Apple Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 11, 2021

2019006409 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/681,911 04/08/2015 Keith Barraclough NIMD.006PA 3744
73576 7590 02/11/2021
APPLE INC. - Fletcher
c/o Fletcher Yoder, PC
P.O. Box 692289
Houston, TX 77269-2289
EXAMINER
EL-BKAILY, AHMAD M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2176
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/11/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket@fyiplaw.com
hill@fyiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte KEITH BARRACLOUGH, DAVID IRVINE, and JOHN LOGAN
____________________

Appeal 2019-006409
Application 14/681,911
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, ERIC S. FRAHM, and BETH Z. SHAW,
Administrative Patent Judges.

FRAHM, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2017). “The word ‘applicant’ when used in this title refers
to the inventor or all of the joint inventors, or to the person applying for a
patent as provided in §§ 1.43, 1.45, or 1.46.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant
identifies the real party in interest as Apple, Inc. (Appeal Br. 2).
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DISCLOSED AND CLAIMED INVENTION
According to Appellant, the disclosed invention, entitled “CONTENT
RENDITION GENERATION AND CONTROL” (Title), relates to the
rendition of media content (see Spec. 1:20), and more particularly to a
method (claim 1) and apparatus (claim 18) for “provid[ing] access to
disparate types of media content on certain devices, or in a flowing and
pleasing format” (Spec. 1:12–13). Appellant discloses and claims
reformatting disparately-formatted media content into a common format
based on disparate device types and characteristics (see claims 1 and 18),
and where necessary, controlling scaling of the content data (see claim 18).
Exemplary independent claims 1 and 18 are illustrative of the claimed
subject matter, and are reproduced below:
1. A method comprising:
utilizing circuitry, reformatting sets of disparately-
formatted media content from disparate publishers having
disparate formats into corresponding renditions of media content
having a common format, the common format including device-
indeterminate ID linking data that links at least one page
corresponding to respective portions of each rendition in the
common format to at least one page corresponding to portions of
the disparately-formatted media content from which each
rendition is generated, the respective portions including assets
and a structural component of the media content that includes the
assets;
for each rendition, utilizing circuitry to generate respective
reformatted assets, each reformatted asset being specific to one
of a plurality of disparate types of devices, based upon
characteristics of the disparate device types; and
[A] tracking access to at least one of the portions of the
disparately-formatted media content and the assets within the
portions of the disparately-formatted media content, based on the
linking data.
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Appeal Br. 18, Claims Appendix (bracketed lettering and emphases added).
18. An apparatus comprising:
a content generation circuit configured and arranged to
access media content from disparate content
providers and in disparate formats,
reformat accessed media content of disparate
formats into a common scalable content format that is
different than the disparate formats, and
store assets corresponding to an original version of
the reformatted media content in association with device-
indeterminate metadata that identifies the media content;
a content reformatting circuit configured and arranged to
communicate with a plurality of different types of
remote user devices including devices having disparate
electronic interface characteristics relating to a format of
the media content provided via the device,
for each remote device, identify a format type for
that device from one of a plurality of format types for
different devices, based on communications with the
device,
for each identified format type, access the stored
assets corresponding to the original version of the
reformatted media content and [B] generate scaled
versions of the assets in a format that complies with the
identified format type and that includes metadata
identifying the media content, and
a communication circuit configured and arranged to
communicate each respective scaled asset to a remote device for
which the scaled asset has been generated, thereby providing
access to the media content of disparate formats at disparate
remote devices having disparate electronic interface
characteristics, using a single rendition for each set of media
content.
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Appeal Br. 25–26, Claims Appendix (bracketed lettering and
emphases added).
The Examiner’s Rejections
(1) The Examiner rejected claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
being directed to a judicial exception such as an abstract idea, without
significantly more (see Final Act. 3–11). Because the Examiner has
withdrawn this rejection in the Answer (see Ans. 3), we do not reach the
merits or otherwise review this rejection in our decision, and we will not
address Appellant’s arguments (see Appeal Br. 5–12) directed thereto.
(2) The Examiner rejected claims 1–5 and 8–19 as being unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over McCurdy et al. (US 2002/0035697 A1;
published March 21, 2002) (hereinafter, “McCurdy”), Keebler et al. (US
2012/0284290 A1; published Nov. 8, 2012) (hereinafter, “Keebler”), and
Doll et al. (US 2013/0024757 A1; published Jan. 24, 2013) (hereinafter,
“Doll”) (Final Act. 12–26).2
(3) The Examiner rejected dependent claims 6, 7, and 20 as being
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over McCurdy, Keebler, Doll, and

2 Appellant presents separate arguments in two major groups: (1) claims 1–5
and 8–17, primarily arguing claim 1 (see Appeal Br. 13–14; Reply Br. 2–4);
and (2) claims 18 and 19, primarily arguing claim 18 (see Appeal Br. 14–15;
Reply Br. 4–6). Based on Appellant’s arguments, we select (i) claim 1 as
representative of the group of claims consisting of claims 1–5 and 8–17; and
claim 18 as representative of the group of claims consisting of claims 18 and
19. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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Kessel et al. (US 2012/0197998 A1; published Aug. 2, 2012) (hereinafter,
“Kessel”)3 (Final Act. 26–31).4
Principal Issues on Appeal
Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief (Appeal Br. 12–
17) and the Reply Brief (Reply Br. 2–6), the following principal issue is
presented on appeal:
Has Appellant shown the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–20 as
being obvious over the base combination of McCurdy, Keebler, and Doll
because the base combination fails to teach or suggest (i) limitation A, as
recited in representative claim 1; and/or (ii) limitation B, as recited in
representative claim 18?

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections (Final Act. 12–31) in
light of Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief (Appeal Br. 12–17) and

3 Although the heading of the statement of the rejection of claims 6, 7, and
20 does not include Keebler as being applied (see Final Act. 26), the body of
the rejection discusses Keebler on the merits as being part of the rejection
(see generally Appeal Br. 27–31). This concurs with (i) Appellant’s
recognition of the rejection as being over the combination of McCurdy,
Keebler, Doll, and Kessel (see Reply Br. 5); and (ii) the fact that because
claims 6, 7, and 20 depend from respective ones of claims 1 and 18, claims
6, 7, and 20 include subject matter for which Keebler was applied as to
claims 1 and 18 (requiring Keebler for the rejection). This is harmless error,
and we consider the rejection to be over the combination of McCurdy,
Keebler, Doll, and Kessel.
4 Appellant relies upon the arguments presented as to independent claims 1
and 18 for the patentability of claims 6, 7, and 20 rejected over McCurdy,
Keebler, and Kessel (see Appeal Br. 15–16). Therefore, we will decide the
outcome of claims 6, 7, and 20 on the same basis as claims 1 and 18 from
which claims 6, 7, and 20 directly and respectively depend.
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the Reply Brief (Reply Br. 2–6) that the Examiner has erred. We have also
reviewed the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s arguments in the
Examiner’s Answer (Ans. 3–6). We disagree with Appellant’s contentions,
which address the teachings of McCurdy, Keebler, and Doll individually,
and fail to address the Examiner’s reliance on the combination of references
as teaching or suggesting the disputed limitations (see e.g., limitation A in
claim 1, and limitation B in claim 18 supra).
With regard to representative claim 1, we adopt as our own (1) the
findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Final Office Action
from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 12–14), and (2) the reasons set
forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer (Ans. 2–5) in response to
Appellant’s Appeal Brief.
With regard to independent claim 18, we also adopt as our own (1) the
findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this
appeal is taken (Final Act. 23–25), and (2) the reasons set forth by the
Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to the Appellant’s Appeal
Brief (Ans. 5).
In general, Appellant’s arguments (see Appeal Br. 13–15; Reply Br.
2–6) address the individual shortcomings of McCurdy and Doll, are
conclusory, and do not address the collective teachings and suggestions of
the references. Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 1 and 18 over the base combination of McCurdy, Keebler, and Doll.
We note that each reference cited by the Examiner must be read, not
in isolation, but for what it fairly teaches in combination with the prior art as
a whole. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
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(finding one cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references
individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references).
Here, Appellant generally argues that McCurdy and Doll individually
fail to teach (i) limitation A recited in claim 1 (see Appeal Br. 14; Reply Br.
3); and/or (ii) limitation B recited in claim 18 (see Appeal Br. 14–15; Reply
Br. 4–5). However, these conclusory statements are not persuasive to show
the Examiner erred in relying on the combination of references in teaching
or suggesting the disputed limitations.
Instead, as to claim 1, we find the Examiner’s findings, reasoning, and
response to Appellant’s arguments (see Ans. 3–5) to be reasonable.
McCurdy teaches tracking access (see McCurdy ¶ 302), Keebler teaches
tracking data content using linking metadata identifying content and
attributes when aggregating data (see Keebler ¶¶ 53, 54, 60), and Doll
teaches identifying and selecting assets within portions of disparately-
formatted media content based on linking data (e.g., page templates and
layouts, overall dimensions, size constraints, size options, aspect ratio) (see
Doll ¶¶ 30, 35 and 36, asset identification module 131 and sizing module
135).
And, as to claim 18, Appellant’s arguments that McCurdy fails to
teach scaling (see Reply Br. 4–5) are not persuasive, inasmuch as the
Examiner relies upon Doll as teaching scaling. As for the claimed “metadata
identifying the media content” (see claim 18, limitation B), we agree with
the Examiner (see Ans. 5) that claim 18 only requires the metadata be
included, not that it be generated. Furthermore, Appellant’s argument that
McCurdy’s metadata does not pertain to original media content, but
converted content (see Reply Br. 5), does not address the Examiner’s
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expanded reliance on (i) paragraph 121 of McCurdy (see Ans. 5) as teaching
elements of claim 18, namely limitation B, including the relationship
between metadata and formatting; along with (ii) Doll (see Final Act. 25) as
teaching metadata such as size, aspect ratio, and dimensions used to
optimize layout for viewing; and (iii) Keebler (see Final Act. 13) as teaching
associating content objects and content sources with unique identifiers.
Appellant has not shown modifying McCurdy to include metadata
identifying media content would require more than ordinary skill in the
pertinent art, or that Keebler does not teach tracking data content using
linking metadata identifying content and attributes.
In this light, Appellant’s arguments as to claims 1 and 18 concerning
the individual shortcomings in the teachings of McCurdy and Doll are not
persuasive, and are not convincing of the non-obviousness of the claimed
invention set forth in claims 1 and 18. And, Appellant’s contention (Reply
Br. 5) that the base combination of McCurdy, Keebler, and Doll fails to
teach limitation B of claim 18, is based on disputes as to individual reference
teachings, and is thus conclusory and unpersuasive.5

5 “A prima facie case of obviousness is established when the teachings from
the prior art itself would appear to have suggested the claimed subject matter
to a person of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 783 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (quoting In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1051 (CCPA 1976))
(emphasis added). “‘[T]he question under 35 USC 103 is not merely what
the references expressly teach but what they would have suggested to one of
ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.’” Merck & Co.
v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting In re
Lamberti, 545 F.2d 747, 750 (CCPA 1976)) (emphasis added); see also
MPEP § 2123.

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In view of the foregoing, we sustain the rejection of representative
claims 1 and 18 as being obvious over the base combination of McCurdy,
Keebler, and Doll, as well as the corresponding claims grouped respectively
therewith. We also sustain the rejection of dependent claims 6, 7, and 20 for
the reasons provided as to claims 1 and 18, from which claims 6, 7, and 20
respectively depend.

CONCLUSION
Appellant has not adequately shown the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 1–20 over the base combination of McCurdy, Keebler, and Doll. As
a result, the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–20 are affirmed.
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
References/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–5, 8–19 103(a) McCurdy,
Keebler, Doll
1–5, 8–19
6, 7, 20 103(a) McCurdy,
Keebler, Doll,
Kessel
6, 7, 20
Overall
Outcome
1–20

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED