Ann Robins, Complainant,v.Tom J. Vilsack, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 25, 2009
0120070767 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 25, 2009)

0120070767

03-25-2009

Ann Robins, Complainant, v. Tom J. Vilsack, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.


Ann Robins,

Complainant,

v.

Tom J. Vilsack,

Secretary,

Department of Agriculture,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120070767

Agency No. 040603

DECISION

On November 21, 2006, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's

September 25, 2006 final decision pertaining to the award of attorney's

fees stemming from a settlement agreement entered into by both parties

on or around July 28, 2006. The settlement agreement concerned a formal

EEO complaint filed by complainant in which she alleged discrimination

on the basis of sex (female) when her position remained classified as

a Rangeland Management Specialist, GS-9, while she was performing the

work of a GS-11.

The settlement agreement states, in relevant part:

The Agency shall ... [p]ay the Complainant reasonable attorney['s]

fees, based on an actual accounting of fees incurred related to this

complaint and any associated fee petition in accordance with 29 CFR �

1614.501(e). If the Parties are unable to reach agreement on the amount

of fees to be paid, the Complainant may submit the claim to the EEOC

for determination of reasonable fees.

On or around August 25, 2006, complainant submitted an accounting of

attorney's fees totaling $31,258.50. The agency issued a final decision

on September 25, 2006, and awarded complainant $19,726.50 in attorney's

fees. On September 29, 2006, complainant's counsel contacted the

agency and informed it that they would agree to a reasonable diminution

of attorney's fees to settle the claim in the amount of $30,000.00.

Subsequently, in an attempt to avoid the cost of future litigation, the

agency offered attorney's fees in the amount of $25,000.00. Complainant's

counsel rejected this amount, and counter-offered $29,500.00. The agency

responded on October 23, 2006, that their offer of $25,000.00 would remain

firm until October 27, 2006. The parties failed to reach an agreement.

Complainant now appeals to the Commission to determine reasonable

attorney's fees. On appeal, complainant states that she is seeking

$30,000.00 in attorney's fees. Complainant also asserts that the agency's

offer of attorney's fees on September 25, 2006, was not a final decision,

but merely a beginning offer in conformance with the settlement agreement.

Conversely, the agency asserts that complainant's appeal is untimely,

as the final decision was issued on September 25, 2006, and complainant

did not file an appeal with the Commission until November 21, 2006.

The agency also asserts that if the Commission finds the appeal was

timely filed, the final decision should be upheld because complainant's

counsel's request for fees is unreasonable.

Final Agency Decision

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement

agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at

any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties. The

Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a contract

between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules of contract

construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense, EEOC Request

No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further held that

it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract, not some

unexpressed intention that controls the contract's construction. Eggleston

v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795 (August 23,

1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard to the

terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally relied

on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states that if the

writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning must

be determined from the four corners of the instrument without resort to

extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Building

Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).

On appeal, complainant's counsel asserts that it was never the intention

of the parties that the agency would decide the attorney's fees in a final

agency decision, and instead asserts that the parties' intent was that

there would be an agreement reached through offers and counter-offers.

Complainant's counsel points to the last sentence of the above paragraph

from the settlement agreement to support their argument. However, a fair

reading of the settlement agreement reveals that the parties agreed to be

bound by 29 CFR � 1614.501(e), which states that an agency shall issue a

decision determining the amount of attorney's fees or costs due within 60

days of receipt of the statement and affidavit. See 1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(A).

Further, the record establishes that the agency's subsequent offers

were merely an attempt to avoid future litigation, and the offer clearly

stated that the agency's earlier decision was not disturbed. Therefore,

the agency's document dated September 25, 2006, was a final decision by

the agency and was appropriately issued.

Timeliness of Appeal

Because we have determined that the agency's issuance of a final

agency decision was appropriate, we now turn to whether complainant

timely filed her appeal with the Commission. EEOC Regulation 29 CFR �

1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(A) provides that the agency's decision regarding the

award of attorney's fees shall include a notice of right to appeal to the

EEOC along with EEOC Form 573, Notice of Appeal/Petition. A review of

the agency's final decision, titled "Determination of Attorneys' Fees,"

reveals that at the end of the decision there is a sentence which states,

"This determination is subject to appeal to the EEOC in accordance with

29 CFR � 1614.501(e) and the settlement agreement by filing the attached

Form 573." EEOC Form 573 was attached to the document.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R � 1614.402(a) provides that a complainant must

appeal a final agency decision within 30 days of receipt of the decision.

Here, complainant appealed to the Commission 181 days after she received

the final agency decision. However, upon review, we find that the

final agency decision did not advise complainant that she had 30 days

from the date she received the decision to timely file an appeal with

the Commission. In light of the agency's failure to properly advise

complainant of the time for filing appeals with the Commission pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.402, we accept complainant's appeal as timely. See Davis

v. Department of Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A21734 (March 18, 2003).

Attorney's Fees

Attorney's fees are ordinarily computed by determining the lodestar,

i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable

hourly rate. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(B) (explaining that this is

the starting point for computing attorney's fees). There is a strong

presumption that this amount represents the reasonable fee, though

in limited circumstances, this amount may be reduced or increased in

consideration of the degree of success, quality of representation,

and long delay caused by the agency. Id.

On appeal, complainant's counsel asserts that five attorneys from their

firm spent a total of 131.3 hours on the complaint and an additional 4.2

hours preparing and filing this appeal. The agency determined that 3.7

hours included on complainant's counsels' itemized statement needed to

be reduced because they were charged to individuals who were not named

in the partner's affidavit. We find that this reduction is reasonable,

because there is no explanation of the positions of these individuals,

or their qualifications, experience, and hourly rate.

The agency also deducted 1.5 hours from the itemized statement for time

spent on the withdrawal from this case, time spent on the reappearance in

this case, and time spent on this case while the firm was withdrawn from

the case. Additionally, the agency deducted 0.1 hours for reviewing

correspondence to a congressman regarding the claims in this case.

We find that these deductions are not reasonable, as the record

establishes that these activities were related to the instant complaint.

The agency also deducted 23.7 hours for complainant's counsels'

pursuit of a desk audit with OPM after the complaint was settled.

In the settlement agreement, the agency agreed to pursue a desk audit

with OPM to determine if complainant was performing at a GS-11 level.

The agency found that these expenses were incurred after the complaint

was resolved and should not be recovered under the regulations. Further,

the agency found that complainant's counsels' involvement in seeking a

desk audit was not necessary, since the agreement clearly stated that

the agency would pursue the desk audit. We find that the attorneys'

time spent on pursuing a desk audit with another federal agency after

the signing of the settlement agreement was not directly related to the

underlying EEO complaint, and as a result, the agency is not responsible

for reimbursement of the associated attorneys' fees.

A number of factors determine what is a reasonable hourly rate for legal

services in connection with EEO complaints, including the experience

of the attorney, the difficulty of the case, the rate charged by other

attorneys in the geographic area for similar services (often referred to

as the "prevailing market rate"), and past hourly rates that have been

awarded. Cooley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Request No. 05960748

(July 30, 1998), quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984). It is

incumbent upon complainant's counsel to establish the reasonableness of

the requested hourly rate and to present evidence to that point.

Complainant's counsel asserts that the prevailing market rate should

be a national market rate, because the agency and the Commission have

offices nation-wide. For the purpose of determining the prevailing

market rate, the relevant community is the area where the agency facility

and complainant are located. See McTier v. Department of the Navy,

EEOC Appeal No. 07A30016 (March 2, 2004), citing Black v. Secretary

of Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01921158 (January 14, 1993). In the instant

complaint, complainant and the agency's facility are located in Utah.

Complainant's counsel failed to offer evidence that would establish

that their rates are similar to the rates of other attorneys in Utah

for similar services. The agency has offered evidence that establishes

that complainant's counsels' rates are unreasonable when compared to the

prevailing market rate for attorneys in Utah who offer the same services

with similar experience, and taking into consideration the level of

difficulty of the case. Therefore, we will use the rates provided by

the agency that establishes the prevailing market rate in Utah.

After a thorough review of the entire record, the Commission finds that

complainant is due the following in reasonable attorneys' fees:

Attorney A: 20 hours @ $240.00 per hour = $4,800.00

Attorney B: 22.3 hours @$175.00 per hour = $3,902.50

Attorney C: 6 hours @ $185.00 per hour = $1,110.00

Attorney D: 46.3 hours @ $185.00 per hour = $8,565.50

Attorney E: 14.1 hours@ $185.00 per hour = $2,608.50

Further, we find that Attorney C reasonably spent an additional 4.2

hours on this appeal.

Attorney C: 4.2 hours @ $185.00 per hour = $777.00

Total attorneys' fees: $21,763.50

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we MODIFY the agency's

final decision. The agency must comply with the order below.

ORDER

The agency is ordered, to the extent it has not already done so, to take

the following remedial action:

Within 30 days of the date this decision becomes final, the agency shall

tender to complainant payment in the amount of $21,763.50 in attorney's

fees.

The agency is further directed to submit to submit a report of compliance,

as provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation verifying

that the corrective action has been implemented.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1208)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar

days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall

be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations,

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington,

DC 20013. The agency's report must contain supporting documentation,

and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the complainant.

If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the complainant

may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a civil action

to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following

an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407,

1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant

has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in

accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil

Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject

to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).

If the complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of

the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

March 25, 2009

Date

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0120070767

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0120070767

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