Apple Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 10, 2020

2019001086 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 10, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/869,238 09/29/2015 Roger N. Pantos 082438.033820 1004
139020 7590 06/10/2020
BakerHostetler / Apple Inc.
Washington Square, Suite 1100,
1050 Connecticut Ave, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20036-5304
EXAMINER
TILAHUN, ALAZAR
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2424
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/10/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
eofficemonitor@bakerlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ROGER N. PANTOS, DAVID L. BIDERMAN,
WILLIAM B. MAY JR., JOHN Y. SU, and MOHAMMED Z. VISHARAM
Appeal 2019-001086
Application 14/869,238
Technology Center 2400

Before JEAN R. HOMERE, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and
DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges.
CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–16, 18–24, 26–28, and 30–38, all of
the pending claims.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). A
hearing was scheduled, but Appellant waived oral arguments on April 2,
2020.
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies Apple Inc. as the real party in interest.
Appeal Br. 2.
2 Claims 17, 25, and 29 are cancelled. Appeal Br. 11–15, Claims App.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s claimed subject matter relates to
techniques for managing playback of media items in a computer
system. A media item may include metadata that identifies
portions of the media item as “gates,” that govern access to other
portions of the media item, called “scopes.” When playback
reaches a scope portion, a player may determine a state of its
associated gate(s). If the gate is locked, the scope portion cannot
be played until the gate is unlocked. When playback reaches a
gate portion, the player may determine its state and either play
the gate or skip playback of the gate depending on its state and
definitions supplied for the gate. Gates may be collected into
larger constructs, called “pools,” which may be locked and
unlocked based on definitions supplied for the pools.
Spec. ¶ 10.3
Independent claim 4 is reproduced below with limitations at issue
emphasized and is exemplary of the claimed subject matter:
4. A media management method, comprising:
playing a media item that includes a plurality of gates
and associated scopes, wherein a plurality of gates are
assigned to a common pool,
when a gate unlock condition is met while playing
content of one of the gates:
determining whether the one gate is a member of the pool
of gates,

3 Throughout this Decision we refer to: (1) Appellant’s Specification filed
September 29, 2015 (“Spec.”); (2) the Final Office Action (“Final Act.”)
mailed November 1, 2017; (3) the Appeal Brief filed April 25, 2018
(“Appeal Br.”); (4) the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) mailed September 26,
2018; and (5) the Reply Brief filed November 20, 2018 (“Reply Br.”).
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Application 14/869,238

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if so, determining whether a pool unlock condition is met,
and
if so, changing a state of all other gates in the pool based
on the pool unlock condition.
Appeal Br. 11 (Claims Appendix).

REFERENCES AND REJECTION
The Examiner rejects claims 1–16, 18–24, 26–28, and 30–38 under
U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over the combined teachings of Barsook et al.
(US 8,776,108 B2; pub. July 15, 2010) (“Barsook”) and Mlodzinski (US
2014/0317653 A1; pub. Oct. 24, 2014). Final Act. 4–13.

OPINION
We review the appealed rejection for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant and in light of Appellant’s arguments and evidence.
Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2017).
We disagree with Appellant that the Examiner erred and adopt as our own
the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner. We add the following
primarily for emphasis.
Independent claim 4 recites, in part, “playing a media item that
includes a plurality of gates and associated scopes, wherein a plurality of
gates are assigned to a common pool.” The Examiner notes that “Barsook
fails to explicitly disclose: wherein a plurality of gates are assigned to a
common pool,” but finds Mlodzinski’s advertisements 414, 422, 430 teach
this limitation. Final Act. 4 (citing Mlodzinski ¶¶ 50, 53, 54, Fig. 4).
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Appellant argues that Mlodzinski does not teach or suggest that gates
are assigned to a common pool, as recited in claim 4. Specifically,
Appellant argues,
Mlodzinski’s system operates on the premise that access to the
various content elements is governed by an elapsed playback
time. Mlodzinski has no disclosure teaching that a plurality of
advertisements ever would be “assigned to a common pool” or
that “a state of all other gates in the pool” would be changed
“based on [a] pool unlock condition.” Instead, Mlodzinski’s
system decides whether to permit a user to skip over an ad based
solely on the various measures of elapsed time. Again,
Mlodzinski’s advertisements 414, 422, 430 are treated
individually; there is no disclosure that describes the
advertisements 414, 422, 430 (or the different content elements
406) would be related to each other.
Appeal Br. 4.
We find unpersuasive Appellant’s argument that “Mlodzinski has no
disclosure teaching that a plurality of advertisements ever would be
‘assigned to a common pool.’” Id.
Mlodzinski’s Figure 4 is reproduced below:

Mlodzinski’s Figure 4 “illustrates an example flow diagram for
implementing arbitrated ad consumption” for advertisements 414, 422, and
430.
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Referring to Figure 4 of Mlodzinski, we agree with the Examiner’s
finding that “the various elapsed session playback time (i.e.[,] 3 min, 5 min,
and 8 min) are clustered among ‘required content (e.g., advertisements 414,
422, 430)’ [and] could be interpreted as wherein a plurality of gates are
assigned to a common pool.” Ans. 5 (emphasis omitted). Ads 414, 422, 430
act as gates because in certain circumstances, such as when a viewing time
threshold is exceeded, a user may not jump past or fast-forward through the
ads to content but instead must watch the ads before watching additional
content. Mlodzinski ¶¶ 55, 56. Moreover, we agree with the Examiner’s
finding that Mlodzinski describes that ads 414, 422, 430 are assigned to a
common pool because each of the ads cited by the Examiner is associated
with content 406 and is governed by the same threshold time of 7 minutes.
Id. at ¶¶ 50, 52–56, Fig. 4.
Appellant further argues Mlodzinski fails to teach determining
whether a pool unlock condition is met, and if so, changing a state of all
other gates in the pool based on the pool unlock condition because
“Mlodzinski has no disclosure that any advertisement has ‘a gate unlock
condition,’ or that any collection of advertisements have ‘a pool unlock
condition’” and “[t]here is no disclosure that, when a pool unlock condition
is met, ‘a state of all other gates in the pool [is changed] based on the pool
unlock condition.’” Reply Br. 2–3.
These arguments are unpersuasive. As Appellant describes,
“Mlodzinski’s system operates on the premise that access to the various
content elements is governed by an elapsed playback time.” Appeal Br. 4.
We also agree with Appellant that in Mlodzinski’s Figure 4 and
corresponding text, “if a user attempts to jump over an ad ( e.g., jump 410),
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the jump is allowed if the elapsed playback time (3 minutes) is less than a
threshold time (7 minutes).” Id. (citing Mlodzinski ¶¶ 52, 53). “However, if
the user attempts to jump over an ad (e.g., jump 426 to subsequent content
406), and the elapsed playback time (8 minutes) is greater than the threshold
time, the jump is disallowed and playback starts at the beginning of the ad
(e.g., ad 430).” Id. (citing Mlodzinski ¶55).
In view of Appellant’s summary, we agree with the Examiner that
Mlodzinski teaches “determining whether a pool unlock condition is met,”
as recited in claim 4, by determining whether the elapsed session playback
time 404 has accumulated (or not) to a threshold value. Mlodzinski ¶52.
Mlodzinski further describes that once the elapsed session playback time
404 has accumulated to a threshold value, no additional advertisements
(including ads such as ad 430 that are otherwise skippable, but for the
threshold having been met) may be skipped until another advertisement in
the pool has been viewed and the elapsed session playback time 404 has
been reset. Mlodzinski ¶¶ 50, 52–56, Fig. 4. Mlodzinski further explains
that “[a]fter viewing advertisement 430, the elapsed session playback time
404 may reset to zero” after which “the user may continue viewing
unrequired content” such as content 406. Mlodzinski ¶¶ 56, 51.
Accordingly, because Mlodzinski describes changing a state of ads 414, 422,
430 to a lock or unlock state based on whether elapsed session playback time
404 meets a predetermined threshold, we agree with the Examiner that
Mlodzinski teaches or suggests “changing a state of all other gates in the
pool based on the pool unlock condition,” as recited in claim 4.
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Claims 30, 35, and 36
Appellant nominally argues claims 30, 35, and 36 separately.
Appellant argues “[b]ecause the prior art fails to teach or suggest the concept
of pools, it cannot teach or suggest the different playback control techniques
that rely on gate state management techniques (Claim 30) or playback
techniques (Claims 35, 36) that depend on the pools” and, therefore, the
rejection of claims 30, 35, and 36 should be reversed. Appeal Br. 7–8.
This argument is unpersuasive for reasons similar to those discussed
above for claim 4. That is, because we find unpersuasive Appellant’s
argument presented for claim 4 that the prior art fails to teach or suggest the
concept of pools, we also find this argument persuasive.
Claims 1–3, 13–16, 24, 26, and 31
Appellant nominally argues claims 1–3, 13–16, 24, 26, and 31
separately. First, Appellant highlights portions of text from each of these
claims and argues “[t]hese claims describe various relationships gate states
that are neither taught nor suggested by the prior art.” Appeal Br. 8.
Such a conclusory statement, however, amounting to little more than a
paraphrasing of the claim language and a general denial, is unpersuasive to
rebut the Examiner’s findings. Cf. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(iv) (2017) (“A
statement which merely points out what a claim recites will not be
considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim.”); see also In
re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold that the Board
reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive arguments in
an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked
assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.”).
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Appellant next argues “[t]hese claims describe that the gates have
states associated with them, described variously as locked, unlocked, and
collapsed, and these states control playback in different ways” and because
“Mlodzinski determines access controls solely by checking elapsed time”
. . . [t]here is no disclosure that gating segments 102 or advertisements 414,
422, 430 have a ‘state.’” Appeal Br. 79.
This argument is unpersuasive for the same reasons discussed above
for claim 4. That is, because we find unpersuasive Appellant’s argument
presented for claim 4 that Mlodzinski fails to teach or suggest that
advertisements 414, 422, 430 have a state that may be changed, we also find
this argument persuasive.
For all of the reasons discussed, Appellant has not persuaded us of
error in the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of representative claim 4.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of that claim, as well as
independent claims 37 and 38, and dependent claims 1–3, 5–16, 18–24, 26–
28, and 30–36.

CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–16, 18–24, 26–28,
and 30–38 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References Affirmed Reversed
1–16,
18–24,
26–28,
30–38
103 Barsook, Mlodzinski 1–16,
18–24,
26–28,
30–38

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED