Annetta J. Beauford, Complainant,v.Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 27, 2009
0120071274 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 27, 2009)

0120071274

02-27-2009

Annetta J. Beauford, Complainant, v. Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Agency.


Annetta J. Beauford,

Complainant,

v.

Timothy F. Geithner,

Secretary,

Department of the Treasury,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120071274

Hearing No. 110-2006-00065X

Agency No. 05-2606

DECISION

On January 6, 2007, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's December

1, 2006, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et

seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation

Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is deemed timely

and is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following

reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final order.

ISSUES PRESENTED

On September 23, 2005, complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that

she was discriminated against on the bases of disability (chronic epilepsy

and depression) and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when:

1. On June 8, 2005, she received a two week suspension due to

excessive absences; and

2. On June 15, 2005, her request for a 90-day leave of absence

without pay, as a reasonable accommodation was denied.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked

as a Clerk, GS-04 at the agency's Internal Revenue Service.1 Complainant

was diagnosed with epilepsy. The agency was aware of her diagnosis but no

work restrictions were in place. Complainant frequently took unplanned

leave and was frequently charged with Absence Without Leave (AWOL).

She was told to follow specific leave procedures, which included talking

directly with her supervisor when she needed to use leave. On June 8,

2005, complainant was issued a Notice of Suspension for leave abuse

after she failed to follow the leave procedures.

Complainant decided that it would be in her best interest if she took

time off after the suspension. She requested a 90 day leave of absence.

She was told that she would have to provide medical documentation

to support her need for leave under Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA).

When complainant did not submit the requested medical documentation,

her request was denied.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely

requested a hearing and the AJ held a hearing on September 20, 2006,

and issued a decision on November 15, 2006. The agency subsequently

issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding that complainant failed

to prove that she was subjected to discrimination as alleged.

The AJ found that assuming arguendo that complainant established a prima

facie case of discrimination as to all bases, the agency articulated

legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The agency

explained that complainant received a letter of suspension due to abuse

of leave. The agency indicated that complainant had a history of leave

problems and had previously received a letter of reprimand, a "leave

concern" letter, a leave restriction letter, an alternative discipline

letter, and a proposed suspension culminating in the final step of

suspending her for 14 days for failure to follow the instructions in

the leave restriction letter and abuse of leave.

With respect to the denial of 90 day leave of absence request, the agency

explained that complainant was told that she had to provide documentation

to support her request for FMLA leave based on her disability.2 The

agency indicated that complainant failed to provide documentation showing

that she needed 90 days off as an accommodation for her disability.

The agency maintained that its actions were not due to complainant's

disability and nor was it because of her prior EEO activity, as her prior

activity had occurred more than a year before the present allegations

and thus was too remote in time for reprisal to be inferred in this case.

The AJ found that complainant failed to show that the agency's articulated

reasons were pretext for discrimination.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, complainant contends that she has a disability and that the

agency was aware of it. She maintains that while all of her absences

were not medically related some were. Complainant contends that the

agency should have granted her request for the leave of absence because

it would have given her time to regroup.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a

de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.

An AJ's credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or

on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or

other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so

lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it.

See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999).

In analyzing a disparate treatment claim under the Rehabilitation Act,

where the agency denies that its decisions were motivated by complainant's

disability and there is no direct evidence of discrimination, we apply

the burden-shifting method of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Heyman v. Queens Village

Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Cmty. Adolescent Program, 198 F.3d 68

(2d Cir. 1999); Swanks v. WMATA, 179 F.3d 929, 933-34 (D.C.Cir. 1999).

Under this analysis, in order to establish a prima facie case, complainant

must demonstrate that: (1) he is an "individual with a disability"; (2)

he is "qualified" for the position held or desired; (3) he was subjected

to an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances surrounding

the adverse action give rise to an inference of discrimination.

Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2001). The burden

of production then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. In order

to satisfy his burden of proof, complainant must then demonstrate by a

preponderance of the evidence that the agency's proffered reason is a

pretext for disability discrimination. Id.

Complainant can establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination

by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to

an inference of discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Admin.,

EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). Specifically, in a reprisal

claim, and in accordance with the burdens set forth in McDonnell

Douglas, Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology,

425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976),

and Coffman v. Department of Veteran Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960473

(November 20, 1997), a complainant may establish a prima facie case of

reprisal by showing that: (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity;

(2) the agency was aware of the protected activity; (3) subsequently,

he or she was subjected to adverse treatment by the agency; and (4) a

nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse treatment.

Whitmire v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340

(September 25, 2000).

Under the Commission's regulations, federal agencies may not discriminate

against individuals with disabilities and are required to make reasonable

accommodation for the known physical and mental limitations of qualified

individuals with disabilities, unless an agency can show that reasonable

accommodation would cause an undue hardship. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1630.2(o)

and (p). The Commission finds that even if we assume arguendo that

complainant established a prima facie case of reprisal and disability

discrimination, we agree that the agency has articulated legitimate

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.

The agency explained that with regard to the suspension, complainant

was issued a suspension because she abused leave and failed to follow

the leave procedures that had been established for her. The Commission

finds that complainant failed to show that the agency's reasons were

pretext for discrimination based on her disability and/or in reprisal for

prior EEO activity. Further, we find that complainant gave no real

explanation as to why she did not follow the leave procedure assigned

to her nor did she identify anyone similarly situated to her who was

treated more favorably. Therefore, we find that complainant has not

demonstrated that her disability or prior EEO activity were considered

with regard to her suspension.

With respect to the denial of complainant's request for a 90-day leave

of absence, the Commission finds that the agency again articulated a

legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action. The agency explained

that the request was denied because complainant failed to provide the

requested medical documentation to support her request for FMLA leave.

Accordingly, we find that complainant has not shown that the agency's

reasons were pretext for prohibited discrimination.

Further, to the extent that complainant is alleging that the agency failed

to accommodate her, the Commission finds that the agency accommodated

complainant by providing her with leave for disability related absences.

We also find that there is no medical documentation in the record that

indicates that complainant needed 90 days off as an accommodation.

When an individual's disability or need for reasonable accommodation is

not obvious, and he or she fails to provide reasonable documentation

requested by the employer, then the employer will not be held liable

for failure to provide the requested accommodation. EEOC's Enforcement

Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the

American with Disabilities Act, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (October 17,

2002), Question 6.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we affirm the agency's

finding of no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in

this case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request

containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous

interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact

on the policies, practices, or operations of

the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See

29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof

of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

02/27/09

__________________

Date

1 Complainant resigned for the agency on December 2, 2005.

2 Initially complainant maintained that she wanted the time off in order

to care for her mother. She later changed her reason and indicated that

she wanted the time off because of her own medical condition.

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0120071274

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

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0120071274