APPLE INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 19, 2021

2019004318 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 19, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/641,135 03/06/2015 Vusthla Sunil Reddy P24659US1 / APPL:0575 5017
73576 7590 02/19/2021
APPLE INC. - Fletcher
c/o Fletcher Yoder, PC
P.O. Box 692289
Houston, TX 77269-2289
EXAMINER
LIAO, HSINCHUN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2641
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/19/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket@fyiplaw.com
hill@fyiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte VUSTHLA SUNIL REDDY, XINPING ZENG,
PETER M. AGBOH, MOHIT NARANG, and BEN CABALLERO

Appeal 2019-004318
Application 14/641,135
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and JOYCE CRAIG
Administrative Patent Judges.

SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–6, 17–25, 28, 29, and 32–39, which
constitute all pending claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Apple
Inc. Appeal Br. 1.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s disclosure is directed to adaptation of radio frequency
system configuration settings based upon detected electronic device housing
and/or proximate accessories. The objective is to improve performance of
the radio frequency system by adjusting the settings based at least in part on
the identified housing and or proximate accessory. Abstract; Spec. ¶¶ 1, 4,
7, 25, 32, 34, 38, 57; Figs. 1, 2, 6–7.
Claim 1 is illustrative of the invention and reads as follows (emphasis
added):
1. An electronic device, comprising:
a radio frequency system, configured to communicate with a
radio frequency reader;
tangible, non-transitory storage, comprising configuration
adjustment logic that comprises machine-readable instructions that
associate a set of settings for the radio frequency system with at least
one housing of an electronic device; and
a processor configured to:
identity of the at least one housing of the electronic
device;
receive at least one particular setting from the set of
settings that is associated with the identity of the at least one
housing; and
apply the at least one particular setting to the radio
frequency system.
Appeal Br. 23 (Claims Appendix).

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REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Rubbmark US 6,012,105 Jan. 4, 2000
Narayanaswami US 6,477,117 B1 Nov. 5, 2002
Kobayashi et al. US 2003/0228891 A1 Dec.11, 2003
Chen et al. US 2005/0009579 A1 Jan. 13, 2005
Finkenzeller US 2009/0040022 A1 Feb. 12, 2009
Asrani US 2015/0172426 A1 Jun. 18, 2015

Claims 9 and 37–39 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or
35 U.S.C. §112 (pre-AIA), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the
written description requirement. Final Act. 5.
Claims 3, 5, 17, 18, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or
35 U.S.C. §112 (pre-AIA), first paragraph, for indefiniteness. Final Act. 5.
Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 17–19, 21–23, 25, and 28 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kobayashi and Chen. Final Act. 6–
9.
Claims 3 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Kobayashi, Chen, and Rubbmark. Final Act. 9–10.
Claims 6 and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Kobayashi, Chen, and Asrani. Final Act. 10–11.
Claim 9 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Kobayashi, Chen, and Finkenzeller. Final Act. 10–12.
Claims 15 and 272 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Kobayashi, Chen, and Narayanaswami. Final Act. 12.

2 Claim 27 is cancelled. Appeal Br. 25 (Claims Appendix).
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Claims 29 and 323 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Kobayashi and Narayanaswami. Final Act. 13.
Claims 33–36 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Kobayashi, Narayanaswami, and Asrani. Final Act. 14–15.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
contentions in the Appeal Brief and the Reply Brief that the Examiner has
erred, as well as the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s arguments in the
Appeal Brief.
The § 112 Rejections of claims 9, 37–39 (written description), and
claims 3, 5, 17, 18, 20 (indefiniteness)
In the rejection of claim 9 for failing to meet the written description
requirement, the Examiner finds the Specification does not support the
limitation “the set of settings comprise a frame delay time (FDT) setting.
Final Act. 5. The Examiner finds it is unclear if FDT is in the same set (e.g.,
the second set) as other settings. Id. The Examiner rejects claims 37–39 for
failing to meet the written description requirement for “a second set of
settings.” Id.
Regarding claim 9, Appellant argues the Specification states “settings
related to frame transmission delay time may be set ... to counteract any
unintended timing issues caused by the housings 28 and/or accessories 29.”
Appeal Br. (citing Spec. ¶ 48). Appellant additionally refers to claim 9 that
recites that “the set of settings” recited in claim 1 includes the FDT setting.

3 The heading in the rejection shows 29 and 32–36 are rejected over
Kobayashi and Narayanaswami but only claims 29 and 32 are identified in
this rejection. Final Act. 13–14.
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Id. Thus, according to Appellant, the set of settings that includes an FDT
setting is supported by the Specification.
A written “description must ‘clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in
the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.’” Ariad
Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (alteration in original) (quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d
1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). “In other words, the test for sufficiency is
whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to
those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed
subject matter as of the filing date.” Id. (citing Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at
1563). “Although [the applicant] does not have to describe exactly the
subject matter claimed, . . . the description must clearly allow persons of
ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [he or she] invented what is
claimed.” Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563 (alteration in original) (quoting In re
Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). Put another way, “the
applicant must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art
that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the
invention.” Id. at 1563–64.
We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the Specification
describes the use of frame transmission delay times settings. Spec. ¶ 48.
Therefore, we do not sustain the written description rejection of claim 9.
Regarding the “second set of settings” of claims 37–39, Appellant
argues the Specification describes a process for determining dynamic
settings for the radio frequency system based upon the housing(s) and/or
accessor(ies) of the electronic device. Appeal Br. 6–7 (citing Spec., Fig. 6,
¶ 42). Appellant argues, upon reaching the target performance, the settings
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associated with the housing, accessories, or a combination of the housing
and accessories are stored. Id. (citing ¶¶ 42, 46, 50, 51, and 55). According
to Appellant, the process may be rerun when untested housing(s) and/or
accessor(ies) with no previous associated radio frequency system settings are
added to the electronic device, resulting in a second set of settings and, thus,
a second set of settings is supported by the Specification. Id. at 6–7.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments regarding claim 37
because the portions of the Specification identified by Appellant do not
describe a second set of settings for the proximate accessory, and Appellant
does not persuasively show why one of ordinary skill that Appellant was in
possession of the claimed invention. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s
arguments regarding claim 38 (“wherein the processor is configured to re-
determine the identity of the at least one proximate accessory upon detection
of an imminent radio frequency communication”) because Appellant
identifies no persuasive evidence to support rerun4 (or “re-determine”) of the
process. Claim 39 depends from independent claim 29 which is directed to
an electronic watch with a watch housing and associated settings with the
watch housing configured to counteract an impact of the housing on
communications of the radio frequency system. Claim 39 is directed to a
watch band and “a second set of settings associated with the watch band.”
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because, as discussed supra
regarding claim 37, the Specification does not describe a second set of
settings for the proximate accessory.

4 We note Spec., ¶ 57, not identified by Appellant, describes “re-
implemented” and “periodic basis.”
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In view of the above, we do not sustain the written description
rejection of claim 9 and we sustain the written description rejection of
claims 37–39.
In the rejection of claims 3, 5, 17, 18, and 20 for indefiniteness, the
Examiner finds there is insufficient antecedent basis for the limitation “at
least one proximate accessory” in claim 1. Final Act. 4. Appellant argues
claims 3, 5, 17, 18, and 20 depend from claim 37 (which depends from claim
1), which recites the limitation “at least one proximate accessory” and
therefore there is sufficient antecedent support for this limitation. Appeal
Br. 8. In the Answer, the Examiner states that because claim 37 fails to
comply with the written description requirement, the limitation “at least one
accessory” recited in claim 37 is not considered. Ans. 3.
We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments regarding the
indefiniteness rejection because claim 37 includes antecedent support in
reciting “at least one proximate accessory.” “[A] claim is indefinite when it
contains words or phrases whose meaning is unclear.” In re Packard, 751
F.3d 1307, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Therefore, we do not sustain the
Examiner rejection of claims 3, 5, 17, 18, and 20 for indefiniteness.
The § 103 Rejections
Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 17–19, 21–23, 25, and 28 over Kobayashi and
Chen

Appellant argues the Examiner errs in finding that Kobayashi and
Chen teach the claim 1 limitation “determine an identity of the at least one
housing of an electronic device” (also referred to as “disputed limitation”).
Appeal Br. 7–10; Reply Br. 4–5.
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In the Final Action, the Examiner finds the combination of Kobayashi
and Chen teaches the limitations of claim 1. Final Act. 4–7. The Examiner
finds Chen teaches the disputed limitation. Id. at 7 (citing Chen, Abstract;
¶¶ 8, 10). In particular, the Examiner finds Chen teaches “determining
identification of the cover” and it would have been obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention to use Chen's cover identity in Kobayashi's device for providing
optimal performance. Id.
Appellant argues Chen, at best, teaches determining the identity and
settings of a cover rather than “determining an identity of the at least one
housing of an electronic device (emphasis added).” Appeal Br. 8. Appellant
argues Chen distinguishes between a cover and a housing by separately
referring to each structure. Id. (citing Chen, Abstract; ¶ 10; Fig. 3).
According to Appellant, Chen teaches “[d]etermining the identity of a cover,
which is a phone accessory separate and detachable from the housing, does
not correspond to determining the identity of a housing of an electronic
device.” Id. Appellant argues the Examiner errs in finding housing reads on
Chen’s cover because “Chen's housing 120 is an internal housing that
encases internal components and has a speaker, display, and microphone
formed onto it. See Chen, ¶ 6. The cover 160, meanwhile, is installed over
the internal housing, providing protective and aesthetic functions.” Id.
In the Answer, the Examiner finds Chen's phone cover (Chen Fig. 3
Item 160) is “clearly a part of the housing of the entire cellular phone (Chen
Fig. 3 Item 100) and the cellular phone does not look complete without item
160).” Ans. 3–4. Therefore, according to the Examiner, the limitation of
"housing" reads on Chen's cover 160. Id. at 4. The Examiner finds the open
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holes over the speaker of Chen's cover are very small (Chen, Fig. 3 Item
162) and speaker 122 has no protection without cover 160). Id. Therefore,
according to the Examiner, the speaker is considered to be "housed" inside
Chen's cover 160. Id. The Examiner finds, since Chen discloses
“determining identification” (Chen, paragraph 0010) using an identification
module (Chen, Fig. 3 Item 170) located inside a cellular phone housing
(Chen, Fig. 3 Item 160), the limitation of determining the identity of and
settings associated with a housing of an electronic device reads on Chen's
arrangement. Id.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant reiterates and argues the “not look
complete” finding of the Examiner is irrelevant as “the threshold question is
whether the cover 160 teaches an item that encases internal components of
the phone (e.g., radio frequency processing circuitry).” Reply Br. 4.
Appellant argues Chen cover is not a housing as the cover may cover a
housing that encases/protects internal components. Id. Appellant argues the
Specification does not deviate from the difference between a cover and a
housing. Id. According to Appellant, the Specification states that the
housing “may protect interior components from physical damage” and may
“shield them from electromagnetic interference” while the cover merely
covers a portion of an electronic device. Id. (citing Spec., ¶¶ 32, 38).
As discussed below, on the record before us, we are persuaded by
Appellant’s argument because the Examiner provides insufficient evidence
to support the finding that Chen teaches the disputed limitation.
During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation when reading claim language in light of the Specification as it
would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of
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Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Although we interpret
claims broadly but reasonably in light of the Specification, we nonetheless
must not import limitations from the Specification into the claims. See In re
Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Our reviewing court
states that “the words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and
customary meaning.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citations omitted). However, the broadest reasonable
interpretation differs from the broadest possible interpretation. In re Smith
Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The correct inquiry in
giving a claim term its broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the
specification is “an interpretation that corresponds with what and how the
inventor describes his invention in the specification, i.e., an interpretation
that is ‘consistent with the specification.’” Id. at 1382–83 (quoting In re
Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
We now refer to the disputed limitation discussed, supra, which
requires “with at least one housing of an electronic device.”
The term “housing” (and “accessory”) is utilized throughout the
Specification and Figures. Appellant refers to the Specification, paragraphs
32 and 34, for a description of “housing” that “may protect interior
components from physical damage and to shield them from electromagnetic
interference.” Spec., ¶ 32. The term “accessory” is described as “e.g., a
case, cover, and/or protective bumper may be added.” Id. The use of the
term “may” indicates the described housing features are optional, rather than
required, and “housing” is not a defined term. However, in the context of
the Specification, the terms “housing” and “accessory” are used to describe
separate and different structures. In particular, the “housing” is a structure
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that protects interior components and shields from electromagnetic radiation.
Spec., ¶¶ 8, 22, 23, 32, and 34, Figs. 2–5. Accessories are described as
structures such as covers and casings. Spec., ¶¶ 37–39, Figs. 2–5. Thus, to
be consistent with the Specification, a housing is a separate and different
structure from a cover (“accessory”).
Chen describes a “cover” installed on a “housing.” Chen, Abstract;
Fig. 3, ¶¶ 8, 10, 23, and 26. Chen’s cover and housing are separate and
different structures. The Examiner’s assertions that Chen’s cover is “part of
the housing,” “the phone does not look complete without the Chen cover,”
and “partially protects internal component” are insufficient5 to support a
finding that Chen’s cover teaches the “housing” as broadly and reasonably
interpreted. To the contrary, the Examiner’s assertions interpreting a Chen
cover as the claimed “housing” is inconsistent with the Specification.
Therefore, on the record before us, we are persuaded by Appellant’s
arguments that the combination of Kobayashi and Chen teaches the disputed
limitation.
Therefore, on the record before us, we do not sustain the rejection of
claim 1 and dependent claims 2, 4, 5, 17, 18, 19, and 21 as these claims
depend directly or indirectly from claim 1.
Independent claim 22 and dependent claims 23, 25, and 28 are also
rejected over Kobayashi and Chen and are discussed below. Although
independent claim 22 is similar to claim 1, claim 22 includes additional

5 The Examiner’s findings appear to be limited more to a § 102 analysis
rather than § 103. In particular, despite broad teachings in Kobayashi and
Chen, the Examiner does not refer to these broad teachings to include
findings that one skilled in the art would extend Chen’s teachings regarding
a “cover” to apply to other structures, such as a housing.
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alternative limitations directed to the size and shape of a proximate
accessory. Claim 22 is set forth below (emphasis added).
22. A processor-implemented method, comprising:
determining a size or shape of at least one housing of an
electronic device, at least one proximate accessory of the
electronic device, or both;
querying for and receiving at least one particular setting
associated with the size or shape from a set of settings
associated with the at least one housing, the at least one
proximate accessory, or both, wherein the at least one particular
setting is configured to counteract an impact of the at least one
housing, the at least one proximate accessory, or both; and
applying the at least one particular setting to a radio frequency
system of the electronic device.

Similar to the Examiner’s findings regarding claim 1, discussed supra,
the Examiner finds Chen’s cover is a “housing.” However, regarding claim
22, we note and agree with Appellant’s assertion that Chen teaches
“determining the identity of a cover, which is a phone accessory (emphasis
added).” Appeal Br. 8. Therefore, Chen’s cover teaches the “proximate
accessory” and the “housing” discussion regarding claim 1 is not applicable
or dispositive to claim 22. Claim 1 recites alternative language “or both” so
the “housing of an electronic device” is not required.
Regarding “determining a size or shape,” the Examiner finds
Kobayashi teaches the size or shape of folding phones 6A and 6B are not the
same. Final Act. 6 (citing Kobayashi, Fig. 6). The Examiner also refers to
Chen’s teachings at paragraph 23, which describes
Every type of cover has its own physical and electrical
properties. The geometry design of different covers could
influence the radio frequency and acoustic performance of the
cellular phone. Besides, depending on the cosmetic design of
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the cover, a Man-and-Machine interface (MMI) could also have
a corresponding change associated with the cover. . .

Id.
Appellant argues Chen merely teaches that the size or shape of
proximate accessories may affect the radio signals of a phone. Appeal Br.
14. Appellant argues Chen, at best, states that the geometric design of
different covers could influence the radio frequency and acoustic
performance of the cellular phone. Id. (citing Chen ¶ 23). According to
Appellant, Chen is silent regarding determining the size or shape of a
housing and/or accessory and applying a setting associated with the size or
shape to a radio frequency system. Id. at 14–15. Appellant argues
Kobayashi does not cure this deficiency. Id. at 15.
In the Answer, the Examiner finds Kobayashi teaches determining
characteristics of a foldable phone when it is open and closed and the phone
changes shape when it is open or closed. Ans. 7–8 (citing Kobayashi ¶¶ 47,
48, Figs. 6A, 6B, 8A, 8B, 53, and 54). The Examiner finds Chen also
discloses the geometry design of different covers could influence the radio
frequency and acoustic performance of the cellular phone. Id. at 8 (citing
Chen ¶ 26). The Examiner concludes Kobayashi in view of Chen discloses
determining a size or shape of a housing and/or an accessory and applying a
setting associated with the size or shape of the housing and/or accessory of
an electronic device to a radio frequency system, as generally recited by
independent claim 22. Id.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues the Examiner misinterprets
Kobayashi because Kobayashi merely teaches that a detected impedance
value may vary based on the ambient environment, such as when an
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antenna’s relative position to the user changes. Reply Br. 10 (citing
Kobayashi, Figs. 6A, 6B, ¶¶ 47, 48). According to Appellant, there is no
discussion in Kobayashi that settings are also determined based on the
size/shape of the housing of the phone in addition to the ambient
environment. Appellant argues Chen does not obviate this deficiency of
Kobayashi since Chen discloses only that the geometric design of different
covers could influence the radio frequency and acoustic performance of the
cellular phone. Id. According to Appellant, Chen does not teach
determining size/shape of the housing and/or an accessory and applying
appropriate settings for the size/shape of the housing and/or accessory. Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. The rejection is
based on the combination of the Kobayashi and Kobayashi. Kobayashi
broadly teaches determining characteristics that affect phone performance
and addressing these characteristics. Kobayashi ¶¶ 12, 23. Kobayashi
teaches determining characteristics of a foldable phone that changes shape
when it is open or closed. Kobayashi ¶¶ 26, 47, 48, 53, 54; Figs. 6A, 6B,
8A, 8B. Kobayashi teaches phone structures affect performance. Kobayashi
¶ 23. The teachings of Kobayashi are not limited to only adjusting for the
ambient environment, excluding any phone structures. Kobayashi ¶¶ 9, 23,
39. Nor does claim 22 exclude adjusting for structure.
Chen teaches phone structure, such as a cover, affects performance of
the phone. Chen ¶¶ 4, 23. Chen teaches the geometry of different covers
could influence the radio frequency and acoustic performance of the cellular
phone. Chen ¶ 26. In the context of the teachings of Kobayashi and Chen,
we agree with the Examiner’s conclusion that one of ordinary skill in the art
would have combined the teachings to result in claim 22.
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Appellant argues an unreasonably narrow teaching of the cited
references to attempt to limit the teaching to the express disclosures, and
asserts an overly demanding standard of obviousness. However, we note:
[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a
secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the
structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed
invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the
references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of
the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill
in the art.
In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981).
As stated by the Supreme Court, the Examiner’s obviousness rejection
must be based on:
[S]ome articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning
to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. . . . [H]owever,
the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the
specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can
take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person
of ordinary skill in the art would employ.
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn,
441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
In view of the above, we sustain the § 103 rejection of independent
claim 22 over Kobayashi and Chen.
Below we discuss dependent claims 23, 25, and 28.
Dependent claim 23 recites “[t]he processor-implemented method of
claim 22, wherein the method is executed each time the electronic device is
powered on.”
The Examiner finds Kobayashi in view of Chen further discloses the
processor is configured to re-determine (Kobayashi, Fig. 7 Item 507) the
identity upon power up of the electronic device (Kobayashi, Fig. 2). Final
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Act. 7. The Examiner finds a mobile phone can inherently power up. Id. In
the Answer, the Examiner finds that a foldable mobile phone is powered on
when it is open. Ans. 8–9 (citing Kobayashi ¶¶ 53, 54, Figs. 8A, 8B).
Appellant’s arguments regarding claim 23 are similar to Appellant’s
arguments directed to claim 22, discussed supra, rather than the claim 23
limitations. Appeal Br. 15–16; Reply Br. 10–11.
The Examiner’s findings regarding phone power up are reasonable
and are not persuasively rebutted by Appellant.
Dependent claim 25 recites “[t]he processor-implemented method of
claim 22, wherein the set of settings comprise one or more settings
associated with a model identifier of the electronic device, the at least one
housing, the at least one proximate accessory, or any combination thereof.”
As discussed supra regarding claim 22, “Chen teaches determining
the identity of and settings associated with the cover by using the ID module
of the cover (proximate accessory) to communicate the identity to the phone,
which is, at best, a proximate accessory.” See Appeal Br. 15–16.
Appellant presents no persuasive argument that the Examiner errs by
finding the combination of Kobayashi and Chen teaches claim 25.
Dependent claim 28 recites “[t]he processor-implemented method of
claim 22, wherein the at least one particular setting comprises a load
modulation amplitude (LMA) setting, an automatic power control (APC)
setting, a phase adjustment, a frame delay time (FDT) setting, or any
combination thereof.”
The Examiner finds Kobayashi in view of Chen further discloses the
particular setting comprises a load modulation amplitude (LMA) setting.
Final Act. 9. In particular, the Examiner finds Kobayashi, paragraph 13,
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describes “load modulation amplitude (LMA) setting” and this reads on
transmission power setting, an automatic power control (APC) setting, a
phase adjustment, a frame delay time (FDT) setting, or any combination
thereof. Id.
Appellant presents no persuasive argument that the Examiner errs by
finding the combination of Kobayashi and Chen teaches claim 25.
In view of the above, we sustain the rejection of dependent claims 23,
25, and 28.
The Rejection of claims 3 and 20 over Kobayashi, Chen, and
Rubbmark

Claim 3 depends from claim 37 which depends from claim 1. Claim
37 includes a second set of settings associated with at least one proximate
accessory. Claim 3 recites “[t]he electronic device of claim 37, wherein the
processor is configured to re-determine the identity of the at least one
proximate accessory upon determining that the at least one proximate
accessory is replaced or removed.”
Claim 20 depends from claim 37 which depends from claim 1. Claim
20 recites “[t]he electronic device of claim 37, wherein the processor is
configured to determine the identity of the at least one proximate accessory
of the electronic device based upon a signal provided by the at least one
proximate accessory to the electronic device.”
These claims depend from claim 1, discussed supra, which recites the
disputed limitation including a “housing.” These claims do not recite the
alternative (“or”) language of claim 1, discussed supra. The Examiner’s
findings do not provide additional support to remedy the deficiency in claim
1. Final Act. 9–10; Ans. 9–11.
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Therefore, on the record before us, we are constrained not to sustain
the rejection of claims 3 and 20.
The Rejection of claims 6 and 24 over Kobayashi, Chen, and
Asrani

Claim 6 recites “[t]he electronic device of claim 1, wherein the
configuration adjustment logic comprises a lookup table (LUT).” The
Examiner’s findings do not provide additional support to remedy the
deficiency in claim 1. Final Act. 10–11. Therefore, on the record before us,
we are constrained not to sustain the rejection of claim 6.
Claim 24 depends from independent claim 22 (discussed supra),
claims 22 and 24 are set forth below (emphasis added).
22. A processor-implemented method, comprising:
determining a size or shape of at least one housing of an
electronic device, at least one proximate accessory of the
electronic device, or both;
querying for and receiving at least one particular setting
associated with the size or shape from a set of settings
associated with the at least one housing, the at least one
proximate accessory, or both, wherein the at least one particular
setting is configured to counteract an impact of the at least one
housing, the at least one proximate accessory, or both; and
applying the at least one particular setting to a radio
frequency system of the electronic device.

24. The processor-implemented method of claim 22,
comprising:
detecting an accessory modification of the electronic
device;
wherein the method is executed each time the accessory
modification is detected.

As discussed regarding the rejection of claim 22, although
independent claim 22 recites “housing” as in claim 1, claim 22 also recites
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alternatively a “proximate accessory” and, therefore, the claim 1 deficiency
discussed supra is not applicable to independent claim 22.
Regarding claim 24, the Examiner finds Asrani teaches the method is
executed each time modification is detected. Final Act. 8-9 (citing Asrani ¶
18); Ans. 10. Appellant’s arguments are directed to the limitations of claim
22 and do not persuasively argue the limitations of claim 24. Reply Br. 12–
13.
In view of the above, we sustain the rejection of claims 6 and 24 over
Kobayashi, Chen, and Asrani.
The Rejection of claim 9 over Kobayashi, Chen, and Finkenzeller

Claim 9 recites “[t]he electronic device of claim 1, wherein the set of
settings comprise a frame delay time (FDT) setting.” The Examiner’s
findings do not provide additional support to remedy the deficiency in claim
1. Final Act. 11–12; Ans. 10–11. Therefore, on the record before us, we are
constrained not to sustain the rejection of claim 9.

The Rejection of claims 15 and 276 over Kobayashi, Chen, and
Narayanaswami
Claim 15 depends from claim 1 and recites “[t]he electronic device of
claim 1, wherein the electronic device comprises a watch.” The Examiner’s
findings do not provide additional support to remedy the “housing”
deficiency in claim 1 discussed supra. Final Act. 12–13; Ans. 11; Appeal
Br. 12; Reply Br. 13–14. Therefore, on the record before us, we are
constrained not to sustain the rejection of claim 15.

6 Claim 27 is cancelled. See Appeal Br. 25 (Claims Appendix).
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The Rejection of claims 29 and 32 over Kobayashi and
Narayanaswami

Independent claim 29 and dependent claim 32 are directed to an
electronic watch and are set forth below (emphasis added)

29. A radio frequency system, configured to:
receive a set of particular settings associated with a
housing of an electronic watch associated with the radio
frequency system, wherein the housing encloses interior
components of the electronic watch, wherein the set of
particular settings are configured to counteract an impact of the
housing on communications of the radio frequency system; and
communicate with a radio frequency reader, using the set
of particular settings.

32. The radio frequency system of claim 29, wherein the
housing is configured to protect the interior components from
physical damage, shield the interior components from
electromagnetic interference, or a combination thereof.

Regarding claim 29, the Examiner finds, in addition to Kobayashi
teachings, Narayanaswami discloses an electronic watch in which the
housing encloses interior components of the electronic watch. Final Act. 13
(citing Narayanaswami, Fig. 1, Item 25). The Examiner concludes it would
have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective
filing date of the claimed invention to use Narayanaswami's watch in
Kobayashi in view of Chen's device for efficiently interacting with alarms
and notifications on the watch. Id. (citing Narayanaswami Abstract).
Appellant argues similar to claim 22, discussed supra, that
Kobayashi’s teachings are limited to impedance values based on an ambient
environment. Appeal Br. 19. Appellant argues it is unclear why one with
skill in the art would combine Narayanaswami’s watch with the impedance
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detection by phone antennas described in Kobayashi to improve the
efficiency of the watch’s interactions with alarms and notifications, when
Kobayashi appears to not disclose anything related to an alarm or
notification. Id. at 20 (citing Final Act. 13).
In the Answer, the Examiner finds
Kobayashi discloses input impedances of the antenna of a
mobile phone are usually performance indices dependent on an
antenna element and a casing attached to the antenna element
(Kobayashi paragraph 0039). Therefore, Kobayashi's discloses
counteract an impact of an electronic device's housing.
Narayanaswami discloses “It would thus be highly desirable to
provide a wearable device/appliance (a wrist watch) capable of
wirelessly accessing information and equipped with an
interactive user interface and high resolution display for
providing a variety of desktop PC-like functions”
(Narayanaswami Col. 1 line 65-Col. 2 line 5). Since both
Narayanaswami's watch (Narayanaswami Fig. 1 Item 25) and
Kobayashi's device are related to wireless communication,
contrary to appellant's argument, it would be proper to combine
Kobayashi and Narayanaswami, and thus the combination of
Kobayashi and Narayanaswami support a prima facie case of
obviousness with respect to claim 29. Therefore, Kobayashi in
view of Narayanaswami teaches receiving setting(s) that
counteract an impact of an electronic watch housing on
communications of the radio frequency system, as generally
recited in independent claim 29.
Ans. 12.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant reiterates and argues Kobayashi
measures the impedance that is associated with the ambient environment and
not the casing (housing) of an electronic watch. Reply Br. 14 (citing
Kobayashi ¶¶ 13, 47, 27, 30 32, and 35). According to Appellant, measuring
the impedance is not the same as determining the identity of and settings
associated with the housing of an electronic watch and therefore Kobayashi
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does not teach counteracting impact of an electronic watch housing on
communications of the radio frequency system. Id. at 14–15.
Narayanaswami teaches a watch housing that is within the broadest
reasonable interpretation of “housing” discussed supra regarding claim 1.
Narayanaswami, Fig. 1, Item 25. Similar to the discussion regarding the
rejection of claim 22, Appellant’s arguments regarding claim 29 are based
on an unreasonably narrow interpretation of the teachings of Kobayashi and
Narayanaswami. The Examiner provides sufficient evidence to support why
one of ordinary skill in the art would combine these teachings to result in
claim 29.
Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 29.
Regarding claim 32, the Examiner finds Kobayashi in view of
Narayanaswami further discloses the watch housing is configured to protect
the interior components from physical damage, shield the interior
components from electromagnetic interference, or a combination thereof
(Narayanaswami, Fig. 1 Item 25). Final Act. 13–14.
Appellant argues Kobayashi teaches settings associated with the
ambient environment and counteract an impact of the ambient environment
on communications of the radio frequency system and not the impact of the
housing of the electric watch. Appeal Br. 19–20 (citing KO ¶¶ 13, 27, and
29). Appellant argues it is unclear why one with skill in the art would
combine Narayanaswami’s watch with the impedance detection by phone
antennas described in Kobayashi to improve the efficiency of the watch’s
interactions with alarms and notifications, when Kobayashi appears to not
disclose anything related to an alarm or notification. Id. at 20, citing Final
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Act. 13. In the Reply Brief, Appellant reiterates and does not persuasively
address the limitations of claim 32. Reply Br. 15–16.
Appellant’s arguments are directed to the limitations of claim 29 and
do not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s findings and conclusions regarding
the limitations of claim 32. Appeal Br, 19–20; Reply Br. 15–16. The
Examiner’s findings and conclusions are reasonable and are not persuasively
argued by Appellant.
Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 32.

The Rejection of claims 33–36 over Kobayashi, Narayanaswami, and
Asrani

Claims 33–36 depend directly or indirectly from claim 29 discussed
supra and are set forth below.
33. The radio frequency system of claim 29, wherein the
set of settings are configured to counteract an impact of a
material of the housing.

34. The radio frequency system of claim 33, wherein the
material comprises gold, stainless steel, aluminum, ceramic, or
any combination thereof.

35. The radio frequency system of claim 39, wherein the
set of particular settings are configured to counteract an impact
of a material of the watch band.

36. The radio frequency system of claim 35, wherein the
material comprises leather, rubber, metal, or any combination
thereof.

Regarding claim 33, the Examiner finds Asrani discloses the one or
more particular settings are configured to counteract an impact of a material
of the housing. Final Act. 14. The Examiner refers to Asrani paragraph 13
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What is needed is a system and method for a mobile
communication device that determines the type of housing
material installed on the mobile communication device so that
the circuitry of the mobile communication device can
retune the antennas according to the housing material and
thereby maintain antenna transmit and receive efficiency
(emphasis added).

The Examiner finds this reads on “housing material,” and concludes it
would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the
effective filing date of the claimed invention to use Asrani's method in
Kobayashi's device for maintaining antenna transmit and receive efficiency.
Id.
Appellant’s arguments are directed to claim 29 limitations discussed
supra, rather than claim 33 limitations. Appeal Br. 21–22; Reply Br. 21–22.
The Examiner’s findings and conclusions regarding claim 33 are reasonable
and are not persuasively rebutted by Appellant.
Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 33.
Regarding claim 34, the Examiner finds Narayanaswami teaches the
material comprises gold, stainless steel, aluminum, ceramic, or any
combination thereof. Final Act. 14 (citing (Narayanaswami, Fig. 1 Item 25).
Appellant’s arguments are directed to claim 29 limitations discussed
supra, rather than claim 34 limitations. Appeal Br. 21–22; Reply Br. 16–17.
The Examiner’s findings and conclusions regarding claim 34 are reasonable
and are not persuasively rebutted by Appellant.
Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 34.
Regarding claim 35, the Examiner finds Asrani discloses the one or
more particular settings are configured to counteract an impact of a material
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of the housing. Final Act. 15 (citing Asrani ¶ 13). The Examiner concludes
it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the
effective filing date of the claimed invention to use Asrani’s method in
Kobayashi's device for maintaining antenna transmit and receive efficiency.
Id.
Appellant argues Kobayashi does not teach settings associated with a
watch band. Appeal Br. 21. Appellant argues Asrani teaches determining
antenna settings of a mobile device based on housing material installed on
the mobile device. Id. (citing Asrani ¶ 13). Appellant argues Asrani does
not teach the settings are used to counteract the impact of the watch band.
Id. According to Appellant, Asrani housing appears to encompass and be in
close proximity to the mobile device. Id. at 21–22. According to Appellant,
watchband material may not encompass and may be further away from the
housing material. Id. (citing Spec., Gig. 5, element 60). Appellant argues
neither Kobayashi or Narayanaswami obviates these deficiencies. Id.
In the Answer, the Examiner finds
Claim 35 recites the set of particular settings are configured to
counteract an impact of a material of the watch band”. Claim 35
does not recite whether the impact is due to encompassing and
is in close proximity to the mobile device or not encompassing
and is further away from the mobile device. Asrani discloses
“What is needed is a system and method for a mobile
communication device that determines the type of housing
material installed on the mobile communication device so that
the circuitry of the mobile communication device can retune the
antennas according to the housing material and thereby
maintain antenna transmit and receive efficiency” (Asrani
paragraph 0013). As mentioned above, Narayanaswami
discloses a watch with a watch band (Narayanaswami Fig. 1
Item 25) for wireless communication. Therefore, Kobayashi in
view of Narayanaswami and Asrani teaches settings that
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counteract an impact of watch band material on the
communications of the radio frequency system, as generally
recited in dependent claim 35.
Ans. 13.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues the Examiner errs in contending
that claim 35 does not recite whether the “impact is due to encompassing
[material] and [whether the material] is in close proximity to the mobile
device or not encompassing and is further away from the mobile device.”
Reply Br. 16–17. Appellant argues Arsani does not teach settings that
counteract an impact of watch band material on the communications of the
radio frequency system and instead, merely teaches retuning the antennas
according to the housing material. Id. at 16 (citing Arsani ¶ 13). Appellant
argues that a watch band is not the same as a housing and thus Arsani does
not match settings that counteract an impact of watch band material. Id.
We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because the Examiner
presents insufficient evidence for a prima facie case of obviousness. In
particular, the Examiner does not show that one of ordinary skill in the art
would understand Asrani’s teachings extend to a watch band. The
Examiner’s findings are based only on the Asrani housing without
discussion of why the teaching would also be applicable to a watch band.
Therefore, on the record before us, we do not sustain the rejection of
claim 35.
Regarding claim 36, the Examiner finds Narayanaswami teaches the
material comprises leather, rubber, metal, or any combination thereof. Final
Act. 15 (citing Narayanaswami, Fig. 1 Item 25). The Examiner’s findings
and conclusions regarding claim 36 are reasonable and are not persuasively
argued by Appellant.
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Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 36.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we do not sustain the § 112 written
description rejection of claim 9. We sustain the § 112 indefiniteness
rejection of claims 37–39.
For the reasons stated above, we sustain the obviousness rejection of
claims 6, 20, 22, 23–25, 28, and 29–36. We do not sustain the obviousness
rejection of claims 1–5, 9, 15, 17–21, and 28.

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
9, 37–39 112(a) Written
description
37–39 9
3,5, 17,
18, 20
112(a) Indefiniteness 3, 5, 17, 18,
20
1, 2, 4, 5,
17–19,
21–23, 25,
28
103(a) Kobayashi,
Chen
22, 23, 25,
28
1, 2, 4, 5, 17–
19, 21
3, 20 103(a) Kobayashi,
Chen,
Rubbmark
3, 20
6, 24 103(a) Kobayashi,
Chen, Asrani
6, 24
9 103(a) Kobayashi,
Chen,
Finkenzeller
9
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Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
157 103(a) Kobayashi,
Chen,
Narayanaswami
15
29, 32 103(a) Kobayashi,
Narayanaswami
29, 32
33–36 103(a) Kobayashi,
Narayanaswami,
Asrani
33, 34, 36 35
Overall
Outcome
6, 22–25, 28,
29, 32, 33,
34, 36–39
1–5, 9, 15,
17–21, 35

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2011).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

7 Claim 27 is omitted here because it is cancelled.