Andre Youngv.Draion M. Burch DO, LLC

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

May 3, 2018

No. 91224580 (T.T.A.B. May. 3, 2018)

THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB

Mailed: May 3, 2018

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

Andre Young
v.
Draion M. Burch DO

_____
Opposition No. 912245801
Opposition No. 91226572
_____

James D. Weinberger of Fross Zelnick Lehrman & Zissu PC,
for Andre Young.

Andrea H. Evans of The Law Firm of Andrea Hence Evans LLC,
Jon A. Schiffrin of Schiffrin & Longo, P.C.,
for Draion M. Burch Do, LLC.

_____

Before Kuhlke, Goodman and Pologeorgis,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Goodman, Administrative Trademark Judge:

1 On March 3, 2016, the Board consolidated proceedings in Opposition Nos. 91224580 and
91226572, designating Opposition No. 91224580 as the parent case. 8 TTABVUE.

References to the record and the briefs refer to the Board’s TTABVUE docket system.

Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
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Draion M. Burch DO, LLC (“Applicant”) filed applications to register the following
marks:
DR. DRAI (standard characters) for:
Educational and entertainment services, namely,
providing motivational speaking services in the field of
osteopathic medicine, obstetrics and gynecology provided
by a doctor, in International Class 41; and
Health care consulting in the field of osteopathic medicine,
obstetrics and gynecology rendered by a doctor; Obstetric
and gynecology services rendered by a doctor, in
International Class 442; and
for:
Audio books in the field of women’s health and men’s
health; Downloadable MP3 files, MP3 recordings, on-line
discussion board posts, webcasts, webinars and podcasts,
news, and audio books in the field of women’s health and
men’s health; Downloadable webinars in the field of
women’s health and men’s health; Electronic publications,
namely, magazines, books, manuals, worksheets,
workbooks, blogs, journal articles, newspapers, tutorials,
forums, research papers, conference papers featuring
men’s health and women’s health topics recorded on
computer media, in International Class 9;

2 Application Serial No. 86590205 was filed on April 7, 2015, under Section 1(a), alleging July
1, 2011 as the date of first use and use in commerce for both services. The application includes
the following statement: The name(s), portrait(s), and/or signature(s) shown in the mark
identifies Dr. Draion Burch, whose consent(s) to register is made of record. This application
is the subject of Opposition No. 91224580.

Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
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A series of books, written articles, handouts and
worksheets in the field of men’s health and women’s
health, in International Class 16;
Education services, namely, providing non-downloadable
webinars in the field of women’s health and men’s health;
Education services, namely, providing classes, webinars,
seminars, workshops, conferences in the fields of women’s
health and men’s health; Educational and entertainment
services, namely, providing motivational and educational
speakers; Educational and entertainment services,
namely, providing motivational speaking services in the
field of osteopathic medicine, obstetrics and gynecology;
Educational services, namely, conducting classes,
seminars, conferences, workshops in the fields of women’s
health and men’s health and distribution of training
materials in connection therewith; Educational services,
namely, providing online instruction in the field of women’s
health, in International Class 41; and
Providing a web site featuring medical information;
Providing medical information; Providing medical
information, consultancy and advisory services, in
International Class 44.3
Andre Young (“Opposer”) opposes registration of Applicant’s marks on the
grounds of (1) likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C.

3 Application Serial No. 86730410 was filed on August 19, 2015. The Class 9 and 16 goods are
based upon Applicant’s allegation of a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce under
Section 1(b) of the Trademark Act. For the Class 41 services, Applicant alleges September
15, 2013 as the date of first use and October 1, 2013 as the date of first use in commerce; for
the Class 44 services, Applicant alleges July 01, 2011 as the date of first use and September
15, 2013 as the date of first use in commerce.
Applicant has disclaimed OBGYN & MEDIA PERSONALITY, and the application includes
the following statement: The name(s), portrait(s), and/or signature(s) shown in the mark
identifies Dr. Draion Burch, whose consent(s) to register is made of record.
Applicant also has provided the following description of the mark: The mark consists of the
stylized text “DOCTOR DRAI OBGYN & MEDIA PERSONALITY.” The “T” is a cross symbol.
The second “O” in the term “Doctor” features a side profile of a woman’s face. The jagged line
that appears between the text “Doctor” and “Drai” represents a fetal heart rate tracing. Color
is not claimed as a feature of the mark. This application is the subject of Opposition No.
91226572.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
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§ 1052(d); (2) false suggestion of a connection under Trademark Act Section 2(a), 15
U.S.C. § 1052(a); and (3) dilution under Trademark Act Section 43(c), 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c).4 Opposer has pleaded ownership of the previously used and registered marks
DR. DRE (typed drawing) 5 for a “series of musical sound recordings” in International
Class 96; “posters, art prints and stickers” in International Class 16; “clothing,
namely, T-shirts, sweatshirts, caps” in International Class 25; and “entertainment
services by a musical artist and producer, namely, musical composition and
production of musical sound recordings” in International Class 41.7
Applicant filed answers denying the salient allegations in the notices of opposition
and asserted affirmative defenses.8 Each party filed a trial brief and Opposer filed a
reply brief.

4 Opposer states in his brief that he “elected not to pursue the dilution claim.” 30 TTABVUE
24. In view thereof, the dilution claim is deemed waived.
5 Effective November 2, 2003, Trademark Rule 2.52, 37 C.F.R. § 2.52, was amended to replace
the term “typed” drawing with “standard character” drawing. A mark depicted as a typed
drawing is the legal equivalent of a standard character mark. ProMark Brands Inc. v. GFA
Brands, Inc., 114 USPQ2d 1232, 1236 n.5 (TTAB 2015) (citing Trademark Manual of
Examining Procedure (“TMEP”) § 807.03(i)).
6 Reg. No. 2275314 issued September 7, 1999; renewed. The registration includes the
statement that ‘“DR. DRE’ identifies the stage name of a living individual whose consent is
of record.”
7 Reg. Nos. 2271449, 2271448 and 2271450 for Classes 16, 25 and 41, respectively, all issued
on August 24, 1999, and have been renewed. The registrations include the statement that
‘“DR. DRE’ identifies the stage name of a living individual whose consent is of record.”
8 Applicant’s “affirmative defense” that it is the senior user and has priority constitutes a
collateral attack on Opposer’s pleaded registrations, which, in the absence of a counterclaim
for cancellation is not permissible. In any event, Opposer’s registrations are more than five
years old, so they could not be canceled on a likelihood of confusion ground. Applicant’s
defenses of “fair use, informational use and descriptive use” are use-based defenses applied
in civil trademark infringement actions and are inapplicable in a Board proceeding which
determines questions of registrability. In the ’580 Opposition, Applicant asserted that the
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
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I. The Record
The record includes the pleadings and, by operation of Trademark Rule
2.122(b)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b)(1), the files of the involved applications. Opposer
made of record his pleaded Registration Nos. 2275314, 2271449, 2271448, and
2271450 by submitting with his notices of opposition current printouts of information,
from the USPTO’s Trademark Search and Document Retrieval System database
(TSDR), showing the current status and title of the registrations pursuant to
Trademark Rule 2.122(d)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(d)(1); Opposer also submitted
additional copies of these registrations from the TSDR database with his notice of
reliance. Opposer submitted the following evidence by way of notice of reliance: copy
of an Office Action for DOCS by DRE, a third-party application (Serial no. 86768267),
copy of notice of opposition for Opposition No. 91219583 involving Serial No.
86214488 for Dre Spitz and order entering default judgment, copy of petition to cancel
for Cancellation No. 92056861 involving Reg. No. 4285945 for and order
entering default judgment, selected responses by Applicant to Opposer’s
Interrogatory requests with accompanying verification, a notice of reliance on
Internet printouts and printed publications from Lexis/Nexis purporting to show the
notoriety, strength, and fame of the Dr. Dre mark and Dr. Dre, the individual, and
Internet printouts from Amazon.com regarding Applicant’s principal Draion Burch’s
book sales.

marks are dissimilar and the goods and services unrelated, which is not a true affirmative
defense, but merely an amplification of its denial of the likelihood of confusion claim.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
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Applicant submitted the testimonial deposition of Draion M. Burch, D.O.,
principal of Applicant, with exhibits, and submitted a notice of reliance on third-party
registrations for phonetic variations of DRE,9 the file histories for the involved
applications,10 selected responses by Opposer to Applicant’s Interrogatory requests
without the verification page, Internet printouts purporting to show Applicant’s
principal Draion Burch’s notoriety and medical experience, printed publications and
Internet printouts purporting to show third-party use of Dr. Dre, Dre, and composite
marks and phonetic equivalents of Dre; file history pertaining to Cancellation No.
92055378 for Reg. No. 4067361 for DIAMONDDRE and a confidential letter
agreement between Opposer and SuperDre Music, LLC.
II. Evidentiary Issues
Both parties, by way of notices of reliance, submitted printouts from various
websites downloaded from the Internet.11 Opposer and Applicant also submitted
printouts from printed publications. Although admissible for what they show on their
face, see Trademark Rule 2.122(e)(2), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(e)(2), this evidence constitutes
hearsay and may not be relied upon for the truth of the matters asserted unless a
competent witness has testified to the truth of such matters or the evidence is subject
to a hearsay exception or stipulation. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) and 803; Safer, Inc. v. OMS

9 Applicant’s motion, filed August 24, 2017, to amend the cover sheet of its notice of reliance
is granted.
10 As indicated, the file histories of the involved applications are automatically of record, and
it was not necessary for Applicant to file copies of the applications in its notice of reliance.
11 Some of the Internet printouts are articles from printed publications such as Forbes,
Rolling Stone, and the New York Times.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
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Invs., Inc., 94 USPQ2d 1031, 1040 (TTAB 2010). However, to the extent that a party
has acknowledged as fact any portion of this evidence submitted by the adverse party,
we deem such portions of the submitted evidence stipulated into the record for the
truth of any matters asserted therein.
Opposer has requested in its brief, in connection with his submitted evidence, that
we apply the hearsay exception for printed publications, (newspapers and
magazines), that are over twenty years old, or that were published before May 1997.12
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(16) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for a
“statement in a document that is at least 20 years old and whose authenticity is
established.” We find that the newspapers or magazines in the record that were
published in 1997 or earlier meet the authenticity requirements of Fed. R. Evid.
902(6) and are admissible under the ancient documents exception to the hearsay rule.
We treat the newspaper story submissions dated 1997 or earlier in Applicant’s notice
of reliance similarly.
Opposer also requests in his brief that we apply the hearsay exception for
“[m]arket quotations, lists, directories, or other compilations that are generally relied
on by the public or by persons in particular occupations” for Exhibit nos. DR 176, 184
and 185 which are Internet printouts from grammy.com (Dr. Dre awards list),
billboard.com (Dr. Dre chart history) and staticbrain.com (Dr. Dre album sales
statistics) for purposes of establishing Opposer’s receipt of Grammy awards, rank on

12 30 TTABVUE 12.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
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the Billboard Hot 100 and Opposer’s record sales.13 We decline to do so. Not only has
Opposer not established that these web pages are compilations contemplated by the
rule, Opposer has made no showing that these Internet pages are generally used or
relied upon by the public or persons in particular professions.
In his brief, Opposer has referenced an entry for Dr. Dre in the Encyclopedia
Britannica which is not in the record and notes that the Board may take judicial
notice thereof.14 The Board, in its discretion, declines to do so.15 Opposer has not made
a specific request for judicial notice nor supplied the necessary information as
required by the Rule. Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(2).
In his brief, Opposer has characterized Exhibit nos. DR 158-162, 175, 179-180,
192-196, which are Internet printouts from Wikipedia (Wikipedia.com), Genius,
(genius.com), IMDB (IMDB.com), Biography (biography.com) and All Music
(allmusic.com), as “online reference works.”16 However, it has not been shown that
any of the referenced online sources constitute a standard reference work or are
otherwise authoritative material. With respect to the printouts from the Wikipedia
online encyclopedia, the Board previously addressed the admissibility of evidence
derived from this website in In re IP Carrier Consulting Grp., 84 USPQ2d 1028, 1032
(TTAB 2007) and determined that “[t]here are inherent problems regarding the

13 30 TTABVUE 17, n.2.
14 30 TTABVUE 18-19.
15 Even if we had taken judicial notice of this reference, it would not change our decision
herein.
16 30 TTABVUE 19. IMDB and Genius are collaborative websites similar to Wikipedia.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
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reliability of Wikipedia entries because Wikipedia is a collaborative website that
permits anyone to edit the entries.” Therefore, exhibits from these websites constitute
hearsay and we do not accept these printouts as evidence of the truth of the matter
asserted therein.
Applicant has requested that the Board take judicial notice of the definitions for
“samurai,” “Thai,” “bonsai,” and “chai” and has submitted these definitions from the
Merriam‐Webster Online Dictionary as an attachment to its brief.17 Dictionary
definitions are generally amenable to judicial notice and we take notice of them. Hard
Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Elsea, 48 USPQ2d 1400, 1405 (TTAB 1998) (although
request for judicial notice of dictionary definitions untimely, the Board took judicial
notice because relevant to the analysis of likelihood of confusion); Weight Watchers
Int’l, Inc. v. I. Rokeach & Sons, Inc., 211 USPQ 700, 702 n.5 (TTAB 1981) (taking
judicial notice of official records where relevance is clear from record and briefs).
Applicant also has requested judicial notice of the term “dre” as defined in
urbandictionary.com and has provided this definition as an attachment to its brief.18
While slang dictionaries with fixed printed editions and online forms are appropriate
for judicial notice, aside from not having a print edition, the urban dictionary is a
collaborative source which the Board treats similar to Wikipedia. In re Star Belly
Stitcher, Inc., 107 USPQ2d 2059, 2061 n.3 (TTAB 2013). Therefore, the Board
declines to take judicial notice of the definition of “dre” from this source.

17 32 TTABVUE 14 n.3.
18 32 TTABVUE 12.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
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Applicant has conceded in its brief that Opposer uses Dre as a shortened version
of Andre and that Dr. Dre is Opposer’s stage name; that Opposer is a record producer
and hip hop artist; that Opposer is “responsible for the sale and production of music;”
and that “Opposer’s net worth is worth of several million dollars.”19
III. The Parties
As we have previously stated, the various articles and Internet materials under
Opposer’s notice of reliance cannot be used as evidence of the “facts” stated therein,
unless subject to a hearsay exception. Thus, many of the facts asserted by Opposer in
his brief have no evidentiary support. While we do not consider these articles and
stories for the truth of the matter, these articles and stories can be considered to show
that Opposer/Dr. Dre has been the subject of significant unsolicited media coverage
involving a variety of commercial and philanthropic endeavors and has been subject
to media coverage in connection with his earnings as a “hip hop cash king” or
celebrity. See Mag Instrument Inc. v. Brinkmann Corp., 96 USPQ2d 1701, 1708
(TTAB 2010) (“probative value [of Internet materials] is strictly confined to showing
that the public may have been exposed to those internet websites and therefore may
be aware of the information or advertisements contained therein”).
With regard to the newspaper and magazine articles subject to a hearsay
exception, we derive the following facts about Opposer and his musical sound
recording and musical sound recording production services.

19 32 TTABVUE 8, 12-13, 18.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
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Opposer, Andre Rommel Young, is known by the stage name Dr. Dre and referred
to in the press as Dr. Dre.20 Opposer has been considered “the single most important
force behind L.A. hip-hop” and has discovered and produced rappers Parcyde, Snoop
Dog, and the Lady of Rage, collaborated with musical artist Ice Cube, and contributed
to the Natural Born Killers soundtrack album.21 Opposer also launched record labels
Death Row records and Aftermath.22
Opposer, identified as Dr. Dre, was a member and producer of the Los Angeles
rap group N.W.A. The N.W.A. album Niggaz4Life, which Dr. Dre produced, was
known for “[p]rofane material [that] pushes notions of what is acceptable musically
to the limit; subject matter ranges from harder-than-the-rest braggadocio to
customary disses of ex-comrade Ice Cube and mind-boggling misogyny (titles: ‘To Kill
A Hooker,’ ‘One Less Bitch,’ ‘Findum, Fuckum & Flee’).”23 Dr. Dre’s first solo rap
album under the stage name Dr. Dre was The Chronic.24 The Chronic was considered
a “rap masterwork” and achieved double platinum status by the end of 1993, selling

20 16 TTABVUE 582; 20 TTABVUE 107.
21 16 TTABVUE 518, 521, 525, 582; 20 TTABVUE 10.
22 16 TTABVUE 508, 582.
23 16 TTABVUE 584.
24 20 TTABVUE 107.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
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more than 3 million copies.25 In 1994, Billboard ranked The Chronic as the sixth
bestselling album of 1993 as well as the fifth biggest selling rap album.26
In 1995, Opposer, identified as Dr. Dre, won Source hip hop awards for producer
of the year, album of the year, best artist, best producer and best album all for The
Chronic.27
Applicant, Draion M. Burch DO, LLC, is a company owned by Draion M. Burch, a
board certified osteopathic doctor and OB/GYN.28 Applicant’s owner’s nickname is
Drai, derived from his name Draion, and he refers to himself as Dr. Drai, as does his
family, his professors, his medical colleagues, and his patients.29 Through the LLC,
Applicant’s owner provides obstetrics and gynecological medical services and
speaking services on women’s health and transgender health.30 Under the “Dr. Drai
brand” Applicant’s owner has authored books, made television and radio

25 16 TTABVUE 574, 598. Songs on the album include what was described as “militant fare:”
“The Day the Niggaz Took Over,” and “Nigga Witta Gun,” as well as “Lil Ghetto Boy,” “Rat-
Tat-Tat-Tat,” “Stranded On Death Row” and the hits “Nuthin’ But a ‘G’ Thang,” (where “G”
stands for Gangster) and “Dre Day.” 16 TTABVUE 560, 574; 20 TTABVUE 107. The rap
music on The Chronic was described as “epithet-laced and insult-laden.” 20 TTABVUE 107.
26 16 TTABVUE 547, 557.
27 16 TTABVUE 537.
28 25 TTABVUE 11, 14, 35, 93, 174.
29 25 TTABVUE 16-17, 98-99, 115-116. “[B]ecause my name is Draion, everyone calls me Drai
in my family. All my friends call me Drai. When I became a physician and I graduated from
medical school, I became Dr. Drai, obviously because I’m actually a physician.” 25 TTABVUE
16-17.
30 25 TTABVUE 12-13.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
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appearances, conducted Twitter chats, and participated in speaking engagements
and online videos all relating to women’s health and transgender health topics.31
IV. Standing
Opposer has properly made his pleaded registrations of record by submitting
copies with his notices of opposition and by way of notice of reliance. Trademark Rule
2.122(d)(1)-(2), 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.122(d)(1)-(2). In view thereof, we find Opposer has
established his personal interest in this proceeding and proven his standing. See
Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753 F.3d 1270, 111 USPQ2d 1058,
1062 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1401 (2015); Cunningham v. Laser Golf
Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1844 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Lipton Indus.,
Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ 185, 189 (CCPA 1982).
V. Priority
Because Opposer has made his pleaded registrations of record and shown they are
valid and subsisting, priority is not an issue in this case as to the DR. DRE marks for
the goods and services recited in those registrations. King Candy, Inc. v. Eunice
King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108, 110 (CCPA 1974); Miller Brewing
Co. v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 27 USPQ2d 1711, 1712 (TTAB 1993).

31 25 TTABVUE 12-13, 60-61, 63-65, 67-69, 75-76, 85-86. Applicant’s owner testified that he
is a “gay gynecologist” and that as a “part of the LGBT community . . . a lot of transgender
people come to me, a lot of lesbians come to me [for health care].” 25 TTABVUE 40, 42, 78.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
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VI. Likelihood of Confusion
We first turn to the likelihood of confusion ground. We consider Opposer’s pleaded
registered marks vis-à-vis the marks in the involved applications. Stone Lion Capital
Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir.
2014). In our analysis we will focus on Opposer’s pleaded registrations with the
classes of goods and services which can be considered closest to the goods and services
in the subject applications, namely Reg. No. 2275314 and its International Class 9
goods and Reg. No. 2271450 and its International Class 41 services.32 Fiserv, Inc. v.
Elec. Transaction Sys. Corp., 113 USPQ2d 1913, 1917 (TTAB 2015). If we find a
likelihood of confusion as to these pleaded registrations, we need not find it as to the
others. On the other hand, if we do not reach that conclusion, we would not find it as
to the other pleaded registrations either. Id. (citing In re Max Capital Grp. Ltd., 93
USPQ2d 1243, 1245 (TTAB 2010)).
Our determination under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of
all of the facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on the issue of
likelihood of confusion. In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177
USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973). Opposer must establish that there is a likelihood of
confusion by a preponderance of the evidence.

32 We note that these goods and services are the ones that Opposer has referenced in his
arguments.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
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Similarity of the Marks
As to the first du Pont factor, “similarity or dissimilarity of the marks,” we analyze
“the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir.
2012) quoting du Pont, 177 USPQ at 567. See also Palm Bay Imps. Inc. v. Veuve
Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting du Pont, 177 USPQ at 567). “The proper test is not a side-
by-side comparison of the marks, but instead ‘whether the marks are sufficiently
similar in terms of their commercial impression’ such that persons who encounter the
marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Coach Servs. Inc.
v. Triumph Learning, LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(citation omitted). The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who
normally retains a general rather than a specific impression of trademarks. See Inter
IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1740 (TTAB 2014); Sealed Air Corp.
v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975).
Serial No. 86590205 DR. DRAI
Applicant’s mark is DR. DRAI and Opposer’s mark is DR. DRE. The marks are
similar in appearance in that both are two words with each mark having as the first
word an identically pronounced abbreviation for doctor (Dr.), and the second word in
each mark beginning with the letters “dr.” The marks differ in appearance because
Opposer’s mark ends with the vowel “e” while Applicant’s mark ends with the vowel
combination “ai.” As to sound, both marks are three syllables. We find the marks are
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
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phonetic equivalents and are capable of being pronounced so as to sound similar, with
consumers pronouncing the DRE/DRAI portion of each parties’ mark with a “long a”
sound. Applicant does acknowledge in its testimony that the parties pronounce DRAI
and DRE the same.33 Nonetheless, Applicant submits that while DRE in Opposer’s
mark is pronounced with a “long a” sound, (as a “shortened version of the given name
Andre”)34, consumers would more likely pronounce DRAI as a “long i” sound due to
consumers’ familiarity with the pronunciation of “long i” words bonsai, samurai, chai
or thai. We recognize that there is no correct pronunciation of a trademark, and not
all purchasers would pronounce DRE/DRAI the same. Nevertheless, given that the
more common pronunciation for the “ai” vowel combination is the “long a” sound,
(similar to the word aid) we think it more likely that numerous consumers would
pronounce DRAI in this manner. See In re Belgrade Shoe Co., 411 F.2d 1352, 162
USPQ 227, 227 (CCPA 1969) (while “there is no correct pronunciation of a
trademark,” the court held that “one is very likely to pronounce ‘Collegienne’ as if it
were spelled ‘Colleejen’ or ‘Colleejun.’”). Thus, we find the marks are similar as to
sound.
As to connotation and commercial impression, Applicant argues that the use of
“Dr.” in the marks is insignificant, submitting that the wording “Dr.” or “doctor” is
“routinely used as a clever play on expertise” and as a reference to individuals who

33 25 TTABVUE 156-57. According to Applicant, Drai is a shortened form or nickname of
Draion, a given name. Id. at 157.
34 32 TTABVUE 8.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
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are doctors by title.35 Applicant also argues that the marks are distinguishable
because DRE and DRAI are shortened versions of the parties’ dissimilar first names,
Draion and Andre, and are spelled differently. However, we find the marks are
similar. Both marks reference a particular person after the abbreviation of the term
“Dr.” and consumers would likely view these marks in a similar manner, i.e., as a
reference to a particular person with expertise. The minor difference in the spelling
of DRE and DRAI is not sufficient to distinguish the marks. Although there are some
visual differences, whether spelled as DRE or DRAI, the word has the same
pronunciation and connotation of a name. We find the marks as a whole are more
similar than dissimilar, and this du Pont factor weighs in favor of a finding of a
likelihood of confusion.
Serial No. 86730410
Applicant’s mark is a word and design mark. In considering
likelihood of confusion, we must consider the marks in their entireties; however, there
is nothing improper in giving more weight, for rational reasons, to a particular
feature of a mark. In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed.
Cir. 1985). In the case of marks which consist of words and a design, the words are
normally accorded greater weight because they would be used by purchasers to

35 32 TTABVUE 12.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
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request the goods or services. See In re Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1908 (“In the case of
a composite mark containing both words and a design, ‘the verbal portion of the mark
is the one most likely to indicate the origin of the goods to which it is affixed.’”)
(quoting CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F.2d 1579, 218 USPQ 198, 200 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); In
re Dakin’s Miniatures, Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1596 (TTAB 1999) (“words are normally
accorded greater weight because they would be used by purchasers to request the
goods”). Also, disclaimed or otherwise descriptive matter is generally viewed as a less
dominant or significant feature of a mark. See In re Nat’l Data Corp., 224 USPQ at
751-52.
Applicant’s mark has some obvious differences to Opposer’s DR.
DRE mark in appearance and pronunciation due to the addition of disclaimed
descriptive or generic wording, the use of the full term DOCTOR, rather than the
abbreviation, and the addition of a design. The most prominent features of
Applicant’s word and design mark are the words DOCTOR DRAI, which are in a
substantially larger type and a more prominent position than the disclaimed terms
OBGYN AND MEDIA PERSONALITY. Applicant claims that the design creates a
“significant visual impression” as does the stylized wording.36 We disagree. DOCTOR
DRAI is the dominant feature of Applicant’s word and design mark. Although design
elements are incorporated into the letters “t” and “o” in the word “doctor,” consumers

36 32 TTABVUE 15.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 19 -
are more likely to remember the letters as forming the word “doctor” rather than the
incorporated design. The “fetal heart rate tracing” design element, which is less
visually prominent than DOCTOR DRAI, would not be articulated by consumers
when calling for the goods and services. As discussed with Applicant’s standard
character mark, the DOCTOR DRAI portion of this mark is the phonetic equivalent
of DR. DRE, and also as found with the standard character mark, DOCTOR DRAI
and DR. DRE have a similar connotation and commercial impression. When
considered in its entirety, Applicant’s mark is more similar than
dissimilar to Opposer’s DR. DRE mark, and this du Pont factor weighs in favor of a
finding of a likelihood of confusion.
Strength of Opposer’s Mark
The fifth du Pont factor is the strength or fame of the prior mark,37 and the sixth
du Pont factor is the number and nature of similar marks in use for similar goods or
services. du Pont, 177 USPQ at 567. It is Opposer’s position that his mark is strong.38
In determining the strength or weakness of a mark, we consider both its inherent
strength (conceptual strength) based on the nature of the term itself and its

37 The Federal Circuit uses the term ‘fame’ instead of ‘strength” in evaluating likelihood of
confusion. 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4:16 (5th ed. March
2018). Fame, if it is found, must be accorded significant weight in the likelihood of confusion
analysis. See Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods. Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 63 USPQ2d 1303, 1305
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
38 In connection with the likelihood of confusion claim, Opposer has not specifically alleged
in his notices of opposition that his mark is famous nor specifically argued that his mark is
famous.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 20 -
commercial/market strength based on use in the marketplace. Tao Licensing, LLC v.
Bender Consulting Ltd., 125 USPQ2d 1043, 1057 (TTAB 2017). To determine the
conceptual strength of the mark, “we evaluate its intrinsic nature, that is, where it
lies along the generic-descriptive-suggestive-arbitrary (or fanciful) continuum of
words.” In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1814 (TTAB 2014). Market strength is the
extent to which the relevant public recognizes a mark as denoting a single source.39
Joseph Phelps Vineyards, LLC v. Fairmont Holdings, LLC, 857 F.3d 1323, 122
USPQ2d 1733, 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea Inc., 80
USPQ2d 1881, 1899 (TTAB 2006). See also In re Morinaga Nyugyo Kabushiki Kaisha,
120 USPQ2d 1738, 1744-45 (TTAB 2016) (market strength is “the degree of
association in the mind of the consumer of the mark with the source of the goods or
services based on the exclusivity (and sometimes renown) of the mark in the relevant
market.”). Evidence of third-party use may reflect commercial weakness, while third-
party registration evidence that does not equate to proof of third-party use may bear
on conceptual weakness if a term is commonly registered for the same or similar goods
or services. See Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915, 189 USPQ 693, 694-
95 (CCPA 1976) (even if “there is no evidence of actual use” of third-party
registrations, such registrations “may be given some weight to show the meaning of
a mark in the same way that dictionaries are used”); Tao Licensing, 125 USPQ2d at
1057.

39 This factor involves assessing the mark “‘along a spectrum from very strong to very weak.’”
Joseph Phelps Vineyards, LLC v. Fairmont Holdings, LLC, 857 F.3d 1323, 122 USPQ2d 1733,
1734 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 21 -
Opposer argues that his DR. DRE mark is arbitrary and entitled to a broad scope
of protection while Applicant argues that the DR. DRE mark is a combination of “two
common elements that are inherently weak.”40
To support its assertions, Applicant has introduced evidence of third-party
registrations for phonetic variants of the term DRE. None of the registrations covers
the specific type of goods and services identified in Opposer’s Class 9 and Class 41
registrations.41 The most relevant of these registrations are as follows:
Registration No. Mark Goods or Services
Reg. No. 3836211 DRAI’S HOLLYWOOD Class 41: nightclubs
Reg. No. 3660562 DRAI’S42 Class 41: nightclubs
Reg. No. 4551215 DRA Class 41: entertainment
in the nature of theater
productions; instruction
in the field of music
Reg. No. 4995595 DRA Class 9: downloadable
music files; phonograph
records featuring music;
compact discs featuring
music
Reg No. 4182571 DRAY Class 9: Apparatus for
recording, transmission,
processing and
reproduction of sound,
images or data

40 32 TTABVUE 31.
41 Applicant has not introduced any third-party registration evidence of the asserted
conceptual weakness of “Dr.” or “Doctor.”
42 Applicant has provided news stories relating to DRAI’s nightclubs which are referred to in
the stories as Drai’s Nightclub, Drai’s Nightclub at The Cromwell, and Drai’s Beachclub. 21
TTABVUE 2-78, 106-107.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 22 -
The only registration that covers goods similar to Opposer’s goods is Reg. No.
4995595, a Section 66(a) registration for the phonetic equivalent DRA. We accord
little probative value to this registration which is not use-based. The other third-
party registrations also are of limited probative value because while they could be
categorized as belonging generally to the entertainment field or tangential to musical
recordings, they do not involve the same or similar goods and services as Opposer and
are only marginally related. See Conde Nast Publ’ns, Inc. v. Am. Greetings Corp., 329
F.2d 1012, 141 USPQ 249, 251-52 (CCPA 1964) (third party registrations showing
goods with “different descriptive properties” insufficient to show weakness). Except
for the third-party registration for DRAI’S, there is no evidence of use to show
consumer exposure to these marks. We do not find the registrations to be sufficient
to establish that the DRE portion of Opposer’s mark is weak or that Opposer’s mark
as a whole is weak. “A personal name mark, unless it is primarily merely a surname,
is registrable on the Principal Register without a showing of secondary meaning, and
thus is deemed to be inherently distinctive under the Lanham Act if the record shows
that it is used in a manner that would be perceived by purchasers as identifying the
services in addition to the person.” Brooks v. Creative Arts By Calloway LLC, 93
USPQ2d 1823, 1829 (TTAB 2009) (case citations omitted). See also In re Carson, 197
USPQ 554 (TTAB 1977) (individual’s name may function as a trademark or service
mark). Therefore, as to conceptual strength, we find that Opposer’s DR. DRE mark is
inherently distinctive.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 23 -
As to his mark’s commercial strength under the fifth du Pont factor, Opposer
points to evidence that “the DR. DRE name and mark has been the subject of
immeasurable publicity and accolades, including unsolicited publicity in prominent
national publications” and “Forbes magazine consistently has ranked Dr. Dre as one
of the highest-earning celebrities and musicians.”43 Applicant, on the other hand,
argues that third-party uses of “Dr.” and phonetic variants of “Dre” as well as the use
of “Dr. Dre” by another individual in a related if not identical field shows that the DR.
DRE mark is weak under the sixth du Pont factor.44
We point out that, to the extent any marketplace strength or fame attaches to the
DR. DRE mark, it is in connection with Opposer’s musical sound recordings and his
production of musical sound recordings.45 As to musical composition services, there
is no evidence of sales or advertising, and the press coverage that could relate to these
services is minimal.46

43 30 TTABVUE 44.
44 32 TTABVUE 31.
45 As discussed, we are focusing on the most relevant goods and services in Classes 9 and 41.
We note that there is no evidence of sales, advertising or any public recognition of Opposer’s
mark in connection with Class 16 posters, art prints, stickers and Class 25 clothing.
46 It appears there are five submissions which reference Dr. Dre in connection with
songwriting, which could fall under music composition services. Most are hearsay. The two
submissions which are subject to a hearsay exception are a mere passing mention in a review
of a music single and do not reflect a reference to the DR. DRE service mark but to the
individual Dr. Dre. See for example:
16 TTABVUE 577.

Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 24 -
To measure the market strength or fame of a mark, normally we look to the
volume of sales and advertising expenditures for the goods and services sold under
the mark, and by the length of time those indicia of commercial awareness have been
evident. Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods. Inc., 63 USPQ2d at 1309. Here, opposer has
provided no evidence of the volume of his sales or of his advertising expenditures in
connection with musical sound recording production services and no evidence of
advertising expenditures in connection with musical sound recordings. There is some
evidence from newspaper and magazine articles relating to Opposer’s sale of musical
sound recordings. Although we have considered the evidence from newspaper and
magazine articles up to 1997 under the hearsay exception, there is no clear evidence
of sales of Opposer’s musical sound recordings under the mark subsequent to 1997,
as these newspaper and magazine articles and Internet web pages are hearsay and
cannot be considered for the truth of the matter. As previously stated, we have not
found the other articles and evidence subject to a hearsay exception, and we do not
accept these printouts as evidence of the truth of the matter asserted therein.
For the most part, Opposer’s printed publications and Internet evidence are
hearsay. These articles and web pages are evidence only of the manner in which the
term is used in the news stories and articles and of the fact that the public has been
exposed to the stories and articles and may be aware of the information they contain.
Many of the stories, articles or web pages do not relate to musical sound recordings
and musical sound recording production services.47 For example, there are stories

47 Some articles provide additional designation and refer to Opposer as a producer, rapper,
or music icon, while other articles refer to him as Beats co-founder, Apple Executive, mogul,
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 25 -
related to Dr. Dre’s Coachella performances, the Straight Outta Compton biopic on
the rap group N.W.A., Dr. Dre’s Beats radio show, the Apple Beats sale, an HBO
documentary featuring Dr. Dre and Jimmy Iovine, the funding by Dr. Dre and Jimmy
Iovine of a multidisciplinary degree program at a California university, Dr. Dre’s
participation in an ice bucket challenge, Dr. Dre’s role in a Dr. Pepper commercial,
Dr. Dre’s monetary gift for terrorism victims, Dr. Dre’s role in the Training Day
movie, Dr. Dre receiving a key to the city of Compton, California, and Dr. Dre
planning an original TV show. These articles are not evidence of the attention
Opposer’s products (musical sound recording) and services (musical sound recording
production) have received.
As to the articles which do reference Opposer in connection with musical sound
recording or production of musical sound recordings, in many instances Opposer was
one of many individuals listed or briefly discussed.48 Many of the articles do not
feature stories about Opposer’s brand or his goods or services, but simply mention
Opposer in the larger context of stories concerning albums, record singles, rap music,
or awards. Such brief mentions in articles would have limited impact on the
purchasing public. See Old Swiss House, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 569 F.2d 1130,
196 USPQ 808, 810 (CCPA 1978) (“12 articles, each published only once, which
appeared in various newspapers and trade journals” and in which “in all but one, the

or entrepreneur. In cases where Dr. Dre is mentioned in passing and not featured, it is not
clear to what extent DR. DRE makes any impression on the reader as a trademark or service
mark rather than a reference to the individual.
48 At least sixty-three of the articles are from the same source, Billboard.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 26 -
mark . . . was buried in the body of the articles” . . . “is not the type of public exposure
of a mark that would be expected to have any significant impact on the purchasing
public”); In re Tennis Indus. Ass’n, 102 USPQ2d 1671, 1681 (TTAB 2012) (applicant’s
mark not likely to be noted in connection with news stories where brief mention
made). Safer Inc., 94 USPQ2d at 1042 (Board could not make inference of fame in
studies where DEER AWAY mark was one of many repellants identified in the
studies and it was in no way singled out as a particularly well-known product). There
also is no evidence regarding the unique visitors to the various websites in which
Opposer’s products and services have been referenced or appeared.49 See Safer Inc.,
94 USPQ2d at 1042 (Board could not infer fame or renown of mark referenced in
governmental studies and university sponsored articles, studies or reports in absence
of circulation figures).
While the evidence of record does not support a finding that the mark DR. DRE,
as used in connection with the Classes 9 and 41 goods and services, has achieved a
degree of fame that would fall at the “very strong” end of the spectrum regarding the
commercial strength of a mark, it does reflect significant exposure to the public over
the years to DR. DRE, as used in connection with musical sound recording and
musical sound recording production services, as the result of widespread unsolicited
media attention. We find on this record that the DR. DRE mark has achieved a degree
of renown in the music field and is strong.

49 For example, it is unclear to the extent the websites thefader.com, spin.com,
hypebeast.com, boombox.com, pitchfork.com, altpress.com, nme.com, and vibe.com have been
viewed.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 27 -
As to the sixth du Pont factor, Applicant argues that third-party uses show the
relative weakness of DR. DRE in related and identical fields.50 To support its
assertions, Applicant has introduced evidence of third-party uses of phonetic variants
of DRE, including those used in combination with another term, and use by one third
party of Doctor Dre.51 As to the term Dr./Doctor, Applicant points to use by a
professional basketball player of the terms “Dr. J.,”52 and “well known” physicians
and medical celebrities that use “Dr.” with their first name, such as Dr. Travis, Dr.
Rachael, Dr. Jenn, and Dr. Phil for unspecified services.53 The third-party uses of
DRE or its phonetic variants provided by Applicant are The Dray Way, used by a
talent agent, Dray Day, used in connection with podcasts, Drai’s, used for nightclubs,
and SuperDre, used for deejay services.54 There is also one third-party use of Doctor
Dre, used by a radio deejay and TV-host (video-deejay).55
The third-party uses of Dr./Doctor by medical doctors or a basketball player are
not probative of the weakness of “Dr.” as this evidence does not show use in connection
with the same or similar services as Opposer. Similarly, the third-party uses for The

50 32 TTABVUE 31.
51 Applicant has not introduced evidence to show the number and nature of third-party uses
of “Dr.” or “Doctor” to support its assertion of commercial weakness of this term.
52 While the Wikipedia entry submitted by Opposer is hearsay, we consider Applicant to have
stipulated to the truth regarding the statement made as to Julius Erving (“Dr. J.”) by
Applicant’s reliance thereon. 19 TTABVUE 316.
53 25 TTABVUE 128-129. Applicant’s testimony is not substantiated with any supporting
documentation regarding these uses. Applicant’s principal testified that doctors in the media
use their first names with their doctor title to be more personable with the audience. Id.
54 21 TTABVUE 2-144, 207-223.
55 20 TTABVUE 92-138. Also shown as Doctor Dré in some articles. See e.g., 20 TTABVUE
92, 121.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 28 -
Dray Way, Dray Day and Drai’s also are of limited probative value as to the weakness
of “Dre” because while the services may be generally classified in the entertainment
field, they are only marginally related to Opposer’s music production services.
Although the use of SuperDre in connection with deejay services may be more closely
related to Opposer’s music production services, this single use would not be sufficient
to show weakness of the term DRE. Lastly, the one use of Doctor Dre by a third party
is insufficient to establish that Opposer’s mark is weak. Corp. Fitness Programs Inc.
v. Weider Health and Fitness Inc., 2 USPQ2d 1682, 1690 n.13 (TTAB 1987) (“[A] single
third-party use cannot serve to establish that the term ‘SHAPE’ is ‘weak’ in the sense
that it has been commonly used in the field as to not have very much effect in
distinguishing source.”) (parenthetical omitted); In re U.S. Shoe Corp., 8 USPQ2d
1938, 1940 (TTAB 1988) (“The weakness of the registered mark is not demonstrated
by a single third-party use . . . .”); Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. The First
Nat’l Bank of Allentown, 220 USPQ 892, 897 (TTAB 1984) (same).
Applicant’s evidence does not establish that there is significant third-party use of
Dr./Doctor marks, Dre marks or Dr. Dre marks in connection with Opposer’s goods
and services such that DR. DRE is weak and entitled to a narrow scope of protection.
In view of the widespread unsolicited media coverage and publicity of DR. DRE we
find that the DR. DRE mark would be viewed as a strong and distinctive mark in
connection with musical sound recording and musical sound recording production
services. Although the record supports a finding that Opposer’s DR. DRE mark is a
strong mark, the strength of the mark on this record does not reach the level of
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 29 -
playing “a ‘dominant’ role in the process of balancing the du Pont factors.” Recot Inc.
v. Benton, 214 F.3d 1322, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1897 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Relatedness of Goods and Services and Channels of Trade
We evaluate the relatedness of Applicant’s and Opposer’s goods and services based
on the identification of goods and services as set forth in the involved applications,
compared with the identification of goods and services contained in the pleaded
registrations of record. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261,
62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous. Computs. Servs.,
Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ
639, 640 (TTAB 1981). We keep in mind that the respective goods and services do not
have to be identical or even competitive in order to determine that there is a likelihood
of confusion; rather, it is sufficient that the respective goods and services are related
in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing must be such that
the goods and services will be encountered by the same purchasers under
circumstances that would give rise to the mistaken belief that they originate from the
same source. Coach Servs., 101 USPQ2d at 1722, (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechler,
83 USPQ 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d
1080, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The issue is not whether purchasers
would confuse the goods or services but whether there is a likelihood of confusion as
to the source of the goods or services. L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434, 1439
(TTAB 2012); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830, 831 (TTAB 1984).
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 30 -
Because each class in Applicant’s multi-class applications is, in effect, a separate
application, we determine whether Opposer has shown a likelihood of confusion with
respect to each class of goods and services in each involved application. N. Face
Apparel Corp. v. Sanyang Indus. Co., 116 USPQ2d 1217, 1228 (TTAB 2015).
Opposer’s services are “entertainment services by a musical artist and producer,
namely, musical composition and production of musical sound recordings.” Opposer
has focused on the following of Applicant’s Class 41 services: “educational and
entertainment services, namely, providing motivational speaking services in the field
of osteopathic medicine, obstetrics and gynecology provided by a doctor,” in
Application Serial No. 86590205, and Applicant’s “educational and entertainment
services, namely, providing motivational and educational speakers; educational and
entertainment services, namely, providing motivational speaking services in the field
of osteopathic medicine, obstetrics and gynecology,” in Application Serial No.
86730410.
Opposer argues that Applicant’s “educational and entertainment services,
namely, providing motivational and educational speakers” are related to Opposer’s
“entertainment services [by a musical artist and producer] because consumers would
perceive that the provision of motivational or educational speakers is related to
Opposer’s musical composition and production services due to the entertainment
nature of both types of services.”56 Opposer has submitted no evidence to support this
assertion.

56 30 TTABVUE 41.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 31 -
In some cases, the Board is able, in the absence of evidence, to make an affirmative
finding that the involved goods or services are related based solely on the goods or
services as described in the involved application and registration. See, e.g., Harry
Winston, Inc. v. Bruce Winston Gem Corp., 111 USPQ2d 1419, 1438 (TTAB 2014)
(goods in part are legally identical because the broadly identified “jewelry”
encompasses within its scope all of the specific jewelry items described in the
application). See also Hewlett-Packard, 62 USPQ2d at 1004 (although addressing the
issue of likelihood of confusion, the court held that the respective identifications of
goods were, themselves, evidence as to the relatedness of the parties’ goods and
extrinsic evidence of relatedness was not per se required). In this case, it is apparent
that the only thing these respective services have in common is that they both are
identified as “entertainment services.” That general point of similarity is not enough
to support a finding that the parties’ specific services are related. Bose Corp. v. QSC
Audio Prods. Inc., 63 USPQ2d at 1310 (“a broad general market category is not a
generally reliable test of relatedness of products”). The record does not provide any
context for entertainment services as a general market category, and Applicant’s
entertainment and educational motivational speaking services which are specifically
limited in content to osteopathic medicine, obstetrics and gynecology are a subject
matter which is obviously far removed from music. With regard to Applicant’s
educational and motivational speaking services generally, (and those not limited by
content), Opposer has provided no evidence of the relatedness of the parties’
respective services. Absent extrinsic evidence as to how musical composition, musical
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 32 -
production and educational and motivational speaking services are related, the fact
that these services fall within the general category of entertainment is insufficient on
its face to show relatedness. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Repcoparts USA, Inc., 218
USPQ 81, 84 (TTAB 1983) (“the mere fact that the products involved in this case (or
any products with significant differences in character) are sold in the same industry
does not of itself provide an adequate basis to find the required ‘relatedness”’). We
find these particular services are not related.
As to the remainder of Applicant’s goods and services, Opposer acknowledges the
limitations on the subject matter to the fields of women’s and men’s health, medicine,
obstetrics, or gynecology. Although, as we have said, each class of each application is
essentially a separate application for which Opposer has the burden to prove
likelihood of confusion, Opposer has not directly addressed which of these other goods
or services in each class it claims to be related to his goods and services. Opposer
submits that confusion is likely because the remaining goods and services “are offered
in non-medical settings to the general public (general interest tv, general interest
radio shows, charity functions, corporate events).” However, the mere fact that
Applicant’s goods and some of Applicant’s services could be offered in non-medical
settings is insufficient to warrant a finding that Opposer’s and Applicant’s goods and
services are related. See Elec. Design & Sales Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 954 F.2d
713, 21 USPQ2d 1388, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[A]lthough the two parties conduct
business not only in the same fields but also with some of the same companies, the
mere purchase of the goods and services of both parties by the same institution does
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 33 -
not, by itself, establish similarity of trade channels or overlap of customers.”). There
is no per se rule in this regard; rather, each case must be determined on the facts
therein.
In this case, there is no evidence of record to show that a single company sells or
offers the types of goods and services of both parties or that consumers would likely
believe that the parties’ goods and services would emanate from the same source. See
e.g., N. Face Apparel, 116 USPQ2d at 1232 (while opposer provided evidence that
clothing and backpacks, and electric scooters or mopeds or motorcycles can be sold
through the same channels of trade, this evidence was insufficient to show that
consumers would believe that the same company that sells clothing and tents and
backpacks would also sell motorcycles and electric scooters, even when the goods are
offered in the same store). We find that the record does not support that the goods
and services offered by Applicant in non-medical settings are related to Opposer’s
musical sound recordings or musical composition and musical sound recording
production services.
Opposer also argues that consumers would consider the goods and services of
Applicant as licensed products and services of Opposer since “the names and
likenesses of well-known persons frequently are licensed for use on various goods and
services.”57 It is true that the Board has recognized in prior cases that it is a common
practice to license commercial trademarks for use on “collateral” products (such as
clothing, glassware, linens, etc.), which are unrelated in nature to the goods or

57 30 TTABVUE 33, 42.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 34 -
services on which the marks are normally used. Here, Opposer has not shown that
he has a history of licensing or that he has done any licensing at all. Nor has Opposer
even shown that Applicant’s goods and services are of the type for which owners of
merchandising marks would license their marks. See Blue Man Prods. v. Tarmann,
75 USPQ2d 1811, 1820 (TTAB 2005), rev’d on other grounds, slip. op. 05-2037, (D.D.C.
Apr. 3, 2008) (noting that there was no evidence of licensing by opposer or others to
establish relatedness of tobacco and cigarettes, and musical recordings, magnets,
postcards, posters, hats, T-shirts, sweatshirts, and musical and theatrical
performances).
Lastly, Opposer has not addressed nor provided any evidence in support of the
relatedness of his goods and services to Applicant’s “health care consulting in the field
of osteopathic medicine, obstetrics and gynecology rendered by a doctor; obstetric and
gynecology services rendered by a doctor” and medical consulting and medical
advisory services. We find on the face of the involved applications and pleaded
registrations that these goods and services are not related.
In view of the foregoing, we find the factor regarding the similarity or dissimilarity
of the goods and services favors Applicant.
As to the channels of trade, absent any specific limitations in Applicant’s
identification of goods and services and the identification of goods and services
contained within Opposer’s pleaded registrations, the issue of likelihood of confusion
must be determined by looking at all the usual channels of trade and methods of
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 35 -
distribution for the respective goods and services. See CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 218 USPQ
at 199.
As there are no restrictions with regard to the goods and services in the pleaded
registrations and the involved applications, we must presume that they move in all
normal and usual channels of trade and methods of distribution for those goods and
services and that they are available for purchase by all the usual purchasers. See
Octocom Sys., 16 USPQ2d at 1787. Applicant’s testimony and supporting exhibits
indicate that Applicant uses a website and social media (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube,
Instagram, Pinterest, Google+, and LinkedIn), blogging, television, radio, “new
media”58 online publications and print media in connection with the DR. DRAI brand
to reach consumers.59 Opposer argues that his goods and services are offered through
the same trade channels of television, radio shows and social media, referencing
Exhibit Nos. DR 188-191, which are screenshots of Opposer’s Dr. Dre Facebook,
Twitter, Instagram and YouTube pages.60 To the extent this evidence may be
accepted to show on its face that Opposer advertises in the same general media, the
parties’ trade channels generally overlap. However, we accord very little weight to
this factor on this record. Federated Foods Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d
1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) (existence of an environment where wide variety
of goods offered in same store, does not necessarily support likelihood of confusion);

58 Applicant identifies these as online publications such as Good Housekeeping, Bustle and
the New York Post. 25 TTABVUE 76-77.
59 25 TTABVUE 17, 33, 39, 41, 44-45, 51, 52, 74-77, 156, 249-253.
60 30 TTABVUE 19.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 36 -
Parfums de Coeur, Ltd. v. Lazarus, 83 USPQ2d 1012, 1021 (TTAB 2007) (“[M]ere fact
that opposer may advertise its products on the same cable television channels . . . is
not enough . . . to demonstrate that the factor of the channels of trade favors
opposer.”); Standard Knitting, Ltd. v. Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha, 77 USPQ2d
1917, 1932 (TTAB 2006) (“simply because automobiles and clothing may both be
marketed over the Internet does not lead to the conclusion that the goods would
emanate from the same source”). We find this du Pont factor is neutral.
Conditions of Sale
As to the du Pont factor focusing on the conditions under which and buyers to
whom sales are made, Applicant argues confusion is still unlikely due to the degree
of care exercised by consumers when acquiring Applicant’s health care services and
Opposer’s music composition and production services. Applicant’s testimony indicates
that his typical fee for a speaking engagement is $5,000, and that depending on the
medical situation, he charges between $1,000 to $5,000 for medical services.61
Additionally, Applicant testified that some of the purchasers for his educational
services are doctors and that some of the classes or webinars he provides may only be
attended by medical doctors.62
We acknowledge that at least some of Applicant’s services are of the type where
the consumer exercises a higher degree of care, as do consumers of Opposer’s music
composition and production services. See e.g., Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning

61 25 TTABVUE 133-134.
62 25 TTABVUE 101-102.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 37 -
LLC, 96 USPQ2d 1600, 1608 (TTAB 2010), aff’d-in-part, rev’d-in-part and remanded
on other grounds, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1723 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
(educational professionals responsible for purchasing educational materials for school
systems are likely to exercise a very high degree of care); Carefirst of Md., Inc. v.
FirstHealth of the Carolinas, Inc., 77 USPQ2d 1492, 1503 (TTAB 2005) (“[I]t is
common knowledge that even ordinary consumers tend to exercise some
sophistication when it comes to decisions relating to healthcare and healthcare
insurance services.”). However, at least some of the goods and services of Applicant
and Opposer, e.g., musical sound recordings, audio books, electronic publications,
would be offered to the general consumer. These less sophisticated consumers may
therefore exercise less care in their purchase, thereby making confusion more likely.
See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 110 USPQ2d at 1163
(affirming that TTAB properly considered all potential investors for recited services,
which included sophisticated investors, but that precedent requires consumer care
for likelihood-of-confusion decision to be based “on the least sophisticated potential
purchasers”); Alfacell Corp. v. Anticancer Inc., 71 USPQ2d 1301, 1306 (TTAB 2004)
(noting that where both sophisticated and members of the general public are relevant
consumers, the standard is equal to that of the least sophisticated consumer).
Additionally, the fact that some purchasers may exercise care before utilizing these
services does not mean there can be no likelihood of confusion. Carlisle Chem. Works,
Inc. v. Hardman & Holden Ltd., 434 F.2d 1403, 168 USPQ 110, 112 (CCPA 1970)
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 38 -
(“Human memories even of discriminating purchasers . . . are not infallible.”). We
find this du Pont factor neutral.
Extent of Concurrent Use and Actual Confusion
Applicant argues that the parties have coexisted for ten years without actual
confusion.63 While there is no evidence of any actual confusion in the record, there
also is no evidence that a meaningful opportunity for actual confusion has existed.
Moreover, a lack of evidence of actual confusion does not mean that there is no
likelihood of confusion. J&J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald’s Corp., 932 F.2d 1460,
18 USPQ2d 1889, 1892 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc.,
710 F.2d 1565, 218 USPQ 390, 396 (Fed. Cir. 1983). We find this du Pont factor
neutral.
Variety of Goods and Services on which a Mark is Used
This du Pont factor assumes that use of the same mark by a single source on a
wide variety of products (house mark, family of marks, product mark) makes it more
likely that relevant consumers will be confused by the similar mark of a newcomer.
See, e.g., Uncle Ben’s, Inc. v. Stubenberg Int’l Inc., 47 USPQ2d 1310, 1313 (TTAB
1998). As Applicant points out, Opposer’s DR. DRE registrations reflect the offering
of goods and services in the music field or in connection with collateral or promotional
items related thereto. We find this du Pont factor slightly favors Opposer.

63 Applicant includes in this time period Applicant’s principal Draion Burch’s being awarded
a medical degree in 2007.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
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Right to Exclude Others
Under this du Pont factor, Applicant argues that it has the right to exclude others
because there are no other DR. DRAI and DR. DRAI and design marks for related
goods and services. However, Applicant’s mere assertion that it is the only user of
these marks does not suffice to establish that Applicant has any significant right to
exclude others from use of its marks. McDonald’s Corp. v. McSweet LLC, 112 USPQ2d
1268, 1284 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1205
(TTAB 2009)). We find this du Pont factor neutral.
Extent of Potential Confusion
Although Applicant argues under the twelfth du Pont factor that there is no
potential for confusion because Applicant’s principal would not want to be associated
with Opposer’s brands, we find the evidence of record does not establish this factor
either way. This du Pont factor is neutral.
Other Established Facts
Opposer argues that Applicant sought registration in bad faith, basing this
contention on Applicant’s failure to conduct a trademark search.64 However,
Applicant’s failure to conduct a search does not constitute a sufficient basis for us to
infer that Applicant acted in bad faith. Techex, Ltd. v. Dvorkovitz, 220 USPQ 81, 84

64 The case cited by Opposer, Int’l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A.
Inc., 146 F.3d 66, 46 USPQ2d 1942 (2d Cir. 1998), is a civil infringement and unfair
competition case which is inapposite to this opposition proceeding both as to its facts and as
to the applicable legal standards.

Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 40 -
(TTAB 1983). To the extent that Applicant’s intent in adopting its mark is a factor to
be considered in our likelihood of confusion analysis, we deem this du Pont factor to
be neutral.
We conclude there is no likelihood of confusion as to Application Serial Nos.
86590205 and 86730410. Although the similarity of the marks and the strength of
the mark favor Opposer, these factors are outweighed by the differences in the goods
and services. See e.g. Han Beauty Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 236 F.3d 1333, 57
USPQ2d 1557, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“While it must consider each [du Pont] factor
for which it has evidence, the Board may focus its analysis on dispositive factors, such
as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods.”); N. Face Apparel Corp. v.
Sanyang Indus. Co., 116 USPQ2d at 1233 (“The difference in the goods and services
is dispositive on the issue of likelihood of confusion.”); Calypso Tech. Inc. v. Calypso
Capital Mgmt. LP, 100 USPQ2d 1213, 1223 (TTAB 2011) (“[T]he factors of the
dissimilarity of the goods and services and the sophistication of the customers
strongly outweigh the factors, such as similarity of the marks and the strength of
plaintiff’s mark, that would favor a finding of likelihood of confusion.”); Morgan Creek
Prods. Inc. v. Foria Int’l Inc., 91 USPQ2d 1134, 1143 (TTAB 2009) (dissimilarity of
clothing items versus motion picture DVDs and CDs dispositive factor).
VII. False Suggestion of a Connection
Section 2(a) prohibits registration of “matter which may . . . falsely suggest a
connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs or national symbols.” 15
U.S.C. § 1052(a). To establish his claim of false suggestion of a connection under
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 41 -
Section 2(a), Opposer must prove (1) Applicant’s mark (or part of it) is the same as or
a close approximation of Opposer’s previously used name or identity; (2) Applicant’s
mark (or part of it) would be recognized as such by purchasers, in that the mark
points uniquely and unmistakably to the Opposer; (3) Opposer is not connected with
the goods and services that are sold or will be sold by Applicant under its mark; and
(4) that Opposer’s name or identity is of sufficient fame or reputation that when
Applicant’s mark (or part of it) is used on Applicant’s goods or services a connection
with Opposer would be presumed. Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Food Imps. Co.,
Inc., 703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ 505, 509 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Jackson Int’l Trading
Co., 103 USPQ2d 1417, 1419 (TTAB 2012); Hornby v. TJX Cos. Inc., 87 USPQ2d 1411,
1424 (TTAB 2008); Buffett v. Chi-Chi’s, Inc., 226 USPQ 428, 429 (TTAB 1985). In re
L.A. Police Revolver and Athletic Club, Inc., 69 USPQ2d 1630, 1633 (TTAB 2003); In
re Debbie Sauer, 27 USPQ2d 1073, 1074 (TTAB 1993).
Whether Applicant’s mark (or part of it) is the same as or a close
approximation of Opposer’s previously used name or identity?
There are two parts to this element. First, we determine whether Dr. Dre is a
name or identity of Andre Young. Next, we determine if DR. DRAI and
are a close approximation of Dr. Dre. The evidence shows, and Applicant does not
dispute, that Opposer is known professionally as “Dr. Dre:”65

65 32 TTABVUE 13.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
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Andre Rommel Young . . . . [p]opularly known as Dr. Dre
first gained notoriety as a member and producer of the
militant L.A. rap group N.W.A. (Niggaz With Attitude).66
N.W.A.’s Dr. Dre Launching Label “Music producer Andre
Young, best known as Dr. Dre of the hit rap group N.W.A.,
plans to launch a record label, Death Row Records . . . .”67
In light of the above, we find that Dr. Dre is a name or identity of Opposer.
We next must decide whether DR. DRAI and are a close approximation
to Dr. Dre. “[T]he similarity required for a ‘close approximation’ is akin to that
required for a likelihood of confusion under § 2(d) and is more than merely ‘intended
to refer’ or ‘intended to evoke.”’ Bos. Athletic Ass’n v. Velocity, LLC, 117 USPQ2d 1492,
1497 (TTAB 2015) (citation omitted). In other words, Applicant’s mark must do more
than simply bring Opposer’s Dr. Dre identity to mind. For the same reasons we found
that Applicant’s marks are similar to Opposer’s DR. DRE mark for purposes of the
likelihood of confusion analysis, we find here that Applicant’s marks are a close
approximation of Opposer’s name or identity, Dr. Dre.
Whether Applicant’s mark or part of it points uniquely and
unmistakably to Opposer?
Under this element, “the initial and critical requirement is that the name (or an
equivalent thereof) claimed to be appropriated by another must be unmistakably
associated with a particular personality or ‘persona.”’ Univ. of Notre Dame, 217 USPQ

66 20 TTABVUE 107.
67 16 TTABVUE 582.

Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 43 -
at 509. As discussed previously in connection with the likelihood of confusion claim,
Opposer has been the subject of widespread media attention. In the articles and
stories he is identified and referred to as Dr. Dre. Bos. Athletic Ass’n, 117 USPQ2d at
1498 (online articles and news stories, while hearsay, are competent to show that the
public has been exposed to the term and the meaning the public is likely to associate
with the term); Nike Inc. v. Maher, 100 USPQ2d 1018, 1024 n.12 (TTAB 2011) (“The
probative value of the news articles is that they show how the authors perceive, or
refer to, opposer, and the exposure of the public to Opposer’s name.”).
Applicant argues that the references in the media do not uniquely point to
Opposer, due to the use of Doctor Dre by another individual, as well as uses by others
of DRE, DRAI and DRA. However, we cannot make any meaningful conclusions
regarding the extent, if any, of public exposure to these references, and while there is
another user of Doctor Dre that has been in the public eye, the record does not show
that he is as well-known to the same degree as Opposer. We find that the evidence
establishes that Dr. Dre has come to be associated with and refers uniquely and
unmistakably to Opposer.
Whether Opposer is connected with Applicant’s activities performed
under its marks DR. DRAI and ?
For this element, the question is whether Applicant has established a commercial
connection, such as “an ownership interest or commercial endorsement or
sponsorship of applicant’s [goods] or services” with Opposer which entitles it to
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 44 -
register the involved marks. In re Sloppy Joe’s Int’l Inc., 43 USPQ2d 1350, 1354
(TTAB 1997). It is undisputed that Opposer has no connection with the goods and
services Applicant intends to offer under its applied-for marks.
Whether the fame or reputation of Dr. Dre is such that a connection
with Opposer would be presumed?
The fourth and final element requires a showing that the fame or reputation of
the name appropriated by the applicant is such that, when applicant’s mark is used
in connection with applicant’s goods and services, purchasers would mistakenly
presume that a commercial connection exists between the named person or
institution and the applicant. This element does not require a fame analysis like that
which might be relevant to a Section 2(d) likelihood of confusion analysis or a Section
43(c) dilution analysis. In re White, 73 USPQ2d 1713, 1720 (TTAB 2004). “Rather, the
key is whether the name per se is unmistakably associated with a particular person
or institution and, as used would point uniquely to the person or institution. In short,
it is the combination of (1) the name of sufficient fame or reputation and (2) its use
on or in connection with particular goods or services, that would point consumers of
the goods or services uniquely to a particular person or institution.” Id.
As stated, Opposer, (as Dr. Dre) gained notoriety as a producer and performer in
the rap group N.W.A., received notice for his work as a producer for other musical
artists, and had considerable success with his first solo effort The Chronic for which
he also received industry awards.68 Dr. Dre, has been interviewed and profiled by the

68 As reflected by Opposer’s submissions under notice of reliance, Opposer has been the
subject of media attention from the 1990’s to the present. We mentioned the subject matter
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
- 45 -
media. The public has been exposed to articles written in connection with Dr. Dre’s
music, both as a member of N.W.A. and as a solo artist, his occasional music
performances, and his music production efforts, both as a producer of his own music
and other artists. The public has been exposed to media coverage regarding Dr. Dre’s
music nominations and awards, the sale of Beats Electronics to Apple, other
commercial and philanthropic endeavors, and his regular mentions on the “hip hop
cash king” list.69 Dr. Dre also has been mentioned on various websites in connection
with his life and his music. We find that the Dr. Dre name is well-known.
Our final inquiry, then, is whether consumers of Applicant’s motivational and
educational speaking services or goods and services relating to the subject areas of
osteopathic medicine, obstetrics and gynecology, and men’s and women’s health
would think only of the well-known Dr. Dre name when the marks DR. DRAI and
are used on or in connection therewith. We do not require proof that the
name Dr. Dre is famous in the health or medical field or even that he offers goods or
services in these fields. In re Pedersen, 109 USPQ2d 1185, 1202 (TTAB 2013). Rather,
the question is whether Opposer’s reputation as a musician and producer is of such a
nature that when Applicant’s DR. DRAI marks are used in connection with its

of many of those articles in our discussion of Opposer’s likelihood of confusion claim, and as
stated, most of these articles are hearsay and not subject to a hearsay exception.
69 The record shows Opposer received press coverage in Forbes as to his earnings with articles
in 2007, 2008, 2010-2012, 2014-2016.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
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applied-for goods and services consumers will understand the mark to refer to Dr.
Dre.70
Opposer argues that it is a common practice of celebrities to use their names in
connection with a vast array of goods and services and that a connection would be
presumed. Applicant, on the other hand, argues that “it is not likely that consumers
will recognize Applicant’s Dr. Drai’s marks as referring to Dr. Dre because Dr. Dre is
not a medical doctor nor is he qualified to provide any type of medical services or sell
products specifically in the medical or healthcare industry.”71 As stated in connection
with the likelihood of confusion discussion, it is commonplace for performers or well-
known individuals to expand their product lines to incorporate a diverse set of goods
and services to capitalize on the renown of their names. In re Jackson Int’l Trading
Co, 103 USPQ2d at 1419 (citing cases); In re Sloppy Joe’s, 43 USPQ2d at 1354 (“Thus,
the name and/or likeness of a well known writer may well be ‘extended’ for use on
goods or services unrelated to writing.”). Here, there is no evidence that it is
commonplace for celebrities to sell or license the sale of goods or services of the type
provided by Applicant in Classes 9, 16, 41 and 44. Nor do we have evidence that
Opposer himself sells or licenses the sale of any products or services under his name.
We only have Opposer’s general statement in his brief regarding celebrity licensing;
however, Attorney argument is no substitute for evidence. Enzo Biochem Inc. v. Gen-

70 Just as in the case of likelihood of confusion, we determine whether Opposer has shown a
false suggestion of a connection with respect to each class of goods and services in each
involved application because each class in Applicant’s multi-class applications is, in effect, a
separate application.
71 32 TTABVUE 42.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
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Probe Inc., 424 F.3d 1276, 76 USPQ2d 1616, 1622 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In re Highlights
for Children, Inc., 118 USPQ2d 1268, 1275 (TTAB 2016).
Opposer also argues that Opposer’s name in the recording industry is sufficiently
related to Applicant’s “MP3 files, magazines, audio books, a series of books and other
types of public performance” and that “it is beyond question that Applicant’s [m]arks
would be viewed by the public as pointing uniquely and unmistakably to Dr. Dre”
“because Applicant has applied to use its marks in connection with services that
relate to the [entertainment] industry in which Dr. Dre is recognized.”72 Although it
is not necessary for Opposer to show that consumers would believe Applicant’s goods
or services would emanate from Opposer,73 the record still must support a likely
association that results from Applicant’s use of its marks, such that it seems likely
that the consumer will think that there is some kind of connection. However, there is
no evidence to establish that Opposer’s reputation in the recording or entertainment
industry is of such a nature that a connection (sponsorship, approval, support or the
like) with Applicant’s educational and motivational speaking services or its medical
and health care products and services would be presumed when Applicant’s DR.
DRAI marks are used on such goods and services. See In re Nieves & Nieves LLC, 113
USPQ2d 1639, 1649 (TTAB 2015) (Princess Kate’s reputation is in part as a fashion
trendsetter and is of such a nature that a connection with cosmetics, jewelry,

72 30 TTABVUE 30; 33 TTABVUE 17. See Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. BAMA-Werke Curt
Baumann, 231 USPQ 408, 411 n.7 (TTAB 1986) (false suggestion of connection can be found
on one item in a class of goods; respondent’s use of BAMA on athletic socks falsely suggested
a connection with petitioner.)
73 Hornby, 87 USPQ2d at 1427 n.19.
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
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handbags, bedding and clothing would be presumed when Applicant’s ROYAL KATE
mark used on such goods.); In re White, 80 USPQ2d 1654, 1662 (TTAB 2006) (evidence
showed that native American’s are engaged in large scale manufacturing of
cigarettes, and run smoke shops, such that when MOHAWK is used in connection
with cigarettes a connection with Mohawk tribe presumed); In re Cotter & Co., 228
USPQ 202, 205 (TTAB 1985) (“WESTPOINT designation, namely, shotguns and
various rifles, are goods of a type that customers would associate with a military post
or reservation”); compare Hornby, 87 USPQ2d at 1427 n.19 (“We point to petitioner’s
fame as a model not to show that consumers would expect her to be associated with
the sale of clothing, but because consumers are likely to associate clothing and
models, and therefore to view the mark TWIGGY as pointing to petitioner.”) with
Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin. v. Record Chem. Co. Inc., 185 USPQ 563, 568-
569 (TTAB 1975) (“NASA has not created, through the evidence presented, a picture
or climate that would alert a purchaser in his natural habitat to look upon every
product reaching the marketplace under the ‘APOLLO 8’ designation as being
associated with or the result of NASA technology. Thus, even assuming that a
purchaser would associate ‘APOLLO 8’ with the historical flight, it is unlikely that
the average purchaser would follow through with a line of reasoning that would lead
him to NASA as the source or sponsorship of applicant’s products or to the mistaken
belief that they are products of NASA space exploration technology.”).
We also find that there was no actual intent by Applicant to trade on the goodwill
generated by Opposer’s name. Applicant’s testimony indicates that Dr. Drai is the
Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572
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nickname of Applicant’s principal and that Applicant’s principal filed DR. DRAI as
his trademark because “That’s my name.”74 Applicant’s principal further testified
that he would not want to be associated with the Dr. Dre name because “it’s a bad
reflection on me as a doctor.”75
Although Opposer has established that his name Dr. Dre is of sufficient fame or
reputation, Opposer has failed to show that a connection would be presumed in the
mind of the consuming public when Applicant’s DR. DRAI marks are used in
connection with its applied-for goods and services. Because the fourth element of the
test has not been met, Opposer has failed to prove that Applicant’s marks falsely
suggest a connection with Opposer.
Decision: Opposition Nos. 91224580 and 91226572 are dismissed on the
likelihood of confusion and false suggestion of a connection grounds.

74 25 TTABVUE 115-116, 157.
75 25 TTABVUE 117.
“This guy is known for misogyny and homophobic things, saying -- lyrics and
stuff like that, which I didn’t know at the time.
And being part of the LGBT community, that’s when I said, you know, ‘I cannot
be associated with that.’ And being an OB-GYN, I cannot be associated with
anyone that has any kind
of misogynistic speech because it’s a bad reflection on me as a doctor.”

As to the cease and desist letter sent by Opposer, Applicant’s owner testified “I was just
appalled how someone would think that I wanted to be them and I actually went to medical
school. … I was hurt that someone was attacking me in my position as being a doctor. And I
earned the right to be a physician.” Id. at 28.