Angeles C,1 Complainant,v.Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Western Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJan 25, 2018
0120160673 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 25, 2018)

0120160673

01-25-2018

Angeles C,1 Complainant, v. Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Western Area), Agency.


U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

Angeles C,1

Complainant,

v.

Megan J. Brennan,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(Western Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120160673

Hearing No. 490-2015-00130X

Agency No. 4G-720-0007-15

DECISION

On November 25, 2015, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.403(a), from the Agency's October 29, 2015, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a City Carrier at the Agency's Asher Post Office facility in Little Rock, Arkansas.

On February 12, 2015, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (African-American), sex (female), and color (Black) when:

1. On October 15, 2014, Complainant was placed on Emergency Placement in Off Duty/Non-Pay Status;

2. On October 15, 2014, she was harassed by Postal Inspectors during an interrogation;

3. On October 15, 2014, her Weingarten Rights were violated.

The Agency accepted claim (1) for investigation. The Agency dismissed claims (2) and (3) pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1) for failure to state a claim. The Agency noted that claim (2) involved a collateral attack on an internal investigation and claim (3) alleged discrimination based on a right pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Therefore, the Agency held that claims (2) and (3) were not properly alleged in the EEO complaint process.

At the conclusion of the investigation of claim (1), the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. When the Complainant did not object, the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency's August 14, 2015, motion for a decision without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing on October 14, 2015. Specifically, the AJ held that the Agency provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for placing Complainant on emergency leave for which Complainant failed to show was pretext for discrimination based on her sex, race and/or color. In the decision, the AJ noted that Complainant did not challenge the Agency's dismissal of claims (2) and (3). Therefore, the AJ concluded that Complainant failed to establish her claim of discrimination.

The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. This appeal followed without specific argument. The Agency asked that the Commission affirm its implementation of the AJ's decision finding no discrimination.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

We must determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate.

Upon review of the record we find that the AJ properly found that the instant complaint was suitable for summary judgment. The record is adequately developed and there are no disputes of material fact.

Complainant alleged that she was subjected to discrimination when she was placed on emergency off duty status on October 15, 2014. A claim of disparate treatment based on indirect evidence is examined under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For Complainant to prevail, he or she must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep't. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the Agency has met its burden, Complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the Agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether Complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Dep't. of Transp., EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Dep't. of Health and Human Serv., EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Dep't. of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

Upon review of the record, we find that the Agency provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. The record showed that, on October 14, 2014, a parcel was seized during an interdiction operation by the Inspection Service at the Agency's Little Rock Processing and Distribution Center. The parcel was identified as an Express Mail parcel sent from the Asher Station by someone with the same first name as Complainant with a different last name albeit starting with the same initial. The parcel contained over $12,000 in cash and was believed to be involved with a drug parcel. The Agency's postal inspectors spoke with Complainant and noted that her account of the circumstances of the mailing of the package was "suspicious." The following day, the Postal Inspectors continued their investigation. During the internal postal investigation interview, Complainant gave conflicting statements but ultimately admitted to being involved in the mailing. She denied knowing the contents were drug related, she admitted using a different last name on the envelope "in case it was bad." Because of the facts learned during the internal postal investigation and her false statements to the Postal Inspectors, the Agency placed Complainant on emergency placement in non-pay, off-duty status. We find that the Agency provide legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action. We turn to Complainant to establish that the Agency's reason was pretext. We find that Complainant failed to do so. As such, we conclude that the AJ correctly found that Complainant did not establish she was subjected to discrimination based on her sex, race, and/or color.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency's final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0617)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 � VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant's request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The agency's request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC's Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)

If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden's signature

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

January 25, 2018

__________________

Date

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website.

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