01973721
03-20-2000
Amy H. Yeh, Complainant, v. Daniel R. Glickman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.
Amy H. Yeh v. Department of Agriculture
01973721
March 20, 2000
Amy H. Yeh, )
Complainant, )
) Appeal Nos. 01973721; 01973722
v. ) Agency Nos. 95-0601; 97-0110
)
Daniel R. Glickman, )
Secretary, )
Department of Agriculture, )
Agency. )
____________________________________)
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
Amy H. Yeh (complainant), by and through her attorney, initiated the
above-entitled appeals to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC or Commission) alleging the Department of Agriculture (agency)
had violated the provisions of two written agreements, executed in
1995 and 1996, which had settled her complaints of unlawful employment
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.<1> The appeals are accepted
pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)(to be codified at 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405).<2>
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue on appeal is whether the agency breached the 1995 and 1996
settlement agreements entered into by the parties.
BACKGROUND
The record establishes that this matter arose when, in June 1995,
complainant, an employee of the agency's National Resources Conservation
Service (NRCS), contacted an EEO Counselor alleging she was being
subjected to unlawful employment discrimination on the bases of her race
(Asian), national origin (Chinese), sex (female) and retaliation for
engaging in prior EEO activity. The parties entered into mediation,
which resulted in a written settlement agreement executed on August
17, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as "Settlement Agreement No. 1").
The agreement provided, in pertinent part, that, in exchange for
withdrawing her complaint, the agency agreed to: (1) promote complainant
to a GS-12 position, with back pay and benefits, retroactive to November
12, 1994; (2) reassign complainant, effective within thirty days of
the signing of the agreement, to the position of Computer Specialist,
GS-334-12, Information Resources Management Division (IRMD) in NRCS
National Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; (3) ensure that complainant
will continue to be a permanent full-time employee of NRCS; (4) not
engage in further acts of retaliation against complainant, "such as and
including reassignment to a position outside NRCS National Headquarters;"
(5) issue complainant a letter of apology; (6) pay complainant proven
compensatory damages; and (7) pay complainant's counsel "reasonable"
fees and costs for representation of complainant in negotiating the
settlement agreement and preparing evidence of compensatory damages.
On July 1, 1996, complainant received notification from the agency that
she was being reassigned from NRCS Headquarters in Washington, D.C. to
agency facilities in Beltsville, Maryland. Complainant again contact
an EEO Counselor alleging discrimination and unlawful retaliation.
After further mediation, this complaint was also settled with a written
agreement, executed August 8, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as "Settlement
Agreement No. 2"), which provided, in pertinent part, that the agency
would: (1) rescind the directed reassignment to Beltsville and instead
reassign complainant to a permanent, full-time Computer Specialist
position in NRCS Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; and (2) honor and abide
by all the provisions of the previous settlement agreement entered into
between the parties on August 17, 1996.
In correspondence dated July 19, 1996, and January 10, 1997, addressed to
the agency, complainant asserted that the agency had breached various
terms of both settlement agreements, and she requested immediate
compliance with those terms. Specifically, complainant alleged that
the agency had breached provisions nos. 2, 4, 6 and 7 of Settlement
Agreement No. 1 by its proposal to reassign her to Beltsville, Maryland
and its failure to award her compensatory damages and attorneys fees.<3>
Complainant noted that her attorney had submitted evidence in support
of her claim of $160,269.01 in compensatory damages on November 21, 1995.
On February 20, 1997, presumably in response to complainant's claim of
breach of the settlement agreements, the agency issued complainant a
final decision awarding her $7,895 in compensatory damages and two hours
of attorney's fees. It is from this decision that complainant appeals
in EEOC Appeal No. 01973721.
By final decision dated March 6, 1997, the agency found that its had not
breached provisions nos. 2 and 4 of Settlement Agreement No. 1 because
the proposal to reassign complainant to Beltsville resulted from an agency
reorganization and not retaliatory animus. In addition, the agency noted
that the reassignment had been rescinded by the provisions of Settlement
Agreement No. 2. The agency further concluded that it had not breached
provisions 6 and 7 of Settlement Agreement No. 1 because it had issued
the February 20, 1997 final decision awarding complainant compensatory
damages and attorney's fees. It is from this decision that complainant
appeals in EEOC Appeal No. 01973722.
On appeal, complainant reaffirms her allegation that the agency remains
in noncompliance with several provisions of the settlement agreements
and has requested that the Commission order the agency to immediately
comply with all terms of the agreements. Beyond stating that it believes
the record supports its decisions, the agency has not responded to
complainant's appeal.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,660 (1999)(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. �
1614.504(a)) provides that any settlement knowingly and voluntarily
agreed to by the agency and an EEO complainant shall be binding on both
parties. The Commission has jurisdiction to adjudicate allegations
by the complainant that the agency has failed to comply with such a
settlement agreement. 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,660 (1999)(to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(b)). In interpreting settlement agreements,
the Commission has applied the contract principle known as the "plain
meaning rule," which holds that where a writing is unambiguous on its
face, its meaning is determined from the four corners of the instrument
without resort to extrinsic evidence. Smith v. Defense Logistics Agency,
EEOC Appeal No. 01913570 (December 2, 1991); see also Montgomery Elevator
Co. v. Building Engineering Service, 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).
Directed Reassignment
Settlement Agreement No. 1's provisions regarding the location of
complainant's assignment are clear and unambiguous. Provision No. 2
plainly states that complainant is to be assigned to a position at NRCS
Headquarters in Washington, D.C. The agreement further clarifies this in
provision no. 4 where prohibited acts of retaliation against complainant
are defined to include reassigning complainant to a position outside
NRCS Headquarters. A fair reading of these two provisions in combination
makes it clear that the parties contemplated that complainant would remain
permanently assigned to a position at its Headquarters in Washington.
However, less than a year after entering into this agreement, the agency
sought to reassign complainant to a position outside Headquarters.
The Commission finds that this action was a violation of the terms of
Settlement Agreement No. 1. Simply because the proposed reassignment
was undertaken during a larger agency reorganization does not insulate
it from a breach of settlement agreement claim. The provisions of the
settlement agreement are unequivocal about complainant remaining at
Headquarters and say nothing about the agency's ability to reassign
complainant under certain circumstances such as a reorganization.
The agency has provided no evidence that it was impossible to retain
complainant in a position at Headquarters.
The Commission presumes that this breach has been corrected by the
provisions of Settlement Agreement No. 2, in which the agency agreed to
rescind the proposed reassignment and retain complainant in a position
at Headquarters. The Commission reminds the agency for the future that
it must abide by its agreement to retain complainant in a position at
its Headquarters in Washington, D.C.
Attorney's Fees
At the time the instant appeals were filed, the agency had awarded
complainant only two hours of attorney's fees. Complainant has correctly
asserted that this was a clear violation of provision no. 7 of Settlement
Agreement No. 1 which provided that complainant's counsel was to be
awarded "reasonable" attorney's fees and costs for representation
of complainant in negotiating the settlement agreement and preparing
evidence of compensatory damages. However, in a statement dated April
21, 1997, complainant's counsel notified that Commission that the agency
had rescinded its decision on attorney's fees and had paid, in full, all
fees requested by counsel for services rendered through March 12, 1997.
Complainant now requests that she be awarded reasonable attorney's fees
for the prosecution of the instant appeals and for any future work her
attorney may need to perform in order to enforce the provisions of her
settlement agreements. As indicated in the Order which appears below,
the Commission will grant this request.
Compensatory Damages
Complainant's final claim is that the agency breached the provisions
of the settlement agreements by failing to award her full compensatory
damages. The record establishes that complainant requested $150,000.00
in compensation for emotional distress and other non-pecuniary injuries;
$4,621.65 for past pecuniary damages; and $5,647.36 for future pecuniary
damages, for a total claim of $160,269.01. The agency, in its final
decision, awarded complainant $7,895.00, which included $1,887 in past
and future pecuniary damages, and $6,008 in non-pecuniary damages.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 authorizes awards of compensatory damages for
intentional discrimination in violation of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. � 1981a.
The Supreme Court has authorized the Commission to award compensatory
damages in the administrative process. West v. Gibson, 119 S.Ct. 1906
(1999).
The Commission notes that complainant's allegations of discrimination
arose when she was notified that she was being reassigned to another
position and job series during an agency reorganization and that a desk
audit would be conducted to determine her grade level. Complainant
asserted that the reassignment adversely affected her chances of being
promoted, an issue which was very important to her as she had not been
promoted in ten years, despite outstanding performance appraisals.
Complainant further alleged that she had signed an earlier settlement
agreement with the agency (in January 1995) in which management agreed to
increase her responsibilities and strongly support her promotion to the
next highest grade. However, complainant alleged that management failed
to carry out this agreement, by not completing a performance evaluation
or a written position description with increased responsibilities
as agreed. In May 1995, after complainant had returned from a trip to
Taiwan occasioned by the death of her 87-year old mother, complainant
discovered that the new position description she had been given, at
least orally, had been taken from her and given to a coworker who had
only worked in the division for a year.
Complainant averred that throughout this period she experienced increasing
shock, depression, loss of self-esteem, feelings of helplessness and
humiliation, insomnia and loss of appetite. In June 1995, she sought
counseling from an agency-funded Employee Assistance Program (EAP)
counselor. The EAP counselor saw complainant on six occasions between
June and September 1995 and concluded that complainant "would benefit
from ongoing therapy and possible anti-depressant medication...with
a therapist whose focus was not short-term." At the EAP Counselor's
recommendation, complainant saw two different Licenced Clinical Social
Workers, who provided her with treatment between July and September
1995 and charged her a total of $425.00. Complainant also consulted
her own internist on four occasions between June and November 1995 for
depression, resulting in charges of $290.00. Her internist prescribed
the anti-depressant drug, Paxil, and required continued visits to monitor
complainant's progress on this drug.
Finally, in September 1995, complainant began seeing a psychiatrist.
Complainant's psychiatrist diagnosed her condition as "depression" with
symptoms such as "having nightmares, trouble going to sleep, decrease
in appetite, difficulty concentrating and a decrease in interest in
anything but her job and its difficulties." The psychiatrist stated
that complainant's husband reported that complainant was "obsessed with
her betrayal at work and had frequent crying spells during the day."
The psychiatrist stated that he believed complainant's depression was
rooted in three causes: "the betrayal at work, the loss of her mother
and her menopausal epoch." Complainant had had five sessions with
the psychiatrist by the time she filed her compensatory damages claim
(at a cost of $820.00) and was scheduled to continue seeing him twice
a month for at least another year. Complainant submitted the medical
expenses from each of these health care professionals, totaling $1,535.00
(plus $121.02 in transportation expenses for medical visits and $7.66
in medication expenses), as part of her compensatory damages claim.
Complainant also requested that she be reimbursed for sick leave used
totaling $2,957.97.
Based on the recommendation of the psychiatrist and her internist,
complainant projected incurring another $5,647.36 in future pecuniary
damages: $3,360.00 for twice monthly visits to her psychiatrist for one
year; $250.00 for five visits to her internist; $86.40 in transportation
expenses for those visits; $300.00 in medication expenses; and $1,650.96
as reimbursement for sick leave.
Complainant's husband of thirty-one years stated that complainant had
been an "easy-going person" in excellent mental health until she began
experiencing problems at work starting in October 1994. In addition
to corroborating complainant's own description of her mental distress,
he said that her emotional state worsened in 1995 to the point where
she was talking about dying and came to his office crying over 100
times in a thirteen-month period. Several of complainant's coworkers
also corroborated that since approximately May 1995 complainant, who
had formerly been a very cheerful individual, was frequently observed
as being stressed, distraught and crying. As noted above, in addition
to reimbursement for her medical and related out-of-pocket expenses,
complainant requested $150,000.00 for her emotional distress.
In its final decision, the agency took two main positions with regard to
complainant's claim for past and future pecuniary damages. First, the
agency denied all cash reimbursement for sick leave used, noting that sick
leave is an employment benefit, not a reimbursable out-of-pocket expense.
Second, based on complainant's psychiatrist's opinion that her depression
had three causes--her work situation, her mother's death and the onset of
menopause--the agency only awarded complainant one-third of her medical
and related expenses.
After a careful review of the evidence of record, the Commission finds
that the record supports complainant's claim for both pecuniary and
non-pecuniary compensatory damages. In this regard, we disagree with
the agency's decision to award complainant only one-third of her proven
past and future pecuniary damages. This decision was based on a single
statement by complainant's psychiatrist that her depression was rooted
in three causes: her work situation, her mother's death and the start
of menopause. However, the Commission notes that this psychiatrist
offered no opinion about these three causes being equally responsible
for complainant's emotional condition. On the other hand, complainant
presented statements from numerous other witnesses about the significant
and severe impact complainant's work situation had on her emotional
health. The Commission notes that the majority of women experience the
onset of menopause and the death of an elderly parent without experiencing
the severe symptoms of depression described in the affidavits submitted
by complainant in support of her claim for compensatory damages.
The Commission finds that the record supports complainant's position
that her work situation so exacerbated these normal life stressors that
she was "pushed over the edge." It is the agency's burden to prove
the possibility of other causes for complainant's damages. Carpenter
v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01945652 (July 17, 1995).
The agency has not met this burden. Accordingly, the Commission holds the
agency fully liable for complainant's injuries and orders an award for
all proven past and future medical and related transportation expenses.
With regard to complainant's claim for sick leave, the Commission
concurs with the agency's finding that complainant is not entitled to
cash reimbursement for her use of sick leave. However, the agency is
responsible for restoring to complainant all sick leave which was used
as a result of the agency's alleged discriminatory actions. Therefore,
the Commission orders the agency to award complainant $1,663.68 in past
pecuniary damages and $3,996,40 in future pecuniary damages, as well
as to restore all the sick leave claimed in Exhibit B of complainant's
November 21, 1995 claim for compensatory damages.
With regard to complainant's claim for $150,000.00 in non-pecuniary
damages for emotional distress, the Commission finds that there are no
precise formulas for determining the amount of damages for non-pecuniary
losses. An award of compensatory damages for non-pecuniary losses,
including emotional harm, should reflect, however, the extent to which
complainant has established that the agency's actions directly or
proximately caused the harm ("the nexus"), as well as the duration,
nature and severity of the harm. In addition, a proper award should
be consistent with awards made in similar cases. The agency should
consider Commission precedent, as well as jury and court awards, for
non-pecuniary damages based on emotional harm. See, e.g., Rountree
v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01941906 (July 7, 1995)
($8,000 award based on complainant's statement, and those of his
co-workers, concerning the emotional distress he experienced as a
result of a discriminatory performance rating); Smith v. Department of
Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01943844 (May 9, 1996) ($25,000 found to be
an appropriate award for non-pecuniary damages in a sexual harassment
case); Wallis v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01950510
(November 13, 1995) ($50,000 award for pain, suffering and emotional
distress where complainant produced sufficient evidence, including
supporting statements from his psychiatrist, to establish that the
agency's acts of reprisal substantially contributed to the worsening
of complainant's mental condition to the point where he had to take
anti-depressive medication); Carpenter v. Department of Agriculture,
EEOC Appeal No. 01945652 (July 17, 1995) ($75,000 for emotional distress
where agency's actions in reassigning complainant exacerbated his asthma,
resulting in both physical and emotional harm).
In Carle v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01922369 (January 5,
1993), the Commission described the type of objective evidence that an
agency may obtain when assessing the merits of a complainant's request
for emotional distress damages:
[E]vidence should have taken the form of a statement by complainant
describing her emotional distress, and statements from witnesses, both
on and off the job, describing the distress. To properly explain the
emotional distress, such statements should include detailed information
on physical or behavioral manifestations of the distress, information on
the duration of the distress, and examples of how the distress affected
complainant day to day, both on and off the job. In addition, the agency
should have asked complainant to provide objective and other evidence
linking . . . the distress to the unlawful discrimination . . . .
Objective evidence may include statements from the complainant concerning
her emotional pain or suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of
enjoyment of life, injury to professional standing, injury to character
or reputation, injury to credit standing, loss of health, and any other
non-pecuniary losses that are incurred as a result of the discriminatory
conduct. Statements from others, including family members, friends, and
health care providers could address the outward manifestations or physical
consequences of emotional distress, including sleeplessness, anxiety,
stress, depression, marital strain, humiliation, loss of self-esteem,
excessive fatigue, or a nervous breakdown. Objective evidence also
may include documents indicating a complainant's actual out-of-pocket
expenses related to medical treatment, counseling, and so forth, related
to the injury allegedly caused by discrimination.
After careful consideration of all the evidence of record, as well
as the arguments of both parties on appeal, it is the decision of the
Commission that the agency undervalued the amount of non-pecuniary damages
incurred by complainant as a result of its discriminatory actions and thus
erred in only awarding her $6,008. First, as already discussed above,
the agency has not proven that it should not be held fully liable (as
opposed to one-third liable) for the damages suffered by complainant.
The statements submitted into the record by complainant, her health
care providers, her husband, and coworkers establishes that complainant
suffered considerable long-term emotional harm directly attributable to
the agency's actions. As a result of her situation at work in 1994-95,
complainant had to seek ongoing psychological and physical health care,
including the need for an anti-depressant medication. Based on the
totality of the evidence, the Commission finds that complainant should
be awarded $50,000.00 See e.g., Wallis v. United States Postal Service,
EEOC Appeal No. 01950510 (November 13, 1995).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, after careful review of the record and for the reasons
stated above, the Commission has determined that the agency has breached
the 1995 and 1996 settlement agreements between the parties. To correct
these breaches, the agency shall immediately comply with the terms of
those agreements in accordance with the following Order.
ORDER
Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final,
the agency shall:
(1) award complainant the sum of $5,660.08 in past and future pecuniary
damages, and the sum of $50,000 in non-pecuniary damages, minus any
compensatory damages award already made to complainant;
(2) restore to complainant all sick leave used as a result of the
agency's actions as documented in Exhibit B of her November 21, 1995
claim for compensatory damages; and
(3) provide complainant with an award of reasonable attorney's fees
and costs for the successful processing of these appeals pursuant to,
and within the time frames detailed in, 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60
(1999)(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)).
A copy of all documentation effectuating this Order, as well as any
final decisions or written explanations provided pursuant to this Order,
must be sent to the Compliance Officer as referenced below.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1199)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.
The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)
calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The
report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting
documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the
complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order,
the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order.
29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a
civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior
to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408), and 29 C.F.R. �
1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a
civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph
below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407
and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the
underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �
2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993). If the complainant files a civil action, the
administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for
enforcement, will be terminated. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)
(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409).
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0300)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED
WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF
RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred
to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management
Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).
All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must
also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R1199)
This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative
processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil
action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United
States District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date
that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a
civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date
you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the
Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN
THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT
HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.
"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
March 20, 2000
Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations
1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal
sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all
federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative
process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations
found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the
present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the
Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.
2 These appeals have been docketed as EEOC Appeal Nos. 01973721 and
01973722. For clarity, the Commission has decided to consolidate the two
appeals for a single decision because they both raise claims that the
agency violated the provisions of two related settlement agreements.
3 Complainant also asserted the agency breached provision no. 2 of
Settlement Agreement No. 2 by these actions.