Anthony Kapp, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 21, 2004
01A44581_r (E.E.O.C. Dec. 21, 2004)

01A44581_r

12-21-2004

Anthony Kapp, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Anthony Kapp v. United States Postal Service

01A44581

December 21, 2004

.

Anthony Kapp,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A44581

Agency No. 4F-900-1202-95 and 4F-900-0161-98

Hearing No. 340-1998-03380X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the

following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final order.

The record reveals that complainant, a part-time flexible Letter Carrier

at the agency's Crenshaw Station, Los Angeles, California facility,

filed two formal EEO complaints, one on September 28, 1995; the other

complaint on July 28, 1998. In his complaints, complainant alleges that

he was subjected to retaliation for prior EEO activity (formal complaints

filed under Title VII and Rehabilitation Act) and discriminated against:

on the bases of disability (depression, unspecified) and race (Black)

when the uniform allowance for his carrier position was terminated from

July 1994 through August 1996, and his first-line supervisor (S1) did

not help him rectify the situation;

on the bases of disability, race and sex (male) when he was denied

overtime from April 25, 1995 through July 15, 1995, by S1 because he

was not allowed to work on off-days in his carrier position;

on the basis of disability when he was directed to deliver two large

parcels for another carrier on July 15, 1995;

when he was issued a notice of suspension for seven calendar days on

September 22, 1995; and

when, between April 9 and April 25, 1998, he was assigned to drive a

postal vehicle containing a hazardous chemical.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy of the

investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative

Judge (AJ). Previously, the AJ issued a decision by summary judgment.

The Commission determined in Anthony Kapp v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Appeal No. 01A11435 (October 18, 2001), that summary judgment was

inappropriate and directed the agency to submit the matter for a hearing.

Following a hearing on March 15, 2004, the AJ issued a bench decision,

dated March 31, 2004, finding no discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainant failed to established a prima facie

case of disability, race, or sex discrimination with any claims in

his complaint. The AJ found that complainant did not establish that

he was a qualified individual with a disability, nor that non-Black

employees received preferential treatment when compared to complainant.

Specifically, the AJ found that complainant failed to demonstrate that

similarly situated employees not in complainant's protected classes were

treated differently under similar circumstances.

Regarding claim (1), the AJ found that a preponderance of the evidence

showed that as soon as complainant's supervisor was alerted to the fact

that complainant's uniform allowance had been terminated, the supervisor

made the inquiries necessary in order for complainant to be paid the

allowance he was due. The AJ found that complainant was unable to show

that the supervisor assisted any other employee, not in complainant's

protected classes, more aggressively when their uniform allowances were,

likewise, terminated.

Regarding claim (2), the AJ found complainant established a prima facie

case of sex discrimination, but the AJ found the evidence presented did

not show that the agency's given reasons for assigning overtime to the

identified employee was a pretext for discrimination. Rather, the AJ

found the evidence showed that the work was needed and she was available.

The AJ found that complainant failed to prove any causal connection

between complainant's prior protected activity and the incidents described

in claims (3), (4), and (5). Additionally, the AJ found complainant

failed to show that the agency's articulated reasons for directing

complainant to deliver two large parcels or for issuing complainant

a Notice of Suspension for 7 days, was a pretext to mask unlawful

discrimination. The suspension was issued because of complainant's

failure to report for work. Complainant failed to report to work after

he was issued a Letter of Warning for Unsatisfactory Attendance and

Excessive Absenteeism. Further, the AJ found believable the testimony of

complainant's supervisor regarding the cleaning of the vehicle reported

by complainant to have had a chemical spilled in it.

The AJ concluded that complainant failed to show, by a preponderance

of the evidence, that discrimination occurred as alleged in any claim.

The agency's final order implemented the AJ's decision.

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a

de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the

AJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the

record and that the AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant

facts and referenced the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws.

We note that complainant failed to present persuasive evidence to show

that any of the agency's actions were in retaliation for complainant's

prior EEO activity or were motivated by discriminatory animus toward

complainant's race, color, age, or disability.<1> We discern no basis

to disturb the AJ's decision.

Therefore, we AFFIRM the agency's final order finding no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to

file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

December 21, 2004

__________________

Date

1We do not address in this decision whether

complainant is a qualified individual with a disability. We simply

assume that even if complainant was disabled, none of the actions taken

by the agency at issue in the complaint were motivated by complainant's

purported disability.