Anuj Chawla

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 17, 2015

No. 86120216 (T.T.A.B. Jun. 17, 2015)

THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB

Mailed:
June 17, 2015

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Anuj Chawla
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Serial No. 86120216
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Nicholas D. Wells of Kirton McConkie for Anuj Chawla.

Jeanie H. Lee, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 105 (Susan Hayash,
Managing Attorney).
_____

Before Bergsman, Shaw, and Masiello, Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Masiello, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Anuj Chawla (“Applicant”), an individual, has applied for registration on the
Principal Register of the mark set forth below:

Applicant seeks to register the mark for the following goods:
Movie making camera accessories, namely, camera
mounts and supports in the nature of stabilizing systems
comprised of rests and platforms, body support and
shoulder supports being stabilizers, matte box, rod
support mounts for securing add-on equipment, follow
focus devices and geared rings, jib, stands, dollies, pan tilt
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head, gimbal head, led light, car mount, glue pod;
microphone accessories, namely, microphone blimps and
windshields, boom poles constructed of metal, plastic,
foam and cloth, in International Class 9.1
The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration under Section 2(d) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant’s mark, as used
in connection with Applicant’s goods, so resembles two registered marks, owned by
different entities, as to be likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive. The cited marks are registered in standard character form for the goods
and services set forth opposite them, below:
Mark: Registered for:
SuperFlyCam Rental of cinematographic machines and apparatus;
Motion picture film production, in International Class 41.2

FLYCAMONE Video cameras, in International Class 9.3

When the refusal was made final, Applicant filed a notice of appeal and a request
for reconsideration. The Examining Attorney denied the request for reconsideration
and this appeal proceeded. Applicant and the Examining Attorney have filed briefs.
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the
probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on the issue of
likelihood of confusion as set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d

1 Application Serial No. 86120216, filed November 15, 2013 under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), with a claim of first use and first use in commerce as
of December 1, 2004.
2 Reg. No. 3095702 issued May 23, 2006; Section 8 affidavit accepted; Section 15 affidavit
acknowledged.
3 Reg. No. 3453101 issued June 24, 2008; Section 8 affidavit accepted; Section 15 affidavit
acknowledged.
Serial No. 86120216

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1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973). In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two
key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the similarities
between the goods and services at issue. See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard
Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976). In this case, Applicant
and the Examining Attorney have also submitted arguments regarding the relevant
channels of trade. We have considered each of these issues and all other matters of
which there is evidence of record.
1. The marks.
We first consider the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks at issue in their
entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. See
Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396
F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689 (Fed. Cir. 2005). While we consider each mark in its
entirety, there is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less
weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided that our ultimate
conclusion rests upon a comparison of the marks in their entireties. In re Nat’l Data
Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
The Examining Attorney argues that the literal portion of Applicant’s mark, the
wording FLYCAM, is incorporated in its entirety within each of the cited marks,
making each cited mark identical in part to Applicant’s mark. The Examining
Attorney argues that Applicant’s mark and the FLYCAM portion of the two cited
marks have the same meaning, “suggestive of a cinematographic feature or function
Serial No. 86120216

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of each of the parties’ goods and services.”4 She contends that SuperFlyCam would
likely be perceived by customers as Applicant’s mark with the laudatory prefix
SUPER added. She argues that customers would likely interpret FLYCAMONE as
referring to “the first version of video cameras in applicant’s FLYCAM series of
cinematographic goods.”5
Applicant, for its part, argues that “the addition of the words ‘super’ and ‘one’ on
the respective cited marks creates a significant difference in appearance, sound,
meaning, and commercial impression.”6 With respect to SuperFlyCam, Applicant
argues that customers would parse it as “superfly cam,” so that it would convey
“how ‘cool’ or ‘hip’ [Registrant’s] service is and even suggests its appeal to a younger
demographic.”7 The record shows that “superfly” is a slang term meaning “way cool
or off the chain”;8 and “Expanding the scope of fly. Suaveness elevated by redeeming
characteristics such as intelect [sic], sophistication, sensuality, charm and respect.”9
We note that this “parsing” of the mark would probably affect the pronunciation of
the mark, changing the stress pattern to SU-per-fly CAM, rather than SU-per FLY-
cam.

4 Examining Attorney’s brief, 10 TTABVUE 7-8. The meaning of the mark is discussed more
fully below.
5 Id., 10 TTABVUE 10.
6 Applicant’s brief, 8 TTABVUE 3.
7 Id., 8 TTABVUE 4.
8 Definition from THE ONLINE SLANG DICTIONARY, Applicant’s response of February 20,
2014 at 28.
9 Definition from URBAN DICTIONARY, id. at 33.
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With respect to the cited mark FLYCAMONE, Applicant argues that it could be
pronounced so that the final syllable rhymes with “bone,” resulting in a fanciful,
meaningless coinage. However, Applicant concedes that the final letters of the mark
could be perceived as the word “one,” such that the mark would suggest that
Registrant’s product is “number one among all competitors.” Applicant also
contends that this reading of the mark suggests the Presidential aircraft “Air Force
One”; and that it could also suggest a count-down, similar to “three-two-one,” such
as is used in the film industry immediately before shooting a scene, giving the
phrase “a familiar ring” to likely consumers of the goods.10
With respect to the appearance of the marks, we give due regard to the stylization
of the lettering in Applicant’s mark, which is a point of distinction. However,
prospective purchasers would readily perceive the essence of Applicant’s mark to be
its literal portion, FLYCAM. We must also consider that Registrants’ standard
character marks may be displayed in lettering styles that are similar to that of
Applicant. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909-10 (Fed. Cir.
2012). As a general matter, the specific style of a mark cannot, alone, distinguish it
from another mark that is registered in standard character form. Id.; In re Mighty
Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010). We also
acknowledge that the additional matter in the cited marks (i.e., the elements
SUPER- and -ONE) affects the cited marks’ appearance, such that they resemble
Applicant’s mark only in part.

10 Applicant’s brief, 8 TTABVUE 5.
Serial No. 86120216

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With respect to the pronunciation of the marks, we note initially that Applicant
has maintained, in prosecuting its application, that FLYCAM is not an actual word
or term of art. “FLYCAM has no meaning in the industry. … Applicant is not aware
of any use of FLYCAM except as Applicant’s trademark.”11 It follows that neither of
the cited marks is a known English word and, accordingly, there is no single correct
pronunciation for either one of them. In re Viterra Inc., 101 USPQ2d at 1912. To the
extent that each of the three marks incorporates the term FLYCAM, this term could
be pronounced the same in each mark.
Inasmuch as the word SUPER is a common and familiar word, it is more likely to
be perceived as a salient element of SUPERFLYCAM than would be the more
unusual SUPERFLY. Thus, we think it more likely that customers would perceive
this mark as “super flycam” rather than as “superfly cam.” (The Examining
Attorney has made of record at least one internet advertisement, apparently
originating with a Registrant, which renders the mark as “Super Flycam.”)12
Similarly, we expect that customers are more likely to perceive the last syllable of
FLYCAMONE as the common word “one,” rather than the meaningless phoneme
“mone.” Thus, at least some customers will perceive the mark as “flycam one” rather
than the wholly fanciful term “flycamone” (rhyming, as Applicant suggests, with
“bone”).
With respect to the meanings of the three marks, we begin with Applicant’s
assertion that FLYCAM has no relevant meaning, other than as Applicant’s

11 Applicant’s response of February 20, 2014 at 1-2.
12 Office Action of March 21, 2014 at 180.
Serial No. 86120216

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trademark, and that “[i]t is suggestive of a user’s ability to hold a camera stable
while shooting still images or while shooting movie film or capturing video. That is,
the camera remains stable while the operator moves about to aim the camera – the
operator can ‘fly’ from place to place.”13 We see no reason that the term FLYCAM,
as a component of the two cited registered marks, would not have the same
suggestive meaning as it has in Applicant’s mark, inasmuch FLYCAMONE is for
use on “video cameras” and SUPERFLYCAM is for use in connection with “rental of
cinematographic machines,” which include cameras. To this extent, the suggestive
meanings of the three marks are similar. The meanings of the cited marks are, of
course, varied by the addition of other matter, i.e., SUPER- and -ONE. However, the
new meanings are reasonable consistent with a perception of the marks as
indicating the same source as Applicant’s mark. SUPERFLYCAM suggests that the
Registrant’s goods are a superlative exemplar of the FLYCAM product.
FLYCAMONE suggests, as Applicant appears to acknowledge, that Registrant’s
goods are “number one” among FLYCAM products.14
As discussed, the three marks at issue are similar in part with respect to
appearance, sound, and meaning, despite the existence of certain differences. We
find that the similarities outweigh the differences such that, overall, the marks
create similar commercial impressions. Accordingly, we find that the du Pont factor

13 Applicant’s response of February 20, 2014 at 2.
14 See Applicant’s brief, 8 TTABVUE 5 (“[T]his pronunciation gives the impression that the
owner of FLYCAMONE claims to be number one among all competitors …”)
Serial No. 86120216

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of the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks favors a finding of likelihood of
confusion.
2. The goods and services.
We next consider the similarity or dissimilarity of the goods and services as
identified in the application and the cited registrations. Stone Lion Capital
Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1161-1162
(Fed. Cir. 2014); Octocom Syst. Inc. v. Houston Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937,
16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The goods and services offered under the
three marks at issue are not the same. Accordingly, we ask whether the goods and
services are related in some manner or whether the circumstances surrounding
their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that they
emanate from the same source. Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668
F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
We will first compare Applicant’s goods, which are “camera mounts and supports
in the nature of stabilizing systems” for “movie making cameras,” with the goods
sold under the mark FLYCAMONE, which are “video cameras.” The goods, as
defined, are complementary, as they are types of goods that are intended to be used
together by the same users; that is, one of Registrant’s cameras could be mounted
on one of Applicant’s mounts for the purpose of stabilizing the camera during use.
The record shows that such goods are sometimes offered under a single trademark.
For example, both a camera and a “Body/Boards Mount Package” are offered under
Serial No. 86120216

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the mark GoPro HERO3+.15 See also the “GoPro Camera Helmet/Bike Mount
Package”;16 and a “suction cup mount” and a “handlebar mount,” both for cameras,
offered under the mark GOPRO.17 A video camera is offered under the mark RED
Epic-M, a mount package is offered under the mark RED Scarlet-X Ti, and a
“titanium PL mount” is offered under the mark RED.18 A combined “Hands Free
Camcorder and Digital Camera Shoulder Support Bracket” is offered under the
ADORAMA mark.19
The Examining Attorney has also made of record at least nine use-based, third-
party registrations that cover both video cameras and camera mounts or supports.20
Third-party registrations which individually cover a number of different goods that
are based on use in commerce may have some probative value to the extent that
they serve to suggest that the listed goods are of a type which may emanate from
the same source. In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-1786; In re
Mucky Duck Mustard Co. Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988).
We find the evidence discussed above sufficient to demonstrate a commercial
relationship between Applicant’s goods and video cameras such that if such goods
were offered under similar trademarks, customers would likely believe that they
originate from the same source.

15 Office Action of March 21, 2014 at 33, 40.
16 Id. at 39.
17 Id. at 120.
18 Id. at 33-34, 36 and 122.
19 Id. at 103.
20 Id. at 123-165.
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We next compare Applicant’s goods with the services identified in the
SUPERFLYCAM registration, which are “rental of cinematographic machines and
apparatus.” We understand “cinematographic machines and apparatus” to include
motion picture cameras.21 Moreover, the evidence shows that camera mounts are
among the “apparatus” available through rental outlets for filmmaking equipment.
See the website at , offering rental and sale of cameras
(including “camcorders”), camera mounts, and other camera-related equipment;22
the website at , offering video cameras and various camera
mounts for rental;23 the website at , offering new and used video
cameras and camera mounts for sale and rental.24 Similar offerings of both types of
goods can be seen at the websites for DC Camera Rental;25 Samy’s Camera;26
Calumet Photographic;27 Midtown Video;28 and Video Gear.29 We acknowledge that
a manufactured product like a camera mount and the business of renting
cinematographic equipment are different in nature. However, the record contains

21 “Cinematography” is defined as “the art or technique of motion-picture photography.” 373
THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1987). See also
“cinematograph”: “1. a motion picture projector. 2. a motion picture camera.” Id. The Board
may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions. Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C.
Gourmet Food Imp. Co., 213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982), aff’d, 703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ 505
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
22 Office Action of March 21, 2014 at 16-40.
23 Id. at 45-55.
24 Id. at 87-92, 98-105.
25 Office Action of December 19, 2013 at 15-26.
26 Id. at 28-34, 38-45.
27 Id. at 62-66.
28 Office Action of October 14, 2014 at 6-7.
29 Id. at 10-11.
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one example of a business that offers camera equipment rental services and a
camera mount under a common mark, i.e., the mark ADORAMA used for both a
rental establishment and a combination camera with shoulder support.30 The record
also includes two third-party registrations that cover both camera tripods and
rental of camera equipment. See Reg. Nos. 4174626 and 3405429.31
For the reasons stated, we find, with respect to both of the cited marks that the du
Pont factor relating to the similarity or dissimilarity of the goods favors a finding of
likelihood of confusion.
3. Trade channels.
The evidence discussed and cited above in part 2 clearly shows that camera
mounts and video cameras such as those offered under the FLYCAMONE mark are
offered through the same specialized trade channels carrying camera equipment.
The same evidence shows a number of rental outlets that offer equipment for
making motion pictures, including numerous types of camera mounts and
stabilizing supports for cameras. Clearly, the SUPERFLYCAM rental service is a
type of channel of trade through which Applicant’s goods could be offered. It has
been recognized that likelihood of confusion may arise where confusingly similar
marks are used on goods, on the one hand, and in connection with sales of such
goods, on the other. See In re Wet Seal, Inc. v. FD Mgmt., Inc., 82 USPQ2d 1629,
1640 (TTAB 2006); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 840, 6 USPQ2d 1025,
1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988). See also J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair

30 Id. at 103.
31 Id. at 137-139, 126-130.
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Competition (4th ed.) § 24:25. Confusion may also occur where goods and the rental
of such goods are offered under confusingly similar marks, inasmuch as customers
would be exposed to both marks in the same marketplace.
We find, with respect to both cited marks, that the du Pont factor of established
and likely to continue trade channels favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.
4. Conclusion.
We have considered all of the arguments and evidence of record, including those
not specifically discussed herein, and all relevant du Pont factors. We affirm the
Examining Attorney’s refusal of registration on the ground that Applicant’s mark,
as used in connection with Applicant’s goods, so closely resembles the cited
registered marks as to be likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception as to the
source of Applicant’s goods.
Decision: The refusal to register is affirmed.