Appleton Electric Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 19, 1953

105 N.L.R.B. 666 (N.L.R.B. 1953)

666 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPLETON ELECTRIC COMPANY and DISTRICT NO. 8,
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, AFL,
Petitioner
APPLETON ELECTRIC COMPANY and INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF BLACKSMITHS, DROP FORGERS &
HELPERS, AFL, Petitioner. Cases Nos. 13-RC-3218 and
13-RC-3252. June 19, 1953
DECISION AND ORDER
Upon petitions duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, a consolidated hearing was held before
Rush F . Hall , hearing officer . The hearing officer ' s rulings
made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are
hereby affirmed.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the
Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case
to a three-member panel [Members Houston, Murdock, and
Peterson] .
Upon the entire record in this case , the Board finds:
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning
of the Act.
2. The labor organizations involved claim to represent
employees of the Employer.
3. No question affecting commerce exists concerning the
representation of employees of the Employer within the meaning
of Section 9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, for the
following reasons:
District No. 8, International Association of Machinists, AFL,
herein called the IAM, seeks to represent all production and
maintenance employees at the Employer's plants at Chicago,
Illinois. International Brotherhood of Blacksmiths , Drop Forg-
ers & Helpers, AFL, herein called the Blacksmiths, seeks to
represent the Employer' s welders . The Employer and the
Intervenors, Locals 134 and 1031, International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, herein called respectively Local 134
and Local 1031, contend that a current contract between the
Employer and Local 134 constitutes a bar to any determination
of representatives at this time. The IAM contends that the
contract is not a bar because ( 1) its petition was filed before
the automatic renewal date of the contract , and (2 ) the con-
tracting union is defunct.'
The record shows that since 1945, Local 134 has had con-
tracts with the Employer covering the employees involved.
Their most recent contract , executed on May 5, 1952, with a
termination date of May 3, 1953, provides for automatic
renewal from year to year, "subject to amendment or termi-
nation in the way later herein provided." The amendment and
termination provisions are as follows:
IThe record fails to show the position of the Blacksmiths on these issues, as it did not
appear at the hearing and has filed no brief.
105 NLRB No. 103.
APPLETON ELECTRIC COMPANY 667
SEC. 2. Either party desiring to amend this Agreement
must notify the other party in writing at least'sixty (60)
days prior to the termination date of the year under con-
sideration. Whenever such notice to amend is given, the
contents of the amendment must accompany the notice and
should the parties be unable to agree with each other
concerning the terms and provisions of such amendments
by negotiation and/or conciliation, then and in that event
the points of difference shall be settled by application of
the provisions of this ARTICLE I, SECTION 5, Paragraphs
6 to 9, both inclusive [arbitration provisions ] .
SEC. 3. Either party desiring to terminate this Agree-
ment must notify the other party in writing at least ninety
(90) days prior to the annual termination date of the year
under consideration and during the ninety (90) days'
interim, the parties shall endeavor to settle all contro-
versial matters involved, including matters which caused
the sending of the termination notice, and on their failure
to fully agree on or prior to that termination date, this
Agreement shall automatically terminate. However, the
parties may by mutual consent extend the date of termi-
nation, provided a definite means of composing all dif-
ferences is reached beforehand.
At the time of the hearing on March 6 and 18, 1953, no notice
to amend or terminate had been given by either party.
The IAM contends that section 2, above, is the controlling
factor in determining the automatic renewal date of the con-
tract, and that its petition, filed on February 13, 1953, was
therefore timely to forestall a contract bar. We do not agree.
Section 3 provides that notice must be given 90 days before
the termination date if either party desires to terminate the
contract. Section 2 merely provides that notice must be given
60 days before the termination date if either party desires
amendments. That this section does not contemplate termina-
tion of the existing contract is clear from the provision for
arbitration if the parties are unable to agree on the proposed
amendments. As the parties to a collective-bargaining contract
may at any time during its term renegotiate or modify any of
its provisions without opening up the contract to an otherwise
untimely filed petition,: we do not believe that the provision
for notice of such modification affects the automatic renewal
of the contract. As no termination notice was given 90 days
before the 1953 termination date, we find, contrary to the con-
tention of the IAM, that the 1952 contract was automatically
renewed on February 3, 1953, and the IAM's petition was
therefore too late to prevent the contract from operating as a
bar. As the Blacksmiths' petition was not filed until March 6,
1953, it was also untimely.
2 Western Electric Company, Incorporated, 94 NLRB 54. See also Crown Products Company,
99 NLRB 602.
668 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In support of its second contention, that Local-134 is defunct
and its contract therefore no bar, the IAM attempted to show
that the Employer is now dealing with Local 1031. For this
purpose it introduced in evidence a copy of a letter on the
letterhead of Local 1031, signed "M. F. Darling, President
and Business Manager," which was sent to the employees on
or about March 10, 1953. This letter statedthat after the Wage
Stabilization Board was abolished, Local 1031, "which as you
know is administering the present Agreement with the Com-
pany," had insisted on payment for a third week of vacation
for 10-year employees and the Company had agreed to pay it;'
that Local 1031 was then in the process of checking several
inequities in job classifications and wage scales on which
complaints had been given to it by the employees; and that it
had already had some adjustments made in favor of the em-
ployees and expected to have several more made within the
next few weeks. The IAM also offered, but the hearing officer
rejected, copy of a bulletin posted in the plant about March 5,
announcing that "as per agreement with Mr. M. F. Darling of
Local 1031," vacation pay would be given in lieu of the third
week of vacation, and a copy of a notice signed by'Darling,
posted on March 9, announcing the nomination and election of
stewards for the night shift. In addition, employee Kowalkowski,
a witness for the IAM, testified that he had been a steward for
Local 1031 for 2 months, and that, as steward, he, together
with other representatives of Local 1031, had met with repre-
sentatives of the Employer about March 2 and entered into an
agreement with respect to vacations. The Employer' s manager
of industrial relations, however, testified without contradiction
that Local 1031 has not requested recognition, and that the
Employer has not entered into any written agreement with it.
As the evidence offered by the IAM indicates at most that Local
1031 is now administering Local 134's contract, andthere is no
evidence that Local 134 is out of existence or has been dis-
solved, we are not convinced, on the record before us, that
Local 134 is defunct.4
We therefore find that the current contract between the
Employer and Local 134 is a bar to a present determination
of representatives. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the petitions.
[The Board dismissed the petitions.]
a Provision for a third week of vacation for employees with 10 years or more of service had
been made in the 1952 contract, subject to Wage Stabilization Board approval
4 We therefore find it unnecessary to decide whether, as the LAM contends, the hearing
officer erred in rejecting part of the evidence offered