Angelica Healthcare Services Group, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 30, 1987

284 N.L.R.B. 844 (N.L.R.B. 1987)

844 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Angelica Healthcare Services Group, Inc. and Amal-
gamated Service and Allied Industries Joint
Board, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile
Workers Union, AFL-CIO, CLC. Case 39-CA-
2643
30 June 1987
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JOHANSEN, BABSON, AND
STEPHENS
On 19 November 1986 Administrative Law
Judge D. Barry Morris issued the attached deci-
sion. The Respondent filed partial exceptions and a
supporting brief; the Charging Party filed partial
cross-exceptions and a supporting brief; the Gener-
al Counsel filed cross-exceptions and a supporting
brief; and the Respondent filed an answering brief
to the General Counsel's and the Charging Party's
cross-exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, 1 and
conclusions, as modified, to modify his remedy,2
and to adopt the recommended Order as modified.3
The Respondent, the General Counsel, and the Charging Party have
excepted to some of the judge's credibility findings The Board's estab-
lished policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's credibility
resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence
convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91
NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir 1951). We have carefully
examined the record and fmd no basis for reversing the findings.
In adopting the judge's finding that Supervisor Benoit's statement to
employees Pearson and Ramos that their names had been mentioned at a
management meeting as "union organizers" created the impression that
the employees' union activities were under surveillance m violation of
Sec. 8(a)(1), we particularly note that neither Pearson nor Ramos had
openly campaigned for the Union or declared herself to be a union sup-
porter.
Further, we conclude that It is unnecessary to pass on the judge's fail-
ure to make a finding concerning the complaint allegation that Benoit's
questions to Pearson and Ramos whether they were going to attend a
union meeting at a Howard Johnson's constituted the creation of the im-
pression of surveillance. We note that the finding of such an additional
violation would be merely cumulative to the creation of the impression of
surveillance violation found above and would not materially affect the
Order.
In adopting the judge's findings that, under all the circumstances, the
Respondent did not violate Sec. 8(a)(1) on the basis of Customer Service
Representative Kilstrom's 25 March conversation with employee Pearson
or Plant Manager Vere's conversation with employees Pearson and
Ramos in the garment department in March 1985, we disavow the
judge's reliance on the fact that the conversations concerned wages and
benefits.
2 In accordance with our decision in New Horizons for the Retarded,
283 NLRB 1173 (1987), interest will be computed at the "short-term Fed-
eral rate" for the underpayment of taxes as set out in the 1986 amend-
ment to 26 U S C §6621
3 The General Counsel excepts to the judge's failure to include a visi-
tatorial clause in the recommended Order. A visitatonal clause authorizes
the Board, for compliance purposes, to obtain discovery from the Re-
spondent under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure under the supervi-
sion of the United States court of appeals enforcing the Board's Order.
284 NLRB No. 92
1. The judge concluded, inter alia, that the Re-
spondent, acting through its supervisor, Benoit, did
not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by promul-
gating a rule forbidding discussion of the Union
among the employees. The judge found in this
regard that Benoit's statement to employees Pear-
son and Ramos that there was to be no talking
about the Union while working did not constitute
disparate treatment. We find merit in the General
Counsel's and the Charging Party's exceptions to
the judge's conclusion.
Pearson credibly testified that during an occasion
in March 1985,4 when she and Ramos were tempo-
rarily transferred from the garment to the tumble-
fold department, Benoit called out as they ap-
proached, "Here come the union organizers. Don't
come down here talking to my people about the
union."
Pearson's testimony was corroborated by Ramos
and also by employee Claudio, who stated that
Benoit yelled out, "Oh no, here come the union or-
ganizers," and, 10 minutes after Pearson and
Ramos went to work, further yelled out, "No talk-
ing about the union."
Contrary to the judge, we fmd that Benoit's
statements constitute an unlawful promulgation of a
rule forbidding discussion about the Union among
employees. In this regard, we note that her direc-
tive to Pearson and Ramos not to discuss the
Union with her "people" was made in conjunction
with her exclamation, "Here come the union orga-
nizers." We also note that Benoit did not qualify
her restriction against talking about the Union by
limiting that restriction to worktime only. Further,
we note that Benoit's instruction was limited to dis-
cussion about the Union and that, as such, there is
no evidence that Benoit was attempting to enforce
the Respondent's no-solicitation rule contained in
the employee manual. 5 In this regard, there was no
evidence adduced in the present case that either
Pearson or Ramos had engaged in union activity
during worktime.
Accordingly, we find on the basis of the forego-
ing that Benoit's statements to Pearson and Ramos
in the tumblefold department in March violated
Section 8(a)(1).
Under the circumstances of this case, we find it unnecessary to include
sueli a clause. Accordingly, we deny the General Counsel's request.
4 All dates are m 1985 unless otherwise specified
5 We find that Houston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 265 NLRB 766, 781-
782 (1982), relied on by the judge, is distinguishable from the present
case Thus, in that case the warning given to the employee was prompted
by a second employee's complaint that the employee had distributed
union literature to him during their worktirne and the employee was told
that the company rules prohibited distribution of literature, without sin-
gling out union literature, and the prohibition was limited to working
time
ANGELICA HEALTHCARE SERVICES 845
2. The judge concluded that statements made by
Personnel Manager Lufler to Pearson and Ramos
in early March did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. The judge noted that Lufler's questioning
of Pearson and Ramos took place in the garment
department and that Lufler was a part-time em-
ployee. Further, the judge stated that the conversa-
tion did not appear threatening. We disagree with
the judge's conclusion.
As found by the judge, Pearson credibly testified
that in early March Lufler approached her and
said, "Janice, what do you think about anything
that's going on?" When Pearson asked him in what
manner he meant that, Lufler replied he was talk-
ing, "about the union and all this mess that's going
on." Ramos similarly testified that when Lufler
came to bring Ramos her check while she was
working on the press, he asked her what her opin-
ion was about the Union.
Contrary to the judge, we find that Lufler's
questioning of Pearson and Ramos constitutes un-
lawful interrogation. Initially, we note that Lufler
was stipulated to be a supervisor and agent of the
Respondent. We further note that the questioning
occurred during the same time period as the coer-
cive rule-promulgation incident involving Pearson
and Ramos, found above. Finally, as we have al-
ready noted, neither Pearson nor Ramos had
openly declared support for the Union. Consider-
ing the totality of the circumstances under Ross-
more House, 269 NLRB 1176 (1984), enfd. 760 Fld
1006 (9th Cr. 1985), we find that Lufler's question-
ing of Pearson and Ramos violated Section
8(a)(1).6
3. The judge made no finding regarding a con-
versation that occurred between Plant Manager
Vere and employee Tether in late February. Vere
credibly testified that when Production Manager
Bove reported to him that Techer was leaving her
work station and making unsubstantiated claims
about unionization, he asked Tether to come to his
office. There, according to Vere, he cautioned
Techer to confine her union activities to breaktimes
and before and after work.
On the basis of the judge's credibility resolutions,
we find that Vere's statements to Techer did not
violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 7 Accordingly,
6 Member Stephens finds it unnecessary to pass on whether Lufier's
questiomng constituted an unlawful interrogation because it is merely cu-
mulative to unlawful mterrogations findings by the judge that we have
adopted,
7 In adopting the judge's credibility resolutions, however, we do not
rely on the judge's findmg that Vere's former status as a union officer
made him knowledgeable about the statements supervisors are permitted
to make in union campaigns
we shall dismiss that portion of the complaint al-
leging that the Respondent, through Vere, created
an impression among the employees that their
union activities were under surveillance; interrogat-
ed them regarding their union membership, activi-
ties, and sympathies; or threatened employees with
loss of benefits if they selected the Union as their
bargaining representative.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge as modified below and orders that the Re-
spondent, Angelica Healthcare Services Group,
Inc., New York, New York, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Order as modified.
1. Insert the following as paragraph 1(b) and re-
letter present paragraph 1(b) and the subsequent
paragraphs.
"(b) Unlawfully promulgating rules forbidding
discussion of the Union among the employees."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
administrative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found
that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or pro-
tection
To choose not to engage in any of these
protected concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully interrogate you re-
garding your union activities, solicit you to engage
in surveillance of other employees' union activities,
or create an impression among you that your union
activities are under surveillance.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully promulgate rules for-
bidding discussion of the Union among you.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally lay off or transfer you
or change your work schedules, without prior
notice to or bargaining with the Union.
846 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with Amalga-
mated Service and Allied Industries Joint Board,
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers
Union, AFL-CIO, CLC as your certified exclusive
collective-bargaining representative in the follow-
ing unit:
All full-time and regular part-time hourly paid
production and maintenance employees, in-
cluding drivers, warehouse employees, and
leadpersons employed by the Employer at its
Milford, Connecticut facility; but excluding all
office clerical employees, casual employees,
managerial employees, and all guards, profes-
sional employees and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of
the Act,
WE WILL, on request, bargain collectively and in
good faith with the Union as the exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative of the above unit of
employees, including bargaining concerning
changes in work schedules, transfers, and layoffs
WE WILL, at the request of the Union, revoke
the changes in work schedules of the maintenance
department employees instituted on 15 April 1985.
WE WILL make whole Tony Calogine and
George Pickering for any loss of earnings as a
result of the work schedule changes, instituted on
15 April 1985, with interest.
WE WILL, at the request of the Union, revoke
the transfers of Janice Pearson and Susan Ramos
from the day shift in the garment department to
the night shift in the OR inspection department, in-
stituted in May 1985, and make them whole for
any losses of earnings, with interest.
WE WILL offer Bobby Blount, Mattie Williams,
Migdalia Lopez, Casandra Waller, Raul Rivera, In-
iovel Mendez, and Dennis Barnes immediate and
full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those
jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent po-
sitions, without prejudice to their seniority or any
other rights or privileges previously enjoyed and
WE WILL make them whole for any loss of earnings
and l other benefits resulting from their discharge,
less any net interim earnings, plus interest.
ANGELICA HEALTHCARE SERVICES
GROUP, INC.
Mark W. Engstrom, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Howard L. Mocerf Esq. (Borovsky, Ehrlich & Kronenberg),
of Chicago, Illinois, for the Respondent.
Larry Cary, Esq., of New York, New York, for the
Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
D. BARRY MORRIS, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was heard before me in Hartford, Connecticut, on 5,
6, and 7 November and 3 and 4 December 1985. 1 On a
charge filed on 30 May and amended on 11 July, a com-
plaint was issued on 11 July, alleging that Angelica
Healthcare Services Group, Inc. (Respondent) violated
Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. Respondent filed an answer denying the com-
mission of the alleged unfair labor practices.
The parties were given full opportunity to participate,
produce evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses,
argue orally, and file briefs. Briefs were filed by all the
parties on 30 January 1986. The record was reopened on
7 March 1986 and supplemental briefs were filed by the
parties on 24 March 1986.
On the entire record of the case, including my obser-
vation of the demeanor of the witnesses, I make the fol-
lowing
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a New York corporation with a place of
business in Milford, Connecticut, is engaged in the oper-
ation of a commercial laundry. It annually derives gross
revenues in excess of $500,000 and receives at its Con-
necticut facility goods valued in excess of $50,000 from
points located outside the State of Connecticut. Respond-
ent admits that it is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act, and I so find. In addition, I find that Amalgamated
Service and Allied Industries Joint Board, Amalgamated
Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO, CLC
(the Union) is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
The issues in this proceeding are:
1. Did Respondent unlawfully interrogate employees
concerning their union activities, create the impression
among employees that their union activities were under
surveillance, and solicit an employee to engage in sur-
veillance of other employees' union activities?
2. Did Respondent promulgate a rule forbidding dis-
cussion of the Union with other employees in violation
of the Act?
3. Did Respondent transfer an employee in retaliation
for her union activities in violation of the Act?
4. Did Respondent threaten employees with the loss of
benefits and with the loss of employment in the event
that employees supported the Union?
5. Did Respondent refuse to negotiate with the Union
with respect of layoffs, transfers, and certain changes it
made, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act?
All dates refer to 1985 unless otherwise specified.
ANGELICA HEALTHCARE SERVICES 847
B. The Facts
1. Background
Respondent operates a commercial laundry facility in
Milford, Connecticut, where it rents hospital linens to
hospitals and other health care institutions and provides
laundry services for these linens. Approximately 140 em-
ployees are employed at the Milford plant. Around the
first week of February the Union began an organizing
campaign at the plant. On 14 February the Union wrote
to Respondent requesting recognition. The request was
received by Respondent the next day. Respondent de-
clined to extend recognition to the Union and on 21 Feb-
ruary the Union filed a petition seeking a representation
election. Pursuant to a Stipulation for Certification Upon
Consent Election, an election was conducted on 11 and
12 April among the employees in the following appropri-
ate collective-bargaining unit:
All full-time and regular part-time hourly paid pro-
duction and maintenance employees including driv-
ers, warehouse employees, and leadpersons em-
ployed by the Employer at its Milford, Connecticut
facility; but excluding all office clerical employees,
casual employees, managerial employees, and all
guards, professional employees, and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
In the election, a majority of the votes was cast for the
Union. Respondent subsequently filed objections to con-
duct affecting the results of the election and a hearing on
those objections was held before Administrative Law
Judge Steven Davis on 31 May. On 8 August Judge
Davis issued his recommended decision on objections,
recommending that Respondent's objections be overruled
and that the Union be certified. On 12 February 1986 the
Board affirmed Judge Davis' decision and certified the
Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of the employees in the appropriate unit.
2. Alleged statements of Brian Hawley
Miryam Caez2 credibly testified that in February,
while she was taking inventory, she was approached by
Production Manager Brian Hawley. Hawley told Caez
that he wanted to speak with her, and Caez subsequently
reported to Hawley's office. No one but Hawley was
present in the office when she arrived and according to
the uncontradicted testimony of Caez, Hawley asked her
"Miryam, are you going to the union meeting?" Caez re-
plied that she was planning to attend the union meeting,
at which point Hawley asked her if she would "investi-
gate what's going on with the union." Caez replied that
she would not do so and Hawley responded, "Okay, no
problem." The meeting then ended. Caez further credi-
bly testified that subsequent to the union meeting she en-
countered Hawley while she was walking in the hall. He
asked her if "[she] still think[ing] about it and [she] told
him no."
2 Caez' name was mcorrectly spelled in the transcript. In this respect,
and in all other respects, Respondent's motion to correct errors in the
transcript is granted.
3. Alleged statements of Joyce Benoit
The complaint alleges that Respondent, acting through
Joyce Benoit, violated the Act by creating an impression
among employees that their union activities were under
surveillance and by promulgating a rule forbidding dis-
cussion of the Union with other employees.
Janice Pearson credibly testified that in February she
and Susan Ramos were approached by Joyce Benoit,
their supervisor. Pearson testified, that Benoit:
asked us if we were going to the meeting, and I re-
plied and asked her what meeting was that, and she
said. . . there was a union trying to form in Angel-
ica and they were having a meeting at Howard
Johnson's.
Pearson further testified that several weeks later,
Benoit again approached herself and Ramos and "told us
of a meeting that management had had and she told
Susan Ramos and myself that our names had been
brought up in a meeting as being union organizers."
Pearson also stated that during an occasion when she,
Ramos, and another employee were temporarily trans-
ferred to another department that Benoit also supervises,
Benoit called out "here come the union organizers, don't
come down here talking to my people about the union."
Ramos largely corroborated Pearson's testimony. She
testified that Benoit told them that she had attended a
management meeting at which both she and Pearson
were mentioned as being "heavily involved with the
union." In addition, Ramos testified that when she and
Pearson were reassigned to the tumblefold area, Benoit
stated, "here come the union organizers" and Benoit
"asked Janice Pearson and myself not to discuss the
union [with] the people."
Maria Claudio, an employee in the tumblefold depart-
ment, appeared to me to be a particularly credible wit-
ness. 3 She stated that prior to the election Ramos and
Pearson came into the tumblefold department to "help
with the work." She testified:
[As] they were coming in, my supervisor, Joyce
Benoit. . . yelled out, oh no, here come the union
organizers.
Q. What happened then?
A. What happened then was that they went to
work, and I would say about. . . ten minutes later
she yells out "no talking about the union."
Benoit denied having a conversation with Pearson or
Ramos concerning the Union. She also denied ever
shouting words to the effect "here come the union orga-
nizers" or ever instructing Pearson and Ramos not to
talk about the Union. In addition, Benoit denied telling
Pearson and Ramos that their names had come up as or-
ganizers in a management meeting concerning the Union.
3 Claudio was a current employee of Respondent with no charge
having been filed on her behalf The testimony given by such an employ-
ee adverse to the interests of a respondent is entitled to considerable
weight. See Bohemia, Inc. 266 NLRB 761, 765 (1983); Shop-Rite Super-
market, 231 NLRB 500, 505 (1977).
848
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
I credit Pearson's testimony. She testified in a forthright
manner and her testimony, in large part, was corroborat-
ed by Ramos and Claudio. On the other hand, Benoit ap-
peared to be an evasive witness during many portions of
her testimony.
4. Alleged statements of Eileen Kilstrom
The complaint alleges that Eileen Kilstrom, Respond-
ent's customer service representative and admitted agent,
unlawfully interrogated employees regarding their union
activities.
Pearson testified that towards the end of February Kil-
strom approached Ramos and herself while they were in
the garment department and asked "how did we feel
about the union." Pearson further testified that again in
March Kilstrom approached them while they were in the
garment department and "again asked us if we had an
opinion about the union." Pearson stated that there was a
third conversation, also in the garment department, when
Kilstrom told Ramos and herself that, "if I [were] you, I
would look into the union a little bit further before I
made a decision. . . because you could lose a lot instead
of gaining." In this connection, Ramos testified:
Q. Would you tell us how you happened to have
a conversation with Miss Kilstrom?
A. She came down to my department. . . while
I was at work and asked Janice Pearson and myself
how did we feel about a union coming in.. . .
Janice Pearson and myself had told her that we
were attending both the company meetings and the
union meetings, that we wanted to hear both sides
of the story.. . . [S]he asked what could we gain
from a union coming to the plant. I mentioned to
her job security. I recall Janice mentioning some-
thing about sick days, and she asked me why I
needed job security when the company hired me
back three separate times.
Kilstrom stated that she had two conversations with
Pearson and Ramos concerning the union campaign. The
first conversation took place when she went to the gar-
ment department to check on garments scheduled for de-
livery. Kilstrom testified:
Q. Did the subject of the union come up?
A. Yes.
Q. How did the subject come up?
A. After I asked [them] this question, then said
hello, how are things going either Sue or Janice
brought up the union.
Q. Could you tell us what you recall about the
conversation?
A. . . . I asked, after they mentioned the union,
what they thought the union would provide for
them, what they would gain from the union.
Kilstrom stated that the second conversation took
place around 25 March, again in the garment depart-
ment. Respondent had begun posting a question and
answer sheet called the "Question of the Day." Kilstrom
testified:
I had asked Janice if she had read the question of
the day and that particular day the questioning was
concerning. . . wages and benefits. Janice said that
she was under the impression that if the union was
voted in, that the wages and benefits would remain
the same and be negotiated up. I told her that it was
my understanding that if the union was voted in and
it came down to negotiations that it would start at
ground zero; it would start at minimum wage,
meaning. . the wages and benefits could be more
than what they are getting now, it could be less, or
it could be the same.
Pearson, Ramos, and Kilstrom all appeared to me to
be credible witnesses. They all testified in a forthright
manner. Accordingly, the General Counsel has not
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Pear-
son's and Ramos' versions of the conversations should
prevail. Kilstrom appeared to me to have good recall of
the details and I credit her version a the two conversa-
tions.
5.Alleged statements of Henry Lufler
Pearson credibly testified that in early March, while
she was working in the garment department, Henry
Lufler, personnel manager, approached her and said,
"Janice, what do you think about anything that's going
on and I said in which manner do you mean that. He
said about the union and all this mess that's going on."
Similarly, Ramos credibly testified that while she was
working on the press, Lufler came to bring her her
check. Ramos testified:
[H]e said good morning to me. He asked me . . .
what my opinion was about the union. . . . I re-
plied to him that I have no opinion, and I would
like to keep it to myself, my opinions to myself.
Although Lufler denied that he had any conversation
concerning the Union with either Pearson or Ramos, I
credit the testimony of both Pearson and Ramos, who
corroborated each other.
6.Alleged statements of Michael. Bove
Mary Techer, an employee in the flat-iron department,
testified that Michael Bove, production manager, ap-
proached her while she was working 4.0 in her depart-
ment. She stated, "He asked me where did I stand with
the union and I asked him why did he ask me that. I
asked him did he want to get me into trouble. He walked
away." Concerning this conversation, Bove testified:
It was my habit to go around and talk with em-
ployees on a daily basis and I stopped by Mary's
station to talk with her to ask her how she was
doing; how work was progressing for the day and I
asked her in the course of conversation what she
thought about what was going on in the plant.
Q. And did she respond?
A. At that point she said something . . . to the
effect that she was neither pro-union or against the
ANGELICA HEALTHCARE SERVICES 849
union; that she was for God and at that point I
ended the conversation.
I credit Techer's version of the conversation. Bove's
own testimony indicates that Techer replied "she was
neither pro-union or against the union." This indicates
that Techer understood the question being asked of her
about what her opinion was of the Union.
7. Alleged statements of Mark Vere
The complaint alleges that Respondent, acting through
Mark Vere, violated the Act by creating an impression
among employees that their union activities were under
surveillance, by interrogating employees concerning their
union activities, and by threatening employees with a
loss of benefits and a loss of employment if they support-
ed the Union.
a. The meeting with Mary Tee/2.er
Vere, plant manager of Respondent, stated that in late
February he had a conversation with Mary Techer. He
stated that Bove reported to him that Techer was "leav-
ing her station" and had some "off-the-wall type com-
ments about the union." Vere testified:
Now, I asked Mike, what do you mean by off-
the-wall? What does that mean? Well, that Mary
would leave her work station, and let's say, walk to
the next ironer. She was in the Flat Work Depart-
ment. For instance, she would tell the girls, if the
union were here, we would not have to work over-
time. It was something to that effect, or if the union
comes in, we are going to get a big raise.
Vere credibly testified that he asked Techer to come
to his office, at which time he told her:
I understand that . . . you are an active propo-
nent of the union. By that I mean you are leaving
your work station. You are going to other work sta-
tions. you are telling the girls. . . that if the union
were here, we would not have to work overtime,
and that the union is going to get us a big wage in-
crease . . . I just want you to be careful of when
you involve yourself in union activities. Please try
to do them on breaktime, after work, before work,
but not during work time.
Techer stated that after she entered Vere's office he
told her "I would like to know where you stand with the
union." She testified:
I told him that my vote didn't count. He said yes it
did and he said that all the employees stand to lose
a lot. I asked him what did he mean. He said such
as [dis]ability benefit[s] and vacation.
I credit Vere's testimony. He testified in a forthright
manner and was able to recollect many of the details. In
addition, in view of his background, including his having
formerly been a union officer, I believe he was knowl-
edgeable regarding the statements supervisors are permit-
ted to make. I believe it is unlikely that he would have
made the statements attributed to him by Techer.
b. Employee meetings
Vere testified that two meetings were called in mid-
March, one with the first-shift employees and one virith
the employees of the second shift. The meetings were
called to inform the employees concerning the possible
loss of Long Island Jewish Hospital as a customer. He
stated that a hiring freeze had been put into effect and
that the Company was "attempting to reduce the work-
force through attrition." He testified that he did not say
anything about the Union election and "tried to restrict
this meeting to just the Long Island Jewish issue."
Pearson stated that she attended the meeting called for
the first-shift employees. She testified that Vere stated at
the meeting that several hospitals considering becoming
customers of Respondent were hesitant because Re-
spondent's employees were "trying to organize a union"
and that "hospitals don't like to deal with. . . unionized
shops because. . . they're afraid that they might go on
strike." Miganlia stated that she too attended the meeting
of first-shift employees. She testified that Vere stated
that the Company "might be losing hospital contracts be-
cause some hospitals might not want to do business with
Angelica if it's a union shop." She further stated that it
was Kinsella who discussed the issue of the possible loss
of Long Island Jewish Hospital as a customer.
For the reasons stated above I credit Vere's testimony.
With respect to Lopez' testimony, it appears she was
mistaken. I credit Vere's testimony that Kinsella was not
present at that meeting.
C. Interrogations
Pearson testified that sometime in March while she
and Ramos were in the garment department Vere ap-
proached them and asked them "what did we think
about everything that was going on." Pearson testified
that she asked "everything like what" and that Vere an-
swered "as far as the union goes, do you have any ques-
tion about the union?" Concerning the same conversation
Ramos testified that Vere asked "what our views were
on the union."
Vere stated that the conversation took place in late
March after he had been informed by Kilstrom that she
received a question from Pearson and Ramos concerning
the Question of the Day. Vere testified that he went to
the garment department, approached Pearson and Ramos
and said, "Ladies, I understand you have a question con-
cerning the question of the day," which on that day
dealt with wages and fringe benefits. Vere's testimony
was as follows:
Q. Did either Ms. Ramos or Ms. Pearson say
anything?
A. . . . I'm not sure if it was Janice or Sue—said
that they had been told, by the union, that they
could not lose benefits. That they would not come
out with less than they currently had, as far as a
wage and fringe package. That the union had given
them a phone number, in Hartford, to call someone
850 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
at the labor board, or someone with the NLRB, and
they would confirm that. . . . I left there saying
. . . go ahead and call. See if you get an answer.
I credit Vere's testimony concerning the conversation.
He testified in a forthright manner and appeared to have
a good recall of the details. His testimony is not substan-
tially different from that of Pearson who stated that Vere
asked them if they had any questions about the Union.
8. Transfer of Caez
The complaint alleges that Caez was transferred to a
different department because of her union activities, in
violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
At the beginning of 1985 Caez was working as a
second shift leadperson in the soil sort department. She
continued to work in this capacity until March, at which
time she requested a transfer to the first shift, and was
assigned to work in the tumblefold department. On 11
April Caez served as a union observer at the election and
on 15 April she was transferred to "the blues." Caez tes-
tified that the blues work is based "way back in the
corner" of the tumblefold department and involves
sewing doctors' and nurses' uniforms, folding them, and
bringing them to the receiving dock. Caez stated that she
remained on the first shift while working in the blues
and that no pay cut was involved. When asked whether
the blues work was less desirable, she replied, "It didn't
make [any] difference to me."
When Caez first transferred into the tumblefold de-
partment she was assigned to work the blues. After
working in that capacity for about 1 week Benoit started
training her to "work the board." Working the board in-
volved counting the inventory and maintaining produc-
tion update sheets. Vere testified that during this period
it was discovered that Caez was making errors on the
production updates. Accordingly, a decision was made
during the last week of March or the first week of April
to reassign Caez. He stated that they were hesitant to re-
assign her then because "we were getting close to elec-
tion time." He testified that no demotion or loss of
wages was involved and that there was "just a reassign-
ment of duties, in the department."
In terms of the location of the blues, Vere credibly tes-
tified:
[T]he Blues would be in the southeast corner. That
is the area where the scrubs were folded, tied and
packed out. In the immediate vicinity was a salvage
girl, one-two folder operators—two small piece
folder operators. Two girls who operated the small
piece folding machines. That is in the immediate vi-
cinity.
JUDGE MORRIS: How far away are they from the
person working in Blues?
THE WITNESS: I would guestimate ten feet.
Q.. . . Is there any barrier between them?
A. No. No physical barriers.
Vere further credibly testified that there is no position
called "Assistant to the Leadperson" in the tumblefold
department, that the blues was not considered to be a
separate department and that "working the blues" is
merely the process of folding, packaging, and getting the
material ready for delivery.
9. Unilateral changes, layoffs, and transfers
The complaint alleges that starting 15 April Respond-
ent changed the work schedules of its maintenance de-
partment employees and laid off and transferred certain
employees without prior notice to the Union and without
having afforded the Union an opportunity to negotiate
and bargain with respect to such action.
Joseph Brandalick credibly testified that on 15 April
the maintenance department employees were advised of
the following changes in their work schedules: his and
Healy's schedules were changed from 6:30 a.m. to 3 p.m.
to the new schedules of 7 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.; Calogine's
schedule was changed from 6 a.m. to 4 p.m. to the new
schedule of 6 a.m. to 2:30 p.m.; and Pickering's schedule
was changed from 6:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. to the new
schedule of 6:30 a.m. to 3 p.m. Kinsella conceded that
these changes occurred.
The complaint alleges and Respondent admits that on
26 April it laid off Blount, Williams, Lopez, and Waller
and on 17 May it laid off Mendez and Barnes. The com-
plaint also alleges that on 26 April Respondent laid off
Rivera. This was conceded by Kinsella. In addition, the
complaint alleges and Respondent admits that during
May Pearson and Ramos were transferred and, as dis-
cussed previously, Caez was reassigned on 15 April. It
was stipulated that the changes in work schedule, the
layoffs, and transfers were made without prior notice to
the Union and without affording the Union an opportuni-
ty to bargain.
C. Discussion
In Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176 (1984), enfd. sub
nom. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 11 v. NLRB,
760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985), the Board returned to the
test originally established in Blue Flash Express, 109
NLRB 591 (1954), in which the Board required that all
the circumstances involved in an interrogation be exam-
ined to determine whether the interrogation tended to re-
strain, coerce, or interfere with rights guaranteed by the
Act. Among the factors examined are the background of
the interrogation, the nature of the information sought,
the identity of the questioner, and the place and method
of interrogation. Sunnyvale Medical Clinic, 277 NLRB
1217 (1985). In Sunnyvale the Board also considered
whether there was a history of employer hostility to-
wards union supporters and whether the questions were
general and nonthreatening.
1. Interrogation of Techer
I have credited Techer's testimony that Bove ap-
proached her and asked her "where did I stand with the
union." She then asked Bove why he asked her the ques-
tion and "did he want to get me into trouble." I find
Bove's question to constitute an unlawful interrogation.
Bove was production manager and Techer had not
openly declared herself to be a union supporter. The ex-
change was not a casual conversation which sought in-
ANGELICA HEALTHCARE SERVICES

851
formation of a general nature. Rather, Bove specifically
asked Techer where she stood with the Union. That
Techer did not regard the conversation as casual is evi-
denced by her responding whether Bove wanted to get
her into trouble. While the fact that the questioning took
place at the employee's work station rather than in a less
formal setting is a relevant consideration, under all the
circumstances, I conclude that Bove's question reason-
ably tended to coerce Techer in the exercise of rights
guaranteed by the Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
See Kona 60 Minute Photo, 277 NLRB 867, 868 (1985).
2. Interrogation of Caez and request to engage in
surveillance
I have credited Caez' testimony that Hawley, the pro-
duction manager, requested her to come to his office
where he asked her whether she was going to the union
meeting. I fmd that Hawley's questioning Caez whether
she was going to the union meeting constituted an un-
lawful interrogation. She had not openly declared herself
to be a union supporter and the questioning took place in
Hawley's office. Under all the circumstances, I conclude
that Hawley's question reasonably tended to coerce Caez
in the exercise of rights guaranteed her by the Act, in
violation of Section 8(a)(1). Kona 60 Minute Photo, supra.
. After Caez informed Hawley that she was planning to
attend the union meeting, he asked her to "investigate
what's going on with the Union." Caez refused to do so.
I find that Hawley's request constitutes a solicitation to
engage in surveillance, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act, irrespective of the fact that Caez refused to
comply. United Artists Theatre Circuit, 277 NLRB 115,
118 (1985); Southern Illinois Petrol, 277 NLRB 160, 170
(1985).
3. Creating impression of surveillance
I have credited Pearson's testimony that Benoit told
her and Ramos that their names had been mentioned at a
management meeting as being "union organizers." A su-
pervisor's statement to employees that management is
aware of their union activities creates an impression that
the employees' union activities are under surveillance, in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. See Cardivan Co.,
271 NLRB 563, 568 (1984).
4. Interrogation of Pearson and Ramos by Lufier
I have credited the testimony of Pearson and Ramos
that Lufler, part-time personnel manager, approached
them in the garment department and asked either "what
do you think about [what's] going on" or, according to
Ramos' recollection, what her opinion was about the
Union. I note that the questioning was done in the gar-
ment department and that Lufler is a part-time employee.
In addition, the conversation did not appear threatening.
Under the totality of the circumstances, I find that
Lufiees interrogation did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. See Rossmore House, supra.
5. Other interrogations
I have credited Kilstrom's testimony with respect to
the conversations she had with Pearson and Ramos. Ac-
cording to Kilstrom, in the first conversation Pearson or
Ramos first brought up the subject of the Union, after
which Kilstrom asked "what they thought the union
would provide for them." The second conversation in-
volved Kilstrom asking Pearson whether she had read
the question of the day. A discussion then ensued con-
cerning wages and benefits. Under the totality of the cir-
cumstances, I find that Kilstrom's questions did not vio-
late Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Similarly, I have credited Vere's testimony concerning
his conversations with Pearson and Ramos. He ap-
proached Pearson and Ramos in the garment department
and said, "Ladies, I understand you have a question con-
cerning the question of the day." Again, a discussion
ensued concerning wages and fringe benefits. Under the
totality of the circumstances, I find that Vere's discussion
with Pearson and Ramos did not violate Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
6. No-solicitation rule
The complaint alleges that in March Respondent,
acting through Benoit, promulgated a rule forbidding the
discussion of the Union with other employees. As previ-
ously found, while Pearson and Ramos were working in
the tumblefold department, Benoit told them "no talking
about the union."
Respondent's employee manual contains the following
provision:
Soliciting: Employee: Solicitation by an employee of
another employee, or distribution of literature of
any kind for any purpose whatsoever, may not be
conducted during working time. This excludes
breaks and lunch periods when employees are not
engaged in performing their work duties.
Ramos testified that she had been aware of the compa-
ny rule prohibiting solicitation or distribution of litera-
ture during working time. The General Counsel does not
argue that Respondent's no-solicitation rule does not
conform with Board standards. See Our Way, Inc., 268
NLRB 394 (1983). Although the General Counsel cites
Southern Illinois Petrol, , supra, in that case the record
does not show whether the company had a no-solicita-
tion rule (277 NLRB at 160 fn. 2). As Claudio credibly
testified, Benoit made her statement while Pearson and
Ramos were working. The General Counsel has not
shown that employees were allowed to discuss other
nonwork subjects while working. I conclude that the
General Counsel has failed to show that Benoit's state-
ment to Pearson and Ramos that there was to be no talk-
ing about the Union while working constituted disparate
treatment. See Houston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 265
NLRB 766, 782 (1982), modified 740 F.2d 398 (5th Cir.
1984). Accordingly, the allegation is dismissed.
7. Transfer of Caez
The complaint alleges that Caez was transferred to a
different department because of her union activities, in
violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. I have credited
Vere's testimony that Caez was reassigned to working in
852 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the blues because of her errors on the production up-
dates in the job previously assigned to her. The blues
work was a function of the tumblefold department and
was done approximately 10 feet away from where sever-
al other employees worked Caez remained on the first
shift, no pay cut was involved and, when asked whether
the blues work was less desirable, she replied that it did
not make any difference to her. I find that the General
Counsel has not shown that Caez was reassigned because
of her union activities and, accordingly, the allegation is
dismissed.
8. Employee meetings
The complaint alleges that Vere impliedly threatened
the employees with the loss of their jobs if they selected
the Union as their bargaining representative. I have cred-
ited Vere's testimony that the meetings in the cafeteria
were called to inform the employees concerning the pos-
sible loss of Long Island Jewish Hospital as a customer.
He informed the employees that a hiring freeze had been
put into effect and that the Company was attempting to
reduce the work force through attrition. I have credited
his testimony that he did not speak about the union elec-
tion. Accordingly, the allegation is dismissed.
9. Unilateral changes, layoffs, and transfers
On 14 February the Union requested recognition, and
on 11 and 12 April an election was held in which the
Union won a majority. On 26 April the Union sent a
telegram to Respondent that stated, in pertinent part:
We hereby renew our February 14 demand for
recognition and request that you immediately begin
negotiations concerning the terms and conditions of
employment for the employees in the bargaining
unit. It has come to our attention that your firm in-
tends to institute a layoff next week. I wish to put
you on notice that any layoff instituted without first
negotiating with this union shall be considered by
us to be a unilateral change in terms and conditions
of employment in violation of our collective bar-
gaining rights.
On 12 February 1986 the Board certified the Union as
the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the
employees in the appropriate unit.
On 15 April Respondent changed the work schedules
of four of its maintenance department employees. The
changes resulted in Calogine and Pickering having their
regularly scheduled overtime eliminated. Healy's and
Brandalick's schedules were changed so that they began
and ended work one-half hour later than previously
scheduled.
On 26 April Respondent laid off Blount, Williams,
Lopez, Waller, and Rivera and on 17 May Respondent
laid off Mendez and Barnes. On 15 April Caez was reas-
signed and during May Respondent transferred Pearson
and Ramos. These changes were all made without prior
notice to the Union and without affording the Union an
opportunity to bargain.
In Mike O'Connor Chevrolet, 209 NLRB 701, 703
(1974), enf. denied on other grounds 512 F.2d 684 (8th
Cir. 1975), the Board stated:
[A]bsent compelling economic considerations for
doing so, an employer acts at its peril in making
changes in terms and conditions of employment
during the period that objections to an election are
pending and the final determination has not been
made. And where the final determination on the ob-
jections results in the certification of a representa-
tive, the Board has held the employer to have vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) for having made such
unilateral changes. Such changes have the effect of
bypassing, undercutting, and undermining the
union's status as the statutory representative of the
employees in the event a certification is issued.
In Clements Wire & Mfg. Co., 257 NLRB 1058 (1981),
the Board found that the company violated Section
8(a)(5) of the Act by laying off employees prior to certi-
fication of the union, without notice to, or bargaining
with, the union. The Board stated (at 1059):
Although an employer may properly decide that an
economic layoff is required, once such a decision is
made the employer must nevertheless notify the
Union, and, upon request, bargain with it concern-
ing the layoffs, including the manner in which the
layoffs and any recalls are to be effected. By failing
to so notify the Union while its objections to the
election were pending, Respondent acted at its peril
and, since the Union was thereafter certified as the
collective-bargaining representative of its employ-
ees, Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.
Similarly, in Van Dorn Plastic Machinery Co., 265
NLRB 864 (1982), modified 736 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1984),
the company engaged in certain unilateral changes after
the election, but prior to certification. In raiding a viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(5), the Board stated (at 865):
The Board has repeatedly held that economic ex-
pediency or sound business considerations are insuf-
ficient defenses to justify unilateral changes in terms
and conditions of employment. Once the General
Counsel has made a prima facie showing of an
8(a)(5) violation—as has been done here—a re-
spondent must demonstrate why the refusal to bar-
gain was privileged. In the instant case, Respondent
was responsible for showing that "compelling eco-
nomic considerations" warranted its acting unilater-
ally. This it has not done here.
Respondent argues that the loss of a significant con-
tract with Long Island Jewish Hospital, effective 24
April, justifies its having implemented the changes with-
out prior notice to the Union and without bargaining
with the Union. I have credited Kinsella's testimony that
the Long Island Jewish Hospital account represented ap-
proximately 14 percent of Respondent's revenue.
ANGELICA HEALTHCARE SERVICES

853
I do not believe that Respondent has sustained its
burden of showing "compelling economic consider-
ations" which would absolve it from being required to
notify the Union and to bargain concerning the changes.
I believe that an underlying reason for not requiring bar-
gaining when there are "compelling economic consider-
ations" is that an unforeseen occurrence, having a major
economic effect, is about to take place that requires the
company to take immediate action. 4 In the instant pro-
ceeding, this has not occurred. In the first place, it has
not been shown that the loss of an account representing
14 percent of revenue, albeit a significant loss, is the type
of "compelling" economic consideration that the cases
require. In addition, the loss of Long Island Jewish Hos-
pital as a customer was not unforeseen. Respondent's
contract with the hospital expired in January and negoti-
ations for its renewal had been underway since Novem-
ber 1984. The record shows that as early as March, Kin-
sella was apprehensive that the account would be lost
and that he and Vere decided to put a general freeze on
hiring and to reduce the work force through attrition.
On 8 April Kinsella was informed that the contract was
cancelled, effective 2 weeks later, on 24 April.
Citing Kal-Die Casting Corp., 221 NLRB 1068 (1975),
Respondent argues that the changes in work schedules of
the maintenance department employees were "routine"
and thus Respondent was not required to notify the
Union or bargain with it. In that case the Board stated
(at 1068 fn. 1):
We agree with the Administrative Law Judge's
conclusions that Respondent's postelection but pre-
certification activity concerning routine production
scheduling and adjustments relating to diminishing
available hours of work did not violate Sec. 8(a)(5)
of the Act. There is no evidence in the record that
this activity varied from the Respondent's past prac-
tice or that the Union at any time attempted to
broach these issues with the Respondent.
I believe that the Kal-Die decision is distinguishable.
The elimination of regularly scheduled overtime is
hardly a "routine" adjustment. In addition, there is no
provision in the employee manual dealing with changes
in work schedules, nor was there any "past practice" for
Respondent to follow. For, as pointed out in Respond-
ent's brief, "the Milford plant had never been faced with
a similar loss of business before." Consequently, unless
the change were "routine" it would constitute a unilater-
al change that would have required prior bargaining.
The complaint alleges that the layoffs of seven em-
ployees on 26 April and 17 May, the transfer of Caez on
15 April, and the transfer of Pearson and Ramos during
May, all done without prior notice to the Union and
4 An analogy may be drawn to the situation m the normal bargaining
context when an event occurs, such as the breakdown of machinery,
where there is no time for management to consult with the union. In
such a case it has been held that the company was permitted to lay off
employees without prior nonce to the union. See Tylertown Wood Prod-
ucts, 251 NLRB 515, 521 (1980). Even in that situation, however, the
company would still be required to bargain concerning the effects of the
layoffs
without affording an opportunity to bargain, constitute
violations of Section 8(a)(5).
In order for a statutory bargaining obligation to arise
with respect to a particular change unilaterally imple-
mented by an employer, such change must be a "materi-
al, substantial, and a significant" one affecting the terms
and conditions of employment of bargaining unit em-
ployees. Alamo Cement Co., 281 NLRB 737 (1986);
United Technologies Corp., 278 NLRB 306 (1986). As I
have previously found, Caez had been reassigned to
work in the blues. This was a function of the tumblefold
department, the same department in which she was
working. She remained on the same shift and suffered no
loss in pay. I find that this change was not "material,
substantial and significant" and accordingly, failure to
furnish prior notice to the Union or to bargain concern-
ing the reassignment was not a violation of Section
8(a)(5),
During May, Pearson and Ramos were transferred
from the day shift in the garment department to the
night shift in the OR inspection department. These trans-
fers, together with the layoffs of the seven employees on
26 April and 17 May were, in my view, "material, sub-
stantial and significant" changes affecting the terms and
conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees.
Accordingly, for the above reasons, in accordance with
the Board's decision in Mike O'Conner Chevrolet, supra,
as reaffirmed in Clements Wire & Mfg. Co., supra, and
Van Dorn Plastic Machinery Co., supra, I find that by im-
plementing changes in the work schedules, by transfer-
ring Pearson and Ramos, and by laying off seven em-
ployees without prior notice to the Union and without
affording the Union an opportunity to bargain, Respond-
ent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By interrogating employees concerning their union
activities, by creating an impression among employees
that their union activities were under surveillance, and
by soliciting an employee to engage in surveillance of
other employees' union activities, Respondent has en-
gaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By refusing to negotiate with the Union with re-
spect to certain changes in work schedules, transfers, and
layoffs, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices constitute unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
6. Respondent did not violate the Act in any other
manner alleged in the complaint.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I find it necessary to order Re-
854 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
spondent to cease and desist therefrom and to take cer-
tain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act.
Respondent, having violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by
laying off employees without notice to, and bargaining
with, the Union, I shall order Respondent, on request, to
bargain with the Union concerning the layoffs of em-
ployees between 26 April and 17 May 1985. I shall fur-
ther order that Respondent make whole those employees
laid off during the aforementioned period for any loss of
earnings suffered by reason of Respondent's unlawful
conduct. Backpay shall be computed in the manner set
forth in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with
interest thereon to be computed in the manner set forth
in Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977).5
Having also found that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by unilaterally changing the
work schedules of its maintenance department employees
and by transferring several of its employees, without
notice to, and bargaining with, the Union, I shall order
Respondent to restore the status quo by rescinding the
unilateral changes and by making whole the employees
for any loss of earnings, the amounts to be computed in
the manner set forth above.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
eds
ORDER
The Respondent, Angelica Healthcare Services Group,
Inc., Milford, Connecticut, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Unlawfully interrogating employees regarding their
union activities, soliciting employees to engage in sur-
veillance of other employees' union activities, or creating
an impression among the employees that their union ac-
tivities are under surveillance.
(b) Unilaterally laying off or transferring employees or
changing employees' work schedules, without prior
notice to or bargaining with the Union as the exclusive
representative of its employees in the below-described
bargaining unit.
(c) Refusing to bargain with Amalgamated Service and
Allied Industries Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing
and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO, CLC in the fol-
lowing appropriate unit:
All full-time and regular part-time hourly paid pro-
duction and maintenance employees including driv-
ers, warehouse employees, and leadpersons em-
ployed by the Employer at its Milford, Connecticut
facility; but excluding all office clerical employees,
5 See generally Isis Plumbing Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
6 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses
casual employees, managerial employees, and all
guards, professional employees, and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) At the request of the Union, revoke the changes in
work schedules of the maintenance department employ-
ees instituted on 25 April 1985.
(b) On request, bargain with the Union as the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of the above
unit of employees, including bargaining concerning the
aforementioned changes in work schedules, transfers, and
layoffs.
(c) In the event it has not already done so, offer to
Bobby Blount, Mattie Williams, Migdalia Lopez, Casan-
dra Waller, Raul Rivera, Iniovel Mendez, Dennis Barnes,
Janice Pearson, and Susan Ramos immediate and full re-
instatement to their former position, or, if such positions
no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions,
without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and
privileges, and make them whole for any losses of earn-
ings, with interest, in the manner set forth in the remedy
section.
(d) Make whole Tony Calogine and George Pickering
for any loss of earnings as a result of the work schedule
changes on 15 April 1985, with interest, in the manner
set forth in the remedy section.
(e) Preserve and, on request, make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports and all other records nec-
essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this order.
(f) Post at its facility in Milford, Connecticut, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." Copies of the
notice on forms provided by the officer in charge for
Subregion 39, after being signed by Respondent's author-
ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecu-
tive days in conspicuous places including all places
Where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or coVered by
any other material.
(g) Notify the officer in charge in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that those allegations of
the complaint that no violations have been found are dis-
missed.
7 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words m the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board"