Anne M. Johnston, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 21, 2009
0120092519 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 21, 2009)

0120092519

10-21-2009

Anne M. Johnston, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Anne M. Johnston,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120092519

Agency Nos. 4F-852-0034-05

4F-852-0149-05

Hearing No. 350-2005-00237X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's April 23, 2009

final action concerning the two captioned EEO complaints that claimed

unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504.

In the two captioned formal complaints, complainant, a former Mail

Processing Clerk, at the agency's Fountain Hills Post Office in Fountain

Hills, Arizona, claimed that the agency discriminated against her on

the bases of religion (Lutheran) and in reprisal for prior EEO activity

when:

1. on November 19, 2004, the Station Manager provided negative

information to the selecting official for the Young Post Office Postmaster

position because she testified in a named employee's EEO case (Agency

No. 4F-852-0034-05, hereinafter referred as "Complaint 1");

2. on February 15, 2005, she was stopped by the Phoenix Police Department

and subsequently, on February 19, 2005, was placed in a non-pay emergency

off-duty status (Complaint 1); and

3. on June 23, 2005, she was removed from the agency for Violation of

Postal Standard of Conduct - Unauthorized Possession of Postal Records

(Agency No. 4F-852-0149-05, hereinafter referred as "Complaint 2").

Following the investigation into her formal complaints, complainant

requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ

consolidated Complaints 1 and 2 in the interest of judicial economy,

pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.606. On April 7, 2006, the agency filed a

Motion for Decision Without a Hearing. Complainant filed a Response to

the Agency's motion. On December 31, 2008, the agency filed a Motion

to Dismiss. Therein, the agency argued that instant complaints should

be dismissed pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(3) on the grounds that

complainant had litigated the same issues in the U.S. District Court

for the District of Arizona.

On April 13, 2009, the AJ issued a decision by summary judgment in favor

of the agency, finding no discrimination. On April 23, 2009, the agency

issued its final action implementing the AJ's decision.

In her April 13, 2009, the AJ noted that the agency filed a motion

requesting that the instant formal complaints be dismissed on the grounds

that complainant filed a civil action concerning the same issues. The AJ

noted, however, that complainant filed a response stating that she was

moving to dismiss her civil action. The AJ noted that the U.S. District

Court for the District of Arizona had already dismissed the instant

complaints. The AJ determined that upon review of the record, the facts

of complainant's non-pay emergency status are the underlying basis for

the civil action. The AJ dismissed the non-pay emergency status issue

pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(3). The AJ determined, however, that

even if this issue had not been dismissed, the agency was nonetheless

entitled to summary judgment because complainant failed to show that

the agency acted with discriminatory intent when she was placed on a

non-pay emergency status and ultimately removed from agency employment.

Specifically, the AJ found that the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions which complainant failed to

show were a pretext.

Further, the AJ found that complainant did not show by a preponderance of

the evidence that she was discriminated against on the bases of religion

and in reprisal for prior protected activity concerning claims 1 - 3.

The AJ noted that in regard to claim 1, three candidates, including

complainant, were selected for a final interview with the selecting

official (SO) for the position of Postmaster, EAS-13 at the agency's

Young, Arizona facility. The AJ further noted that the SO chose selectee

for the subject position because of her extensive work experience.

Regarding the contention that the Station Manager (SM) provided

negative information to SO because complainant testified in a named

employee's EEO case, the AJ noted that according to SM, he was not a

part of the selection process and did not supply any information to

SO concerning complainant. Specifically, SM stated "to my knowledge

no one in management was upset that [complainant] had been called as

a witness in another person's EEO nor were we out to get [complainant]

because of her previous EEO activity."

Regarding claim 2, the record reflects that on February 15, 2005, the

Phoenix police stopped complainant because her vehicle license plate

was covered with a piece of cardboard and she was driving without the

headlights on. The record further reflects that the police observed that

complainant was dressed all in black, with underwear around her neck,

as a mask. Upon searching complainant's vehicle, the police discovered

latex gloves, a flashlight, a screwdriver, a river rock wrapped in

napkins, and confidential postal box documents.

The AJ noted that according to SM, the USPS Inspection Service called

his office stating that they had received a record from the Phoenix

Police indicating that on February 15, 2005, complainant was stopped by

the police "under suspicious circumstances very early in the morning.

They believed she was either going to or coming from a crime. They found

Post Office Box Records in her vehicle." SM stated that he conducted a

fact finding with complainant and "she refused to answer any questions

regarding the incident and denied having any box records in her car.

I placed [complainant] in an off duty status after conferring with my

[named Postmaster] and the Labor department."

Regarding claim 3, SM stated that following the filing of complainant's

grievance, management agreed to conduct a second fact finding in which

complainant agreed to cooperate. SM stated that during the second fact

finding, complainant's answers were "contrived and in many cases prepared

in advance and read from her notes the response were unrealistic and

did not support the facts. After reviewing her response and discussing

it with my [postmaster] and Labor relations, we agreed the responses

were not credible and that she did not see anything wrong with taking

box records if it served her purposes. It was felt that we would be

unable to trust this employee with customer and Postal records that if

she had access to this kind of material she could and would use it to

her own personal gain."

On May 16, 2005, SM issued complainant a Notice of Removal for Violation

of Postal Standard of Conduct/Unauthorized Possession of Postal Records.

The record reflects that SM relied on the following Sections of

the Employee and Labor Relations Manual: Section 661 "Employees are

expected to discharge their duties conscientiously and effectively;"

Section 668.3 "Records; Information and Associated Processing Systems

and Equipment;" Section 668.33 "Prohibited Uses;" and Section 668.34

"Protection Responsibilities." SM stated that complainant's religion and

prior protected activity were not factors in his determination to remove

her from agency employment. Moreover, SM stated the fact that complainant

"had confidential records copies and was using them for personal gain,

that she took information that as a knowledgeable employee she would

have know was confidential and also left it unprotected by having it in

her car were the reasons for the removal."

The Postmaster (PM) stated that he was the concurring official concerning

complainant's removal. PM stated that complainant was removed from agency

employment because she "took restricted information from the Post Office

that had confidential information about our customers. The restricted

information was found in [complainant's] vehicle and was not properly

safe guarded. This information was taken from the Post Office without

the knowledge of management. This action has forever compromised

the employer/employee trust factor. In short, [complainant] cannot be

trusted with the information that her specific job required her to handle

on a daily basis." Furthermore, PM stated that he did not discriminate

against complainant based on her religion and prior protected activity.

On appeal, complainant argues that she is not challenging the AJ's finding

of no discrimination concerning claim 1. However, complainant argues

that she is challenging the AJ's findings of no discrimination concerning

claims 2 and 3 because the AJ "erred as a matter of law. On those issues,

[complainant] respectfully requests that the Administrative Judge's

decision be reversed and her claims related to both her placement in

non-pay emergency off-duty status and her removal from the Postal Service

be reinstated."

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case

can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment

is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding,

an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination

that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.

Complainant has offered no persuasive arguments on appeal regarding the

AJ's decision to issue a decision without a hearing, or regarding the

AJ's findings on the merits. Therefore, after a review of the record

in its entirety, including consideration of all statements submitted

on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission to AFFIRM the agency's final action, because the Administrative

Judge's issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate and a

preponderance of the record evidence does not establish that unlawful

discrimination occurred.1

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court

that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court

also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs,

or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as

amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as

amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request

is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an

attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file

a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed

within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File

A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

October 21, 2009

__________________

Date

1 Because we affirm the AJ's finding of no discrimination concerning

claims 1 - 3, we find it unnecessary to address the dismissal of

complainant's non-pay status (portion of claim 2) on alternative

procedural grounds (i.e. filing a civil action).

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U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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