01974660
10-20-1999
Anthony B. Dixon, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Anthony B. Dixon v. United States Postal Service
01974660
October 20, 1999
Anthony B. Dixon, )
Appellant, )
) Appeal No. 01974660
v. ) Agency No. 4C-440-0003-97
)
William J. Henderson, )
Postmaster General, )
United States Postal Service, )
Agency. )
)
DECISION
Appellant timely initiated an appeal of a final agency decision (FAD)
concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination on
the bases of race (Black ) and sex (male) in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.
Appellant alleges he was discriminated against when he was required to
serve a seven day suspension for an accident which took place on June 27,
1996. The appeal is accepted in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001.
BACKGROUND
The record reveals that appellant, employed by the agency as a Letter
Carrier, filed a formal EEO complaint on October 22, 1996, alleging
discrimination as referenced above. The agency accepted the complaints
for processing and, at the conclusion of the investigation, appellant
opted for an immediate FAD, which the agency issued on May 9, 1997,
finding no discrimination.
The central event in this case occurred on June 27, 1997 when appellant
was involved in an "on the job" car accident. According to the agency's
accident report, appellant was proceeding through an intersection at
approximately 20-25 miles per hour when the car in front of him came
to a sudden stop. Notwithstanding appellant's assertion that there was
about a one car clearance between him and the suddenly stopped vehicle,
he could not stop in time, which resulted in him hitting the car in
the rear. Upon conducting an investigation, the agency concluded that
appellant was at fault for inadequate distancing, i.e., tailgating.
Based on its conclusion, the agency decided to suspend appellant for
seven days, which he served from September 28 to October 4, 1996.
Appellant then filed the instant complaint.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocation
of burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case
alleging discrimination is a three-step process. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973). Appellant has the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at
802, If appellant meets this burden, then the burden shifts to the
agency to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
challenged action. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Appellant must then prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the legitimate reason articulated by the agency
was not its true reason, but rather was a pretext for discrimination.
Id. at 256.
Although the initial inquiry in a discrimination case usually focuses
on whether the appellant has established a prima facie case, following
this order of analysis is unnecessary when the agency has articulated a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Washington
v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).
In such cases, the inquiry shifts from whether the appellant has
established a prima facie case to whether he/she has demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that the agency's reason for its actions
merely was a pretext for discrimination. Id.; see also United States
Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-717
(1983).
The Commission finds that the agency has articulated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Burdine, at 253. Specifically,
the agency contends that appellant was suspended for being at fault in
a rear-end collision.
Because the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the alleged discriminatory event, appellant now bears the burden
of establishing that the agency's stated reason is merely a pretext
for discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Administration, EEOC
Request No. 05960403 (December 6, 1996). Appellant can do this by showing
that the agency was motivated by a discriminatory reason. Id. (citing
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)). In this case,
appellant has failed to meet that burden. Appellant's primary contention
is that others similarly situated involved in traffic accidents were
not suspended. The agency's finding of no discrimination is bolstered
by the fact that none of the comparatives is similarly situated
because none of them was under the guidance of appellant's supervisor,
the agency official responsible for issuing the seven day suspension,
at the time of their accidents. In addition, two of the employees
cited by appellant as not being disciplined for their role in causing
traffic accidents are Black and male, which indicates that appellant's
suspension was not motivated by discriminatory animus. Accordingly,
we find that the appellant failed to prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the reason proffered by the agency for its action was a
pretext for discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Based on a careful review of the record, including appellant's contentions
on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence not
specifically addressed in this decision, we hereby AFFIRM the agency's
final decision.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0795)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in the
case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available
when the previous decision was issued; or
2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,
regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or
3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial
precedential implications.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST
BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the
decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive
a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in
opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider
MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party
WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request
to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments
must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received
by the Commission.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances
have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,
a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the
delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your
request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests
for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).
RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)
It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file
a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN
NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive the decision.
You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that
a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the
date that you receive the decision. To ensure that your civil action is
considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS from the date that you receive the decision or to consult an attorney
concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction in which your
action would be filed. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE
DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD
OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND
OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil
action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph
above ("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
October 20, 1999
DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations