Anthony B. Dixon, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 20, 1999
01974660 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 20, 1999)

01974660

10-20-1999

Anthony B. Dixon, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Anthony B. Dixon v. United States Postal Service

01974660

October 20, 1999

Anthony B. Dixon, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01974660

v. ) Agency No. 4C-440-0003-97

)

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

Appellant timely initiated an appeal of a final agency decision (FAD)

concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination on

the bases of race (Black ) and sex (male) in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.

Appellant alleges he was discriminated against when he was required to

serve a seven day suspension for an accident which took place on June 27,

1996. The appeal is accepted in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001.

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that appellant, employed by the agency as a Letter

Carrier, filed a formal EEO complaint on October 22, 1996, alleging

discrimination as referenced above. The agency accepted the complaints

for processing and, at the conclusion of the investigation, appellant

opted for an immediate FAD, which the agency issued on May 9, 1997,

finding no discrimination.

The central event in this case occurred on June 27, 1997 when appellant

was involved in an "on the job" car accident. According to the agency's

accident report, appellant was proceeding through an intersection at

approximately 20-25 miles per hour when the car in front of him came

to a sudden stop. Notwithstanding appellant's assertion that there was

about a one car clearance between him and the suddenly stopped vehicle,

he could not stop in time, which resulted in him hitting the car in

the rear. Upon conducting an investigation, the agency concluded that

appellant was at fault for inadequate distancing, i.e., tailgating.

Based on its conclusion, the agency decided to suspend appellant for

seven days, which he served from September 28 to October 4, 1996.

Appellant then filed the instant complaint.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocation

of burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case

alleging discrimination is a three-step process. McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973). Appellant has the initial

burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at

802, If appellant meets this burden, then the burden shifts to the

agency to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

challenged action. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Appellant must then prove, by a preponderance

of the evidence, that the legitimate reason articulated by the agency

was not its true reason, but rather was a pretext for discrimination.

Id. at 256.

Although the initial inquiry in a discrimination case usually focuses

on whether the appellant has established a prima facie case, following

this order of analysis is unnecessary when the agency has articulated a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Washington

v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

In such cases, the inquiry shifts from whether the appellant has

established a prima facie case to whether he/she has demonstrated by a

preponderance of the evidence that the agency's reason for its actions

merely was a pretext for discrimination. Id.; see also United States

Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-717

(1983).

The Commission finds that the agency has articulated a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Burdine, at 253. Specifically,

the agency contends that appellant was suspended for being at fault in

a rear-end collision.

Because the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for the alleged discriminatory event, appellant now bears the burden

of establishing that the agency's stated reason is merely a pretext

for discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Administration, EEOC

Request No. 05960403 (December 6, 1996). Appellant can do this by showing

that the agency was motivated by a discriminatory reason. Id. (citing

St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)). In this case,

appellant has failed to meet that burden. Appellant's primary contention

is that others similarly situated involved in traffic accidents were

not suspended. The agency's finding of no discrimination is bolstered

by the fact that none of the comparatives is similarly situated

because none of them was under the guidance of appellant's supervisor,

the agency official responsible for issuing the seven day suspension,

at the time of their accidents. In addition, two of the employees

cited by appellant as not being disciplined for their role in causing

traffic accidents are Black and male, which indicates that appellant's

suspension was not motivated by discriminatory animus. Accordingly,

we find that the appellant failed to prove, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that the reason proffered by the agency for its action was a

pretext for discrimination.

CONCLUSION

Based on a careful review of the record, including appellant's contentions

on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence not

specifically addressed in this decision, we hereby AFFIRM the agency's

final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in the

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive the decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive the decision. To ensure that your civil action is

considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive the decision or to consult an attorney

concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction in which your

action would be filed. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil

action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph

above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

October 20, 1999

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations