Angela L. Britt, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJan 16, 2009
0120072276 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 16, 2009)

0120072276

01-16-2009

Angela L. Britt, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Angela L. Britt,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120072276

Agency No. 4A070017806

DECISION

On April 6, 2007, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's March 2,

2007 final decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Section

501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended,

29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is accepted

pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the

Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final decision.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked

as an Automated Mark-Up Clerk at the agency's Newark, New Jersey Main

Post Office. On September 5, 2006, complainant filed an EEO complaint

alleging that she was discriminated against on the basis of disability

(multiple sclerosis) when:

1. beginning May 8, 2006, her work hours were reduced and she was

not being accommodated and utilized to her work capabilities;

2. on May 26, 2006, she was advised that she needed to have her

work restrictions updated;

3. effective June 3, 2006, she was placed "on-call" for work; and

4. on August 18, 2006, her request for light duty was denied.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). When complainant

did not request a hearing within the time frame provided in 29 C.F.R. �

1614.108(f), the agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.110(b). The decision concluded that complainant failed to prove

that she was subjected to discrimination as alleged.

The agency found complainant was a qualified individual with

a disability, but she failed to establish a prima facie case of

disability discrimination because she failed to show how she was treated

differently than similarly situated non-disabled individuals. Rather,

the agency maintained that all individuals within the CFS Unit where

complainant worked had their hours reduced due to the Postal Automated

Redirection System (PARS), a machine that reduced the unit's workload

by 80 percent. The agency also maintained that in May 2006, it did

ask complainant to update her medical restrictions in order to develop

new modified job offers. The Manager, Customer Service, averred that

complainant was placed "on call" due to PARS implementation. Furthermore,

management personnel averred that complainant was not denied light duty;

rather, she was given Window Clerk training and the District Reasonable

Accommodation Committee (DRAC) reviewed her case in an attempt to find

a clerical position for complainant. As complainant notes on appeal,

she has been placed into a part-time Window Clerk position.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

Complainant's primary contention on appeal involves her dispute

with the agency's reduction of her hours from full-time to part-time.

Complainant does not dispute that her transfer from the CFS unit to the

Mail Processing Unit was done due to the automation and the unit's loss

of work. However, she argues that when she was returned to the CFS unit,

her hours were reduced despite her observation that others were asked

to work overtime. She supplies an affidavit, and one of a co-worker,

which aver that other full-time regular and part-time flexible employees

assigned to the CFS Unit, and other part-time flexible employees who had

been reassigned to the Mail Processing Unit were asked to work overtime.

Complainant contends that the request to update medical documentation

and her placement "on call" was discriminatory and harassing, and she

also maintains that she was denied light duty.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the agency's decision is subject to de novo

review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See EEOC Management

Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.A. (November 9, 1999) (explaining that

the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine

the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the

previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements,

and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions

of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's

own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").

Complainant's claim raises both disparate treatment and failure to

accommodate claims. In analyzing a disparate treatment claim under

the Rehabilitation Act, where the agency denies that its decisions were

motivated by complainant's disability and there is no direct evidence of

discrimination, we apply the burden-shifting method of proof set forth

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Heyman

v. Queens Village Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Cmty. Adolescent

Program, 198 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1999); Swanks v. WMATA, 179 F.3d 929,

933-34 (D.C.Cir. 1999). Under this analysis, in order to establish

a prima facie case, complainant must demonstrate that: (1) she is an

"individual with a disability"; (2) she is "qualified" for the position

held or desired; (3) he was subjected to an adverse employment action;

and (4) the circumstances surrounding the adverse action give rise to an

inference of discrimination. Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916

(7th Cir. 2001). The burden of production then shifts to the agency

to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse

employment action. In order to satisfy his burden of proof, complainant

must then demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's

proffered reason is a pretext for disability discrimination. Id.

Here, assuming complainant was an individual with a disability1 and that

she otherwise could establish a prima facie case of discrimination

on the alleged bases, the agency has articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for reducing complainant's hours; namely,

that there was insufficient work in her former unit to occupy her for

eight hours. As a part-time flexible employee, complainant was only

guaranteed work for four hours per day. Although complainant contends

on appeal that others were granted overtime in the unit, we find she

failed to prove the agency's reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

Complainant essentially concedes on appeal that a reduction in personnel

was necessary given the automation of the PARS system. Like all CFS

Unit part time flexible employees, complainant was removed from the CFS

Unit and placed into the Mail Processing Unit.

When it became clear the job duties of the Mail Processing Unit were not

in compliance with her medical restrictions, complainant was returned

to the CFS Unit.2 However, there was only a limited amount of work

available that was within her medical restrictions, and as such,

complainant suffered a reduction in hours, and was placed "on call."

Complainant contends that others received overtime; however, she failed to

name any individual in order for the agency to assess if they were indeed

similarly situated. Further, she failed to identify the type of work that

was being performed on overtime such that an assessment could be made as

to whether the work was within her medical restrictions. Complainant

has not carried her burden of proof in this case to establish that the

agency's reasons for reducing her hours and placing her "on call" were

a pretext to discriminate against her on the basis of her disability.

Complainant also complains that the agency inappropriately requested

medical documentation from her. An employer may require an employee

to provide documentation that is sufficient to substantiate that she

has a disability within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act and needs

the reasonable accommodation requested, but cannot ask for unrelated

documentation. Documentation is insufficient if it does not specify

the existence of a disability and explain the need for reasonable

accommodation. An employer that requests additional information based

on a good faith belief that the documentation the employee submitted is

insufficient is not liable for discrimination. EEOC Enforcement Guidance:

Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of Employees Under

the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), response to question 11,

(July 27, 2000) (available at www.eeoc.gov). In this case, complainant

was asked to provide medical documentation around the time that the

nature of her position was changing. It was reasonable for the agency

to request updated medical documentation in this circumstance.

Finally, complainant states that she was denied light duty, a form of

a reasonable accommodation. Federal agencies are required to provide

reasonable accommodation to qualified individuals with disabilities who

are employees or applicants for employment unless to do so would cause

undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.9(a). In this case, the record reveals

that complainant requested light duty, and she received a response on

August 16, 2006. Therein, the Manager, Customer Service informed her that

she had been sent to window training to see if she could become a Window

Clerk at another facility, and in the interim, management was waiting

to hear back on the decision of the District Reasonable Accommodation

Committee (DRAC). The record reveals complainant has since been placed

into a Window Clerk position. Accordingly, we find that complainant

has failed to establish she was denied an accommodation.

CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the agency's final decision finding no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

January 16, 2009

Date

1 We do not decide in this decision whether complainant is a qualified

individual with a disability.

2 At the time, complainant was limited to no lifting over 10 pounds,

no pushing or pulling over 20 pounds, no twisting, climbing, kneeling,

or squatting; intermittent sitting, standing, walking, bending, stooping,

and driving.

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0120072276

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

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0120072276

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0120072276