Anand Subramanian et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 1, 2021

2020000872 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 1, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/627,902 01/26/2007 Anand Subramanian PUL-P13-11 2821
134513 7590 07/01/2021
Cambridge Technology Law LLC
P.O. Box 590638
Newton, MA 02459-0006
EXAMINER
DAGNEW, SABA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3682
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/01/2021 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ANAND SUBRAMANIAN and SHANTHI SARKAR
Appeal 2020-000872
Application 11/627,902
Technology Center 3600
Before DONALD E. ADAMS, ERIC B. GRIMES, and TAWEN CHANG,
Administrative Patent Judges.
GRIMES, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING
Appellant requests rehearing of the Decision entered February 26,
2021 (“Decision”). The request for rehearing is denied.
OPINION
Written Description
Appellant argues that the Decision misapprehended the argument and
legal test for adequate written description because “[t]he Board should have
looked to technical sources to ascertain the use among those of ordinary
skill” of the phrase “continuously receiving.” Req. Reh’g 4. Appellant
argues that,
[a]s used idiomatically among those of ordinary skill in
computer communications, “continuously receiving” carries no
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implication about the rate of arrival; the term “continuously
receiving” or “programmed to continuously receive” only
implies that the receiver is continuously in receive mode over
some period of time, and accepts whatever data that senders
send.
Id. Appellant cites several patents and web sites in support of this
position. Id. at 5.
We are not persuaded that this argument shows that we
misapprehended or overlooked any issue of fact or law in the Decision,
because Appellant did not argue in the Appeal Brief that “continuously” has
a special meaning in the art of computer communications. See Appeal Br.
15–18. Thus, this argument is untimely. Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321,
1331 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“A party cannot wait until after the Board has
rendered an adverse decision and then present new arguments in a request
for reconsideration.”); Ex parte Quist, 95 USPQ2d 1140 (BPAI 2010)
(precedential) (“Arguments raised by Appellants for the first time in a
Request for Reconsideration are waived if the arguments were required to
have been made in the Briefs, unless good cause is shown.”).
Appellant also argues that the “Appeal Brief argued that various
disclosures of ‘real time’ receiving by the computer necessarily implies that
receiving is ‘continuous.’” Req. Reh’g 6. That argument was addressed in
the Decision (see pages 4–5).
In addition, the disputed claim language is “continuously receiving
. . . data indicating future internet advertising inventory currently owned by
the respective owners offered for sale to advertisers.” Claim 28. As the
Examiner pointed out (Final Action 3), the Specification’s only mention of
an action carried out “continuously” states that “media ownership rules are
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updated after trades are executed in the marketplace. These updates can be
made continuously as the trades are executed.” Spec. 16:1–3.
Appellant pointed to the use of the phrase “in real time,” and argued
that “[c]lassifying in ‘real time’ only makes sense if the requests are
‘received’ by the classifying computer ‘continuously’ and substantially as
they are sent by submitters.” Appeal Br. 16–17. However, each use of that
phrase identified by Appellant relates to classifying or categorizing ad
requests received from a user, routing ad requests, or requests to publisher
sites to retrieve content, not “data indicating future internet advertising
inventory currently owned by the respective owners offered for sale to
advertisers,” as recited in claim 28 (emphasis added).
Appellant also argues that the affirmance of the written description
rejection raises a new ground for three reasons: (1) “the Examiner’s only
rationale was disagreement in in haec verba language. In contrast, the
Board’s February Decision gives an explanation based on dictionary
meaning of words. That shift in rationale is a ‘new ground.’”; (2) “the
Examiner and Board applied different legal standards”; and (3) “the
Examiner had entirely failed to engage with the issue as late as the final
Action and pre-appeal decision.” Req. Reh’g 7–8.
We are not persuaded that the basis for affirming the rejection for lack
of adequate written description in the Decision amounts to a new ground of
rejection. “[T]he ultimate criterion of whether a rejection is considered
‘new’ in a decision by the board is whether appellants have had fair
opportunity to react to the thrust of the rejection.” In re Kronig, 539 F.2d
1300, 1302 (CCPA 1976).
Here, the Examiner found that both claim 28 and claim 38 recite
“‘continuously receiving from a plur[a]lity of current owners of future
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internet advertising inventory.’” Final Action 3.1 The Examiner pointed
out that the Specification discloses updating media ownership rules
continuously, but found that “neither of these paragraphs nor anywhere in
the disclosure of Applicants’ speci[fic]ation provides support for the above
limitation.” Id.
The affirmance in the Decision relied on the same rationale. See
Decision 4 (“We conclude that the Examiner has set out a prima facie case
by explaining what, in her view, is missing from the Specification's written
description.”). The remaining discussion of the written description rejection
simply responded to Appellant’s arguments. Id. at 4–6. Thus, we do not
agree that Appellant lacked a “fair opportunity to react to the thrust of the
rejection.” In re Kronig, 539 F.2d at 1302. See also In re Jung, 637 F.3d
1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“To assert that the Board’s thoroughness in
responding to [Appellant’s] explanation put it in the position of a ‘super-
examiner’ would limit the Board to verbatim repetition of the examiner’s
office actions, which would ill-serve the Board’s purpose as a reviewing
body.”).
We do not agree that the Decision relied on a different legal standard
for claim interpretation than the Examiner’s. The Examiner stated that the
broadest reasonable interpretation of “real time media classification, real
time routing [of] ad request and performing real time categorization [of]
each request [is] ‘the real time as actual time during [which] a process or
event occurs, and ‘continuously’ is interpreted [as] without interruption.”
Ans. 4. The Decision draws the same distinction. Decision 5 (“The

1 The Examiner paraphrased the relevant limitation but Appellant understood
that “the objection appears to be limited to the word ‘continuously.’” Appeal
Br. 15.
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definition of ‘continuous’ is ‘without a pause or interruption,’ while the
definition of ‘real-time’ is ‘communicated, shown, presented, etc. at the
same time as events actually happen.’”).
Appellant also argues that “the § 132 ‘new matter’ requirement
applies to amendments to the specification. Amendments to claims are
governed by the § 112(a) ‘written description’ requirement.” Req. Reh’g 8.
Appellant argues that the Decision “applies a standard that looks like the
‘new matter’ standard, rather than the ‘written description’ standard.” Id.
We are not persuaded that this argument represents an issue that was
overlooked or misunderstood in rendering the Decision. Whether the issue is
phrased as new matter or lack of adequate written description, a
Specification that fails to describe a claimed invention’s limitations does not
meet the requirements of § 112(a). See Hyatt v. Doll, 576 F.3d 1246, 1274
(Fed. Cir. 2009):
We held in Alton [In re Alton, 76 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1996)]
that after studying the specification, an examiner can make out
a prima facie case of lack of adequate written description, thus
shifting the burden of production to the applicant, simply by
identifying specific claim limitations and stating that despite
reviewing the specification, he could not find support for those
limitations.
Eligibility
Appellant argues that
[t]he Examiner’s November 2017 paper sets forth a Step
2A “directed to” concept [at pages 5–6]. . . . The Board’s
February 2021 decision picks a different Step 2A “‘directed to”
concept at page 16. Because the starting point for the § 101
rationale is entirely different, the responsive arguments are
entirely different. That difference constitutes a “‘new ground.”
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Req. Reh’g 10. Appellant also argues that “as noted in the Reply Brief at
page 6, the Examiner’s Answer failed to engage in any meaningful way.” Id.
at 11. Appellant argues that, “[b]ecause of that, essentially everything the
Board had to say in February was new.” Id.
We do not agree that the Decision changed the basic thrust of the
rejection. Appellant cites to the Final Office Action that was mailed in 2017,
but the Office updated its Eligibility Guidance in January 2019. 84 Fed. Reg.
50 (2019). The Examiner applied the updated Guidance in the Examiner’s
Answer (pages 9–11).2 Appellant responded to the updated rejection in the
Reply Brief (pages 5–9).
The Decision applies essentially the same rationale as the Examiner’s
Answer. The Examiner found that the claims recite limitations falling within
“Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity,” a category that includes
commercial or legal interactions such as advertising, marketing, or sales
activities. Ans. 9–10. Similarly, the Decision finds that several steps of claim
28 “are expressly directed to advertising and sales activity.” Decision 16.
The Examiner found that the
judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application
because the only additional elements are computer operated
marketplace for trading the classified and received advertising
inventory and a computer-readable, non-transitory memory for
storing the classified internet adverting inventory for sale to
buyers of corresponding buckets of future internet advert[is]ing
inventory and matching the request purchase attribute to one or

2 Appellant filed a petition seeking to have the Examiner’s Answer
designated as including a new ground of rejection, based on the assertion
that the Examiner cited a paragraph of Sagalyn, in regard to the § 103
rejections, that had not been cited in the Final Office Action. See Petition
filed Aug. 12, 2019. Appellant did not, however, petition to have the § 101
rejection designated as a new ground of rejection.
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more respective bucket attribute . . . [which] are recited at a
high-level of generality (i.e., as a generic processor performing
a generic computer function of processing data) such that it
amounts no more than mere instructions to apply the exception
using a generic computer component.
Ans. 10. Similarly, the Decision concludes that
The claimed method . . . requires no more than a generic,
conventional computer system. . . . We conclude that the
method of claim 28 does not reflect an improvement in the
functioning of a computer, or an improvement to another
technical field. Rather, the generic computer recited in the
claim merely implements the recited advertising and sales
activity.
Decision 18.
Finally, the Examiner found that
[t]he claim does not include additional elements that are
sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception. As discussed above with respect to integration of the
abstract idea into a practical application, the additional element
of using computer operated marketplace and processor for
trading the classified internet advertising, when buyer and seller
reach into agreement amounts to no more than mere instructions
to apply the exception using a generic computer component.
Ans. 10. Likewise, the Decision concludes that,
aside from the steps that are expressly directed to the sale of
internet advertising, claim 28 recites only a “computer operated
as a marketplace.” However, the claim language does not
require any unconventional computer configuration or software,
nor does the Specification describe any unconventional
computer implementation as part of the claimed method. Thus,
claim 28 requires using only a generic computer to carry out the
claimed process, and “the mere recitation of a generic computer
cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-
eligible invention.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S.
208, 223 (2014).
Decision 18–19.
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Thus, the Decision applied essentially the same rationale as the
Examiner’s Answer, to which Appellant responded in the Reply Brief. We
do not agree with Appellant’s position that the Examiner’s Answer “failed to
engage in any meaningful way,” or that “essentially everything the Board
had to say in February was new.” Req. Reh’g 11.
Appellant argues that “[t]he Board misapprehended the law relating to
‘commercial or legal interactions’ for Step 2A. . . . Alice carefully confines
‘abstract ideas’ to fundamental, longstanding, and long prevalent
commercial practices.” Req. Reh’g 11–12. Appellant also argues that
“[a]fter some initial confusion at the Federal Circuit, the law has clearly
solidified around ‘long prevalent’ rather than machine-or-transformation
principles for Step 2A.” Id. at 12. Appellant provides a list of cases that are
said to support this interpretation. Id. at 12–13. Appellant argues that
“[t]here is no evidence to support a conclusion that ‘bucketized future
internet advertising inventory’ was even known in 2006, let alone so ‘long
prevalent’ as to be ‘abstract’ in the Alice sense.” Id. at 15.
This argument is unpersuasive. The USPTO’s interpretation of the
state of § 101 law is reflected in the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance published on January 7, 2019 (84 Fed. Reg. 50), as
updated in October 17, 2019 (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf). That Guidance is
binding on the Board as well as on examiners. See 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Guidance is “for use by USPTO personnel in evaluating subject matter
eligibility”); id. (“[T]he USPTO . . . must ensure that its more than 8500
patent examiners and administrative patent judges apply the Alice/Mayo test
in a manner that produces reasonably consistent and predictable results.”);
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id. at 51 (“All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency
management, expected to follow the guidance.”).
The Guidance lists three categories of abstract ideas, one of which is
“Certain methods of organizing human activity.” Id. at 52. One subcategory
of such methods is “fundamental economic principles or practices,” but that
category also includes “commercial or legal interactions,” such as
“advertising, marketing or sales activities,” with no requirement that those
activities be fundamental, longstanding, or long prevalent. Id. We disagree
with Appellant’s position that “the Guidance gives no guidance to
understand the word ‘certain.’” Req. Reh’g 13.
Appellant argues that its view of the case law is supported by
CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc., 955 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Req.
Reh’g 14.3 However, the only passage from the majority decision that
Appellant cites concerns whether the case could be resolved at the Rule
12(b)(6) stage without remanding to assess the state of the art as of the
invention’s date to determine whether the invention was directed to
automating a practice long used by doctors. Id. The court “conclude[d] that a
remand [was] unnecessary.” CardioNet, 955 F.3d at 1372. The remaining
portions of CardioNet that Appellant cites are from Judge Dyk’s opinion,
dissenting in part and concurring in the result. Id. at 1375, 1377. Those
views therefore do not represent the opinion of the court, and are not binding
precedent.

3 New arguments are not normally permitted in a Request for Rehearing, but
one exception to that rule is “a new argument based upon a recent relevant
decision of either the Board or a Federal Court.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.52(a)(2).
We will therefore consider Appellant’s argument based on CardioNet.
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Appellant argues that “the Board decides an issue of fact on the
grounds that ‘Attorney’s argument in a brief cannot take the place of
evidence.’ In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974).” Req. Reh’g
15. We are not persuaded that this represents an issue that was overlooked or
misapprehended. The context of that statement was addressing Appellant’s
argument that
the claims pertain to an improvement to the functioning of a
computer or other technology because
the claims claim the further inventive concept of
“classifying” future internet advertising inventory into
“buckets” so that the future internet advertising
inventory can be allocated to its highest and best use
. . . . Providing an efficient way to allocate advertising
space in advance may reduce network load relative to
the conventional approach to internet advertising, in
which advertisers and publishers negotiate every ad
placement in real time.
Decision 21.
We concluded that the argument was unpersuasive, “because
Appellant has cited no evidence to support the argument . . . that the claimed
method results in an improvement in computer functioning by reducing
network load compared to the current approach.” Id. Factual assertions must
be supported by evidence, and attorney argument is not evidence.
Appellant also argues that “the Board also overlooked extant
evidence. The specification describes advantages of bucketizing and site-
blind bucketizing. See . . . Appeal Br. 12–13.” Req. Reh’g 16. We have
reviewed the cited portions of the Specification, but fail to find anything that
supports the assertion that the claimed method improves computer
functioning by reducing network load.
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Appellant argues that
[t]he Appeal Brief, at . . . pages 28–29, argued a specific point
from Federal Circuit caselaw and the examiner guidance: where
a claim recites a “claimed advance” or “specific asserted
improvement in computer capabilities,” . . . the claim is eligible
at Step 1 (Step 2A of the guidance).
Req. Reh’g 17.4 Appellant argues that, “[t]hough the issue was clearly and
specifically raised, the February Decision makes no mention of, let alone
response to, this argument.” Id.
It is true that the Decision did not expressly address the argument at
pages 28–29 of the Appeal Brief, because that argument was presented in
response to the Examiner’s analysis based on the pre-2019 Examination
Guidance, rather than the analysis based on the Examination Guidance
issued in January 2019, which was presented in the Examiner’s Answer and
responded to in Appellant’s Reply Brief. However, the Reply Brief made
substantively the same argument: “As argued in the Appeal Brief at . . .
page[s] 26–28,[5] Step 2A is to ‘focus’ on the ‘specific asserted
improvement.’ That improvement is ‘bucketizing’ of ‘future internet
advertising inventory.’ This focus is new over the art, and thus the claim is
eligible.” Reply Br. 7. This argument was responded to at pages 20–21 of
the Decision. Thus, the Decision’s omission of an express reference to the
Appeal Brief’s presentation of the same argument is harmless.

4 Appellant also states that the argument includes the conditions that the
“specific asserted improvement is itself new, and uses the computer as ‘more
than a tool.’” Req. Reh’g 17. Those conditions, however, are not included in
the argument at pages 28–29 of the Appeal Brief.
5 While the Reply Brief cites pages 26–28, page 26 includes only a
“Summary of argument” and page 27 adds only a discussion of the need to
avoid oversimplifying the claims. The substantive argument is found on
page 28.
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Appellant also argues that patent eligibility of its claimed method is
supported by TecSec, Inc. v. Adobe Inc., 978 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2020),
because in that case, “the invention was directed to computer implementation
of a legal concept, key management for data access. Nonetheless, because the
combination of features in TecSec’s claim recited a specific solution and
computer implementation of new functionality, the character of those claim
limitations became irrelevant, and the claim was eligible.” Req. Reh’g 17.6
We disagree with Appellant’s position that the claimed invention in
TecSec was “directed to computer implementation of a legal concept, key
management for data access.” Id. The court stated that “[t]he patents are
entitled ‘Distributed Cryptographic Object Method’ (the ‘DCOM patents’)
and claim particular systems and methods for multi-level security of various
kinds of files being transmitted in a data network.” TecSec, 978 F.3d at
1282.
“Adobe argued . . . that ‘the claims are directed to the impermissibly
abstract idea of managing access to objects using multiple levels of
encryption.” Id. at 1294. But the court concluded that “claim 1 requires
more. . . . [I]t expressly requires, as well, accessing an ‘object-oriented key
manager’ and specified uses of a ‘label’ as well as encryption for the access
management.” Id. at 1295.
The court held that “[t]he specification . . . shows that the claims at
issue are directed at solving a problem specific to computer data networks.”

6 As noted above, one exception to the rule against presenting new
arguments in a Request for Rehearing is for “a new argument based upon a
recent relevant decision of either the Board or a Federal Court.” 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.52(a)(2). We will therefore consider Appellant’s argument based on
TecSec.
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Id. Specifically, “[t]he patent focuses on allowing for the simultaneous
transmission of secure information to a large group of recipients connected
to a decentralized network—an important feature of data networks—but
without uniform access to all data by all recipients.” Id.
Thus, the court “conclude[d] that the claims are directed to improving
a basic function of a computer data-distribution network, namely, network
security.” Id. at 1296. That is, the claims were “directed to improving a data
network’s basic functioning by enabling secure and efficient transmission to
intended recipients when use is made of the basic multicasting functionality
of such a data network.” Id.
The claims in TecSec therefore were not directed to “key management
for data access,” as Appellant argues (which is not, in any case, a “legal
concept”). They were “directed to improving a basic function of a computer
data-distribution network” “by enabling secure and efficient transmission to
intended recipients,” id. at 1296 (emphasis added), “without uniform access
to all data by all recipients.” Id. at 1295.
Thus, TecSec’s claims fit squarely within the category of “‘cases
involving software innovations . . . whe[re] the claims focus on specific
asserted improvements in computer capabilities.’” Id. at 1293, quoting
Uniloc USA, Inc. v. LG Electronics USA, Inc., 957 F.3d 1303, 1306–07 (Fed.
Cir. 2020). Appellant’s claims, by contrast, focus “‘on a process or system
that qualifies [as] an abstract idea for which computers are invoked merely
as a tool,’” id.; specifically, a process or system in which a computer is
merely used as a tool to receive future internet advertising inventory,
classify it into “buckets,” and sell the buckets of advertising inventory to
buyers. Appellant’s invention does not improve the computer’s capabilities
like the claimed invention in TecSec.
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Finally, Appellant argues that it “filed a Notice of Supplemental
Authority on August 21, 2020, noting similarities in the facts of this case to
Ex parte Hannun, 2018-003323 (Apr. 1, 2019) and Ex parte Smith, 2018-
000064 (Feb. 1, 2019)” but “[t]here’s no apparent discussion of Hannun,
Smith or this Notice of Supplemental Authority in the February decision.”
Req. Reh’g 18.
We have considered the decisions cited in Appellant’s Notice of
Supplemental Authority, but do not agree that either Hannun or Smith
require any change in the Decision. First, “[i]nformative opinions and orders
are not binding, but illustrate norms of Board decision-making for the
public, the patent examining corps, and future Board panels.” Notice of the
Chief Administrative Patent Judge of December 27, 2006, 1314 Off. Gaz.
Pat. & Tm. Office 4 (Jan. 23, 2007) (available at www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/com/sol/og/2007/week04/patopin.htm). These decisions were issued
shortly after publication of the January 2019 Eligibility Guidance,7 and
therefore provide illustrative examples of the Board’s analysis under the new
Guidance. The Decision’s analysis is entirely consistent with the analysis in
both Hannun and Smith.
In addition, the claimed inventions in Hannun and Smith differ
significantly from Appellant’s claimed method of receiving, classifying
(“bucketizing”), and selling future internet advertising inventory. The
invention in Hannun was directed to a “method[] for improving the
transcription of speech into text” so that “the system . . . can handle

7 Ex parte Smith was issued February 1, 2019 and Ex parte Hannun was
issued April 1, 2019 (although Hannun originally listed the wrong inventors
on the front page, and was re-issued on January 15, 2020 with the correct
inventors listed).
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challenging noisy environments better than widely used, state-of-the-art
commercial speech systems.” Ex parte Hannun, Appeal 2018-003323 at 2.
The panel held that the claims did not recite an abstract idea and, in any
event, “the alleged judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application” because “‘the claims . . . include specific features that were
specifically designed to achieve an improved technological result’ and
‘provide improvements to that technical field.’” Id. at 10–11 (quoting the
Appeal Brief). Here, by contrast, the claims do recite an abstract idea and do
not achieve an improvement to a technical field.
And in Smith, “[t]he claims [we]re directed to a hybrid trading system
for concurrently trading securities or derivatives through both electronic and
open-outcry trading mechanisms.” Ex parte Smith, Appeal 2018-000064 at
2. The panel held that the claims recited an abstract idea; specifically, “the
fundamental economic practice of derivative trading.” Id. at 7. The panel
also “d[id] not find the computer-related limitations [we]re sufficient to
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.” Id. at 8.
The Smith panel held, however, that “claim 1 also recites additional
limitations which focus on addressing problems arising in the context of a
hybrid derivatives trading system in which trades are made both
electronically and on a trading floor (i.e., ‘in the pits’).” Id. “Thus, the use of
the claimed timing mechanisms and the associated temporary restraints on
execution of trades provide a specific technological improvement over prior
derivatives trading systems.” Id. at 9. In Smith, therefore, as in Hannun, the
claimed invention provided a specific technological solution, rather than
merely using a computer to carry out a recited abstract idea, as Appellant’s
claims do.
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For the reasons explained above, we conclude that the Request for
Rehearing does not raise any issue of fact or law that merits a change in the
Decision’s affirmance of the claims for lack of adequate written description
and patent ineligibility. The Request for Rehearing is denied.

DECISION SUMMARY
Outcome of Decision on Rehearing:
Claims 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Bas
is
Denied Granted
13, 15,
19–38
112, first
paragraph
Written
Description
13, 15,
19–38

13, 15, 17,
19–38
101 Eligibility 13, 15,
17, 19–38

Overall
Outcome
13, 15,
17, 19–38

Final Outcome of Appeal after Rehearing:
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
13, 15,
19–38
112, first
paragraph
Written
Description
13, 15,
19–38

13, 15,
17, 19–
38
101 Eligibility 13, 15,
17,
19–38

13, 15,
19–26,
28–35,
37, 38
103(a) Sagalyn, Ozer,
Llach
13, 15,
19–26,
28–35,
37, 38
17, 27,
36
103(a) Sagalyn, Ozer,
Llach, Hsu
17, 27,
36
Overall
Outcome
13, 15,
17,
19–38

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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
REHEARING DENIED