Anurup Singhal et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 15, 2020

15391662 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 15, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/391,662 12/27/2016 Anurup Singhal 0557 (134140.01242) 4477
43699 7590 04/15/2020
Go Daddy Operating Company, LLC
14455 NORTH HAYDEN ROAD
SUITE 219
SCOTTSDALE, AZ 85260
EXAMINER
CHEN, WUJI
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2456
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/15/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
inventions@godaddy.com
pat-dept@quarles.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ANURUP SINGHAL, ARNOLD NEIL BLINN, GUY WILLIAM
ELLIS, and JUDD CONRAD JACOBS
Appeal 2019-000694
Application 15/391,662
Technology Center 2400
BEFORE CATHERINE SHIANG, JASON J. CHUNG, and
SCOTT E. BAIN, Administrative Patent Judges.

BAIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 1–7, which constitute all claims pending in the
application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Go Daddy
Operating Company, LLC. Appeal Br. 1.
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BACKGROUND
The Claimed Invention
The invention relates to modifying the content of a website via text
messaging. Spec. ¶ 1, Abstract. Claim 1, the sole independent claim, is
illustrative of the invention and the subject matter in dispute, and reads as
follows:
1. A method, comprising the steps of:
hosting a website configured to be altered by a text
message sent by an owner of the website from a text device
having a user phone number, wherein a text service determines
the website to be altered out of a plurality of websites based on
the user phone number;
receiving the text message at a text phone number of the
text service running on one or more hardware servers sent by
the owner of the website from the text device;
producing, on the one or more hardware servers, an
action code comprising an alpha-numeric string based, at least
in part, on the text message; and
transmitting, by the one or more hardware servers, the
action code to one or more hosting servers, wherein the action
code is used to alter the website by changing a template of the
website.
Appeal Br. 8 (Claims Appendix) (emphases added).

References
The references relied upon by the Examiner are:
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Name Reference Date
Six et al. US 2008/0227435 A1 Sept. 18, 2008
Breaker et al. (“Breaker”) US 2009/0287701 A1 Nov. 19, 2009
Hashmi US 2013/0326333 A1 Dec. 5, 2013
Jorasch et al. (“Jorasch”) US 2014/0250198 A1 Sept. 4, 2014

The Rejections on Appeal
Claims 1, 2, and 6 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Jorasch and Hashmi. Final Act. 7–10.
Claims 3–5 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Jorasch, Hashmi, and Breaker. Final Act. 10–11.
Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Jorasch, Hashmi, Breaker, and Six. Final Act. 11–12.

DISCUSSION
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments presented in this appeal. Arguments which Appellant could have
made but did not make in the Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv). On the record before us, Appellant has not persuaded us
of error. We adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth in the
rejections and in the Examiner’s Answer, and we provide the following for
highlighting and emphasis.

Nonstatutory Double Patenting Rejection
Appellant does not contest the double patenting rejection of claims 1–
7, stating only that the rejection should be “held in abeyance.” Appeal Br. 3.
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The Examiner maintains the rejection. Ans. 3. Accordingly, we summarily
sustain the double patenting rejection of claims 1–7.

Rejection of Claims 1, 2, and 6
Under 35 U.S.C. § 103
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding the prior art teaches or
suggests “determines the website to be altered out of a plurality of websites
based on the user phone number,” as recited in claim 1 (emphasis added).
Appeal Br. 4–5. Appellant additionally argues the prior art lacks any
teaching or suggestion of an “action code [] used to alter the website by
changing a template of the website,” as further recited in claim 1. Id. 5.
Finally, Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding a rationale for
combining Jorasch and Hashmi. Id. We, however, are not persuaded of
error.
As to Appellant’s first argument, we agree with the Examiner’s
finding that Jorasch teaches or suggests a “user phone number” to determine
the website to be altered. Ans. 9. Specifically, Jorasch discloses “computer
servers [to] receive an electronic message at [an] email address,”
automatically “extract[ing] content from the electronic message,” and
“post[ing] the content extracted from the electronic message at the
destination at the website.” Jorasch ¶ 12. Jorasch further discloses that,
instead of an email address associated with content submission, the disclosed
system can use “a mobile phone number” and “text” the desired content
(such as a picture to be posted on a website) using a “mobile phone” and
“Short Message Service” (SMS, i.e., text) Id. ¶¶ 45–46. Even if Jorasch had
not explicitly disclosed using text, rather than email, to modify a website, we
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also agree with the Examiner’s finding that a person of ordinary skill would
have found it obvious to make that substitution, based on the teachings of
Jorasch. Ans. 8–9; see also Jorasch ¶¶ 12, 39, 45–51.
We are also unpersuaded by Appellant’s second argument because, as
the Examiner finds, Jorasch discloses extracting “commands” which cause a
website to be modified from its prior appearance (i.e., template) to a new
appearance, such as by posting a “sepia image” on the page or “publish[ing]
text.” Jorasch ¶ 49; Ans. 9. As described in Appellant’s Specification,
“changing a template” for a website includes “changing/adding/deleting a
graphic, blogging, performing customer service or support and/or
changing/adding/deleting a promotion.” Spec. ¶ 44. This is precisely what
is disclosed in Jorasch. Jorasch ¶¶ 45–46, 49–51. Appellant identifies no
error, and we discern none, in the Examiner’s finding that Jorasch’s
disclosure of commands to alter a website would be understood by one of
ordinary skill as being (or causing execution of) “action codes” as recited in
claim 1. Ans. 9; Final Act. 8–9. The Specification does not characterize
“action codes” as anything other than software, i.e., code carrying out a
user’s desired modifications, as described above. Spec. ¶¶ 2–7.
The Examiner also cites Hashmi regarding the disputed limitation. In
light of the foregoing, we view Hashmi as redundant in the rejection of
claim 1, but we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Hashmi (in
combination with Jorasch) also teaches modifying a website “template”
based on a user’s commands to “modules” (action codes). Ans. 10; Hashmi
¶¶ 41–42 (disclosing modification of a website “template”).
Appellant’s argument regarding the rationale to combine Jorasch with
Hashmi consists of a cursory, single sentence, and we discern no error in the
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Examiner’s findings. Appeal Br. 5; Final Act. 9. Both references are
directed to the problem of efficient, convenient user modification of web
sites, and a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to look to
Hashmi’s “modules” for modifying website “templates,” in applying
Jorasch’s email or text-based modification. Id.; KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (“[T]he [obviousness] analysis need not seek
out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged
claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.”). In addition, as discussed
above, Hashmi is redundant in the rejection of claim 1.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the Examiner did not err in
rejecting claim 1. For the same reasons, we are unpersuaded of error
regarding the rejection of claims 2 and 6, which Appellant does not argue
separately. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We, therefore, sustain the
obviousness rejection of claims 1, 2, and 6.

Rejections of Remaining Claims Under 35 U.S.C. § 103
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding the prior art teaches or
suggests the action code is “based, at least in part, on the text message and
the text phone number,” as recited in dependent claim 4. Appeal Br. 6.
Appellant argues that “text phone number” refers to the phone number of the
text service, not the user. Id. Although we agree with Appellant’s
contention regarding how the claim element should be construed, we are not
persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 4.
The Examiner cites Breaker, combined with Jorasch and Hashmi, as
teaching or suggesting the disputed limitation. Ans. 11–12. Breaker
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discloses a user SMS (text message) and user phone number associated with
that message. Breaker ¶¶ 52–53. If this had been the extent of the prior art
cited by the Examiner, we would agree with Appellant’s argument. As
Appellant argues, the Specification plainly states that “text phone number”
refers to the phone number of the “text service” (associated with the web
service provider or equivalent) and “user phone number” refers to the user’s
phone number. Spec. ¶ 3. The distinction between the two is clear. Id.
As discussed above, however, the Examiner relies not on Breaker
alone, but on the combination of Breaker with Jorasch and Hashmi. Ans.
11–12; Final Act. 11; In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (observing that a reference must be read “not in isolation, but for
what it fairly teaches in combination with the [cited] prior art as a whole.”).
Jorasch discloses that a user can direct a message to different email
addresses of the website service in order to alter different portions of the
user’s website. Jorasch ¶ 51. For example, a user emailing
“mysportsteam.pictures.1@nexo.com” would post a photo on page 1 of a
website, while emailing mysportsteam.pictures.8@nexo.com would post a
photo on page 8. Id. Further, as discussed above, Jorasch discloses that
texts can be used instead of email, i.e., “text messages” (e.g., by Short
Message Service) may be sent to “designated . . . addresses” from a “mobile
phone[].” Id. ¶ 45. Based upon the foregoing disclosures, we find Jorasch
(in combination with the other references) teaches or suggests the disputed
limitation of producing an action code “at least in part, on the text message
and the text phone number,” as recited in claim 4. Appeal Br. 6 (emphasis
added). We, therefore, are unpersuaded of error in the rejection of claim 4.
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We do not enter a new ground of rejection of claim 4, notwithstanding
our departure from the Examiner’s reliance on Breaker in the Answer,
because the Examiner also cited and relied upon the relevant portions of
Jorasch which we discuss and rely upon, above. See supra; see also Final
Act. 7–9 (rejection of claim 1, from which claim 4 depends). The “basic
thrust of the rejection at the examiner and board level [is] the same, and we
believe that appellants have had fair opportunity to react to that rejection.”
In re Kronig, 539 F.2d 1300, 1302–03, (CCPA 1976).
Appellant does not argue the rejections of the remaining claims
separately. Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed above, we discern
no error in the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of these claims. We sustain
the rejection of claims 3–5.

SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–7 Nonstatutory
Double Patenting
1–7
1, 2, 6 103 Jorasch, Hashmi 1, 2, 6
3–5 103 Jorasch, Hashmi,
Breaker
3–5
7 103 Jorasch, Hashmi,
Breaker, Six
7
Overall
Outcome
1–7
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DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–7.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED