Applied Materials, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 21, 2021

2020003730 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 21, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/375,577 12/12/2016 Wendell Glenn BOYD JR. 024439USA 4313
44257 7590 04/21/2021
PATTERSON & SHERIDAN, LLP - - APPLIED MATERIALS
24 GREENWAY PLAZA
SUITE 1600
HOUSTON, TX 77046
EXAMINER
LU, JIONG-PING
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1713
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/21/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Pair_Eofficeaction@pattersonsheridan.com
psdocketing@pattersonsheridan.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte WENDELL GLENN BOYD JR.
Appeal 2020-003730
Application 15/375,577
Technology Center 1700
Before CATHERINE Q. TIMM, KAREN M. HASTINGS, and
DONNA M. PRAISS, Administrative Patent Judges.
HASTINGS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–11 and 13–20. See Final Act. 1. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Applied Materials,
Inc. Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2020-003730
Application 15/375,577

2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a new repair method for an electrostatic
chuck. Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed
subject matter (emphasis added to highlight key disputed limitation):
1. A method for refurbishing an electrostatic chuck, comprising:
removing a first portion of an electrostatic chuck body to
expose a second portion of the electrostatic chuck body, wherein
the first portion has a first depth below a top surface of the
electrostatic chuck body and the second portion has a second
depth below the top surface of the electrostatic chuck body;
depositing a layer of dielectric material onto the second
portion, the dielectric layer having a porosity not greater than
1% without annealing or compressing the layer of dielectric
material, the layer of dielectric material deposited using a
suspension slurry plasma spray process, the suspension slurry
plasma spray process comprising:
producing a plasma discharge;
atomizing a suspension slurry comprising nano-sized solid
particles of a dielectric material dispersed in a liquid or semi-
liquid carrier into a stream of droplets using an atomizing probe
that uses a pressurized gas to shear the suspension slurry of the
dielectric material into the stream of droplets;
injecting the stream of droplets into the plasma discharge
to form partially melted drops; and
forming a layer of dielectric material onto the exposed
second portion by projecting the partially melted drops onto the
second portion of the electrostatic chuck body; and
selectively removing material from the layer of dielectric
material to establish a new top surface.

Independent claim 13 recites a method similar to that of claim 1
(Appeal Br. Claims Appendix 19). Appellant argues all the claims on appeal
as a group based on the limitation in italics, which is common to both claims
1 and 13 (Appeal Br. 7–14).
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Application 15/375,577

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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Boyd, Jr. US 2012/0307412 A1 Dec. 6, 2012
P. Fauchais Key Challenges and
Opportunities in
Suspension and
Solution Plasma
Spraying, 35 Plasma
Chem. Plasma Process
511–25
2015

REJECTION
Claims 1–11 and 13–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Boyd and Fauchais. Final Act. 5.

OPINION
Upon consideration of the evidence of record and each of Appellant’s
contentions as set forth in the Appeal Brief, as well as the Reply Brief, we
determine that Appellant has not demonstrated reversible error in the
Examiner’s rejections (e.g., see generally Ans.). In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356,
1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining the Board’s long-held practice of
requiring Appellant(s) to identify the alleged error in the Examiner’s
rejection). We sustain the rejections for the reasons expressed by the
Examiner in the Final Office Action and the Answer.
We add the following primarily for emphasis.
It has been established that “the [obviousness] analysis need not seek
out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged
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Application 15/375,577

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claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007); see also In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264–
65 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (a reference stands for all of the specific teachings
thereof as well as the inferences one of ordinary skill in the art would have
reasonably been expected to draw therefrom).
Appellant’s main contention is that since Boyd uses a thermal plasma
spray process with a densification step, it would not have been obvious to
modify Boyd and use the suspension spray plasma slurry (SPS or SPPS)
process exemplified in Fauchais (Appeal Br. 7, 8). Appellant contends that
there is no reason to do so because the advantage provided by Fauchais is
not needed by Boyd, mainly because Boyd is silent on the use of SPS and
SPPS processes (Appeal Br. 9, 10). Appellant also contends that since
Fauchais is silent regarding the metal layer having a porosity not greater
than 1%, the Examiner has failed to establish a prima facie case of
obviousness (Appeal Br. 11, 12). Finally, Appellant argues that the
Examiner’s rejection is based on using impermissible hindsight (Appeal Br.
13, 14). These arguments are reiterated in the Reply Brief. Appellant’s
arguments are not persuasive of reversible error for reasons presented by the
Examiner (Ans. 3–8).
One of ordinary skill in the art would have inferred and readily
appreciated that a known SPS technique using nano-sized particles (such as
explicitly taught in Fauchais to be an alternative to conventional air plasma
spraying (APS)), may also be useful as an alternative to plasma spraying the
dielectric material for refurbishing the chuck of Boyd because it would
eliminate the densification step of Boyd (e.g., Ans. 5, 6). Fauchais teaches
Appeal 2020-003730
Application 15/375,577

5
its process produces dense, porosity-controlled coatings (Fauchais p. 522,
last paragraph; Ans. 5). Indeed, as pointed out by the Examiner, Fauchais
discusses that because of the many benefits of SPS, “many industries are
looking into that technology because of the improved properties of coatings”
(Ans. 7, Fauchais, p. 524, 2nd paragraph). Thus, an artisan of ordinary skill
would have weighed the advantages and disadvantages of these two known
plasma spraying techniques, thermal plasma spraying as taught in Boyd and
the alternative SPS (and SPPS) taught in Fauchais. “The fact that the
motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should
not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with
the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should
be weighed against one another.” Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202
F.3d 1340, 1349 n. 8 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Appellant’s argument that the applied prior art does not teach or
suggest that the layer of dielectric material has a porosity not greater than
1% is not persuasive of reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection (Appeal
Br. 11, 12). The Examiner has reasonably determined that a layer of
dielectric material made by essentially the same process as recited in claims
1 and 13 (as exemplified in the Boyd/Fauchais combination) would have
been arrived at through routine experimentation optimizing the depositing
process to produce the desired dense coating, which would have been
expected to have such a porosity (e.g., Ans. 4; Final Act. 4). See In re Aller,
220 F.2d 454, 456 (CCPA 1955) (“[I]t is not inventive to discover the
optimum or workable ranges by routine experimentation.”); PAR Pharm.,
Inc. v. TWI Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1195–96 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“in an
obviousness analysis,” inherency may be established where the limitation at
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Application 15/375,577

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issue is “the natural result of the combination of prior art elements.”); In re
Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 693 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (“In particular, the
statement [in In re Wright] that a prima facie obviousness rejection is not
supported if no reference shows or suggests the newly-discovered properties
and results of a claimed structure is not the law.”) (Overruling-in-part In re
Wright, 848 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).2
Likewise, Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner has used
impermissible hindsight (Appeal Br. 13, 14) are also unpersuasive for the
reasons given above, mainly that thermal plasma spraying and SPS (and/or
SPPS) are known (alternative) methods for application of a metal layer onto
a substrate and the use of either one would have been within the ordinary
skill in the art. That is, the arguments fail to account for “the inferences and
creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” See
KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.
Thus, Appellant has not shown reversible error in the Examiner’s
obviousness determination of the claimed method. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417
(the predictable use of known prior art elements or steps performing the
same functions they have been known to perform is normally obvious; the
combination of familiar elements/steps is likely to be obvious when it does
no more than yield predictable results); Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container,
Inc. v. Limited Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (under the
flexible inquiry set forth by the Supreme Court, the PTO must take account

2 See also Ex parte Obiaya, 227 USPQ 58, 60 (BPAI 1985), aff’d mem., 795
F.2d 1017 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (the recognition of another advantage flowing
naturally from following the suggestion of the prior art cannot be the basis
for patentability when the difference would otherwise have been obvious).
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Application 15/375,577

7
of the “inferences and creative steps,” as well as routine steps, that an
ordinary artisan would employ) (emphasis omitted).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claims 1 and 13, and all claims dependent thereon, noting that no claims are
separately argued (Appeal Br. generally).

CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection is AFFIRMED.

DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–11, 13–20 103 Boyd, Fauchais 1–11, 13–20

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED