01981666
11-25-1998
Linda M. Threatt v. United States Postal Service
01981666
November 25, 1998
Linda M. Threatt,
Appellant,
v.
William J. Henderson,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
(Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic Areas),
Agency.
Appeal No. 01981666
Agency No. 1D-221-1118-95
1D-221-1151-95
Hearing No. 100-96-7182X
100-96-7515X
100-97-7200X
DECISION
Appellant timely initiated an appeal to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (Commission or EEOC) from a final agency decision (FAD)
concerning her allegations that she was discriminated against, in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq. The Commission hereby accepts the appeal in
accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001. For the reasons set forth below
the FAD is AFFIRMED.
The issues on appeal are as follows:
Complaint No. 1/Hearing No. 100-96-7182X - whether appellant
was discriminated against on the bases of sex (female), race
(African-American), color (brown), and reprisal (prior EEO activity),
when from March 25, 1995 through May 9, 1995: (1) she was denied an
opportunity to work at a higher level as an acting supervisor; and (2)
she was denied career developmental details.
Complaint No. 2/Hearing No. 100-96-7515X - whether appellant was
discriminated against on the basis of reprisal when on June 1, 1995, and
ongoing: (1) she was denied an opportunity to work at a higher level as an
acting supervisor; and (2) she was denied career developmental details.
Complaint No. 3/Hearing No. 100-97-7200X - whether appellant
was discriminated against on the bases of sex (female), race
(African-American), color (brown), and reprisal (prior EEO activity)
when: (1) in June 1994 she was removed from the Supervisor's schedule;
and (2) from May 1994 through March 24, 1995, she was kept off the Acting
Supervisor's schedule.
At the time of the alleged discriminatory events, appellant was
employed as a Distribution Clerk at the agency's Merrifield Processing
and Distribution Center in Merrifield, Virginia. The investigative
record reveals that beginning in May 1994, the Manager of Distribution
Operations (MDO1) removed appellant's name from the schedule list of
acting supervisors. Consequently, a second MDO (MDO2) did not use
appellant as an acting supervisor. From March 25 and thereafter,
appellant was not chosen to participate in any of a number of duties
that she perceived as career developmental opportunities, including:
Dispatch Coordinator, relief for the Manager Distribution Operations
and relief for the Administrative Support Office. Several similarly
situated comparators were treated more favorably. The agency presented
credible testimony that appellant was removed from the acting supervisor
list because she was found to be lacking in integrity and because of
poor performance. Specifically, MDO1 and MDO2 concluded that appellant
had lied about another employee's whereabouts and behavior in a witness
statement she made for a Union Grievance appeal. The agency officials
further testified that permitting appellant to work in a supervisory
capacity would affect the morale of the duty station as it would
give the impression that they were rewarding lackluster performance.
Further, individuals who participated in the aforementioned developmental
opportunities were selected based on their dependability and work ethic.
Appellant had not displayed the desired attributes and work quality.
Believing that she was the victim of discrimination, appellant sought
EEO counseling and, thereafter, filed formal EEO complaints on August
24, 1995 (Complaint No. 1) and October 10, 1995 (Complaint No. 2).
The agency accepted the complaints for investigation and complied with all
of our procedural and regulatory prerequisites. Thereafter, the agency
dismissed part of Complaint No. 1 and continued processing the rest of
the complaint. Subsequently, appellant requested a hearing before an
EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) concerning that portion of Complaint No. 1
that was not dismissed and Complaint No. 2. and appealed the dismissal to
the Commission. In Threatt v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal
No. 01960443 (October 8, 1996) the Commission remanded several of the
issues that had been dismissed. During the period that the remanded
issues were being investigated, and because a hearing date had been
set for Complaint Numbers 1 and 2, the agency moved for a continuance
in order that the AJ might review the remanded issues at the same time.
The motion was granted and the complaints were consolidated for review
by the AJ. The remanded issues were assigned a separate EEOC hearing
number, 100-97-7200X and referred to by the AJ as Complaint No. 3.
Prior to the hearing, the AJ responded to the agency's motion for a
decision on the record. After consideration of the respective positions
of the parties, the AJ concluded that there were no issues of material
fact and granted the motion.
Upon review of the record, the AJ issued a Recommended Decision (RD)
finding no discrimination. In her RD, the AJ concluded that appellant
had established a prima facie case of discrimination based on race, color
and sex, but failed to show that the agency's actions were pretextual.
The AJ further concluded that appellant failed to establish a prima
facie case of reprisal discrimination because there was no showing that
any of the responsible agency officials were aware of appellant's prior
EEO activity. Thereafter, the agency adopted the RD and issued a FAD,
dated November 19, 1997, finding no discrimination. It is from this
agency decision that appellant now appeals. On appeal, appellant
reiterates previously submitted contentions.
After careful review of the entire record, including arguments and
evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, the Commission finds
that the AJ's RD sets forth the relevant facts, and properly analyzes
the appropriate regulations, policies and laws. The Commission discerns
no basis to disturb the AJ's finding. Accordingly, the FAD is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0795)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available
when the previous decision was issued; or
2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,
regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or
3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial
precedential implications.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST
BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this
decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive
a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in
opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider
MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party
WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request
to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments
must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,
the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received
by the Commission.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances
have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,
a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the
delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your
request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests
for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � l6l4.604(c).
RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)
It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file
a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN
NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.
You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that
a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from
the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil
action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY
(30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or
to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the
jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil
action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON
WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT
PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may
result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department"
means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or
department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the
administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
Nov 25, 1998
______________ ____________________________________
Date Ronnie Blumenthal, Director
Office of Federal Operations