Ardell B.,1 Complainant,v.Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Headquarters), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Sep 6, 2018

0120160357 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 6, 2018)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013

Ardell B.,1
Complainant,

v.

Megan J. Brennan,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Headquarters),
Agency.

Appeal No. 0120160357

Agency No. 66-000-0004-13

DECISION

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) accepts
Complainant’s appeal, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the October 6, 2015 final
Agency decision (FAD) concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 206(d) et seq. The Commission’s review is de novo. For the following reasons, the
Commission AFFIRMS the FAD.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Postal Inspector,
ISLE-10, Step 2, with the Agency’s San Francisco Inspection Service Division in Richmond,
California.2 On June 30, 2012, Complainant entered duty with the Agency. Complainant
claimed that prior to accepting the Agency’s offer of employment, she was told that her pay
would be set at the GS-10, Step 5 level. Complainant alleged that she later learned that her
salary was set at the GS-10, Step 2 level. Complainant stated that the Business Services

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name
when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.

2 Although Complainant referred to her grade level as “GS-10, Step 2,” the record evidence
indicates that she was classified as an ISLE-10, Step 2 Postal Inspector.
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Inspection Service Manager (M1) informed her that she would not get credit for her last job as a
part-time college instructor nor would she get credit for any of her “graduate units.”
Complainant claimed that she provided M1 documentation indicating that she was paid $66.00
per hour as a college instructor. Complainant alleged that M1 then advised her that paying her at
an equivalent salary would place her well below the entry-level salary for a Postal Inspector.
Complainant claimed that M1 informed her that she would be placed at the GS-10, Step 2 level
based on her graduate degree. Complainant believed that her salary was miscalculated and that
her salary should have been set at $137,280.00. Complainant was paid at base salary of
$55,736.00 during training and $82,480.00, including locality pay, after her assignment
following graduation to the San Francisco Division.

Upon entering duty at the San Francisco Division, Complainant claimed that she was “set up for
failure.” Complainant alleged that she was ostracized, given broken equipment, and excluded
from all but one team activity. Complainant claimed that the Post-Basic Training Coordinator
treated her poorly, gave her no direction, and participated in collusion against her. On December
26, 2012, the Assistant Postal Inspector-in-Charge issued Complainant a Notice of Separation
from Service During Probationary Period. The Notice indicated that Complainant had exhibited
an attitude toward her official duties and her supervisor that was inconsistent with that of a Postal
Inspector. The Notice specifically noted that Complainant questioned the validity of instructions
given to her to carry and to respond to messages and telephone calls received on her Agency-
issued Blackberry device and that Complainant had exhibited a lack of respect toward her Team
Leader. The Notice further stated that Complainant’s integrity had been called into question and
she required more guidance and personal attention than other Inspectors. As a result,
Complainant was terminated effective December 26, 2012.

On April 11, 2013, Complainant filed a formal complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated
against her on the bases of race (African-American), sex (female and sex stereotyping due to
sexual orientation), color (Light Brown), and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when:

1. She was paid at a lower rate than most of the male Postal Inspectors who trained
with her at the academy; and

2. She was removed effective December 26, 2012.

On May 6, 2013, the Agency accepted the complaint, with the exception of the basis of sex
(sexual orientation), finding that the EEO process did not have jurisdiction over sexual
orientation claims. On May 20, 2013, Complainant contended that sexual orientation was
covered by the EEO statutes and regulations and requested to amend her complaint to add the
following additional claims:

3. In early October 2012, shortly after being posted in California, TL disclosed her
sexual orientation by talking to her about how she and her partner commuted in
the presence of several staff members; and
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4. On December 14, 2012, TL directed her to take a male co-worker (CW-1) to her
home to check her Verizon wireless coverage there, and this suggested to her that
she was to perform sexual favors for CW-1.

On June 3, 2013, the Agency determined that its dismissal of sexual orientation as a basis of
discrimination was proper and failed to acknowledge Complainant’s amendment request. At the
conclusion of the investigation of the accepted claims and bases, the Agency provided
Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation (ROI) and notice of her right to request a
hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant requested a final Agency
decision. In accordance with Complainant’s request, the Agency issued a final Agency decision
pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). In the decision, the Agency found that Complainant had
not been subjected to discrimination or reprisal as alleged.

Complainant appealed and, in Complainant v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120140202
(June 3, 2015), the Commission vacated the FAD and remanded the complaint for a
supplemental investigation to include sexual orientation as a basis of discrimination and the
amended claims.

Following the completion of the supplemental investigation, the Agency provided Complainant
with a copy of the supplemental report of investigation (SROI) and notice of her right to request
a hearing before an EEOC AJ. Complainant requested a FAD. In accordance with
Complainant’s request, the Agency issued a FAD pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b).

In the FAD, the Agency assumed arguendo that Complainant established a prima facie case of
discrimination and reprisal and found that management had articulated legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically, with regard to claim (1), M1 explained
that she managed the team that calculated salaries for employees who were new to the Agency.
M1 stated that credit was given to candidates with advanced degrees, but that unless the
candidate was in a law enforcement officer position, they would not get additional credit for
work experience relative to setting their base pay. The Inspection Service Program Specialist
(PS) acknowledged that he set Complainant’s base pay. PS explained that at the time
Complainant was hired, the pay stubs she provided indicated a monthly income of $693.00,
which calculated to an annual salary of $8,316.00. PS stated that as this salary was far below
the minimum salary set for an entry-level Postal Inspector, Complainant’s salary was first set at
the minimum, ISLE 10, step 1. PS advised, however, that Complainant was given credit for her
advanced degree, which moved her to step 2. PS denied telling Complainant that her salary
would be set higher and noted that within 10 minutes of receiving Complainant’s pay stub, he
emailed her the salary calculation. PS added that Complainant received credit for her advanced
degree.

As to claim (2), Complainant’s Team Leader (TL) stated that Complainant exhibited both
performance and conduct issues during her probationary period. TL added that there was a
significant problem related to Complainant’s honesty and integrity. TL noted that Complainant
was in a law enforcement position and was expected to be entirely honest, forthcoming, and
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truthful. TL indicated that Complainant failed in this regard on several occasions. TL described
an incident in which Complainant insisted that an Information Technology (IT) Specialist told
her, in the presence of another Postal Inspector, that TL prohibited her from having access to the
Office Communicator software. Management conducted an investigation and concluded that
both the IT Specialist and the Postal Inspector denied that the IT Specialist made the comment in
question. TL stressed that Complainant demonstrated a lack of integrity and respect for the
position which was incompatible with the duties and responsibilities of a Postal Inspector. TL
documented his observations of Complainant’s performance and conduct issues in a
memorandum. Based on these reasons and those outlined in the removal notice, Complainant
was removed during her probationary period.

The Agency concluded that Complainant failed to show that management’s reasons for its
actions were pretextual. As a result, the Agency found that Complainant had not been subjected
to discrimination or reprisal as alleged. The instant appeal followed.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, Complainant contends that she has been unable to obtain employment in the field of
federal law enforcement as a result of her separation. Complainant claims that TL disclosed her
sexual orientation, which caused her emotional and psychological damage. Complainant alleges
that she was refused help by other Inspectors and set up for failure. In addition, Complainant
claims that she told TL to respect her boundaries and he then retaliated against her by
terminating her. Complainant contends that the salary calculated by PS was not representative of
her professional worth. Complainant notes that only one male Postal Inspector was paid less
than she. Complainant claims that she was not informed of any performance issues prior to her
removal. Complainant argues that TL’s reasons for her termination are pretext for
discrimination. Accordingly, Complainant requests that the Commission reverse the FAD.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As an initial matter, the Commission notes that Complainant requested to amend her complaint
in May 2013. While the Agency did not accept the amended claims, the Commission’s previous
decision remanded the entire complaint as amended. The Agency properly investigated the
amended claims, but failed to adequately address them in the FAD. Nonetheless, the
Commission finds that the record is fully developed as to claims (3) and (4), and the Commission
will address the merits of these allegations in the interests of administrative efficiency of
processing.

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Disparate Treatment

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this,3 Complainant must satisfy the three-part
evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that
she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an
inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of
a prima facie case will vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 802 n. 13. The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Tx. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the Agency’s explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530
U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).

Upon review of the record, and assuming arguendo that Complainant established a prima facie
case of discrimination and reprisal, the Commission finds that the Agency articulated legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. More specifically, as to claim (1), M1 denied making
the alleged comments about Complainant’s pay upon her hire. ROI, at 363. PS explained that he
received the pay stubs from each of the candidates, entered the candidates’ current pay
information into the worksheet, added in the applicable locality pay and Law Enforcement
Availability Premium (LEAP), and calculated the figures based on the information entered. Id.
at 419. PS stated that Complainant’s submitted pay stubs indicated that her salary at her
previous job was $693.00 per month, which calculated to a yearly salary of $8,316.00 per year.
Id. PS expressed that this was below the minimum basic salary of $47,297.00 for an entry level
Postal Inspector ISLE-10 Step 1, so her basic salary was increased to that amount. Id. PS stated
that Complainant was then given credit for her advanced degree and then was increased to an
ISLE 10 Step 2, basic salary of $48,823.00 plus locality pay totaling $82,480.00. Id. at 419, 432.

Regarding claim (2), TL stated that Complainant exhibited an attitude toward her official duties
and him which was inconsistent with that of a Postal Inspector, a Federal Law Enforcement
Agent. ROI, at 292. TL confirmed that he advised Complainant on numerous occasions that she
was required to carry with her and respond to telephone calls as well as email messages on her
Agency-issued Blackberry device; however, she continued to question the validity of those
instructions. Id. Additionally, TL affirmed that Complainant’s integrity was called into question
as she claimed that she was told by an IT Specialist that he had blocked her access to a software
application, but no one who was present during the conversation could support her claim. Id. at
292-93. Further, TL stated that Complainant’s performance during her tenure in the San
Francisco Division disclosed that she required more guidance and personal attention than other
Inspectors who just graduated from the training program; she demonstrated a lack of interest and
ability in problem solving; she exhibited a tendency to deflect her actions on external factors;
and she displayed a lack of ability to properly establish priorities. Id. at 293. The Postal

3A claim of sexual orientation discrimination is a claim of sex discrimination under Title VII.
Baldwin v. Dep’t of Transp., EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080 (July 15, 2015).
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Inspector-in-Charge confirmed that he decided to issue Complainant the separation notice based
on information he received from TL and the Assistant Postal Inspector-in-Charge. Id. at 321. In
the Notice, the Postal Inspector-in-Charge detailed the numerous instances of performance and
conduct issues TL noted. Id. at 440-42. The Assistant Postal Inspector-in-Charge stated that he
signed the Notice and issued the Notice after reviewing all the facts of the matter with the Postal
Inspector-in-Charge. Id. at 334.

Complainant now bears the burden of establishing that the Agency’s stated reasons are merely a
pretext for discrimination. Shapiro v. Soc. Sec. Admin., EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 9,
1996). Complainant can do this directly by showing that the Agency’s proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence. Tx. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.

The Commission does not have the benefit of an Administrative Judge’s credibility
determinations after a hearing. Therefore, the Commission can only evaluate the facts based on
the weight of the evidence presented. The Commission finds no evidence that Complainant’s
protected classes were a factor in any of the Agency’s actions. Complainant’s subjective belief
that the management actions at issue were the result of discrimination or reprisal is insufficient to
prove pretext. At all times, the ultimate burden remains with Complainant to demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that the Agency’s reasons were not the real reasons and that the
Agency acted on the basis of discriminatory or retaliatory animus. Complainant failed to carry
this burden. As a result, the Commission finds that Complainant was not subjected to
discrimination or reprisal as alleged.

EPA Claim

Complainant also alleged a violation of the Equal Pay Act (EPA). Specifically, Complainant
alleged that she was paid at a lower rate than most other male Postal Inspectors who trained with
her at the Agency’s training academy. The United States Supreme Court articulated the
requirements for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the EPA in Corning
Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). To establish an EPA claim, a complainant must
show that he or she received less pay than an individual of the opposite sex for equal work,
requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility, under similar working conditions within the same
establishment.

Once a complainant has met this burden, an employer may avoid liability only by showing that
the difference in pay is justified under one of the four affirmative defenses set forth in the EPA:
(1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system; (3) a system which measures earnings by quantity or
quality of production of work (also referred to as an incentive or piecework system); or, (4) a
differential based on any factor other than sex. Id.

The requirement of “equal work” does not mean that the jobs must be identical, but only that
they must be “substantially equal.” Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 567 F.2d 429, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1976). The terms skill, effort, and responsibility, “constitute separate tests, each of which must
be met in order for the equal pay standard to apply.” 29 C.F.R. § 1620.14(a).
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The factors of skill, effort, and responsibility used to measure the equality of jobs are not
precisely definable. Id. Skill includes such things as “experience, training, education, and
ability.” 29 C.F.R. § 1620.15(a). Effort addresses the amount of “physical or mental exertion
needed for the performance of a job.” 29 C.F.R. § 1620.16(a). Responsibility concerns “the
degree of accountability required in the performance of the job, with emphasis on the importance
of the job obligation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1620.17(a).

Complainant identified seven male Postal Inspectors who attended the training academy with her
and were paid more than she. The record indicates that six of the seven identified comparators
were paid more than Complainant and performed the same work requiring equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, under similar working conditions, within the same establishment. Therefore, the
Commission finds that Complainant has established a prima facie case of discrimination under
the EPA. The Commission now turns to whether the Agency has met its burden of proving an
affirmative defense.

Here, the Agency’s defense is that the pay differential resulted from factors other than sex, most
notably the most recent salary history. As discussed above, PS affirmed that he received each
employee’s previous salary documentation and entered the information into a formula to
calculate each employee’s starting salary. ROI, at 419. First, the employee’s previous salary
was divided by 1.25 and converted to the closest ISLE level to establish the employee’s base
salary. Id. at 432. The employee’s salary was then calculated by adding the applicable locality
pay and LEAP. Id. at 419. In Complainant’s case, her previous salary information placed her
below the minimum starting salary for a Postal Inspector; therefore, she was slotted at the entry-
level ISLE 10, Step 1 level. Id. PS noted that Complainant was then given credit for her
advanced degree and placed at the ISLE 10, Step 2 level or $48,823. Id. at 419. PS confirmed
that one of the identified male comparators was also placed at the minimum ISLE 10, Step 1
level based on his previous salary falling below the entry-level Postal Inspector base salary. Id.
at 420, 543. The remaining identified comparators were brought in at a higher starting salary
based on their higher salary history than Complainant. ROI, at 426; See ROI, Exs. 10-22.

In sum, the Commission concludes, based on a thorough review of the record evidence that the
Agency has met its burden of establishing its affirmative defense that the pay differentials in this
case occurred because of a factor other than sex.

Hostile Work Environment – Non-Sexual Harassment (Claim (3))

To establish a claim of harassment a complainant must show that: (1) she belongs to a statutorily
protected class; (2) she was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical
conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on her
statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or
had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or creating
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for imputing
liability to the employer. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
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Further, the incidents must have been “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
[complainant’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).

Therefore, to prove her harassment claim, Complainant must establish that she was subjected to
conduct that was either so severe or so pervasive that a “reasonable person” in Complainant’s
position would have found the conduct to be hostile or abusive. Complainant must also prove
that the conduct was taken because of her protected classes. Only if Complainant establishes
both of those elements, hostility and motive, will the question of Agency liability present itself.

Here, Complainant asserted that TL disclosed her sexual orientation to co-workers shortly after
she entered duty with the San Francisco Division and specifically talked about her and her
partner’s commute. TL denied disclosing Complainant’s sexual orientation to anyone or having
the conversation as described by Complainant. SROI, at 52-53. Further, TL denied any
knowledge of Complainant’s sexual orientation. Id. at 52. Complainant presented no
corroborating evidence in support of her claim that TL or any other official disclosed her sexual
orientation at any time. As a result, the Commission finds that Complainant has not established
that the conduct as issue occurred as alleged.

Hostile Work Environment - Sexual Harassment (Claim (4))

Finally, with respect to Complainant’s sexual harassment claim, to establish a case of sexual
harassment creating a hostile work environment, Complainant must show, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that: (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature; (3) the harassment complained of was based on sex; (4) the harassment affected a term or
condition of employment, either unreasonably interfering with the work environment or creating
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for imputing
liability to the employer. Humphrey v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01965238 (Oct. 16,
1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11. The harasser’s conduct should be evaluated from the objective
viewpoint of a reasonable person in the victim’s circumstances. See Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Enforcement
Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Mar. 8, 1994).

The Commission notes again that it does not have the benefit of an Administrative Judge’s
credibility determinations after a hearing. Therefore, the Commission can only evaluate the facts
based on the weight of the evidence presented. The Commission finds that Complainant has not
established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she was subjected to sexual harassment.
More specifically, Complainant claimed that she understood TL’s instructions for CW-1 to go to
her house to check cell phone coverage as a request for her to perform sexual favors for the co-
worker. TL denied requesting that CW-1 go to Complainant’s residence. TL explained that
Complainant had complained about cell service issues and he suggested that she check if another
carrier’s service was better around her residence in Fairfield, California. SROI, at 54.
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TL stated that he knew that CW-1 and Complainant were classmates continuing their Post-Basic
Training activities and were often participating in the same activities. Id. TL affirmed that he
simply mentioned to Complainant that if they intended to carpool to an upcoming activity that
Complainant might check if CW-1’s cell phone carrier’s service was better than her current
carrier’s. Id. TL denied suggesting that Complainant perform any sexual favors for CW-1 and
stressed that he was only trying to help Complainant resolve her cell phone issues. Id. TL
documented his efforts to assist Complainant with her cell phone reception difficulties in his
December 2012 memorandum. ROI, Ex. 9. CW-1 denied that he was ever requested to go to
Complainant’s house to check on her phone reception and stated that he did not even know
where Complainant lived. ROI, at 387.

Complainant presented no corroborating evidence in support of her belief that TL was suggesting
that she perform sexual favors for CW-1. Thus, based on the record evidence, the Commission
finds that Complainant failed to establish that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. As a result, the
Commission finds that Complainant has not established that she was subjected to sexual
harassment or a hostile work environment as alleged.

CONCLUSION

After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration of all statements submitted on
appeal, it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the
Agency’s final decision because the preponderance of the evidence of record does not establish
that discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0617)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or
the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish
that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact
or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or
operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of
Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party
shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for
reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405;
Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110),
at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the
Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
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Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC
20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a
legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail
within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The
agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal
(FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of
service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration
as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any
supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The
Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very
limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within
ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action,
you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or
department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do
so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the
administrative processing of your complaint.

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION-EQUAL PAY ACT (Y0408)
You are authorized under section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. § 216(b)) to
file a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction within two years or, if the violation is
willful, three years of the date of the alleged violation of the Equal Pay Act regardless of
whether you have pursued any administrative complaint processing. The filing of the civil action
will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)

If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may
request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or
costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may
request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of
court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission.

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The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not
alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right
to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations

September 6, 2018
Date