APPLIED MATERIALS, INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 15, 2021

2020004323 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 15, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/691,157 08/30/2017 VIACHSLAV BABAYAN 24427USA 1020
55649 7590 09/15/2021
Moser Taboada / Applied Materials, Inc.
1030 Broad Street
Suite 203
Shrewsbury, NJ 07702
EXAMINER
BRAYTON, JOHN JOSEPH
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1794
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/15/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Applied_Materials.Pair@anaqua.com
ataboada@mtiplaw.com
docketing@mtiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte VIACHSLAV BABAYAN,
ADOLPH MILLER ALLEN, MICHAEL STOWELL,
ZHONG QIANG HUA, CARL R. JOHNSON,
VANESSA FAUNE, and JINGJING LIU
____________

Appeal 2020-004323
Application 15/691,157
Technology Center 1700
____________

Before DEBRA L. DENNETT, LILAN REN, and
MERRELL C. CASHION, JR., Administrative Patent Judges.

CASHION, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–15. We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Applied Materials, Inc. as the real
party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
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Application 15/691,157

2
The invention relates generally to power delivery for plasma
processing in semiconductor process chambers. Spec. ¶ 2. Claims 1 and 9
illustrate the subject matter on appeal and is reproduced below:
1. A system for generation and delivery of a pulsed,
high voltage signal for a process chamber, comprising:

a high voltage supply, disposed remotely from the
process chamber, to generate a high voltage signal;

a pulser, comprising a separate component from the high
voltage supply, disposed relatively closer to the process
chamber than the high voltage supply to pulse the generated
high voltage signal;

a first shielded cable to deliver the high voltage signal
from the remotely disposed high voltage supply to the pulser to
be pulsed; and

a second shielded cable to deliver a pulsed, high voltage
signal from the pulser to the process chamber.

9. A method for generating and delivering a pulsed,
high voltage signal to a process chamber, comprising:

generating a high voltage signal at a location remote from
the process chamber;

delivering the high voltage signal to a location relatively
closer to the process chamber to be pulsed;

in a component separate from a source of the generated
high voltage signal, pulsing the delivered, high voltage signal;
and

delivering the pulsed, high voltage signal to the process
chamber.

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3
The Examiner presents the following new grounds of rejections in the
Examiner’s Answer dated March 23, 2020:2
I. claims 9 and 12 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as
anticipated by Cremer (US 2011/0180389 A1, published July 28,
2011);

II. claims 1, 4, 5, 7, and 8 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Cremer, Leung (US 2011/0096885 A1, published
April 28, 2011), and Petrach (US 2006/0260938 A1, published
November 23, 2006);

III. claims 2 and 3 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Cremer, Leung, Petrach, and Kimijima (JP 63080146 A,
published April 11, 1988);

IV. claim 6 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Cremer, Leung, Petrach, and Jackson (US 2011/0247851 A1,
published October 13, 2011);

V. claims 10 and 11 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Cremer and Kimijima;

VI. claim 13 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Cremer, Leung, and Petrach;

VII. claim 14 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Cremer and Leung; and

VIII. claim 15 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Cremer, Leung, and Jackson.

2 The Examiner withdrew the rejections of claims 1–15 set forth in the Final
Office Action. Ans. 10. The Examiner presents new grounds of rejections
for these claims in the Answer. Id. Appellant submitted a Reply Brief dated
May 26, 2020 addressing the new grounds of rejections that is timely.
Accordingly, we refer to the statements of rejections as set forth in the
Examiner’s Answer for the purposes of this opinion.
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Appellant presents arguments only for independent claim 9 (Rejection
I) and independent claim 1 (Rejection II). See generally Appeal and Reply
Briefs. Appellant relies on these arguments to address the rejections of the
remaining claims. Id. Accordingly, we select independent claims 1 and 9 as
representative of the subject matter claimed and decide the appeal as to all
grounds of rejections based on the arguments presented for claims 1 and 9.

OPINION
After review of the respective positions the Appellant presents in the
Appeal and Reply Briefs and the Examiner presents in the Final Office
Action and the Answer, we AFFIRM the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–
15 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1) and 103 for essentially the reasons the
Examiner presents. Our reasoning follows.

Claim 9 (Rejection I -- Anticipation)
Claim 9 recites a method for generating and delivering a pulsed, high
voltage signal to a process chamber generating a high voltage signal at a
location remote from the process chamber that is pulsed in a component
separate from a source of the generated high voltage signal prior to
delivering the pulsed, high voltage signal to the process chamber.
The Examiner finds Cremer describes a method that anticipates the
claimed invention. Ans. 3–4; Cremer Figure 2, ¶¶ 29, 72. The Examiner
specifically finds that Cremer’s component 6, used to generate the high
voltage signal, is remote from the processing chamber because it is located
outside of the processing chamber. Ans. 4.
Appellant argues the Examiner’s interpretation of “remote” is (1) not
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consistent with the interpretation described in the Specification and (2)
contrary to the ordinary meaning of the Appellant’s claim term “remote.”
Reply Br. 3–4. Thus, Appellant contends Cremer’s component 6, used to
generate the high voltage signal, is not at a location remote from the
processing chamber. Id. at 4–5.
Appellant’s arguments do not identify reversible error in the
Examiner’s finding of anticipation.
Our review of the Examiner’s analysis and Appellant’s arguments
requires that the claims must first be construed to define the scope and
meaning of the disputed term “remote.” See Gechter v. Davidson, 116 F.3d
1454, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Thus, our review of the grounds of rejection of
the appealed claims necessarily entails the interpretation of the scope of the
appealed claims, giving the broadest reasonable interpretation to the terms
thereof consistent with the written description provided in Appellant’s
Specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in this art.
See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
During examination, terms in the claims must be given their broadest
reasonable interpretation including the ordinary meaning unless another
meaning is intended by Appellant as established in the written description of
their Specification. See, e.g., In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321–22 (Fed. Cir.
1989). When the Specification does not contain an express definition, a
reasonable, supported interpretation of the appealed claims that differs from
that urged by Appellant can be used to determine the patentability of the
claims. Morris, 127 F.3d at 1055–56 (“Absent an express definition in their
specification, the fact that appellants can point to definitions or usages that
conform to their interpretation does not make the PTO’s definition
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unreasonable when the PTO can point to other sources that support its
interpretation.”). Indeed, “[i]t is the applicants’ burden to precisely define
the invention, not the PTO’s. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2 [statute omitted].”
Morris, 127 F.3d at 1055–56.
Consistent with the Examiner’s analysis, Cremer describes component
6 as mounted in the immediate vicinity of the cathodes on an associated
electro-vacuum passage 8 on the outside of the processing chamber wall.
Ans. 10–11; Cremer Figure 2; ¶ 74. We now turn to Appellant’s arguments.
(1) Interpretation of “remote” in the Specification
Appellant argues that paragraphs 24–25 in the Specification would
lead one skilled in the art to interpret the term “remote” to mean “in a
different location” and not just outside of the process chamber as alleged by
the Examiner. Reply Br. 3–4.
We have read the portions of the Specification Appellant relies upon
to define the term “remote” and find no description that distinguishes the
claimed invention from Cremer’s method. In fact, paragraph 24 of the
Specification describes “the high voltage DC power supply 202 is
illustratively located in a subfab 210, a room below the clean room [that
contains the processing chamber].” See Application Figure 2. At best, this
portion of the Specification describes the high voltage power supply as
located apart from, yet in the vicinity of (“room below”), the processing
chamber. Further, Appellant refers to this disclosure as an embodiment of
the invention and the specific distinguishing details of this embodiment are
not present in the claims. Reply Br. 5. Thus, Appellant fails to explain
adequately why this description distinguishes the claimed invention from
Cremer’s placement of component 6 in the immediate vicinity outside of the
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processing chamber wall, as interpreted by the Examiner. Ans. 4.
(2) Dictionary definition of “remote”
Appellant argues the Examiner's interpretation of the term “remote” is
contrary to the ordinary meaning of the word. Reply Br. 4. According to
Appellant, Webster’s Dictionary defines “remote” as requiring separation by
“space greater than usual” (far removed in space). Id. That is, Appellant
contends that the definition of “remote” requires substantial separation
and/or distance between the claimed components. However, Appellant’s
description of the high voltage DC power supply as located in a room below
the clean room [that contains the processing chamber] (Spec. ¶ 24–25) does
not convey how far these components need to be placed to be remote from
each other. In fact, as we note above, the Specification, at best, describes the
phrase “room below” as in the vicinity of the clean room. Moreover, the
Webster’s Dictionary definition Appellant relies upon appears to be too
restrictive given that other sources, such as Dictionary.com, also define
“remote” as “situated at some distance away.”3 This broader definition
dovetails with the Examiner’s interpretation of “remote” as outside of the
processing chamber.
Therefore, we find no reversible error in the Examiner’s determination
of obviousness based on the Examiner’s broadest reasonable interpretation
of “remote”
Appellant argues Cremer fails to teach or suggest pulsing a generated
high voltage signal in a component separate from a source of said signal.
Reply Br. 5. According to Appellant, Cremer teaches that a high voltage
signal is generated and pulsed in a single component identified as a HPPMS

3 https://www.dictionary.com/browse/remote (accessed August 25, 2021).
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power supply 14. Id.
These arguments are also unpersuasive of reversible error in the
Examiner’s finding of anticipation.
Cremer describes an HPPMS power supply 14 comprising distinct
components including a switching element 5 (pulser), a capacitive element 6
(high voltage signal generator) and a DC power supply unit 7. Cremer ¶ 71.
Appellant asserts the claimed invention is distinguished from Cremer’s
teachings because of Cremer’s group designation of the noted components
as a “power supply.” Yet, Appellant does not contest that the claimed
invention and Cremer comprise the same noted components. Reply Br. 5–6.
Moreover, the Specification also designates these individual components as
a group under the term “system.” Spec. ¶ 24 (“The system 200 of Figure 2
illustratively comprises a high voltage DC power supply 202, a high voltage,
shielded cable 204, a pulser 206 and a process chamber 100.”). This
notwithstanding, Appellant treats the noted components as separate in the
arguments. That is, Appellant recognizes that a group designation of a
combination of individual components does not necessarily impart a
structural difference on the individual components themselves. This is even
more so given that Cremer’s pulsing component 5 is described as mounted
separately in the vicinity of the processing chamber. Cremer ¶¶ 74, 80. This
description supports the Examiner’s finding that Cremer’s component 5 is a
component separate from the DC power supply unit and component 6.
Thus, Appellant fails to explain why or how the claimed invention
distinguishes from Cremer’s method because of Cremer’s designation
grouping the noted components as a power supply.
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9
Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 9 and 12
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) for reasons the Examiner presents and we give
above.

Claim 1 (Rejection II -- Obviousness)
We refer to the Examiner’s Answer for a complete statement of the
rejection of claim 1. Ans. 4–5.
Appellant addresses the rejection of claim 1 using the same line of
arguments presented when discussing the anticipation rejection of claim 9
based on Cremer. Reply Br. 7–8. Appellant does not contest the reasons for
which the Examiner relies on the secondary references Leung and Petrach.
See generally Appeal Br.; Reply Br. 8–15; see Ans. 5–10.
Therefore, we find these arguments unpersuasive of reversible error
for the reasons the Examiner presents and we give above.
Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–8, 10,
11, and 13–15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (Rejections I–VIII) for reasons the
Examiner presents and we give above.
Arguments not specifically addressed are deemed not persuasive for
the reasons the Examiner presents.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are affirmed.

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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:

Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
9, 12 102 Cremer 9, 12
1, 4, 5, 7, 8 103 Cremer, Leung,
Petrach
1, 4, 5, 7, 8
2, 3 103 Cremer, Leung,
Petrach, Kimijima
2, 3
6 103 Cremer, Leung,
Petrach, Jackson
6
10, 11 103 Cremer, Kimijima 10, 11
13 103 Cremer, Leung,
Petrach
13
14 103 Cremer, Leung 14
15 103 Cremer, Leung,
Jackson
15
Overall
Outcome
1–15

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136.

AFFIRMED