Apple Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 10, 2021

2020001407 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 10, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/750,600 06/25/2015 Rishab Aiyer Ghosh 04860.P22859XC2 7649
45217 7590 06/10/2021
WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP/ APPLE INC.
Attn: IP Docketing
P.O. Box 7037
Atlanta, GA 30357-0037
EXAMINER
NGUYEN, LOAN T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2158
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/10/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
FIP_Group@bstz.com
PTO.MAIL@BSTZ.COM
PTO.MAIL@BSTZPTO.COM
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte RISHAB AIYER GHOSH and VIPUL VED PRAKASH
____________

Appeal 2020-001407
Application 14/750,600
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before KARL D. EASTHOM, SCOTT B. HOWARD, and
STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 21–40, which constitute all of the claims pending in
this application. Claim 1–20 have been cancelled. See Appeal Br. 19. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Apple Inc.
Appeal Br. 2.
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THE INVENTION
The disclosed and claimed invention is generally “directed to systems
and methods for search queries, and more particularly to systems and
methods that use reputation or influence scores in search queries.” Spec.
¶ 2.2
Claim 21, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
21. A non-transitory machine-readable medium containing
executable program instructions which when executed by a data
processing device cause the device to perform a method of
ranking objects using reputation scores, comprising:
determining reputation scores for one or more subjects
based on connections, the reputation scores indicating
reputations of the subjects and a subject is a representation of a
user of a social network;
receiving a plurality of citations, each citation representing
an online posting in the social network of an expression of
opinion by a subject on an object, wherein the object is an object
that is accessible outside of the social network and each citation
is represented as an edge in a citation graph of subject and object
nodes;
selecting a subset of citations for each object from the
citations citing each object, the content of the citations in the
selected subset matching one or more of search terms of a search
query;
assigning citation scores to a subset of a plurality of
objects, the citation scores indicating relevance of the objects

2 We refer to the Specification filed June 25, 2015 (“Spec.”); Final Office
Action mailed June 29, 2018 (“Final Act.”); Appeal Brief filed Mar. 25,
2019 (“Appeal Br.”); Examiner’s Answer mailed Oct. 16, 2019 (“Ans.”);
and the Reply Brief filed Dec. 12, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).
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cited by citations and are determined based at least in part on
matching one or more search terms with the content of the
citations of the objects cited by citations by the one or more
subjects;
determining a selection score for each of the subset of a
plurality of objects based on the citation scores for the objects
cited by citations and the reputation scores for the subjects citing
the objects cited by citations; and
selecting and ranking the objects based on the selection
scores of the objects.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence in rejecting the
claims on appeal is:
Name Reference Date
Atazky et al. (“Atazky”) US 2007/0121843 A1 May 31, 2007
Xu et al. (“Xu”) US 8,086,605 B2 Dec. 27, 2011
Takashi et al. (“Takashi”) JP 2006-202253 Aug. 2006
REJECTIONS
Claims 21–40 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 8.
Claims 21–40 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Xu, Atazky, and Takashi. Final Act. 11.
ANALYSIS
Section 101 Rejection
A. Section 101
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
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include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
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become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
A. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101.3 The Manual of

3 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”). In response to received public
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Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) now incorporates this revised
guidance and subsequent updates at Section 2106 (9th ed. rev. 10.2019 June
2020).4
Under MPEP § 2106, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).5
MPEP § 2106.04(a), (d).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field; or

comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019,
clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance. USPTO, October 2019 Update:
Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019 Update”). “All USPTO
personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to
follow the guidance.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 51; see also October 2019 Update
at 1.
4 All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019
(Last Revised June 2020), unless otherwise indicated.
5 “Examiners evaluate integration into a practical application by (a)
identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim
beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements
individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole
integrates the exception into a practical application.” MPEP § 2106.04(d)II.
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(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.6
MPEP § 2106.05(d).
USPTO Step 2A, Prong 1
The Examiner determines that the claimed invention is “directed to
the abstract idea of . . . enabl[ing] a person to obtain information useful in
search queries.” Final Act. 8. Specifically, the Examiner concludes that the
claimed invention is directed to a mental process. Ans. 3. The Examiner
concludes that the claimed “determining,” “selecting,” “assigning,”
“selecting and ranking” limitations “are processes of gathering, analyzing,
and manipulating data, which may be done mentally/by hand and falls under
the ‘Mental Processes’ grouping of abstract ideas.” Id. at 3–4. The
Examiner compares the claimed invention to the abstract ideas of “collecting
information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and
analysis,” and “collecting, displaying, and manipulating data.” Final Act. 8
(citing Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2016); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332
(Fed. Cir. 2017)).
Appellant argues that the claimed subject matter does not recite an
abstract idea and instead is “directed to ranking objects using reputation
scores using a citation graph, where each citation in the citation graph is
represented as an edge in a citation graph of subject and object nodes.”

6 This corresponds to Alice part two where it is determined whether the
claim contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed
abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221.
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Appeal Br. 11. Specifically, Appellant argues that the claimed invention
cannot be characterized as an abstract idea because it recites “a series of
steps to using a citation graph to rank objects.” Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner
erred.
As relevant here, the Guidance explains that mental processes include
“concepts performed in the human mind,” such as “an observation,
evaluation, judgment, [or] opinion.” 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 52.
The each limitation of claim 21—with the exception of the
preamble—is a step of observation, evaluation, and judgment that can be
practically performed by a human, either mentally or with the use of pen and
paper. Specifically, the claim limitations are directed to (i) determining
reputation scores for subjects (analyzing information using evaluation and
judgment); (ii) receiving citations representing online opinion postings about
objects and represented as edges in a citation graph (collecting and
manipulating information for evaluation and judgment); (iii) selecting
citations and assigning citation scores indicating relevance of cited objects
(analyzing information using evaluation and judgment); (iv) determining
selection scores based on reputation scores and citation scores (analyzing
information using evaluation and judgment); and (v) selecting and ranking
objects based on the determined selection scores (analyzing information
using evaluation and judgment).
Each of those steps, both individually and as a combination, can be
performed by a human, either mentally or with the aid of paper and pencil,
which is similar to the claims considered patent ineligible as mental
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processes in Electric Power. See Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1353, 1355
(“collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the
collection and analysis” are “abstract-idea processes,” and “selecting
information, by content or source, for collection, analysis, and display does
nothing significant to differentiate a process from ordinary mental
processes”); see also SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA,
555 F. App’x 950, 955 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he claim at issue here involves
a mental process excluded from section 101: the mental steps of comparing
new and stored information and using rules to identify medical options” and
“calls on a computer to do nothing that is even arguably an advance in
physical implementations of routine mental information-comparison and
rule-application processes.”); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc.,
654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Thus, claim 3’s steps can all be
performed in the human mind. Such a method that can be performed by
human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible
under § 101. Methods which can be performed entirely in the human mind
are unpatentable not because there is anything wrong with claiming mental
method steps as part of a process containing non-mental steps, but rather
because computational methods which can be performed entirely in the
human mind are the types of methods that embody the ‘basic tools of
scientific and technological work’ that are free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none.” (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 67) (footnote omitted));
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps,
there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being
performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”); Versata Dev.
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Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Courts
have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still found that
the underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and
paper or in a person’s mind.”).
Accordingly, we conclude that claim 21 recites a method of
observation, evaluation, and judgment that can be performed in the human
mind, which is a mental process identified in the MPEP, and thus an abstract
idea.
USPTO Step 2A, Prong 2
In determining whether claim 21 is “directed to” the identified
abstract ideas, we next consider whether claim 21 recites additional elements
that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. For the
reasons set forth below, we discern no additional element (or combination of
elements) recited in claim 21 that integrates the judicial exception into a
practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
As the Examiner properly concludes, claim 21 does not constitute an
improvement to computer technology; rather, it merely adapts the abstract
idea of collecting and manipulating data (i.e., “receiving . . . citations”
referencing objects to be displayed as edges in citation graphs) and
analyzing data to select and rank objects (i.e., “determining reputation
scores,” “selecting a subset of citations,” “assigning citation scores to a
subset of . . . objects,” “determining a selection score for each of the subset
of . . . objects based on the citation scores . . . and the reputation scores,” and
“selecting and ranking the objects based on the selection scores of the
objects”), which can be practically performed in the human mind, to an
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execution of steps practically performed by computers. See Final Act. 8–11;
see Spec. ¶ 64.
For example, the Specification explains that the claimed “systems and
methods can be implemented in a variety of electronic environments
(including both non-wireless and wireless computer environments, including
cell phones and video phones), partial computing environments, and real
world environments.” Spec. ¶ 64. The Specification also explains that the
techniques “may be implemented in hardware or software, or a combination
of both,” and “in computing environments maintaining programmable
computers that include a computer network, processor, servers, and a storage
medium readable by the processor.” Id.
Relying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more
accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible. See Alice, 573
U.S. at 224 (“use of a computer to create electronic records, track multiple
transactions, and issue simultaneous instructions” is not an inventive
concept); Bancorp Servs. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266,
1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (a computer “employed only for its most basic
function . . . does not impose meaningful limits on the scope of those
claims”); MPEP § 2106.05(f)(2) (“Use of a computer or other machinery in
its ordinary capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or
transmit data) or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer
components after the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic
practice or mathematical equation) does not provide significantly more.”).
Moreover, the “mere automation of manual processes using generic
computers does not constitute a patentable improvement in computer
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technology.” Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044,
1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Appellant argues that “claim 21 is a practical application” because it
“recites practical steps of using a citation graph ranking objects.” Appeal
Br. 12; see also Reply Br. 4. Specifically, Appellant argues that claim 21
recites “that each citation represents an edge in a citation graph of subject
and object nodes,” which “recites a particular structure of how the citations
are related in a citation graph,” which “integrates the judicial exception into
a practical application.” Reply Br. 4.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because manipulating
the received data (i.e., “plurality of citations, each citation representing an
online posting in the social network of an expression of opinion by a subject
on an object”) to be displayed as edges in a graph (i.e., “each citation is
represented as an edge in a citation graph of subject and object nodes”) does
not improve technology. Rather, the claimed invention merely improves the
abstract idea of selecting and ranking objects based on selection scores
based on citation scores and reputation scores. No improvements are made
to the technology used to select and rank objects.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s
determination that claim 21 is directed to an abstract idea, and we find the
claimed additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical
application.
USPTO Step 2B
Turning to step 2B, we look to whether claim 21 (a) adds a specific
limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood,
routine, conventional activity in the field, or (b) simply appends well-
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understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
MPEP § 2106.05.
The Examiner determines that the additional claim elements (see
claim 40 for a “device comprising: a processor; a memory”) “are recited at a
high-level of generality such that it amounts to no more than mere
instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component.”
Ans. 6.
Appellant does not address the Examiner’s determination. As
discussed above, the claimed invention is directed to determining reputation
scores, receiving citations for objects, selecting citations, assigning citations
scores to selected objects, determining a selection score based on the
citations scores and reputation scores, and selecting and ranking the objects
based on the selection scores, which are steps that can be performed in the
human mind. Similarly, the claimed additional elements (i.e., “device,”
“processor,” “memory”) amount to no more than mere instructions to apply
the abstract idea using generic computer components, which is insufficient
to provide an inventive concept. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26.
Appellant does not direct our attention to anything in the Specification
that indicates the computer components perform anything other than well-
understood, routine, and conventional functions, such as collecting data and
manipulating data (i.e., receiving citations represented as edges in a citation
graph), and analyzing data (i.e., determining reputation scores, selecting a
subset of citations, assigning citation scores, determining a selection score
based on the citation scores and reputation scores, selecting and ranking the
objects based on the selection scores). Moreover, those types of generic
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computer components performing generic computer functions have been
found to be well-understood, routine, and conventional. See, e.g., Elec.
Power, 830 F.3d at 1355 (“Nothing in the claims, understood in light of the
specification, requires anything other than off-the-shelf, conventional
computer, network, and display technology for gathering, sending, and
presenting the desired information.”); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765
F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends the
information over a network—with no further specification—is not even
arguably inventive.”); In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607,
610, 614 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (server that receives data, extracts classification
information from the received data, and stores the digital images insufficient
to add an inventive concept); Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26 (receiving, storing,
sending information over networks insufficient to add an inventive concept);
see also MPEP § 2106.05(d) (“Courts have held computer‐implemented
processes not to be significantly more than an abstract idea (and thus
ineligible) where the claim as a whole amounts to nothing more than generic
computer functions merely used to implement an abstract idea, such as an
idea that could be done by a human analog (i.e., by hand or by merely
thinking.”)).
Conclusion on Section 101 Rejection
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 21 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter, as well as independent claims 31
and 40 with commensurate limitations, and dependent claims 22–30 and 32–
39, which are not separately argued. See Appeal Br. 17.

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Section 103 Rejection
Claim 21 recites “receiving a plurality of citations, each citation
representing an online posting in the social network of an expression of
opinion by a subject on an object, wherein the object is an object that is
accessible outside of the social network and each citation is represented as
an edge in a citation graph of subject and object nodes” (emphasis added).
Appellant argues that Takashi teaches “that an edge in a graph is a
link,” but is “silent as to the type of link that is used in this graph,” and
thereby “does not teach or suggest a citation that is an edge of the citation
graph as claimed.” Appeal Br. 14; see also Reply Br. 5. Appellant also
argues that none of Takashi’s “URL format indicates that this type of link is
necessarily discloses that the link online posting of an expression of an
opinion by a subject on an object as claimed,” and that “Takashi’s graph
cannot be properly equated [to] Appellant’s citation graph as claimed.” Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
erred. One cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references
individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references.
In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Keller, 642
F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981).
The Examiner does not rely on Takashi to teach that the claimed
citations represent expressions of opinions by subjects on objects. Instead,
the Examiner relies on Xu’s teaching that “each node in the graph represents
a user connect to other users based on their relationship regarding the
content item selected by the users” to teach receiving citations that each
represent an online posting of an expression of opinion by a subject on an
object. Final Act. 12 (citing Xu, col. 4, ll. 12–19, col. 8, ll. 37–38, col. 9,
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ll. 49–59, col. 10, ll. 23–36); see also Ans. 7. Specifically, the Examiner
relies on Xu’s providing “user’s thoughts or comments regarding the content
item or the content” to teach the claimed citations. Final Act. 12. The
Examiner relies on Takashi’s teaching that “each Web page is a node in
graph theory and a link is an edge” to teach that information “is represented
as an edge in a citation graph of subject and object nodes.” Id. at 14 (citing
Takashi ¶¶ 3, 7); see also Ans. 7.
As cited by the Examiner, Xu discloses that “reputation or trust values
may also be propagated.” Xu, col. 4, ll. 7–32. Xu also discloses “sav[ing]
an annotation and associate the annotation with a content item available . . .
providing the user’s thoughts or comments.” Id. at col. 8, ll. 34–38. Takashi
discloses that “each Web page is a node in graph theory and a link is an
edge.” Takashi ¶ 7.
Appellant fails to persuasively explain why Xu’s propagating
reputation values, including the user’s thoughts or comments on content
items, does not teach “receiving a plurality of citations” that each represent
“an expression of opinion by a subject on an object,” as claimed. Appellant
also fails to persuasively explain why Takashi’s links being edges in the
graph does not teach representing data “as an edge in a . . . graph” as
claimed. Appellant does not address the combination of the references, or
explain why Takashi’s links being edges in a graph, combined with Xu’s
user comments about content items (citations), fail to teach displaying
“citations,” which represent “expression[s] of opinion by a subject on an
object” as “edge[s] in a citation graph,” as claimed.
Claim 21 also recites “determining a selection score for each of the
subset of a plurality of objects based on the citation scores for the objects
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cited by citations and the reputation scores for the subjects citing the objects
cited by citations.”
Appellant argues that “Atazky discloses computing a reputation score
whereas Appellant claims computing a score that uses a reputation score as
an input.” Appeal Br. 15; see Reply Br. 7. According to Appellant,
“Atazky’s inter-trust score is a measure of a trust between an opinion leader
and a user and cannot be equated with a reputation score.” Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
erred. As with the prior limitation, Appellant improperly argues the
references individually. See Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097; Keller, 642 F.2d at
425.
The Examiner relies on Xu’s calculating rank of content item
including reputation of users (reputation score), and on Xu’s ranking score
(citation score) of a content item including thoughts and comments
(citations) to teach the claimed “determining reputation scores” (for
subjects) and “assigning citation scores” (for objects). Final Act. 11–13.
The Examiner relies on Atazky’s “tracking the opinion leader’s viral
influence and calculating reputation score to the advertised item” and
“weight[ing] the opinion leaders’ response with their personal inter-trust by
the user” to teach determining a selection score for the objects based on the
citation scores of the objects and reputation scores for the subjects. Ans. 8
(citing Atazky ¶¶ 213, 247, 258–259); see also Final Act. 13.
Xu discloses “the ranking component” that may “calculate the rank of
a content item involves reputation or trust of the users that are providing
annotations and tags.” Xu, col. 12, ll. 56–64. Xu also discloses “sav[ing] an
annotation and associate the annotation with a content item available . . .
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providing the user’s thoughts or comments.” Id. at col. 8, ll. 34–38. Atazky,
as cited, discloses “[c]alculat[ing] an overall, reputation score to the
advertised item” including “weight[ing] the opinion leaders’ response.”
Atazky ¶ 258.
Appellant fails to explain why Xu’s ranking content items including
user reputation, and user’s thoughts or comments, does not teach
determining reputation scores and citation scores as claimed. Appellant
also fails to explain why Atazky’s computing an “overall” score including
inputs such as “the opinion leaders’ response,” combined with Xu’s
reputation scores and citations scores, does not teach “determining a
selection score . . . based on the citation scores . . . and the reputation scores”
as claimed.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claim 21, along with independent claims 31 and 40, and dependent claims
22–30 and 32–39, which are not argued separately. See Appeal Br. 17.

CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of claims 21–40.
We affirm the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claims 21–40.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
21–40 101 Eligibility 21–40
21–40 103 Xu, Atazky, Takashi 21–40
Overall
Outcome
21–40

Appeal 2020-001407
Application 14/750,600

19

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED