Ann's Laundry

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 21, 1984

268 N.L.R.B. 1013 (N.L.R.B. 1984)

ANN'S LAUNDRY
Ann's Laundry & Dry Cleaners, Inc. and Textile
Processors, Service Trades, Health Care, Pro-
fessional and Technical Employees International
Union Local No. 2, affiliated with International
Brotherhood of Teamsters. Case 17-CA-11092
21 February 1984
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
ZIMMERMAN AND HUNTER
On 11 May 1983 Administrative Law Judge Jay
R. Pollack issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief,
and the General Counsel filed a brief in answer to
the Respondent's exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,' and
conclusions 2 and to adopt the recommended
Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge and orders that the Respondent, Ann's Laun-
dry & Dry Cleaners, Inc., Kansas City, Kansas, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the Order, except that the at-
tached notice is substituted for that of the adminis-
trative law judge.
The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find-
ings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative
law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all
the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry
Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951).
We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing
the findings.
2 Chairman Dotson, in determining the legality of employer interroga-
tions of employees, would apply the test set forth by the Second Circuit
in Bourne v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 47 (1964). Having applied that standard
here, Chairman Dotson agrees that the Respondent unlawfully interrogat-
ed its employees about their union activities.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportu-
nity to present evidence and state their positions,
the National Labor Relations Board found that we
have violated the National Labor Relations Act,
and has ordered us to post this notice.
The Act gives employees the following rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choice
To engage in activities together for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection
To refrain from the exercise of any or all
such activities.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discrimi-
nate against employees for supporting or engaging
in activities on behalf of Textile Processors, Serv-
ice Trades, Health Care, Professional and Techni-
cal Employees International Union Local No. 2, af-
filiated with International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees about their
union activities or the union activities of other em-
ployees.
WE WILL NOT threaten to close our facility be-
cause of our employees' union activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in
the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the
Act.
WE WILL offer Anner Faye Miller full and im-
mediate reinstatement to her former position or, if
that position no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent position, with full seniority, privileges,
and benefits, and WE WILL make her whole for any
losses she may have suffered because of our dis-
crimination against her, plus interest.
WE WILL expunge from our files any reference
to the discharge of Miller in July 1982, and WE
WILL notify her in writing that this has been done
and that evidence of this unlawful discharge will
not be used as a basis for future personnel action
against her.
ANN'S LAUNDRY & DRY CLEANERS,
INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAY R. POLLACK, Administrative Law Judge: I heard
this case in trial at Kansas City, Kansas, on March 8 and
9, 1983. Pursuant to a charge filed against Ann's Laun-
dry & Dry Cleaners, Inc. (the Respondent), on July 15,
1982,' by Textile Processors, Service Trades, Health
I Unless otherwise stated, all dates hereafter refer to the year 1982.
268 NLRB No. 155
1013
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Care, Professional and Technical Employees Internation-
al Union Local No. 2, affiliated with International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters (the Union), the Regional Director
for Region 17 of the National Labor Relations Board
issued a complaint and notice of hearing on August 20,
alleging in substance that the Respondent engaged in cer-
tain violations of Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et
seq., herein called the Act.
The Issues
The principal questions presented for decision are:
I. Whether the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act by interrogating employees concerning their
union activities.
2. Whether the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of
the Act by threatening to close its business because of
the advent of the Union.
3. Whether the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l)
and (3) of the Act by discharging its employee Anner
Faye Miller on July 14.
All parties were given full opportunity to appear, to
introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-exam-
ine witnesses, to argue orally, and to file briefs. Briefs,
which have been carefully considered, were filed on
behalf of the General Counsel and the Respondent.
Based on the entire record and from my observation of
the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent is a Kansas corporation with an office
and principal place of business located in Kansas City,
Kansas, where it is engaged in the wholesale and retail
laundry and dry cleaning business. In an unreported De-
cision and Certification of Representative, dated October
6, 1982, in Case 17-RC-9446, the Board found the Re-
spondent to be an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of the Act. Accordingly, in this case, the
Respondent admits and I find that the Respondent is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
On October 6, the Board certified the Union as the ex-
clusive representative of all of the Respondent's employ-
ees in the following appropriate unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, and other conditions of employ-
ment:
All full-time and regular part-time production em-
ployees employed by Ann's Laundry & Dry Clean-
ers, Inc., at its facility located at 2900 Brown,
Kansas City, Kansas, but excluding drivers, office
clerical employees, managerial employees, supervi-
sors as defined in the Act, and all other employees.
Accordingly, I find that the Union is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
On June 25, the Union filed a petition in Case 17-RC-
9446 with the Board seeking to represent the Respond-
ent's employees. A representation hearing was scheduled
for July 13 which hearing was postponed to July 19.
Thereafter the parties executed a Stipulation for Certifi-
cation Upon Consent Election which stipulation was ap-
proved by the Acting Regional Director for Region 17
of the Board on July 27. An election by secret ballot was
conducted on August 19, under the direction and super-
vision of the Regional Director. The challenged ballots
were sufficient in number to affect the results of the elec-
tion and, on August 24, the Employer filed timely objec-
tions to conduct affecting the election. Thereafter, on
September 16, the Regional Director issued and served
on the parties a Report on Challenged Ballots and Objec-
tions and Recommendations. The Regional Director rec-
ommended to the Board that the Union be certified as
the exclusive bargaining representative of the Respond-
ent's employees in the stipulated appropriate unit, de-
scribed above. No exceptions to the Regional Director's
report were filed by either party and, on October 6, the
Board issued its Decision and Certification of Represent-
ative adopting the Regional Director's recommendations
and certifying the Union as the exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative of the Respondent's employees in the appro-
priate unit described above. The parties promptly com-
menced negotiations and reached an agreement by No-
vember 15, 1982.
Anner Faye Miller, who had been employed as a shirt
presser by the Respondent since July 1980, signed an au-
thorization card for the Union dated May 20.2 The
record reveals that the Respondent's managerial staff
became aware of the Union's organizational campaign
"sometime in May." However, there is no evidence that
the Respondent was aware of Miller's union sympathies
until July. On or about July 12, Miller notified Anna
Knoff, the Respondent's principal stockholder,3 that she
had been subpoenaed by the Union to testify at the rep-
resentation hearing then scheduled for July 13. Miller
showed Knoff the subpoena, and Knoff said, "O.K." No
further discussion about the subpoena or representation
hearing took place. Although other employees were sub-
poenaed for July 13, only Miller made her subpoena
known to Knoff. The other employees did not notify the
2 While Miller's authorization card bears the date May 20, the card
was apparently first dated June 20. Miller testified that she signed the
card in June. The card was submitted by the Union to the Board along
with the representation petition which was filed on June 25.
s Anna Knoff died prior to the instant trial. The Respondent objected
to any testimony regarding conversations Miller or any other employee
had with Anna Knoff presumably on the grounds of the "dead man's"
statute. The Board may consider as evidence statements of persons who
are deceased, including testimony about such statements from parties
having a direct legal interest in the proceeding. Hood Industries, 248
NLRB 597, 599 (1980); Calaandra Photo, 151 NLRB 660, 669 fn. 23 (1965).
However the Board will subject such testimony to the closest scrutiny
before deciding what weight to give it. Calandra Photo, supra. The Ca-
landra Photo guidelines have been followed herein. To the extent that the
Respondent argues that statements by Anna Knoff are hearsay, that ob-
jection is also lacking in merit. Knof's statements are admissions by a
party opponent under Fed.R.Evid. 801(dX2XI) and by definition not
hearsay.
1014
ANN'S LAUNDRY
Respondent of their subpoena until shortly before the
actual hearing date of July 19.
Employee Patricia Jackson testified that, on or about
July 1, she heard Anna Knoff tell employee Mary Wil-
liams that Knoff believed that employees Erie Lowery
and Miller "started this mess about the Union" and "put
the people on it." Knoff asked Williams whether she
agreed and Williams answered that she did not know.
According to Jackson, Knoff asked Williamrs to "find
out." Williams, on the other hand, testified that Knoff
simply said that Knoff "wished she could find out who
brought [the Union] in."
I credit Jackson's testimony over that of Williams.
Jackson appeared to be a credible witness. Further, from
the fact that Jackson testified against her employer, I
draw the inference that her testimony is not likely to be
false. Williams, on the other hand, appeared most willing
to tailor her testimony to aid her employer's case.
Employee Robert Lee testified that he informed
Eugene Knoff, the Respondent's manager and the son of
Anna Knoff, on July 19, of the subpoena given him by
the Union for the representation hearing that same date.
According to Lee, Eugene Knoff asked him whether the
employee intended to participate in union activities if the
Respondent became unionized. Eugene Knoff testified
that he only asked Lee whether the employee was going
to attend the representation hearing because Knoff
needed someone to run the pants press. Knoff denied
asking Lee any question about participation in the Union.
Lee impressed me as a more credible witness than Knoff.
Knoff appeared more intent on denying any wrongdoing
than in testifying to objective facts.
Shortly after the representation election of August 15,
according to employee Erie Lowery, Anna Knoff asked
Lowery whether Lowery knew anything about the
Union and if Lowery knew who was behind the Union.
Knoff said that she was "not going to let no union come
in and tell her how to run her place. She would close
down."
Also shortly after the election, according to employee
Alice Williams, Georgia Mullins, an employee, told
Knoff that Mullins could not read and had mistakenly
voted for the Union when she had intended to vote
against it. Knoff then asked Williams and another em-
ployee how the employees had voted in the election.
Soon after this conversation, the Respondent filed objec-
tions to the conduct of the election based, inter alia, on
the ground that Mullins had incorrectly marked her
ballot.
As mentioned earlier, on July 12, Miller showed Anna
Knoff the subpoena for the representation hearing. When
Miller arrived home that evening, she learned that her
small son was ill. Miller called her physician and made
an appointment to have her son examined. Miller then
called Knoff and explained that she could not be at work
in the morning because she would be taking her son to
the doctor. Knoff told Miller that it was "O.K." The fol-
lowing day, Miller called Knoff, at noon, and told Knoff
that she was still at the doctor's office and would, there-
fore, not be in to work that day.4 When Miller reported
4 Knoff told Bernadine Debrick, her daughter and office manager, that
Miller's child had called in for Miller and that Miller was discharged as
for work the next day, July 14, she found that her time-
card was not in the rack near the timeclock. Miller went
to Knoff's office where Knoff immediately handed the
employee a paycheck and said, "Anner Faye, I don't
need you anymore." Miller asked why she was being ter-
minated and Knoff answered that Miller had been
"laying off too many days." Miller asked how many days
Knoff was referring to and Knoff answered that she did
not have the figure but Knoff would find out from the
books kept by the Respondent's bookkeeper. Miller
called Knoff the next day, July 15, and Knoff told Miller
that the employee had missed 53 days. The 53 days of
absence involved the time period from July 18, 1981,
until the termination. A termination letter containing the
dates of the absences was prepared sometime after Mil-
ler's termination. Miller was never given a copy of the
termination letter.
A. Respondent's Defense
The Respondent asserts that Miller was discharged
due to "excessive absenteeism and lateness for work."5
Bernadine Debrick, the Respondent's office manager and
the daughter of Anna Knoff, testified that while employ-
ees were expected to work 8 hours per day, 5 days a
week, there was no specific rule pertaining to absences
or tardiness. Debrick testified that Miller was discharged
by Anna Knoff and that Debrick took no part in the dis-
charge. According to Debrick, she witnessed Knoff
twice warn Miller about Miller's work but not about her
absences. Although Debrick began taking notice of Mil-
ler's attendance record in May, Debrick never spoke to
the employee about her attendance record."
Eugene Knoff, the Respondent's manager and the son
of Anna Knoff, testified that he often spoke to his
mother concerning Miller's absences and tardiness.
Eugene testified that his mother was "put out with it."
However, Eugene Knoff did not speak with Miller con-
cerning her absences or tardiness nor did he have any
knowledge of any action taken by his mother to correct
Miller's attendance record. Patricia Johnson, an employ-
ee, testified that when Miller was tardy, which was quite
often, Johnson operated Miller's machine until Miller ar-
rived. Johnson, on many occasions, heard Anna Knoff
ask Miller why Miller had not come to work or had not
called in. However, Johnson never heard Miller's re-
sponses. Most importantly, Johnson never heard Knoff
warn Miller about her absences or tardiness.
Mary Williams testified that Knoff warned Miller sev-
eral times about Miller's absences and tardiness. Williams
testified that she heard such warnings in May. On cross-
examination, Williams testified that such warnings were
of that date. Debrick marked the Respondent's payroll records in accord-
ance with Knoff's instructions.
a Although some of the Respondent's witnesses made reference to Mil-
ler's poor attitude toward Anna Knoff, there is no evidence that the al-
leged poor attitude contributed to the discharge. Knoff alone decided to
discharge Miller and made no mention of Miller's poor attitude in the ter-
mination letter. Moreover, "poor attitude" was not mentioned to Miller
at the time of discharge or at any time prior to the discharge.
s Debrick never explained what prompted her, in May, to begin
making notations about Miller's absences in the Respondent's payroll
records.
1015
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
given weekly during the entire period of Miller's em-
ployment with the Respondent. Miller denied ever re-
ceiving such warnings. As mentioned earlier, Williams
was quite willing to color her testimony in order to aid
the Respondent's case. Further, if Knoff had warned
Miller as Williams testified there surely would have been
other witnesses. However, no other witness had any
knowledge of such warnings. Thus, I do not credit Wil-
liams' testimony on this point.
Scrutiny of the Respondent's payroll records reveals
that, during the period of May through July 1982, sever-
al employees had poor attendance records, including two
employees who had more absences than Miller. There is
no evidence that any adverse action was taken against
these employees because of their attendance records.
Miller's attendance record was also poor during the same
period in 1981. However, Miller's record was worse in
1982. Similarly, with regard to tardiness, while Miller
was consistently tardy, many other employees had the
same problem. There is no evidence that any action was
taken against these other employees because of tardiness.
The Respondent sought to explain this disparity by offer-
ing evidence that because of Miller's job assignment her
tardiness caused more inconvenience than the tardiness
of other employees. While Miller's tardiness did cause
another employee (Patricia Johnson) to leave her own
position to cover for Miller, the Respondent took no
action to reassign Miller or otherwise minimize the prob-
lem caused by her attendance record. Miller's problems
with tardiness were not recent but apparently had oc-
curred throughout her employment with the Respondent.
B. Conclusions Regarding 8(a)(1) Issues
1. As found earlier, in early July, Anna Knoff asked
Mary Williams whether Miller and Lowery had started
this "mess about the Union" and when Williams an-
swered that she did not know, Knoff asked Williams to
find out. By questioning Williams concerning the identity
of the union organizers and instructing Williams to
obtain such information, the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. It is no defense to such conduct that
Williams did not give the requested information to
Knoff. Knoff's conduct still created the impression that
the Respondent would take some adverse action against
the employees responsible for the union activities at its
facility. See NLRB v. Los Angeles New Hospital, 640 F.2d
1017, 1020 (9th Cir. 1981).
2. On July 19, Eugene Knoff asked Robert Lee wheth-
er Lee intended to participate in union activities if the fa-
cility became unionized. The questioning of Lee went
beyond Knoff's legitimate need to know whether Lee
would be absent from work due to the representation
hearing. Knoff's inquiry into Lee's intended participation
in union activities violates Section 8(a)(1) because it im-
plies that the Respondent was keeping track of its em-
ployees' union activities and/or that the Respondent
looked unfavorably on such activities.
3. During August, shortly after the election, Anna
Knoff questioned two employees regarding their secret
ballots in the recently conducted Board election. Al-
though apparently concerned that the employees might
have mistakenly marked their ballots, as had Georgia
Mullins, Knoff did not limit her inquiry as to whether
the employees correctly marked their ballots. Rather,
without any assurances that no reprisals would be taken
against the employees, Knoff asked the employees to
reveal whether they voted for or against representation
by the Union. Accordingly, I find that the Respondent
interrogated the employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
and that such conduct was not justified by the Respond-
ent's concern over the conduct of the election. See, e.g.,
Hedison Mfg. Co., 260 NLRB 1037 (1982); CNA Finan-
cial Corp., 264 NLRB 619 (1982).
4. Shortly after the election, Anna Knoff questioned
Erie Lowery about the Union and told Lowery that she
was not going to let the Union tell her how to run her
business and that she would "close down." Even if
Knoffs threat to close was contingent on the Union's at-
tempting to "tell her how to run her place," as argued
by the Respondent, the threat would not be privileged.
The Board and the courts here recognized the right of
an employer to make a prediction as to the precise effect
she believes unionization will have on her company.
However, the prediction must be carefully phrased on
the basis of objective fact to convey an employer's belief
as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond her
control. ? In this case, an attempt by the Union to tell
Knoff how to run her business was not demonstrably
probable nor a reasonable prediction as to the effects of
unionization. Accordingly, I find Knoff's remarks to con-
stitute an unlawful threat to close her business in order
to discourage union activities.
C. Conclusions Regarding the Discharge of Miller
In Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d
899 (Ist Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1981), the
Board announced the following causation test in all cases
alleging violations of Section 8(a)(3) or violations of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) turning on employer motivation. First, the
General Counsel must make a prima facie showing suffi-
cient to support the inference that protected conduct was
a "motivating factor" in the employer's decision. Upon
such a showing, the burden shifts to the employer to
demonstrate that the same action would have taken place
even in the absence of the protected conduct.8
It is well settled that if an employer discharges an em-
ployee involved in "unwelcome concerted activities" for
behavior that would warrant a discharge in the absence
of union or concerted activities then "the circumstance
that the employer welcomed the opportunity to dis-
charge does not make it discriminatory and therefore un-
lawful." Klate Holt Co., 161 NLRB 1606, 1612 (1966).
However, it is equally well established that the existence
of a justifiable ground for dismissal is no defense if it is a
I See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissell Packing Ca, 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969); Bac-
chus Wine Cooperative, 251 NLRB 1552, 1559 (1980).
" In enforcing the Board's Wright Line decision, the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated that the burden on the em-
ployer is the "burden of production," which requires the employer to
come forward with credible evidence to rebut or meet the General Coun-
sel's prima facie case, rather than the "burden of persuasion." The United
States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a case that squarely
presents the burden shifting issue. See NLRB v. Transportation Manage-
ment Corp., cert. granted 103 S.Ct. 372 (1982).
1016
ANN'S LAUNDRY
pretext used to mask an unlawful motive. General
Thermo, 250 NLRB 1260 (1980).9
For the following reasons I find that the General
Counsel has made a prima facie showing that the Re-
spondent was motivated by a desire to discourage mem-
bership in the Union. First, Miller's absence on July 13,
the alleged triggering event for the discharge, was ex-
cused. Miller called Anna Knoff on July 12 and again on
July 13, first to tell Knoff of the doctor's appointment
and later to tell Knoff that she would not be in until the
next day. Anna Knoff did not inform Debrick that Mil-
ler's absence was excused and later gave Debrick false
information regarding Miller's telephone call. Knoff's fal-
sification of this event supports an inference that the Re-
spondent had an unlawful motive for the discharge. See
e.g., Keller Mfg. Co., 237 NLRB 712, 716 (1978); Party
Cookies, 237 NLRB 612, 623 (1978). The timing of the
discharge is an important factor in determining whether
the Respondent was motivated by its employees' union
activities. In this case, Miller was discharged the day
after revealing to Anna Knoff that she was intending to
appear on behalf of the Union at the representation hear-
ing. Further, just prior to hearing of Miller's subpoena
from the Union, Knoff had attempted to find out wheth-
er Lowery and Miller had started this "mess about the
Union." Prior to these events, Knoff had been tolerant of
Miller's absences and tardiness. Shortly after Miller's dis-
charge, Knoff unlawfully interrogated Lowery concern-
ing union activities and unlawfully threatened to close
the facility. An inference can be drawn from such an-
tiunion conduct that the Respondent was similarly moti-
vated in its discharge of Miller.
The burden shifts to the Respondent to establish that
Miller would have been discharged even in the absence
of her protected conduct. As shown above, Miller had
an attendance record which would normally justify dis-
charge. However, the issue is whether the Respondent in
fact relied on that ground or merely advanced it as a
pretext for an action it was undertaking essentially for
discriminatory reasons, such as the employee's status as a
union supporter. Limestone Apparel Corp., 255 NLRB 722
(1981). In this case the Respondent historically tolerated
absences and tardiness from its employees, including
Miller. The Respondent made no distinctions in its
records between excused and unexcused absences or tar-
diness. No warnings were given or adverse actions taken
against employees for either absences or tardiness. Nei-
ther Eugene Knoff nor Bernadine Debrick ever warned
Miller nor did they have any knowledge of any warning
given by Anna Knoff. Although Miller's tardiness incon-
venienced Eugene and Anna Knoff, neither took any
steps to reassign or discipline Miller. Thus, based on the
record as a whole, including the evidence offered by the
Respondent in its defense, I am convinced that Miller's
absences and tardiness were not in fact the reason for the
discharge. Rather, I find that the record of absences and
tardiness were seized on to justify the discharge because
of Miller's unwelcomed support of the Union. While I
do not condone Miller's attendance record, I find that
the Respondent condoned that record until it obtained
9 Enf denied on other grounds 664 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1981).
knowledge of Miller's support of the Union. Similarly,
absences and tardiness of undischarged employees were
condoned by the Respondent. Finally, I am not im-
pressed by the Respondent's argument that no action was
taken against Lowery, a more active union supporter. A
discriminatory motive otherwise established is not dis-
proved by an employer's proof that it did not weed out
all union adherents. American Petrofina Co. of Texas, 247
NLRB 183, 193 (1980); Nachman Corp. v. NLRB, 337
F.2d 421, 424 (7th Cir. 1964).
Accordingly, I find that the Respondent discharged
Miller because of her support for the Union and that
under either the Board's Wright Line test or that of the
First Circuit, a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act has been proven by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Ann's Laundry & Dry Cleaners,
Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce and in a busi-
ness affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, Textile Processors, Service Trades,
Health Care, Professional and Technical Employees
International Union Local No. 2, affiliated with Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Respondent has engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by unlaw-
fully interrogating employees about union activities and
by unlawfully threatening to close its facility due to
union activities.
4. The Respondent has engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by
unlawfully discharging Anner Faye Miller on July 14,
1982.
5. The unfair labor practices found above are unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to
cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirm-
ative action to effectuate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent shall be required to offer Anner Faye
Miller reinstatement to her former job or, if that position
no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and
privileges and to make her whole for any losses she may
have suffered as a result of the discrimination against her
in the manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90
NLRB 289 (1950), with interest computed in the manner
set forth in Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977).
See, generally, Isis Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommended
1017
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ORDER'
The Respondent, Ann's Laundry & Dry Cleaners,
Inc., Kansas City, Kansas, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against
employees for supporting or engaging in activities on
behalf of Textile Processors, Service Trades, Health
Care, Professional and Technical Employees Internation-
al Union No. 2, affiliated with International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, or any other labor organization.
(b) Interrogating employees about their union activities
or the union activities of other employees.
(c) Threatening to close its facility because of its em-
ployees' union activities.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of
their rights under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Offer Anner Faye Miller full and immediate rein-
statement to her former position or, if that position no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, with
full seniority, privileges, and benefits, and make her
whole for any losses she may have suffered because of
the discrimination against her in accordance with the
10 All outstanding motions inconsistent with this recommended Order
hereby are denied. If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46
of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
provisions set forth in the section of this Decision enti-
tled "The Remedy."
(b) Expunge from its files any reference to the dis-
charge of Miller in July 1982, and notify her in writing
that this has been done and that evidence of this unlaw-
ful discharge will not be used as a basis for future per-
sonnel action against her.
(c) Post at its Kansas City, Kansas facility copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said
notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 17, after being duly signed by the Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Re-
spondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ent to ensure that such notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
(d) Preserve and, on request, make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records nec-
essary to analyze the amount of backpay due and the
right of reinstatement under the terms of this Order.
(e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply.
' If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of
Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board."
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