APPLE INC.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardFeb 19, 20212019004318 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 19, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/641,135 03/06/2015 Vusthla Sunil Reddy P24659US1 / APPL:0575 5017 73576 7590 02/19/2021 APPLE INC. - Fletcher c/o Fletcher Yoder, PC P.O. Box 692289 Houston, TX 77269-2289 EXAMINER LIAO, HSINCHUN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2641 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/19/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docket@fyiplaw.com hill@fyiplaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte VUSTHLA SUNIL REDDY, XINPING ZENG, PETER M. AGBOH, MOHIT NARANG, and BEN CABALLERO Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 Technology Center 2600 ____________ Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and JOYCE CRAIG Administrative Patent Judges. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–6, 17–25, 28, 29, and 32–39, which constitute all pending claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM-IN-PART 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Apple Inc. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s disclosure is directed to adaptation of radio frequency system configuration settings based upon detected electronic device housing and/or proximate accessories. The objective is to improve performance of the radio frequency system by adjusting the settings based at least in part on the identified housing and or proximate accessory. Abstract; Spec. ¶¶ 1, 4, 7, 25, 32, 34, 38, 57; Figs. 1, 2, 6–7. Claim 1 is illustrative of the invention and reads as follows (emphasis added): 1. An electronic device, comprising: a radio frequency system, configured to communicate with a radio frequency reader; tangible, non-transitory storage, comprising configuration adjustment logic that comprises machine-readable instructions that associate a set of settings for the radio frequency system with at least one housing of an electronic device; and a processor configured to: identity of the at least one housing of the electronic device; receive at least one particular setting from the set of settings that is associated with the identity of the at least one housing; and apply the at least one particular setting to the radio frequency system. Appeal Br. 23 (Claims Appendix). Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 3 REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Rubbmark US 6,012,105 Jan. 4, 2000 Narayanaswami US 6,477,117 B1 Nov. 5, 2002 Kobayashi et al. US 2003/0228891 A1 Dec.11, 2003 Chen et al. US 2005/0009579 A1 Jan. 13, 2005 Finkenzeller US 2009/0040022 A1 Feb. 12, 2009 Asrani US 2015/0172426 A1 Jun. 18, 2015 Claims 9 and 37–39 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. §112 (pre-AIA), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. Final Act. 5. Claims 3, 5, 17, 18, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. §112 (pre-AIA), first paragraph, for indefiniteness. Final Act. 5. Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 17–19, 21–23, 25, and 28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kobayashi and Chen. Final Act. 6– 9. Claims 3 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kobayashi, Chen, and Rubbmark. Final Act. 9–10. Claims 6 and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kobayashi, Chen, and Asrani. Final Act. 10–11. Claim 9 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kobayashi, Chen, and Finkenzeller. Final Act. 10–12. Claims 15 and 272 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kobayashi, Chen, and Narayanaswami. Final Act. 12. 2 Claim 27 is cancelled. Appeal Br. 25 (Claims Appendix). Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 4 Claims 29 and 323 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kobayashi and Narayanaswami. Final Act. 13. Claims 33–36 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kobayashi, Narayanaswami, and Asrani. Final Act. 14–15. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s contentions in the Appeal Brief and the Reply Brief that the Examiner has erred, as well as the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief. The § 112 Rejections of claims 9, 37–39 (written description), and claims 3, 5, 17, 18, 20 (indefiniteness) In the rejection of claim 9 for failing to meet the written description requirement, the Examiner finds the Specification does not support the limitation “the set of settings comprise a frame delay time (FDT) setting. Final Act. 5. The Examiner finds it is unclear if FDT is in the same set (e.g., the second set) as other settings. Id. The Examiner rejects claims 37–39 for failing to meet the written description requirement for “a second set of settings.” Id. Regarding claim 9, Appellant argues the Specification states “settings related to frame transmission delay time may be set ... to counteract any unintended timing issues caused by the housings 28 and/or accessories 29.” Appeal Br. (citing Spec. ¶ 48). Appellant additionally refers to claim 9 that recites that “the set of settings” recited in claim 1 includes the FDT setting. 3 The heading in the rejection shows 29 and 32–36 are rejected over Kobayashi and Narayanaswami but only claims 29 and 32 are identified in this rejection. Final Act. 13–14. Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 5 Id. Thus, according to Appellant, the set of settings that includes an FDT setting is supported by the Specification. A written “description must ‘clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.’” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (alteration in original) (quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). “In other words, the test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Id. (citing Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563). “Although [the applicant] does not have to describe exactly the subject matter claimed, . . . the description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [he or she] invented what is claimed.” Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). Put another way, “the applicant must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention.” Id. at 1563–64. We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the Specification describes the use of frame transmission delay times settings. Spec. ¶ 48. Therefore, we do not sustain the written description rejection of claim 9. Regarding the “second set of settings” of claims 37–39, Appellant argues the Specification describes a process for determining dynamic settings for the radio frequency system based upon the housing(s) and/or accessor(ies) of the electronic device. Appeal Br. 6–7 (citing Spec., Fig. 6, ¶ 42). Appellant argues, upon reaching the target performance, the settings Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 6 associated with the housing, accessories, or a combination of the housing and accessories are stored. Id. (citing ¶¶ 42, 46, 50, 51, and 55). According to Appellant, the process may be rerun when untested housing(s) and/or accessor(ies) with no previous associated radio frequency system settings are added to the electronic device, resulting in a second set of settings and, thus, a second set of settings is supported by the Specification. Id. at 6–7. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments regarding claim 37 because the portions of the Specification identified by Appellant do not describe a second set of settings for the proximate accessory, and Appellant does not persuasively show why one of ordinary skill that Appellant was in possession of the claimed invention. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments regarding claim 38 (“wherein the processor is configured to re- determine the identity of the at least one proximate accessory upon detection of an imminent radio frequency communication”) because Appellant identifies no persuasive evidence to support rerun4 (or “re-determine”) of the process. Claim 39 depends from independent claim 29 which is directed to an electronic watch with a watch housing and associated settings with the watch housing configured to counteract an impact of the housing on communications of the radio frequency system. Claim 39 is directed to a watch band and “a second set of settings associated with the watch band.” We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because, as discussed supra regarding claim 37, the Specification does not describe a second set of settings for the proximate accessory. 4 We note Spec., ¶ 57, not identified by Appellant, describes “re- implemented” and “periodic basis.” Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 7 In view of the above, we do not sustain the written description rejection of claim 9 and we sustain the written description rejection of claims 37–39. In the rejection of claims 3, 5, 17, 18, and 20 for indefiniteness, the Examiner finds there is insufficient antecedent basis for the limitation “at least one proximate accessory” in claim 1. Final Act. 4. Appellant argues claims 3, 5, 17, 18, and 20 depend from claim 37 (which depends from claim 1), which recites the limitation “at least one proximate accessory” and therefore there is sufficient antecedent support for this limitation. Appeal Br. 8. In the Answer, the Examiner states that because claim 37 fails to comply with the written description requirement, the limitation “at least one accessory” recited in claim 37 is not considered. Ans. 3. We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments regarding the indefiniteness rejection because claim 37 includes antecedent support in reciting “at least one proximate accessory.” “[A] claim is indefinite when it contains words or phrases whose meaning is unclear.” In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner rejection of claims 3, 5, 17, 18, and 20 for indefiniteness. The § 103 Rejections Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 17–19, 21–23, 25, and 28 over Kobayashi and Chen Appellant argues the Examiner errs in finding that Kobayashi and Chen teach the claim 1 limitation “determine an identity of the at least one housing of an electronic device” (also referred to as “disputed limitation”). Appeal Br. 7–10; Reply Br. 4–5. Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 8 In the Final Action, the Examiner finds the combination of Kobayashi and Chen teaches the limitations of claim 1. Final Act. 4–7. The Examiner finds Chen teaches the disputed limitation. Id. at 7 (citing Chen, Abstract; ¶¶ 8, 10). In particular, the Examiner finds Chen teaches “determining identification of the cover” and it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to use Chen's cover identity in Kobayashi's device for providing optimal performance. Id. Appellant argues Chen, at best, teaches determining the identity and settings of a cover rather than “determining an identity of the at least one housing of an electronic device (emphasis added).” Appeal Br. 8. Appellant argues Chen distinguishes between a cover and a housing by separately referring to each structure. Id. (citing Chen, Abstract; ¶ 10; Fig. 3). According to Appellant, Chen teaches “[d]etermining the identity of a cover, which is a phone accessory separate and detachable from the housing, does not correspond to determining the identity of a housing of an electronic device.” Id. Appellant argues the Examiner errs in finding housing reads on Chen’s cover because “Chen's housing 120 is an internal housing that encases internal components and has a speaker, display, and microphone formed onto it. See Chen, ¶ 6. The cover 160, meanwhile, is installed over the internal housing, providing protective and aesthetic functions.” Id. In the Answer, the Examiner finds Chen's phone cover (Chen Fig. 3 Item 160) is “clearly a part of the housing of the entire cellular phone (Chen Fig. 3 Item 100) and the cellular phone does not look complete without item 160).” Ans. 3–4. Therefore, according to the Examiner, the limitation of "housing" reads on Chen's cover 160. Id. at 4. The Examiner finds the open Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 9 holes over the speaker of Chen's cover are very small (Chen, Fig. 3 Item 162) and speaker 122 has no protection without cover 160). Id. Therefore, according to the Examiner, the speaker is considered to be "housed" inside Chen's cover 160. Id. The Examiner finds, since Chen discloses “determining identification” (Chen, paragraph 0010) using an identification module (Chen, Fig. 3 Item 170) located inside a cellular phone housing (Chen, Fig. 3 Item 160), the limitation of determining the identity of and settings associated with a housing of an electronic device reads on Chen's arrangement. Id. In the Reply Brief, Appellant reiterates and argues the “not look complete” finding of the Examiner is irrelevant as “the threshold question is whether the cover 160 teaches an item that encases internal components of the phone (e.g., radio frequency processing circuitry).” Reply Br. 4. Appellant argues Chen cover is not a housing as the cover may cover a housing that encases/protects internal components. Id. Appellant argues the Specification does not deviate from the difference between a cover and a housing. Id. According to Appellant, the Specification states that the housing “may protect interior components from physical damage” and may “shield them from electromagnetic interference” while the cover merely covers a portion of an electronic device. Id. (citing Spec., ¶¶ 32, 38). As discussed below, on the record before us, we are persuaded by Appellant’s argument because the Examiner provides insufficient evidence to support the finding that Chen teaches the disputed limitation. During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable interpretation when reading claim language in light of the Specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 10 Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Although we interpret claims broadly but reasonably in light of the Specification, we nonetheless must not import limitations from the Specification into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Our reviewing court states that “the words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citations omitted). However, the broadest reasonable interpretation differs from the broadest possible interpretation. In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The correct inquiry in giving a claim term its broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification is “an interpretation that corresponds with what and how the inventor describes his invention in the specification, i.e., an interpretation that is ‘consistent with the specification.’” Id. at 1382–83 (quoting In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). We now refer to the disputed limitation discussed, supra, which requires “with at least one housing of an electronic device.” The term “housing” (and “accessory”) is utilized throughout the Specification and Figures. Appellant refers to the Specification, paragraphs 32 and 34, for a description of “housing” that “may protect interior components from physical damage and to shield them from electromagnetic interference.” Spec., ¶ 32. The term “accessory” is described as “e.g., a case, cover, and/or protective bumper may be added.” Id. The use of the term “may” indicates the described housing features are optional, rather than required, and “housing” is not a defined term. However, in the context of the Specification, the terms “housing” and “accessory” are used to describe separate and different structures. In particular, the “housing” is a structure Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 11 that protects interior components and shields from electromagnetic radiation. Spec., ¶¶ 8, 22, 23, 32, and 34, Figs. 2–5. Accessories are described as structures such as covers and casings. Spec., ¶¶ 37–39, Figs. 2–5. Thus, to be consistent with the Specification, a housing is a separate and different structure from a cover (“accessory”). Chen describes a “cover” installed on a “housing.” Chen, Abstract; Fig. 3, ¶¶ 8, 10, 23, and 26. Chen’s cover and housing are separate and different structures. The Examiner’s assertions that Chen’s cover is “part of the housing,” “the phone does not look complete without the Chen cover,” and “partially protects internal component” are insufficient5 to support a finding that Chen’s cover teaches the “housing” as broadly and reasonably interpreted. To the contrary, the Examiner’s assertions interpreting a Chen cover as the claimed “housing” is inconsistent with the Specification. Therefore, on the record before us, we are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the combination of Kobayashi and Chen teaches the disputed limitation. Therefore, on the record before us, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 1 and dependent claims 2, 4, 5, 17, 18, 19, and 21 as these claims depend directly or indirectly from claim 1. Independent claim 22 and dependent claims 23, 25, and 28 are also rejected over Kobayashi and Chen and are discussed below. Although independent claim 22 is similar to claim 1, claim 22 includes additional 5 The Examiner’s findings appear to be limited more to a § 102 analysis rather than § 103. In particular, despite broad teachings in Kobayashi and Chen, the Examiner does not refer to these broad teachings to include findings that one skilled in the art would extend Chen’s teachings regarding a “cover” to apply to other structures, such as a housing. Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 12 alternative limitations directed to the size and shape of a proximate accessory. Claim 22 is set forth below (emphasis added). 22. A processor-implemented method, comprising: determining a size or shape of at least one housing of an electronic device, at least one proximate accessory of the electronic device, or both; querying for and receiving at least one particular setting associated with the size or shape from a set of settings associated with the at least one housing, the at least one proximate accessory, or both, wherein the at least one particular setting is configured to counteract an impact of the at least one housing, the at least one proximate accessory, or both; and applying the at least one particular setting to a radio frequency system of the electronic device. Similar to the Examiner’s findings regarding claim 1, discussed supra, the Examiner finds Chen’s cover is a “housing.” However, regarding claim 22, we note and agree with Appellant’s assertion that Chen teaches “determining the identity of a cover, which is a phone accessory (emphasis added).” Appeal Br. 8. Therefore, Chen’s cover teaches the “proximate accessory” and the “housing” discussion regarding claim 1 is not applicable or dispositive to claim 22. Claim 1 recites alternative language “or both” so the “housing of an electronic device” is not required. Regarding “determining a size or shape,” the Examiner finds Kobayashi teaches the size or shape of folding phones 6A and 6B are not the same. Final Act. 6 (citing Kobayashi, Fig. 6). The Examiner also refers to Chen’s teachings at paragraph 23, which describes Every type of cover has its own physical and electrical properties. The geometry design of different covers could influence the radio frequency and acoustic performance of the cellular phone. Besides, depending on the cosmetic design of Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 13 the cover, a Man-and-Machine interface (MMI) could also have a corresponding change associated with the cover. . . Id. Appellant argues Chen merely teaches that the size or shape of proximate accessories may affect the radio signals of a phone. Appeal Br. 14. Appellant argues Chen, at best, states that the geometric design of different covers could influence the radio frequency and acoustic performance of the cellular phone. Id. (citing Chen ¶ 23). According to Appellant, Chen is silent regarding determining the size or shape of a housing and/or accessory and applying a setting associated with the size or shape to a radio frequency system. Id. at 14–15. Appellant argues Kobayashi does not cure this deficiency. Id. at 15. In the Answer, the Examiner finds Kobayashi teaches determining characteristics of a foldable phone when it is open and closed and the phone changes shape when it is open or closed. Ans. 7–8 (citing Kobayashi ¶¶ 47, 48, Figs. 6A, 6B, 8A, 8B, 53, and 54). The Examiner finds Chen also discloses the geometry design of different covers could influence the radio frequency and acoustic performance of the cellular phone. Id. at 8 (citing Chen ¶ 26). The Examiner concludes Kobayashi in view of Chen discloses determining a size or shape of a housing and/or an accessory and applying a setting associated with the size or shape of the housing and/or accessory of an electronic device to a radio frequency system, as generally recited by independent claim 22. Id. In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues the Examiner misinterprets Kobayashi because Kobayashi merely teaches that a detected impedance value may vary based on the ambient environment, such as when an Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 14 antenna’s relative position to the user changes. Reply Br. 10 (citing Kobayashi, Figs. 6A, 6B, ¶¶ 47, 48). According to Appellant, there is no discussion in Kobayashi that settings are also determined based on the size/shape of the housing of the phone in addition to the ambient environment. Appellant argues Chen does not obviate this deficiency of Kobayashi since Chen discloses only that the geometric design of different covers could influence the radio frequency and acoustic performance of the cellular phone. Id. According to Appellant, Chen does not teach determining size/shape of the housing and/or an accessory and applying appropriate settings for the size/shape of the housing and/or accessory. Id. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. The rejection is based on the combination of the Kobayashi and Kobayashi. Kobayashi broadly teaches determining characteristics that affect phone performance and addressing these characteristics. Kobayashi ¶¶ 12, 23. Kobayashi teaches determining characteristics of a foldable phone that changes shape when it is open or closed. Kobayashi ¶¶ 26, 47, 48, 53, 54; Figs. 6A, 6B, 8A, 8B. Kobayashi teaches phone structures affect performance. Kobayashi ¶ 23. The teachings of Kobayashi are not limited to only adjusting for the ambient environment, excluding any phone structures. Kobayashi ¶¶ 9, 23, 39. Nor does claim 22 exclude adjusting for structure. Chen teaches phone structure, such as a cover, affects performance of the phone. Chen ¶¶ 4, 23. Chen teaches the geometry of different covers could influence the radio frequency and acoustic performance of the cellular phone. Chen ¶ 26. In the context of the teachings of Kobayashi and Chen, we agree with the Examiner’s conclusion that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings to result in claim 22. Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 15 Appellant argues an unreasonably narrow teaching of the cited references to attempt to limit the teaching to the express disclosures, and asserts an overly demanding standard of obviousness. However, we note: [t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). As stated by the Supreme Court, the Examiner’s obviousness rejection must be based on: [S]ome articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. . . . [H]owever, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). In view of the above, we sustain the § 103 rejection of independent claim 22 over Kobayashi and Chen. Below we discuss dependent claims 23, 25, and 28. Dependent claim 23 recites “[t]he processor-implemented method of claim 22, wherein the method is executed each time the electronic device is powered on.” The Examiner finds Kobayashi in view of Chen further discloses the processor is configured to re-determine (Kobayashi, Fig. 7 Item 507) the identity upon power up of the electronic device (Kobayashi, Fig. 2). Final Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 16 Act. 7. The Examiner finds a mobile phone can inherently power up. Id. In the Answer, the Examiner finds that a foldable mobile phone is powered on when it is open. Ans. 8–9 (citing Kobayashi ¶¶ 53, 54, Figs. 8A, 8B). Appellant’s arguments regarding claim 23 are similar to Appellant’s arguments directed to claim 22, discussed supra, rather than the claim 23 limitations. Appeal Br. 15–16; Reply Br. 10–11. The Examiner’s findings regarding phone power up are reasonable and are not persuasively rebutted by Appellant. Dependent claim 25 recites “[t]he processor-implemented method of claim 22, wherein the set of settings comprise one or more settings associated with a model identifier of the electronic device, the at least one housing, the at least one proximate accessory, or any combination thereof.” As discussed supra regarding claim 22, “Chen teaches determining the identity of and settings associated with the cover by using the ID module of the cover (proximate accessory) to communicate the identity to the phone, which is, at best, a proximate accessory.” See Appeal Br. 15–16. Appellant presents no persuasive argument that the Examiner errs by finding the combination of Kobayashi and Chen teaches claim 25. Dependent claim 28 recites “[t]he processor-implemented method of claim 22, wherein the at least one particular setting comprises a load modulation amplitude (LMA) setting, an automatic power control (APC) setting, a phase adjustment, a frame delay time (FDT) setting, or any combination thereof.” The Examiner finds Kobayashi in view of Chen further discloses the particular setting comprises a load modulation amplitude (LMA) setting. Final Act. 9. In particular, the Examiner finds Kobayashi, paragraph 13, Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 17 describes “load modulation amplitude (LMA) setting” and this reads on transmission power setting, an automatic power control (APC) setting, a phase adjustment, a frame delay time (FDT) setting, or any combination thereof. Id. Appellant presents no persuasive argument that the Examiner errs by finding the combination of Kobayashi and Chen teaches claim 25. In view of the above, we sustain the rejection of dependent claims 23, 25, and 28. The Rejection of claims 3 and 20 over Kobayashi, Chen, and Rubbmark Claim 3 depends from claim 37 which depends from claim 1. Claim 37 includes a second set of settings associated with at least one proximate accessory. Claim 3 recites “[t]he electronic device of claim 37, wherein the processor is configured to re-determine the identity of the at least one proximate accessory upon determining that the at least one proximate accessory is replaced or removed.” Claim 20 depends from claim 37 which depends from claim 1. Claim 20 recites “[t]he electronic device of claim 37, wherein the processor is configured to determine the identity of the at least one proximate accessory of the electronic device based upon a signal provided by the at least one proximate accessory to the electronic device.” These claims depend from claim 1, discussed supra, which recites the disputed limitation including a “housing.” These claims do not recite the alternative (“or”) language of claim 1, discussed supra. The Examiner’s findings do not provide additional support to remedy the deficiency in claim 1. Final Act. 9–10; Ans. 9–11. Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 18 Therefore, on the record before us, we are constrained not to sustain the rejection of claims 3 and 20. The Rejection of claims 6 and 24 over Kobayashi, Chen, and Asrani Claim 6 recites “[t]he electronic device of claim 1, wherein the configuration adjustment logic comprises a lookup table (LUT).” The Examiner’s findings do not provide additional support to remedy the deficiency in claim 1. Final Act. 10–11. Therefore, on the record before us, we are constrained not to sustain the rejection of claim 6. Claim 24 depends from independent claim 22 (discussed supra), claims 22 and 24 are set forth below (emphasis added). 22. A processor-implemented method, comprising: determining a size or shape of at least one housing of an electronic device, at least one proximate accessory of the electronic device, or both; querying for and receiving at least one particular setting associated with the size or shape from a set of settings associated with the at least one housing, the at least one proximate accessory, or both, wherein the at least one particular setting is configured to counteract an impact of the at least one housing, the at least one proximate accessory, or both; and applying the at least one particular setting to a radio frequency system of the electronic device. 24. The processor-implemented method of claim 22, comprising: detecting an accessory modification of the electronic device; wherein the method is executed each time the accessory modification is detected. As discussed regarding the rejection of claim 22, although independent claim 22 recites “housing” as in claim 1, claim 22 also recites Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 19 alternatively a “proximate accessory” and, therefore, the claim 1 deficiency discussed supra is not applicable to independent claim 22. Regarding claim 24, the Examiner finds Asrani teaches the method is executed each time modification is detected. Final Act. 8-9 (citing Asrani ¶ 18); Ans. 10. Appellant’s arguments are directed to the limitations of claim 22 and do not persuasively argue the limitations of claim 24. Reply Br. 12– 13. In view of the above, we sustain the rejection of claims 6 and 24 over Kobayashi, Chen, and Asrani. The Rejection of claim 9 over Kobayashi, Chen, and Finkenzeller Claim 9 recites “[t]he electronic device of claim 1, wherein the set of settings comprise a frame delay time (FDT) setting.” The Examiner’s findings do not provide additional support to remedy the deficiency in claim 1. Final Act. 11–12; Ans. 10–11. Therefore, on the record before us, we are constrained not to sustain the rejection of claim 9. The Rejection of claims 15 and 276 over Kobayashi, Chen, and Narayanaswami Claim 15 depends from claim 1 and recites “[t]he electronic device of claim 1, wherein the electronic device comprises a watch.” The Examiner’s findings do not provide additional support to remedy the “housing” deficiency in claim 1 discussed supra. Final Act. 12–13; Ans. 11; Appeal Br. 12; Reply Br. 13–14. Therefore, on the record before us, we are constrained not to sustain the rejection of claim 15. 6 Claim 27 is cancelled. See Appeal Br. 25 (Claims Appendix). Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 20 The Rejection of claims 29 and 32 over Kobayashi and Narayanaswami Independent claim 29 and dependent claim 32 are directed to an electronic watch and are set forth below (emphasis added) 29. A radio frequency system, configured to: receive a set of particular settings associated with a housing of an electronic watch associated with the radio frequency system, wherein the housing encloses interior components of the electronic watch, wherein the set of particular settings are configured to counteract an impact of the housing on communications of the radio frequency system; and communicate with a radio frequency reader, using the set of particular settings. 32. The radio frequency system of claim 29, wherein the housing is configured to protect the interior components from physical damage, shield the interior components from electromagnetic interference, or a combination thereof. Regarding claim 29, the Examiner finds, in addition to Kobayashi teachings, Narayanaswami discloses an electronic watch in which the housing encloses interior components of the electronic watch. Final Act. 13 (citing Narayanaswami, Fig. 1, Item 25). The Examiner concludes it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to use Narayanaswami's watch in Kobayashi in view of Chen's device for efficiently interacting with alarms and notifications on the watch. Id. (citing Narayanaswami Abstract). Appellant argues similar to claim 22, discussed supra, that Kobayashi’s teachings are limited to impedance values based on an ambient environment. Appeal Br. 19. Appellant argues it is unclear why one with skill in the art would combine Narayanaswami’s watch with the impedance Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 21 detection by phone antennas described in Kobayashi to improve the efficiency of the watch’s interactions with alarms and notifications, when Kobayashi appears to not disclose anything related to an alarm or notification. Id. at 20 (citing Final Act. 13). In the Answer, the Examiner finds Kobayashi discloses input impedances of the antenna of a mobile phone are usually performance indices dependent on an antenna element and a casing attached to the antenna element (Kobayashi paragraph 0039). Therefore, Kobayashi's discloses counteract an impact of an electronic device's housing. Narayanaswami discloses “It would thus be highly desirable to provide a wearable device/appliance (a wrist watch) capable of wirelessly accessing information and equipped with an interactive user interface and high resolution display for providing a variety of desktop PC-like functions” (Narayanaswami Col. 1 line 65-Col. 2 line 5). Since both Narayanaswami's watch (Narayanaswami Fig. 1 Item 25) and Kobayashi's device are related to wireless communication, contrary to appellant's argument, it would be proper to combine Kobayashi and Narayanaswami, and thus the combination of Kobayashi and Narayanaswami support a prima facie case of obviousness with respect to claim 29. Therefore, Kobayashi in view of Narayanaswami teaches receiving setting(s) that counteract an impact of an electronic watch housing on communications of the radio frequency system, as generally recited in independent claim 29. Ans. 12. In the Reply Brief, Appellant reiterates and argues Kobayashi measures the impedance that is associated with the ambient environment and not the casing (housing) of an electronic watch. Reply Br. 14 (citing Kobayashi ¶¶ 13, 47, 27, 30 32, and 35). According to Appellant, measuring the impedance is not the same as determining the identity of and settings associated with the housing of an electronic watch and therefore Kobayashi Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 22 does not teach counteracting impact of an electronic watch housing on communications of the radio frequency system. Id. at 14–15. Narayanaswami teaches a watch housing that is within the broadest reasonable interpretation of “housing” discussed supra regarding claim 1. Narayanaswami, Fig. 1, Item 25. Similar to the discussion regarding the rejection of claim 22, Appellant’s arguments regarding claim 29 are based on an unreasonably narrow interpretation of the teachings of Kobayashi and Narayanaswami. The Examiner provides sufficient evidence to support why one of ordinary skill in the art would combine these teachings to result in claim 29. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 29. Regarding claim 32, the Examiner finds Kobayashi in view of Narayanaswami further discloses the watch housing is configured to protect the interior components from physical damage, shield the interior components from electromagnetic interference, or a combination thereof (Narayanaswami, Fig. 1 Item 25). Final Act. 13–14. Appellant argues Kobayashi teaches settings associated with the ambient environment and counteract an impact of the ambient environment on communications of the radio frequency system and not the impact of the housing of the electric watch. Appeal Br. 19–20 (citing KO ¶¶ 13, 27, and 29). Appellant argues it is unclear why one with skill in the art would combine Narayanaswami’s watch with the impedance detection by phone antennas described in Kobayashi to improve the efficiency of the watch’s interactions with alarms and notifications, when Kobayashi appears to not disclose anything related to an alarm or notification. Id. at 20, citing Final Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 23 Act. 13. In the Reply Brief, Appellant reiterates and does not persuasively address the limitations of claim 32. Reply Br. 15–16. Appellant’s arguments are directed to the limitations of claim 29 and do not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s findings and conclusions regarding the limitations of claim 32. Appeal Br, 19–20; Reply Br. 15–16. The Examiner’s findings and conclusions are reasonable and are not persuasively argued by Appellant. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 32. The Rejection of claims 33–36 over Kobayashi, Narayanaswami, and Asrani Claims 33–36 depend directly or indirectly from claim 29 discussed supra and are set forth below. 33. The radio frequency system of claim 29, wherein the set of settings are configured to counteract an impact of a material of the housing. 34. The radio frequency system of claim 33, wherein the material comprises gold, stainless steel, aluminum, ceramic, or any combination thereof. 35. The radio frequency system of claim 39, wherein the set of particular settings are configured to counteract an impact of a material of the watch band. 36. The radio frequency system of claim 35, wherein the material comprises leather, rubber, metal, or any combination thereof. Regarding claim 33, the Examiner finds Asrani discloses the one or more particular settings are configured to counteract an impact of a material of the housing. Final Act. 14. The Examiner refers to Asrani paragraph 13 Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 24 What is needed is a system and method for a mobile communication device that determines the type of housing material installed on the mobile communication device so that the circuitry of the mobile communication device can retune the antennas according to the housing material and thereby maintain antenna transmit and receive efficiency (emphasis added). The Examiner finds this reads on “housing material,” and concludes it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to use Asrani's method in Kobayashi's device for maintaining antenna transmit and receive efficiency. Id. Appellant’s arguments are directed to claim 29 limitations discussed supra, rather than claim 33 limitations. Appeal Br. 21–22; Reply Br. 21–22. The Examiner’s findings and conclusions regarding claim 33 are reasonable and are not persuasively rebutted by Appellant. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 33. Regarding claim 34, the Examiner finds Narayanaswami teaches the material comprises gold, stainless steel, aluminum, ceramic, or any combination thereof. Final Act. 14 (citing (Narayanaswami, Fig. 1 Item 25). Appellant’s arguments are directed to claim 29 limitations discussed supra, rather than claim 34 limitations. Appeal Br. 21–22; Reply Br. 16–17. The Examiner’s findings and conclusions regarding claim 34 are reasonable and are not persuasively rebutted by Appellant. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 34. Regarding claim 35, the Examiner finds Asrani discloses the one or more particular settings are configured to counteract an impact of a material Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 25 of the housing. Final Act. 15 (citing Asrani ¶ 13). The Examiner concludes it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to use Asrani’s method in Kobayashi's device for maintaining antenna transmit and receive efficiency. Id. Appellant argues Kobayashi does not teach settings associated with a watch band. Appeal Br. 21. Appellant argues Asrani teaches determining antenna settings of a mobile device based on housing material installed on the mobile device. Id. (citing Asrani ¶ 13). Appellant argues Asrani does not teach the settings are used to counteract the impact of the watch band. Id. According to Appellant, Asrani housing appears to encompass and be in close proximity to the mobile device. Id. at 21–22. According to Appellant, watchband material may not encompass and may be further away from the housing material. Id. (citing Spec., Gig. 5, element 60). Appellant argues neither Kobayashi or Narayanaswami obviates these deficiencies. Id. In the Answer, the Examiner finds Claim 35 recites the set of particular settings are configured to counteract an impact of a material of the watch band”. Claim 35 does not recite whether the impact is due to encompassing and is in close proximity to the mobile device or not encompassing and is further away from the mobile device. Asrani discloses “What is needed is a system and method for a mobile communication device that determines the type of housing material installed on the mobile communication device so that the circuitry of the mobile communication device can retune the antennas according to the housing material and thereby maintain antenna transmit and receive efficiency” (Asrani paragraph 0013). As mentioned above, Narayanaswami discloses a watch with a watch band (Narayanaswami Fig. 1 Item 25) for wireless communication. Therefore, Kobayashi in view of Narayanaswami and Asrani teaches settings that Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 26 counteract an impact of watch band material on the communications of the radio frequency system, as generally recited in dependent claim 35. Ans. 13. In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues the Examiner errs in contending that claim 35 does not recite whether the “impact is due to encompassing [material] and [whether the material] is in close proximity to the mobile device or not encompassing and is further away from the mobile device.” Reply Br. 16–17. Appellant argues Arsani does not teach settings that counteract an impact of watch band material on the communications of the radio frequency system and instead, merely teaches retuning the antennas according to the housing material. Id. at 16 (citing Arsani ¶ 13). Appellant argues that a watch band is not the same as a housing and thus Arsani does not match settings that counteract an impact of watch band material. Id. We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because the Examiner presents insufficient evidence for a prima facie case of obviousness. In particular, the Examiner does not show that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand Asrani’s teachings extend to a watch band. The Examiner’s findings are based only on the Asrani housing without discussion of why the teaching would also be applicable to a watch band. Therefore, on the record before us, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 35. Regarding claim 36, the Examiner finds Narayanaswami teaches the material comprises leather, rubber, metal, or any combination thereof. Final Act. 15 (citing Narayanaswami, Fig. 1 Item 25). The Examiner’s findings and conclusions regarding claim 36 are reasonable and are not persuasively argued by Appellant. Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 27 Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 36. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, we do not sustain the § 112 written description rejection of claim 9. We sustain the § 112 indefiniteness rejection of claims 37–39. For the reasons stated above, we sustain the obviousness rejection of claims 6, 20, 22, 23–25, 28, and 29–36. We do not sustain the obviousness rejection of claims 1–5, 9, 15, 17–21, and 28. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed 9, 37–39 112(a) Written description 37–39 9 3,5, 17, 18, 20 112(a) Indefiniteness 3, 5, 17, 18, 20 1, 2, 4, 5, 17–19, 21–23, 25, 28 103(a) Kobayashi, Chen 22, 23, 25, 28 1, 2, 4, 5, 17– 19, 21 3, 20 103(a) Kobayashi, Chen, Rubbmark 3, 20 6, 24 103(a) Kobayashi, Chen, Asrani 6, 24 9 103(a) Kobayashi, Chen, Finkenzeller 9 Appeal 2019-004318 Application 14/641,135 28 Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed 157 103(a) Kobayashi, Chen, Narayanaswami 15 29, 32 103(a) Kobayashi, Narayanaswami 29, 32 33–36 103(a) Kobayashi, Narayanaswami, Asrani 33, 34, 36 35 Overall Outcome 6, 22–25, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 36–39 1–5, 9, 15, 17–21, 35 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2011). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 7 Claim 27 is omitted here because it is cancelled. 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