Applied Materials, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 2, 2021

2020003192 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/000,857 01/19/2016 Kwangduk Douglas LEE 016078/USAC02/
DSM/BCVD/AG
5949
44257 7590 04/02/2021
PATTERSON & SHERIDAN, LLP - - APPLIED MATERIALS
24 GREENWAY PLAZA
SUITE 1600
HOUSTON, TX 77046
EXAMINER
COLEMAN, RYAN L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1714
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/02/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Pair_Eofficeaction@pattersonsheridan.com
psdocketing@pattersonsheridan.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte KWANKGDUK DOUGLAS LEE, SUDHA RATHI,
RAMPRAKASH SANKARAKRISHNAN, MARTIN JAY SEAMONS,
IRFAN JAMIL, and BOK HOEN KIM
Appeal 2020-003192
Application 15/000,857
Technology Center 1700
Before ADRIENE LEPIANE HANLON, GEORGIANNA W. BRADEN,
and SHELDON M. MCGEE, Administrative Patent Judges.
MCGEE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction.
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Applied
Materials, Inc. Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2020-003192
Application 15/000,857
2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to methods of dry-stripping films containing
carbon and boron using oxygen-containing and hydrogen-containing plasma.
Appeal Br. 13–16 (Independent Claims 1, 9, 15); Spec. ¶ 2.
Claim 1 is illustrative of the claimed subject matter, and is reproduced
below with a key limitation on appeal italicized for emphasis:
1. A method for stripping a film from a substrate,
comprising:
positioning a substrate having the film thereon in a
chamber, the film comprising boron and carbon;
providing an oxygen-containing plasma in the chamber;
exposing the film to the oxygen-containing plasma to
generate one or more volatile compounds from the boron and
carbon;
providing an hydrogen-containing plasma in the chamber;
exposing the film to the hydrogen-containing plasma to
generate one or more volatile compounds from the boron and
carbon;
exhausting the oxygen-containing plasma from the
chamber while continuing to provide the hydrogen-containing
plasma; and
exhausting at least one of the one or more volatile
compounds from the chamber.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Examiner rejects claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the
combined disclosures of Wang,2 Sin,3 Gouk,4 and Liebau,5 with or without
additional prior art. Final Act. 3–22. Regarding claim 1, the Examiner finds
that Wang teaches a method of stripping a film containing carbon and boron

2 US 2005/0202683 A1, published September 15, 2005.
3 US 2007/0107749 A1, published May 17, 2007.
4 US 2011/0143170 A1, published June 16, 2011.
5 US 2009/0045161 A1, published February 19, 2009.
Appeal 2020-003192
Application 15/000,857
3
by providing oxygen-containing and hydrogen-containing plasmas. Final
Act. 3. The Examiner finds that while Wang does not explicitly disclose that
the oxygen- and hydrogen-containing plasmas generate one or more volatile
compounds from the boron and carbon, it would have been reasonably
expected to occur. Id. at 4.
The Examiner also finds that Wang does not disclose exhausting the
volatile compounds from the chamber as claimed. To address this
difference, the Examiner turns to Sin, which the Examiner undisputedly
finds discloses such exhaustion. Id. The Examiner determines it would
have been obvious to modify Wang’s method by exhausting the volatile
compounds away from the treated substrate to avoid contaminating the
treated substrate’s surface. Id. at 5.
The Examiner finds further that Wang and Sin do not teach
exhausting the oxygen-containing plasma from the chamber while
continuing to provide the hydrogen-containing plasma as recited in claim 1.
Id. To address this difference, the Examiner turns to Gouk and Liebau. Id.
at 5–6. Specifically, the Examiner finds Gouk evinces that, post-etch, a
hydrogen plasma can be used to remove “any remaining undesired material
on the surface of the substrate” and that such removal “can be performed by
replacing the flow of first plasma constituent gases” with that of the second,
hydrogen plasma. Id. at 5. The Examiner also finds Liebau evinces “that a
hydrogen-comprising plasma can successfully be used to etch away carbon
from a substrate.” Id. at 5–6. Based on these disclosures, the Examiner
determines it would have been obvious to modify the method of Wang as
modified by Sin, to continue providing hydrogen-containing plasma after
exhausting the oxygen-containing plasma in order to “advantageously
Appeal 2020-003192
Application 15/000,857
4
allow[] etching products to be removed and allow[] the continued hydrogen
plasma to etch away any remnants of carbon.” Id. at 6.
OPINION
We review the appealed rejections for reversible error based on the
arguments and evidence presented by Appellant. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv); Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010)
(precedential) cited with approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (explaining that even if the Examiner had failed to make a prima
facie case, “it has long been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to
identify the alleged error in the examiner’s rejections”).
Appellant only provides arguments directed to the Examiner’s
rejection of independent claims 1, 9, and 15. Appeal Br. 7–11; Reply Br. 2–
9. Appellant relies on the same arguments presented as to claims 1, 9, and
15 in asserting that the rejections of claims 2–8, 10–14, and 16–20 are
likewise improper. Appeal Br. 11. In accordance with 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv), and based upon the lack of arguments directed to the
subsidiary rejections, claims 2–8, 10–14, and 16–20 will stand or fall
together with the independent claims. Having reviewed the appeal record,
we affirm the obviousness rejections for the reasons provided by the
Examiner. Final Act. 3–27; Ans. 3–10. We add the following primarily for
emphasis.
Appellant argues that Wang does not disclose a film comprising
carbon and boron. Appeal Br. 7–8; Reply Br. 2–4. While Appellant is
correct that Wang does not expressly state that the resultant film contains
carbon and boron when a boron-containing derivative of a hydrocarbon
compound is used (Wang ¶ 25), such express disclosure is not required to
Appeal 2020-003192
Application 15/000,857
5
establish a finding of fact. In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968)
(“in considering the disclosure of a reference, it is proper to take into
account not only specific teachings of the reference but also the inferences
which one skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw
therefrom”). Here, the Examiner finds that the skilled artisan would have
understood that Wang’s films would contain carbon and boron if a boron-
containing derivative of the hydrocarbon was used to prepare the film. Final
Act. 25.
That finding is sufficiently supported. Wang discloses that “[a]n
amorphous carbon layer may be deposited by a process including
introducing a gas mixture of one or more hydrocarbon compounds.” Wang
¶ 24. Wang then discloses that doped derivatives such as “boron-containing
derivatives of the hydrocarbon compounds as well as fluorinated
derivatives” can be used as an alternative to the hydrocarbon. Id. ¶ 25.
Wang provides further detail regarding possible fluorinated derivatives
which may be used and what the resultant layer would be––“a fluorinated
amorphous carbon layer, which may be described as an amorphous
fluorocarbon layer.” Id. (emphasis added). In other words, using the
fluorinated derivative of the hydrocarbon yields a layer containing carbon
and fluorine. Despite Wang’s comparative lack of detail regarding boron-
containing derivatives vis-à-vis fluorinated derivatives, the skilled artisan
would have reasonably inferred from Wang’s disclosure that the layer would
contain carbon and boron if a boron-containing derivative was used.
In addition, the Examiner’s findings sufficiently establish that Wang’s
film inherently contains boron if a boron-containing derivative is used in its
preparation. “The inherent teaching of a prior art reference [is] a question of
fact.” In re Napier, 55 F.3d 610, 613 (Fed. Cir. 1995). “[T]o rely on
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Application 15/000,857
6
inherency to establish the existence of a claim limitation in the prior art in an
obviousness analysis[,] the limitation at issue necessarily must be present, or
the natural result of the combination of elements explicitly disclosed by the
prior art.” PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1195–96
(Fed. Cir. 2014). An inherency finding must be supported by factual
evidence and must also be directed to the claim limitation at issue. See
Napier, 55 F.3d at 613 (discussing the evidence relied on by the Board to
establish the prior art’s inherent disclosure of “redirection of noise”); cf.
PAR, 773 F.3d at 1196 (faulting the district court’s analysis for not tying the
evidence presented to the recited claim limitation of “no substantial
difference in Cmax”).
Here, the Examiner has provided ample evidence supporting a finding
that the natural result of using Wang’s boron-containing hydrocarbon
derivative to deposit the amorphous carbon layer would be a layer
containing carbon and boron as required by the claims. Final Act. 25;
Ans. 3–5; Wang ¶¶ 24–25. And “when the PTO shows sound basis for
believing that the products of the applicant and the prior art are the same, the
applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.” In re Spada, 911
F.2d 705, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Appellant has made no such showing on
this record.
We likewise are unpersuaded by Appellant’s contentions directed to
the limitation requiring “exhausting the oxygen-containing plasma from the
chamber while continuing to provide the hydrogen-containing plasma.”
Appeal Br. 9–10. Contrary to Appellant’s argument, the Examiner relies on
the combined disclosures of Gouk and Liebau, not on Gouk alone, to
establish why this limitation would have been obvious. Compare Final Act.
5–6, with Appeal Br. 9 (“the Examiner relies on Gouk to disclose the
Appeal 2020-003192
Application 15/000,857
7
missing elements”). Appellant’s focus on Gouk’s teachings to the exclusion
of Liebau does not fully address the substance of the rejection and, therefore,
fails to identify reversible error.
We also disagree with Appellant’s argument that the Examiner failed
to provide a reason to modify the combination of Wang, Sin, Gouk, and
Liebau with the teachings of the Yin reference (Appeal Br. 9; Reply Br. 4–5)
or the Kaveh and/or Miya references (Appeal Br. 11; Reply Br. 6). As the
Examiner makes clear in the Answer, the Yin reference was merely relied on
as an evidentiary reference to demonstrate one example of boron-doped
carbon layers. Ans. 6–7; See Final Act. 24–25 (stating that Yin is cited
“simply for greater (but unnecessary) clarity” to explain “how boron-doped
amorphous carbon films are formed”). Similarly, Kaveh and Miya are not
part of a rejection, but serve as evidence supporting the Examiner’s findings
based on Official Notice. Final Act. 23; Ans. 8–9. The Examiner need not
provide a rationale to modify the relied-upon prior art with such evidentiary
references.
Finally, we discern no persuasive merit in Appellant’s traversal of the
Examiner’s use of Official Notice to establish it was well known to handle a
substrate in a clean environment to avoid contamination of the substrate’s
surface. Appeal Br. 10. Appellant does not explain, nor do we discern, how
the relied upon evidentiary reference Kaveh fails to evince the officially
noticed fact. Id.; Final Act. 23; Kaveh, 1:20–34; see MPEP 2144.03C
(explaining that an adequate traversal of an officially noticed fact “must
specifically point out the supposed errors in the examiner’s action, which
would include stating why the noticed fact is not considered to be common
knowledge or well-known in the art.” (emphasis added)). In fact,
Appellant’s statement that “clean environments can be desirable in some
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Application 15/000,857
8
circumstances while processing substrates in the electronics industry”
undermines Appellant’s traversal and supports the Examiner’s reliance on
Official Notice here. Appeal Br. 10.
We, therefore, sustain the rejections of claims 1–20 for the reasons
expressed by the Examiner and above.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are affirmed.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References / Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 8, 9, 12,
14, 15, 20
103(a) Wang, Sin, Gouk,
Liebau
1, 8, 9, 12,
14, 15, 20

2 103(a) Wang, Sin, Gouk,
Liebau, Nguyen
2
3 103(a) Wang, Sin, Gouk,
Liebau, Qingyuan
3
4–7 103(a) Wang, Sin, Gouk,
Liebau, Huang
4–7
10–11 103(a) Wang, Sin, Gouk,
Liebau, Nguyen
10–11
13 103(a) Wang, Sin, Gouk,
Liebau, Huang
13
16–18 103(a) Wang, Sin, Gouk,
Liebau, Nguyen
16–18
19 103(a) Wang, Sin, Gouk,
Liebau, Huang
19
Overall
Outcome
1–20
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Application 15/000,857
9
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED