0120162287
10-25-2016
Arden W.,1 Complainant, v. Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area), Agency.
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
Arden W.,1
Complainant,
v.
Megan J. Brennan,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Pacific Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120162287
Hearing No. 480-2012-00420X
Agency No. 4F-926-0025-12
DECISION
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts Complainant's appeal from the Agency's June 9, 2016 final action concerning an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint claiming employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.
BACKGROUND
During the period at issue, Complainant worked as a City Carrier at the Agency's Montclair, California Post Office.
On May 26, 2016, Complainant filed the instant formal complaint. Therein, Complainant alleged that he was subjected to harassment and a hostile work environment on the basis of disability when:
on October 1, 2011 and continuing, his requests for medical leave were denied, he was required to provide medical documentation, and he was constantly verbally abused and told he was not performing well.
After an investigation, Complainant was provided a copy of the investigative file, and requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Thereafter, the Agency filed a Motion for a Decision Without a Hearing. On May 26, 2016, the AJ issued a decision by summary judgment in favor of the Agency.
In finding no discrimination by summary judgment, the AJ found that the record developed during the investigation established the following undisputed facts. Complainant identified that he has unspecified type of cancer and that it was in remission. Complainant also identified that he has diabetes without describing specific reasonable accommodation requirements because of the diabetes.
On October 26, 2011, the Supervisor, Customer Service, also Complainant's supervisor, approved Complainant's sick leave request for that day. The record reflects that October 27, 2011 was Complainant's scheduled day off. When Complainant returned to work on October 28, 2011, he asked his supervisor for unplanned sick leave to go to the doctor, without providing him any explanation. In response, the supervisor asked Complainant for medical documentation, because the supervisor had altered his schedule to allow him time for a doctor's visit on October 26, 2011. The supervisor questioned whether Complainant used his sick leave on October 26, 2011 for his medical appointment. The AJ noted that because the supervisor approved Complainant's request for sick leave on October 28, 2011, less than two days after Complainant's prior request (of October 26, 2011) without providing an explanation as to the reason, the supervisor requested medical documentation to support such a request.
The AJ noted that during the relevant period, the supervisor stated that he did not deny any of Complainant's medical leave requests. The AJ noted although Complainant stated in his affidavit that the supervisor denied some of his sick leave requests in the past, Complainant did not identify the specific dates of the denials nor did he provide documentation to support his claim.
With respect to Complainant's allegation that was constantly verbally abused and told he was not performing well, the AJ noted that on several occasions in 2011, the supervisor advised Complainant that it was his observation that "he is a good and fast caser," but that it takes Complainant "way too long to pull the route down." Complainant alleged that the supervisor would often yell at him by asking why he was taking so long and that he better be back to the facility in a timely manner. The AJ noted, however, Complainant did not deny that he was slow or that he took his time to deliver his route than the supervisor expected from him.
Further, the AJ noted that Complainant acknowledged that his productivity was slow because of the "stress, anxiety, and depression" he experienced because Agency management was telling him he was taking too long and challenging him on how long it should take to carry his route. The AJ noted that Complainant did not offer evidence to support his assertions. The AJ also noted that there was no medical documentation indicating that Complainant suffered from "stress, anxiety, and depression," that these medical issues substantially limited his ability to perform the essential functions of his mail carrier position, and that he needed reasonable accommodation to perform the essential duties of a mail carrier.
Moreover, the AJ noted that Complainant did not provide medical documentation to establish that lifting restrictions of 40 pounds, his pushing and pulling restriction of 30 pounds, and a shoulder injury that restricted him from carrying a mail satchel, caused him to be slower in taking down his route and to deliver his mail in a timely manner on a "driving route."
The AJ noted that the supervisor stated that he and Complainant met to discuss his job performance on multiple occasions. The supervisor stated that he offered Complainant advice on how to improve his time but Complainant would get "loud and upset with him," and then tell him that he was "now feeling sick and he was going home." The AJ noted that during the relevant period, Complainant was not subjected to disciplinary action for the performance deficiencies that the supervisor perceived Complainant was having.
Based on these facts, the AJ concluded that Complainant did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination on any of the bases alleged and, even if he had, the responsible management officials articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions.2 The AJ then determined that Complainant failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that these articulated reasons were a pretext designed to mask the true discriminatory or retaliatory motivation.
The Agency fully implemented the AJ's decision in its final action. The instant appeal followed. Complainant submitted no argument on appeal.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.
A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-party analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima facie of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
Here, the undisputed facts fully support the AJ's determination that the responsible management officials clearly articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions. After careful review of the record, as well as the arguments presented on appeal, we conclude that Complainant did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that these proffered reasons were a pretext designed to mask discrimination on any basis alleged.
The Agency's final action implementing the AJ's decision without a hearing, finding no discrimination, is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0416)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 � VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The requests may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden's signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
October 25, 2016
__________________
Date
1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website.
2 We presume for purposes of analysis only, and without so finding, that Complainant is an individual with a disability.
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