Ark employees from
the surrounding hotel, casino and parking lot—or even
from Ark’s public restaurants.” 334 F. 3d at 110. Spe-
cifically, the court noted that “[o]nly a few pages before
the rules in question, the employee handbook states: ‘All
Ark Las Vegas employees are welcome to use the gam-
bling facilities, when off-duty, at the Hotel. That is the
explicit policy of New York-New York Hotel & Casino.
. . . All of our employees, likewise, are welcome to dine
at our restaurant outlets.’” Id. at 110. Further, the court
said that, “in two other cases involving the New York
New York Hotel and Casino, decided just two months
before the instant case, the Board found that New York
New York ‘permits, even encourages, off-duty employ-
ees of Ark to visit and patronize the casino and the res-
taurants in the complex, and to use routes open to the
public . . . to enter or exit,’ and that Ark employees are
‘invited to spend off-duty hours using the facilities.’” Id.
(quoting New York New York Hotel, LLC, 334 NLRB
762, 767 (2001), and New York New York Hotel, LLC,
334 NLRB 772, 778 (2001), enf. denied 313 F.3d 585
(D.C. Cir. 2002)). The court concluded that, based on
the foregoing, “[i]t would be surprising if Ark’s work
rules were truly intended to bar its employees from ac-
cepting these express invitations made by both Ark and
New York New York.” Id. at 110. However, the court
found that the Respondent was unable to “bring any clar-
ity to the question” of what areas they covered. Id. at
110.
Because the court found that the Board “appears to
have invalidated the rules based on a misunderstanding
of their meaning, or at a minimum without considering
the contradictory indications of their meaning described
above,” and because the parties’ briefs did not clarify the
issue, the court set aside the Board’s Section 8(a)(1) find-
ing and remanded the issue for further consideration and
explanation. Id. at 111.

5 334 F.3d at 109. (Emphasis in original).
II. ANALYSIS
Having considered all of the relevant evidence, we re-
affirm our finding, for the reasons set forth below, that
the Respondent’s rules 30 and 45 violate Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
As discussed above, the court agreed that the Respon-
dent’s access policy with respect to its off-duty employ-
ees, as set forth in rules 30 and 45, would be invalid un-
der Tri-County if that policy covered areas outside Ark’s
leasehold, including the surrounding New York New
York hotel, casino, and parking lot. The court simply
found that the Board’s determination that the rules had
such an unlawful reach was not explained, and appeared
questionable in light of other rule language and that it
was “doubtful that Ark’s no-access rules actually barred
off-duty Ark employees from the surrounding hotel, ca-
sino and parking lot.” 334 F.3d at 110. Thus, the court
found it unclear exactly what areas the rules did cover.
In light of the court’s remand, and considering the re-
cord as a whole, we find, contrary to the Respondent and
our dissenting colleague, that the language of the rules
reasonably could lead employees to conclude that they
were prohibited from entering areas outside Ark’s lease-
hold, including the surrounding New York New York
hotel, casino, and parking lot, during their off-duty hours,
unless they were returning to the hotel as paying guests.
At the very least, employees reasonably could be con-
fused by the rules’ use of the terms “property” and
“premises.” Any ambiguity in the rules must be con-
strued against the Respondent as the promulgator of the
rules6 because rules 30 and 45 do not meet the require-
ments set forth in Tri-County, we find that the mainte-
nance of the rules would reasonably tend to chill em-
ployees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.
As set forth above, rules 30 and 45 prohibit employees
from reporting to the “property” more than 30 minutes
before a shift is to start and from staying on the “prop-
erty” more than 30 minutes after a shift ends and from
returning to the Respondent’s “premises” other than as a
guest, during unscheduled hours unless authorized by the
Respondent.
The employee handbook itself uses the terms “prop-
erty” and “premises” on numerous occasions in different
contexts. Taken as a whole, these references create an
ambiguous message for employees as to the meaning of
those terms. For example, the handbook’s “employee
parking” section states that New York New York “cus-
tomer parking areas are not available for employee park-

6 Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 828 (1998); Nor-
ris/O’Bannon, 307 NLRB 1236, 1245 (1992).
ARK LAS VEGAS RESTAURANT CORP. 1283
ing unless you are visiting the property as a guest.”7 The
term “property” here clearly refers to the entire ho-
tel/casino complex, and not only to the Respondent’s
leasehold. The handbook’s “workplace violence” and
“work place searches” sections use terms such as “our
property” and “our premises” and “Ark premises” to des-
ignate the areas where violence, stealing, drug use, and
other inappropriate behavior are prohibited. Similarly,
the handbook’s “work rules” section also prohibits the
possession of dangerous weapons “on Company prem-
ises, or while off the Company premises in the perform-
ance of job duties”; stealing guest, employee, or Com-
pany property, “including items found on the Company’s
premises”; taking liquor or food off “Company premises
without authorization”; and “using vulgar or profane
language toward a guest, supervisor, or fellow employee
while on premises.” By contrast, where a particular area
is intended, the handbook specifically describes it. For
example, the “smoking policy” section states that em-
ployees are permitted to smoke only in designated areas
and specifically provides that “[s]moking in private of-
fices, work areas, public areas or stairwells is prohib-
ited.”
These provisions contain general references to “prop-
erty” and “premises,” occasionally modified by the term
“Company.” The provisions appear at times to refer to
the Respondent’s property, but at other times to non-
leasehold areas. In these circumstances, it is unclear
whether the references to “property” and “premises” in
rules 30 and 45 were meant only to apply to the Respon-
dent’s leasehold areas, or were also meant to reach all
areas of the hotel complex and not just the Respondent’s
interior areas.
The court found that if the references in rules 30 and
45 to “property” and “premises” include all areas of the
hotel and casino facility, then the rules clearly violate
Tri-County. We find that employees could reasonably
understand rules 30 and 45 to refer broadly to the entire
hotel property—and consequently to forbid them both to
remain on, and return to, areas that otherwise would be
accessible to them as off-duty employees. Further, as
discussed, the judge noted that the word “property” in the
“hotel-industry parlance” generally refers to the entire
hotel, casino, outside grounds, and parking lot complex.8

7 The Respondent maintained a separate parking area for employees
who drove to work and provided shuttle buses to the hotel.
8 The Respondent argues that the word “premises” has been used by
other hotel/casinos in their rules and the Board did not find the use of
the word impermissibly broad or ambiguous. We reject this argument.
The Board in the cases cited by the Respondent did not address the
issue, presented here, concerning the meaning of the terms “property”
and “premises.” In Santa Fe Hotel & Casino, 331 NLRB 723 (2000),
the Board found it unnecessary to rely on the judge’s discussion of the
In these circumstances, we find that rules 30 and 45 vio-
late Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Although the dissent argues that the rules do not cover
areas outside the Respondent’s facilities, the rules do not
explicitly exclude such areas. Further, contrary to the
dissent, it is not clear that the Respondent’s rules would
apply only to the Respondent’s own property. Since the
Respondent operated on New York New York Hotel and
Casino property, it would make sense for the Respondent
to prescribe behavior for its employees on both its own
leased premises and New York New York’s premises,
which employees were required to transverse to and from
work. Indeed, the Respondent’s employee handbook
states that
[M]any of the policies in our handbook are in part
the result of our tenancy at the New York-New York
Hotel Casino. Employee entrances, parking, drug
testing, name tags, conduct at the hotel while off and
on duty are just some of the rules we have included
as it relates to Hotel policies, not necessarily our
policies.
Moreover, even if the Respondent, as the dissent main-
tains, did not intend for the rules to reach beyond the
interior of the Respondent’s property, that intent was not
clearly communicated to the employees. See, e.g., La-
fayette Park Hotel, supra, 326 NLRB at 828. Conse-
quently, contrary to the dissent, employees could rea-
sonably interpret rules 30 and 45 as barring them from
engaging in Section 7 activities in areas outside the Re-
spondent’s leasehold, including the surrounding New
York New York Hotel, casino, and parking lot.
The court stated that because the employee handbook
provides that off-duty employees are welcome to use the
gambling facilities and to dine at the Respondent’s res-
taurants, “[i]t would be surprising if Ark’s work rules
were truly intended to bar its employees from accepting
these express invitations made by both Ark and New
York New York.” 334 F.3d at 110. However, we find
these provisions do not contradict the message that off-
duty employees may not be anywhere on the hotel prop-

Board’s application of Tri-County to Trump Plaza Hotel & Casino, 310
NLRB 1162 (1993), and Sears Co., 300 NLRB 804 (1990). The Board
agreed with the judge, however, that there was no evidence of a rule
banning off-duty employees’ access to the facilities. As in the present
case, the employer there invited off-duty employees to gamble, partake
of entertainment events, and to eat and drink in bars and restaurants.
However, contrary to the facts here, the judge noted that there was “no
record evidence that Respondent ever maintained a published employ-
ment rule, prohibiting off-duty employees from remaining or returning
to its facility.” 331 NLRB at 728. President Riverboat Casinos of
Missouri, 329 NLRB 77, 82 fn. 13 (1999), cited by the Respondent, is
inapposite. The issue there concerned the validity of the employer’s no
solicitation rule.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1284
erty except as paying guests. The issue the court raises is
whether employees would understand that the term
“guest” encompassed the individual’s status as an “em-
ployee” with Section 7 rights. However, the Respon-
dent’s own rules are ambiguous as to the distinction be-
tween “off-duty employees” and “guests.” The hand-
book’s “Employee as Guest” section allows “off-duty”
employees to use the gambling facilities “at the Hotel.
That is the explicit policy of New York-New York Hotel
& Casino.” That section also indicates employees are
“welcome” to dine at the restaurants at a reduced price.
Although this provision refers to “off duty” employees, it
is clear that it is meant to apply to employees entering
the premises as paying guests, and not to employees re-
turning to the premises as nonpaying, off-duty employees
exercising Section 7 rights. Moreover, in the New York
New York9 cases cited by the court, New York New York
argued that because Ark’s off-duty employees were on
the hotel and casino premises only as guests, comparable
to the general public, they were prohibited from engag-
ing in Section 7 activities on the hotel and casino prop-
erty.10 Thus, we find that those provisions reinforce the
prohibition of rules 30 and 45 by allowing the off-duty
employees on the hotel and casino premises only if their
status is that of paying customers, and not that of em-
ployees with Section 7 rights.11
We therefore find rules 30 and 45 to be unlawfully
overbroad because they did not meet the requirements set
forth in Tri-County.12 We would at best consider the
rules to be ambiguous, as reasonably open to our inter-
pretation as to the dissent’s interpretation. Any ambigu-
ity in the rules must be construed against the Respondent
as the promulgator of the rules.13 Accordingly, we reaf-
firm the Board’s earlier finding that the Respondent vio-

9 334 NLRB 762 (2001); 334 NLRB 772 (2001), enf. denied 313
F.3d 585 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
10 313 F.3d at 587, 590.
11 The Respondent states that New York New York’s asserted re-
strictions on the Respondent’s employees’ rights do not render the
Respondent’s rules unlawful. The issue here, however, as framed by
the court’s remand, is what employees would reasonably understand the
rules to mean. As noted above, the Respondent’s handbook specifically
informed employees that some of its rules reflected New York New
York’s rules, since the Respondent was operating as a tenant on New
York New York’s property. Thus, it is not unreasonable for employees
to assume that New York New York’s rules against Sec. 7 activity on
its property fairly reflect the meaning of the Respondent’s rules con-
cerning access to the property.
12 Although the Respondent again contends that its rules serve le-
gitimate business needs, we agree with the court that the Respondent’s
proffered business reasons for the rules do not justify the denial of
access by off-duty employees to exterior nonworking areas of the Re-
spondent’s premises such as the hotel, casino, and parking lot.
13 Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 828 (1998), enfd. 203 F. 3d
52 (D.C. 1999); Norris/O’Bannon, 307 NLRB 1236, 1245 (1992).
lated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining rules 30 and 45 in
its employee handbook.14
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board reaffirms its prior
Order in relevant part and orders that the Respondent,
Ark Las Vegas Restaurant Corp., Las Vegas, Nevada, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining a rule barring employees from the
premises 30 minutes before their shift and requiring them
to leave within 30 minutes after their shift.
(b) Maintaining a rule barring employees from return-
ing to the premises, other than as a guest, during un-
scheduled hours.
(c) Telling employees that they must comply with an
unlawful rule barring them from arriving on the premises
more than 30 minutes before their shift begins and re-
quiring them to leave within 30 minutes after their shift
ends.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind its rules contained in the employee hand-
book barring employees from the premises more than 30
minutes before their shift and requiring them to leave
within 30 minutes of the time their shift ends, and bar-
ring employees from returning to the premises, other
than as a guest, during unscheduled hours; and notify
employees that the rules have been rescinded to the same
extent that the unlawful rules were publicized.
(b) Within 14 days after service by Region 28, post at
its restaurants and hiring offices in Las Vegas, Nevada,
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”15
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 28, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days

14 In the Board’s original decision, in addition to finding that the Re-
spondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by maintaining rules 30 and 45, the
Board found that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by demanding
that employee Ron Isomura comply with Rule 30. See 335 NLRB at
1292–1293. Because the court remanded the Board’s determination
that rules 30 and 45 were unlawful, the court also remanded the Sec.
8(a)(1) finding regarding Isomura. See 334 F.3d at 106 fn. 3. Because
we find that the maintenance of rules 30 and 45 violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by
demanding that Isomura comply with rule 30.
15 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board’ shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
ARK LAS VEGAS RESTAURANT CORP. 1285
in conspicuous places including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the no-
tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Re-
spondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former
employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since March 13, 1997.
(b) Within 21 days after service by the region, file with
the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsi-
ble official on a form provided by the region attesting to
the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
CHAIRMAN BATTISTA, dissenting.
Contrary to my colleagues, I do not find that the Gen-
eral Counsel has established that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining rules 30 and 45
in its employee handbook.
Rule 30 prohibits employees from “[r]eporting to
property more than 30 minutes before a shift is to start or
staying on property more than 30 minutes after a shift
ends, unless authorized by a supervisor.” Rule 45 pro-
hibits employees from “[r]eturning to the Company’s
premises, other than as a guest, during unscheduled hours
unless authorized in advance by management.”
This case involves only an attack on the facial validity
of a rule. There is no evidence of unlawful application;
indeed there is no evidence that any employee has been
deterred from engaging in Section 7 activity. Thus, the
rule is unlawful only if, hypothetically, we can say that
the rule can reasonably be read as prohibiting Section 7
activity.1 The Section 7 right involved herein is the right
of employees to engage in Section 7 activity during their
off-duty hours. That right exists only if such activity
occurs outside of the Respondent’s premises.2 The Re-
spondent’s premises here are its restaurants. Thus, the
issue is whether the rule, on its face, can reasonably be
read to prohibit off-duty employees from engaging in
Section 7 activity outside the restaurants. I conclude that
the General Counsel has not shown that a reasonable
employee would read the rule that way. That is, a rea-
sonable employee would read the rules as being confined
to the restaurants.
Rule 45 specifically refers to “the Company’s prem-
ises.” The rule appears in the Respondent’s handbook,

1 Adtranz ABB Daimler-Benz Transp. N.A. Inc. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d
19 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
2 Tri-County Medical Center, 222 NLRB 1089. Inasmuch as no
party attacks the validity of that case, I shall accept it as the applicable
law.
and thus “the Company” is clearly the Respondent. Al-
though rule 30 refers to “property,” the parties have
treated the two rules synonymously. Thus, the term
“property” refers to the “Company premises” mentioned
in the other rule. Further, rule 30 speaks of “reporting
to” the property. The only property to which these em-
ployees “report” is the Respondent’s property. Finally,
matters relating to activities on property other than the
Respondent’s property are set forth in other provisions.
These provisions encourage patronage, regulate parking,
etc. The essential point, understood by any reasonable
employee, is that rules 30 and 45 pertain only to the Re-
spondent’s property, and other rules pertain to the prop-
erty of others, i.e., the hotel and casino.
In sum, absent evidence of unlawful application, I
would not seek to stretch these rules beyond their rea-
sonable meaning. More specifically, in the absence of
such evidence, I would not infer that a reasonable em-
ployee would read rules 30 and 45 as prohibiting Section
7 activity outside the restaurants.3
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist any union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain any rule which bars employees
from our premises 30 minutes before their shift or re-
quires them to leave within 30 minutes after their shift.
WE WILL NOT maintain any rule which bars employees
from returning to our premises, other than as a guest,
during unscheduled hours.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that they must comply
with an unlawful rule barring them from arriving on the
premises more than 30 minutes before their shift begins
and requiring them to leave within 30 minutes after their
shift ends.

3 Consistent therewith, I would find that the Respondent did not vio-
late Sec. 8(a)(1) by demanding that employee Ron Isomura comply
with rule 30.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1286
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL rescind our unlawful rules contained in the
employee handbook barring employees from the prem-
ises more than 30 minutes before their shift and requiring
them to leave within 30 minutes of the time their shift
ends, and barring employees from returning to our prem-
ises, other than as a guest, during unscheduled hours, and
WE WILL notify employees that the rules have been re-
scinded to the same extent that the unlawful rules were
publicized.
ARK LAS VEGAS RESTAURANT CORPORATION