Amnesty International USA

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 12, 2019

368 N.L.R.B. 112 (N.L.R.B. 2019)

368 NLRB No. 112
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Amnesty International of the USA, Inc. and Raed Jar-
rar. Case 05–CA–221952
November 12, 2019
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN RING AND MEMBERS MCFERRAN
AND KAPLAN
On March 18, 2019, Administrative Law Judge Michael
A. Rosas issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General
Counsel filed an answering brief. The General Counsel
filed a cross-exception with supporting argument.1
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record in
light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm
the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and conclusions only to the
extent consistent with this Decision and Order.
The Respondent’s executive director, Margaret Huang,
made statements at April 9 and May 9, 2018 meetings re-
garding a petition employees joined in support of compen-
sation for unpaid interns. The judge found that Huang’s
statements violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor
Relations Act in several respects. Specifically, the judge
concluded that Huang unlawfully (1) instructed employ-
ees to communicate complaints to management orally be-
fore submitting them in writing, (2) threatened employees
with unspecified reprisal because they engaged in pro-
tected concerted activity, (3) equated protected concerted
activity with disloyalty, and (4) requested that employees
report to management employees who are engaging in
protected concerted activity.3 As explained below, we re-
verse the judge’s conclusions and dismiss the complaint.
Facts
The Respondent, a nonprofit advocacy organization,
has a main office in Washington, D.C., which usually
maintained a complement of approximately 25 employees

1 The General Counsel also filed a motion to strike the Respondent’s
exceptions and brief in support, which the Board denied by unpublished
Order dated May 17, 2019.
2 The Respondent has implicitly excepted to some of the judge’s cred-
ibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an ad-
ministrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear prepon-
derance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis
for reversing the findings.
and 15 interns. The employees relied on the interns, who
typically volunteered for a single academic semester, to
perform administrative tasks and to otherwise assist in the
completion of the Respondent’s work, such as by report-
ing back on governmental hearings and drafting content
for publication. The interns were unpaid and received no
other economic compensation from the Respondent.
In February 2018, a group of the Washington office’s
interns started planning to write a petition requesting that
the Respondent provide them with financial compensation
for their volunteer work. The interns approached em-
ployee Raed Jarrar for assistance, and Jarrar provided
feedback on the draft petition. Thereafter, Jarrar and Un-
ion Shop Steward Emily Walsh, who also supported the
interns’ petition, encouraged other employees to sign the
petition. In the end, Jarrar and Walsh collected signatures
from all but a few of the office’s employees.
As it happened, by February 2018 the Respondent’s ex-
ecutive team had been in discussions for over a year about
changing to a paid internship program. Their plans in-
cluded shrinking the program to just three paid interns for
the entire organization and cutting program goals and per-
formance expectations because of the sharp reduction in
interns. They had anticipated implementing the new pro-
gram in 2019.
On April 2, 2018, Executive Director Huang held a
meeting in the Washington office to present the results of
an employee satisfaction survey. At this point, Huang and
the Respondent’s leadership were unaware of the interns’
petition. During the meeting, which was attended by
about five or six of the Washington employees, employee
Jarrar asked the Respondent to consider paying interns.
Huang responded positively and discussed the Respond-
ent’s plans for a paid internship program, which included
a significant reduction in the number of interns at the of-
fice.
The next day, the interns emailed Huang their signed
petition, which included the employee signatures. The in-
terns did not refer to the prior day’s meeting or the Re-
spondent’s plans, nor did they make any specific demands
or requests pertaining to the paid internship program
3 No exceptions were filed to the judge’s dismissal of the allegation
that Huang impliedly threatened to increase employees’ workloads as a
result of the petition.
The General Counsel filed a cross-exception, contending that the
judge should have additionally concluded that Huang unlawfully told
employees they should have requested a meeting instead of submitting a
petition. In light of the fact that the judge found that Huang unlawfully
instructed employees to communicate complaints to management orally
before submitting them in writing, we need not pass on this duplicative
exception. In any event, we note that we would not find merit in this
exception because we do not find Huang’s statements unlawful in any
respect, for the reasons set forth in this decision.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
beyond expressing the opinion that interns should at least
be partially compensated.
After receiving the petition, Huang and the executive
team decided to accelerate plans to switch to paid intern-
ships. On April 9, 2018, Huang held two meetings, one
with the current interns and one with the employees who
signed the petition, to announce the Respondent’s plans to
implement paid internships that fall. At the employees’
meeting, many employees reacted negatively to Huang’s
announcement, much to her surprise and frustration. The
employees were concerned about the effect that the sharp
reduction in the number of interns would have on their
ability to perform their work and about the competitive
process that would be necessary to allocate the interns’
services. Huang expressed disappointment that employ-
ees did not avail themselves of the Respondent’s open-
door policy to discuss this matter with her and the execu-
tive team before using a petition. She also conveyed her
belief that the petition was adversarial and threatened liti-
gation.4
On May 9, 2018, employee Jarrar initiated a one-on-one
meeting with Huang to discuss a number of issues, includ-
ing the April 9 meeting about the petition. Jarrar largely
drove the nearly hour-long conversation, but Huang re-
sponded at various points.5 Huang spoke about how she
and the executive team perceived the petition to be “liti-
gious,” “adversarial,” and “sort of levy[ing] a threat.”
Huang confessed feeling “very embarrassed” that her em-
ployees felt unable to approach her about a policy change
and disappointed that she did not “have the kind of rela-
tionship with staff” that she thought she had. Huang sug-
gested it would have been “really helpful” to have had ad-
vance notice of the interns’ interest in paid internships and
that Jarrar could have told “the interns to give me the
heads-up to let me know it’s coming.” She repeated later,
“I’m not asking anybody to tell on somebody. . . . [I]t helps
to know so that I could know, for example, and again it

4 The petition did not expressly threaten litigation; this was Huang’s
interpretation of the petition.
5 Jarrar recorded most of this conversation on his phone, and the
judge’s decision reproduces more of it than we do here. The judge
misattributes the following quotation to Huang instead of Jarrar:
I would like to discuss moving forward in a way that like gives all staff
the assurances that, you know, we’re whole on what happened and like
there was some—it was a negative experience but no one is going to
pay a price. No one is going to be like punished because of it, and these
are the steps that we’re going to take moving forward. Like this con-
versation that I have with you now made me feel very good about the
situation.
6 The Respondent did not create any expectation of a future economic
relationship. Notably, there is no evidence that the Respondent ever
hired interns as paid staff members following their internships.
doesn’t have to be you. It could be the people who draft
the petition. If you let [me] know it’s coming, if you let
[me] know your intentions, what you are seeking.”
The Respondent, as an advocacy organization, often
uses petitions as a tool for its own goals, and Huang drew
from that context in discussing the effective use of peti-
tions with Jarrar. Huang stated that a petition “sets off a
more adversarial relationship” and is not an effective strat-
egy if an organization is already willing to consider a de-
mand and the demand could “be met without applying that
pressure.” She added the petition here “tactically . . . felt
very strange to me” because at the meeting just the day
before, she discussed how the Respondent was consider-
ing transitioning to paid internships. Huang recom-
mended that “you could try talking to us before you do
another petition.”
Analysis
We disagree with the judge’s finding that the employees
engaged in activity protected by Section 7 of the Act when
they joined the interns’ petition. Activity advocating only
for nonemployees is not for “other mutual aid or protec-
tion” within the meaning of Section 7 and accordingly
does not qualify for the Act’s protection. See Five Star
Transportation, Inc., 349 NLRB 42, 44 (2007), enfd. 522
F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2008). The unpaid interns here did not
receive or anticipate any economic compensation from the
Respondent, and therefore they did not constitute “em-
ployees” under Section 2(3) of the Act.6 Compare WBAI
Pacifica Foundation, 328 NLRB 1273, 1274–1276 (1999)
(unpaid staff of nonprofit radio station were not employ-
ees), with Seattle Opera Assn., 331 NLRB 1072, 1073–
1074 (2000) (auxiliary choristers, who received a set pay-
ment at the end of each production, were employees).
There is no evidence that the employees of the Washing-
ton office joined the petition for any reason beyond sup-
porting the nonemployees’ effort to be paid, which is not
protected activity.7
7 The judge relied on a standard used by courts and the Department
of Labor for determining when the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) ap-
plies to interns of for-profit entities. Even assuming that standard applies
in the FLSA context to the nonprofit employer here, the Board has never
adopted it in the different context of defining employees under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, and we decline to do so here. We also find
no merit in the judge’s speculative suggestion that, even if the interns
were not employees, the Washington employees’ support for the interns’
petition was protected because the petition affected their own terms and
conditions of employment, specifically by affecting their future use of,
and involvement in the selection of, interns. Although the petition may
have indirectly affected the employees’ terms and conditions of employ-
ment, there is no evidence suggesting that the employees joined the pe-
tition in order to change or protect their own terms and conditions of
employment.
We additionally reject the General Counsel’s argument that the in-
terns’ petition for compensation made the interns analogous to applicants
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL OF THE USA, INC. 3
Although it is clear that Huang’s statements could not
have violated Section 8(a)(1) to the extent her statements
were limited to employees’ unprotected activity,8 the
judge further found that Huang’s statements also violated
Section 8(a)(1) by coercing employees in the exercise of
their right to engage in protected activity in the future.
See, e.g., Keller Ford, 336 NLRB 722, 722 (2001) (em-
ployer’s broad statement against discussing terms and
conditions of employment was coercive regardless of
whether the employee to whom the statement was made
was engaged in protected concerted activity). We disagree
with this assessment.
Under Section 8(c) of the Act, “[t]he expressing of any
views, argument, or opinion . . . shall not constitute or be
evidence of an unfair labor practice . . . if such expression
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of bene-
fit.” This means that “not all displeased communications
from an employer to an employee are coercive . . . . [T]o
violate Section 8(a)(1), a statement must contain a threat
of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.” Greater Omaha
Packing Co. v. NLRB, 790 F.3d 816, 822 (8th Cir. 2015).
Huang’s statements conveyed her disappointment about
how the petition transpired, but we do not see in these facts
any threat of reprisal.
Huang received the petition just a day after she had out-
lined the Respondent’s plans for a paid internship program
to about a quarter of the Washington employees who had
signed the petition, and the petition did not make any spe-
cific demands about the details of a paid internship pro-
gram. Huang was genuinely surprised when employees
were upset by her announcement at the April 9 meeting,
which she viewed as responsive to the petition, that the
Respondent would be accelerating its plans to implement
a paid internship program.

for employment, who are employees under our precedent. Unlike job
applicants, the interns were not attempting to secure positions that the
Respondent was seeking to fill.
Our concurring colleague takes the novel position that activity in sup-
port of the interests of nonemployees can be for the purpose of mutual
aid or protection under the Act. The Board, at least since the Supreme
Court’s decision in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978), has un-
derstood “mutual aid or protection” to require a finding that “the em-
ployee or employees involved are seeking to ‘improve terms and condi-
tions of employment or otherwise improve their lot as employees.’”
Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Market, Inc., 361 NLRB 151, 153 (2014)
(quoting Eastex, 437 U.S. at 665) (emphasis added). Put simply, em-
ployees’ object must be to help employees—be it themselves or the em-
ployees of another employer. Our colleague relies on an isolated pre-
Eastex case, General Electric Co., 169 NLRB 1101 (1968), to argue
against this well-settled principle. In General Electric, the Board found
that a union’s effort to have its employee members collect money at the
employer’s gate on behalf of “grape worker employee-strikers who were
attempting to organize” was for the purpose of mutual aid or protection.
Id. at 1103. The Board reached this conclusion even though the employ-
ees were acting for the benefit of grape workers who were “agricultural
It was in this context that Huang expressed her opinion
that it would have been helpful for employees to use the
Respondent’s open-door policy to discuss paid internships
before the Respondent felt the need to implement the pro-
gram under the pressure of the petition. At the later May
9 meeting, she also expressed her opinion that it would
have been helpful for the petition signers to have provided
her with advance notice so that there could have been a
dialogue about the specifics of their request before pre-
senting her with the petition. Considered in context, we
view her opinions about how to handle petitions in the fu-
ture to be, at most, suggestions, rather than commands or
even direct requests. Huang’s statements that she was
“disappointed” and “very embarrassed,” and that she
viewed the petition as “adversarial” and “litigious,”
clearly expressed her frustration that, as a result of a lack
of communication, management’s attempt to provide a
positive response to the interns’ petition had instead re-
sulted in a backlash from employees. Nothing Huang said
rose to the level of conveying that she was angry, let alone
that she was threatening any reprisal or accusing employ-
ees of betraying her or the Respondent. Compare, e.g.,
Oklahoma Installation Co., 309 NLRB 776, 776 (1992)
(absent direct reference to disloyalty, supervisor’s state-
ments were lawful where he told one employee that he had
“hurt [his] feelings” by starting “all this Union bull” and
by distributing T-shirts and literature, and he told a second
employee he was “disappointed” in him and the first em-
ployee “because of their union activities and that he had
thought that they would ‘shoot straight’ with him”),9 with
Print Fulfillment Services, LLC, 361 NLRB 1243, 1243–
1244 (2014) (statements about protected activity unlawful
where manager “tended to convey that he was not merely
disappointed in [the employee], but felt strongly enough
laborer[s]” statutorily excluded from the Act’s Sec. 2(3) definition of
“employee.” Id. Whether or not this case was correctly decided, and
whether or not it is still valid in light of Eastex, we find it distinguishable
because the grape workers at issue would have been employees under the
Act had they not worked in an excluded industry. Thus, the employees’
activities to help the grape workers’ strike and effort to organize were
directly analogous to assisting the statutory employees of another em-
ployer. Here, the unpaid interns had no similar economic relationship.
8 Our concurring colleague faults us for reaching the question whether
the employees engaged in activity protected by Sec. 7 here because, in
her view, the case could be decided solely on the basis that the Respond-
ent had not threatened employees with reprisal for future protected ac-
tivity. We disagree. The judge found the employees had engaged in
protected activity and included, among the violations he found, that
“[t]he Respondent violated Sec[.] 8(a)(1) . . . by: . . . (b) threatening
employees with unspecified reprisal because they engaged in protected
concerted activity.”
9 Enf. denied on other grounds mem. 27 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 1994) (per
curiam).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
to take action against [him]”), and Sea Breeze Health Care
Center, 331 NLRB 1131, 1132 (2000) (statements unlaw-
ful where supervisor communicated “extreme disappoint-
ment” over employee’s “failure to report her union sym-
pathies” and thereby equated her conduct with disloyalty
and impliedly threatened reprisal against employee for her
union activity, particularly if she did not keep supervisor
informed about such activity in the future). Because
Huang’s statements did not imply any threat of reprisal
against employees or suggest that employees had been dis-
loyal to the Respondent, we conclude that Huang’s state-
ments did not violate Section 8(a)(1) in any respect.
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed.
Dated, Washington, D.C. November 12, 2019
______________________________________
John F. Ring, Chairman
______________________________________
Marvin E. Kaplan, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MEMBER MCFERRAN, concurring in the result.
In supporting office interns who sought to be paid for
their work, Amnesty International’s employees—their co-
workers—engaged in activity clearly protected by Section
7 of the National Labor Relations Act.1 The majority’s
contrary finding is inconsistent with Supreme Court and
Board precedent. It also represents another instance of the
majority reaching out to wrongly narrow statutory protec-
tions for employees.2 Amnesty has not challenged the
judge’s finding that the employees engaged in Section 7
activity, and the Section 8(a)(1) allegations here—which
involve a manager’s statements to the employees—are
properly dismissed regardless of whether Section 7

1 Sec. 7 provides in relevant part: “Employees shall have the right to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection. . . .” 29 U.S.C. §157 (emphasis added).
2 See, e.g., Alstate Maintenance, LLC, 367 NLRB No. 68, slip op. at
9 (2019) (dissenting opinion). See also 800 River Road Operating Co.,
368 NLRB No. 60, slip op. at 3–4 (2019) (dissenting opinion).
3 The majority argues that the Board is required to reach the issue of
whether the employees engaged in protected concerted activity—despite
the fact that the Respondent has not raised this issue on exceptions to the
Board—because the judge concluded that the Respondent had violated
Sec. 8(a)(1) by, in the judge’s words, “threatening employees with
activity took place, because the statements did not have a
reasonable tendency to coerce employees (as, indeed, the
majority finds). The potential lesson of today’s decision
is an alarming one: employees who are covered by the Act
may now risk discipline or discharge if they act together
at work on behalf of coworkers who are not covered by
the Act.
I.
There is no dispute here about the facts. Amnesty’s em-
ployees worked side-by-side with the unpaid interns. As
the majority observes, the “employees relied on the interns
. . . to perform administrative tasks and to otherwise assist
in the completion of [Amnesty’s] work.” When some of
the interns decided that they wanted to be paid—interns,
too, need food, clothing, and shelter—they asked an em-
ployee, Raed Jarrar, for help with a petition. That em-
ployee provided help, and then he and another employee
encouraged others to sign the interns’ petition, which
many did. After the petition was delivered to Amnesty’s
executive director, Margaret Huang, Amnesty decided to
accelerate a plan to switch to paid internships—but to dra-
matically shrink the number of interns. Huang met sepa-
rately with interns and with employees to announce the
plan; employees, perhaps not surprisingly, reacted nega-
tively. Huang, in turn, expressed disappointment in their
reaction, making statements that ultimately were alleged
by the General Counsel to violate Section 8(a)(1). Later,
Huang met individually with employee Jarrar, and again
made statements alleged to be unlawful.
II.
Because Huang’s statements did not threaten employees
with reprisal if they engaged in Section 7 activity in the
future, the statements were not unlawful. On this narrow
point, I agree with the majority, essentially for the reasons
my colleagues give. That rationale should be enough to
decide the case.3 Instead the majority offers a different,
primary rationale: that the interns were not statutory em-
ployees under Section 2(3) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act4 and so the employees did not engage in Section
unspecified reprisal because they engaged in protected concerted activ-
ity.” But if the Respondent did not threaten employees in the first
place—as the majority concludes—then obviously it is immaterial
whether employees engaged in protected concerted activity.
The majority’s holding that the employees did not engage in protected
concerted activity presents a separate basis on which the employees may
seek judicial review of the Board’s order as “person[s] aggrieved.” See
Act, Sec. 10(f), 29 U.S.C. §160(f). Entirely apart from the dismissal of
the 8(a)(1) allegation here, the holding has the independent effect of per-
mitting Amnesty to discipline or discharge employees for any past or
future concerted activity on behalf of the interns.
4 I express no opinion on whether the interns were employees under
the Act, because their status is immaterial to whether the employees
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL OF THE USA, INC. 5
7 activity when they supported the interns’ effort to be
paid. According to the majority, “[a]ctivity advocating
only for nonemployees is not for ‘other mutual aid or pro-
tection’ within the meaning of Section 7 and accordingly
does not qualify for the Act’s protection.” That claim is
wrong, as controlling precedent demonstrates.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Eastex5 establishes
that “mutual aid or protection” must be understood
broadly. There, the Court rejected the arguments that
“only activity by employees on behalf of themselves or
other employees of the same employer is protected” and
that Section 7 protects only activity “within the scope of
the employment relationship.”6 The Board’s decision in
General Electric,7 meanwhile, is directly on point here.
The issue in General Electric was whether the employer
had unlawfully prohibited its California employees from
collecting money to support California grape workers—
“agricultural laborers” expressly excluded from the Act’s
coverage by Section 2(3). The Board unequivocally re-
jected the employer’s contention “that the Act does not
protect activity aimed at benefitting employees excluded
from the Act’s definition of ‘employee.’”8 The Board, ra-
ther, endorsed the Second Circuit’s view of “mutual aid or
protection” in Peter Cailler Kohler.9 There, the court

engaged in Sec. 7 activity. That said, the majority’s cursory analysis of
the issue is unpersuasive. According to the majority, the interns cannot
be statutory employees because they were not compensated. But if, as a
legal matter, the interns were entitled to compensation under the Federal
Labor Standards Act, then the fact that were not paid is immaterial. To
be sure, treating the interns as entitled to compensation under the FLSA
does not decide the question of whether they were employees under our
Act, which incorporates the common-law test of employee status, not the
FLSA’s broader standard.
5 Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978) (holding that employees’
distribution of newsletter opposing “right-to-work” legislation and sup-
porting voter registration to elect candidates favoring minimum-wage in-
crease was for “mutual aid or protection”).
6 Id. at 563–564.
7 General Electric Co., 169 NLRB 1101 (1968), enfd. 411 F.2d 750
(9th Cir. 1969).
8 169 NLRB at 1103.
9 NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates, Inc., 130 F.2d 502
(2d Cir. 1942).
10 Id. at 505–506. The Supreme Court has endorsed the Second Cir-
cuit’s view that the solidarity principle is integral to the Act. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 261 (1975).
11 Act, Sec. 2(9), 29 U.S.C. §152(9) (“The term ‘labor dispute’ in-
cludes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of em-
ployment or concerning the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employer and employee.”). Sec. 2(9) refers not
to “employees,” but to “persons,” and in seeking to be paid, the interns
here (surely “persons,” even if not “employees”) clearly sought to ar-
range a term of employment—with the help of the employees. Partici-
pation in a labor dispute is protected concerted activity. See, e.g., Tanner
Motor Livery, Ltd., 148 NLRB, 1402, 1403–1404 (1964).
found that employees engaged in Section 7 protected ac-
tivity when they protested the actions of their employer, a
chocolate company, against an organization of dairy farm-
ers, who were not statutory employees. Writing for the
court, Judge Learned Hand explained that by demonstrat-
ing solidarity with the farmers, the employees might gain
their support in a future dispute with the employer: this
“solidarity” was the essence of “mutual aid” under Section
7—and it made no difference that the farmers were not
themselves covered by the Act.10 General Electric and
Peter Cailler Kohler are consistent with the Act’s broad
definition of a “labor dispute,” which easily covers the
controversy in this case and which explicitly declares that
it is immaterial “whether the disputants stand in the prox-
imate relation of employer and employee.”11
The case here for finding “mutual aid or protection” is
even stronger than it was in General Electric or Peter
Cailler Kohler because the employees and the interns
worked side-by-side for the same entity—indeed, the em-
ployees (and Amnesty) indisputably depended on the in-
terns to get their work done. Whether or not the interns
were statutory employees is immaterial to the prospect of
solidarity between the employees and the interns.12
12 The majority argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Eastex
somehow casts doubt on the continuing viability of the General Electric,
but that argument is baseless. The Board’s own decision in Eastex cited
General Electric with approval. See Eastex, Inc., 215 NLRB 271, 274
(1974). The Fifth Circuit, in turn, affirmed the Board’s decision—and
cited with approval the Ninth Circuit’s decision affirming General Elec-
tric. See Eastex, Inc., 550 F.2d 198, 202 fn. 6 (5th Cir. 1977), citing
NLRB v. General Electric Co., 411 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1969). The Eastex
Court, finally, affirmed the Fifth Circuit. Nothing in the Supreme
Court’s decision, and nothing in any subsequent decision of the Board,
suggests that General Electric has been contradicted. Certainly Fresh &
Easy Neighborhood Market, Inc., 361 NLRB 151 (2014), cited by the
majority, in no way undercuts General Electric. That decision did not
address the question presented in General Electric, but it did embrace
the Second Circuit’s decision in Peter Cailler supra, just as General
Electric did. See Fresh & Easy, supra, 361 NLRB at 155–156 & fn. 15.
The majority refers to General Electric as an “isolated” decision, but
its reasoning is echoed in Fresh & Easy, among other cases.
The majority’s attempt to distinguish General Electric here makes no
sense. The majority says that the grape workers in General Electric are
not like the interns in this case—although neither group comprises stat-
utory employees under the Act—“because the grape workers . . . would
have been employees under the Act had they not worked in an excluded
industry,” while the “interns had no similar economic relationship” (em-
phasis added). This supposed distinction between kinds of persons who
are not statutory employees has no basis in General Electric. What Gen-
eral Electric makes clear, rather, is that the potential for work-related
solidarity between statutory employees and other persons is the key fac-
tor. That factor is obviously present in this case because the employees
and the interns worked side-by-side with each other. Cf. Southern Pride
Catfish, 331 NLRB 618, 620 (2000) (employees’ walkout to protest dis-
charge of supervisor, excluded from statutory coverage by Sec. 2(3), was
protected concerted activity because discharge affected employees’ own
terms and conditions of employment).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
Moreover, the employees would reasonably have be-
lieved that supporting the interns could improve their own
terms and conditions of employment directly. If nothing
else, supporting the interns obviously might lead to better
working relationships with them and a better work envi-
ronment. Moreover, if the interns had succeeded in win-
ning paid status (especially without reducing their ranks),
employees might well have benefitted from having
coworkers who did better work (because they were paid
for it), who did not threaten to undercut employees’ own
working conditions (by working for free), or whose suc-
cessful quest for compensation could precipitate reevalu-
ation of the employees’ own wage levels. Indeed, being
paid might even had led to the interns achieving employee
status under the Act, producing a workplace where all
workers enjoyed the same legal protections, increasing the
current employees’ bargaining power. The majority dis-
misses any suggestion that supporting the interns’ petition
might have positively affected the employees’ terms and
conditions as speculative, asserting that “there is no evi-
dence suggesting that the employees joined the petition in
order to change or protect their own conditions of employ-
ment.” But no such evidence is necessary because the test
of whether an activity is for “mutual aid or protection” is
an objective one.13 And in any case, Amnesty has not ar-
gued that the employees did not engage in protected activ-
ity, so any supposed lack of evidence can hardly be held
against the General Counsel or the Charging Party.
The only Board decision relied upon by the majority,
meanwhile, is easily distinguishable. Five Star involved
the efforts of school bus drivers to prevent a school district
from awarding the driving contract to another company.14
Certain drivers wrote letters to the school district that “fo-
cused solely on general safety concerns and did not indi-
cate that their concerns were related to the safety of the
drivers as opposed to others.”15 In that context, a divided
Board panel concluded that the letter-writers had not en-
gaged in Section 7 activity.16 The Five Star drivers, unlike
the employees here, were not supporting co-workers on
whom they relied—the Board majority found they were
expressing general concern about public safety. Whatever
might be said about the situation in Five Star, the facts in

13 Fresh & Easy, supra, 361 NLRB at 153.
14 Five Star Transportation, Inc., 349 NLRB 42 (2007). Member
Liebman dissented. Id. at 48 (dissenting opinion).
15 Id. at 44.
16 Id. The Five Star Board cited Waters of Orchard Park, 341 NLRB
642 (2004), as support. That case, too, is easily distinguishable. There,
the Board held that nurses who called a state agency to complain about
excessive heat in a nursing home did not engage in Sec. 7 activity be-
cause they had disclaimed any interest in their own working conditions
and instead insisted that they were calling only to protect patients.
Eastex, supra, 437 U.S. at 567–568.
this case clearly do not support a finding that (in the words
of the Eastex Court) the relationship between employees’
concerted activity and their interests as employees is “so
attenuated that [the] activity cannot fairly be deemed to
come within the ‘mutual aid or protection’ clause.”17
The harmful consequences of the majority’s position are
easy to see. Imagine if instead of supporting the interns’
effort to be paid, the employees here had joined together
to protest the sexual harassment of an intern by a supervi-
sor who (thus far) preyed on interns specifically and ex-
clusively. Under the majority’s view, the employees’ pro-
test would seemingly not be protected by Section 7, be-
cause they were “advocating only for nonemployees”—
and thus the employees could be fired for with impunity
for their protest. There is no support in law, policy, or
common sense for that result.
III.
The majority’s conclusion that the employee did not en-
gage in Section 7 activity is wrong. But it would not mat-
ter here even if it were correct. A finding that the state-
ments of Amnesty’s manager violated Section 8(a)(1)
does not depend on showing that employees had already
engaged in Section 7 activity. Rather, it would be enough
if the statements had a reasonably tendency to coerce em-
ployees from engaging in future Section 7 activity. The
Board’s cases make that clear.18 The majority, in short,
has no need at all to opine on whether the employees en-
gaged in Section 7 activity.
IV.
This should be a straightforward case. Because the
statements of Amnesty’s manager did not threaten em-
ployees with reprisal if they engaged in Section 7 activity
in the future, the statements did not violate Section 8(a)(1).
Instead of limiting itself to this sufficient rationale, how-
ever, the majority reaches out to decide an issue that was
not raised by the Respondent and that is not necessary to
decide the case. The majority then compounds its error by
reaching a conclusion that is contrary to Supreme Court
and Board precedent. Even though I concur in the ultimate
result here, I cannot condone the majority’s approach or
its reasoning. Until today, it was clear that the National
See, e.g., SKD Jonesville Division, L.P., 340 NLRB 101, 103 (2003)
(employer’s warning to employee violated Sec. 8(a)(1), regardless of
whether employee had engaged in protected concerted activity); Keller
Ford, 336 NLRB 722. 722 (2001) (employer’s threat unlawful, regard-
less of whether employee had engaged in protected concerted activity);
enfd. 69 Fed. Appx. 672 (6th Cir. 2003); Monarch Water Systems, 271
NLRB 558, 558 (1984) (same). See also Parexel International, LLC,
356 NLRB 516, 519 (2011) (“If an employer acts to prevent concerted
protected activity . . . that action interferes with and restrains the exercise
of Section 7 rights and is unlawful without more.”).
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL OF THE USA, INC. 7
Labor Relations Act protected covered employees who
joined together to help their coworkers, even if those
workers were not covered themselves. Because the Board
should uphold the protections of the Act, not tear them
down at every opportunity, real or invented, I dissent.
Dated, Washington, D.C. November 12, 2019
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
G. Alexander Robertson and Thomas Murphy, Esqs.,
for the General Counsel.
Kate Clark and Kay Hodge, Esqs. (Stoneman, Chandler
& Miller LLP), of Boston, Massachusetts, for the Respond-
ent.
Monique Miles, Esq. (Old Towne Associates, P.C.), of
Alexandria, Virginia, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MICHAEL A. ROSAS, Administrative Law Judge. This case was
tried in Washington, D.C., on January 16, 2019. The amended
complaint alleges that Amnesty International of the USA, Inc.
(Respondent or AIUSA) violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National
Labor Relations Act (the Act)1 by interfering with, restraining,
and coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act on or about April 6, 2018,2 by (1) advising
that they should have requested a meeting with the Respondent
instead of circulating and submitting a petition that related to
their terms and conditions of employment, and (2) telling em-
ployees that their participation in supporting the petition could
lead to an increased workload. Additionally, on May 9, the Re-
spondent allegedly (a) criticized its employees’ decision to cir-
culate and/or support the petition, (b) asked employees why it
was not provided with advanced notice of the petition, and (c)
advised employees that they should have requested a meeting
with Respondent rather than circulating and submitting the peti-
tion. The Respondent concedes that its executive director ex-
pressed disappointment on both occasions with the employees’
decision to submit a petition rather than speak with her before-
hand about their concerns. It contends, however, that the state-
ments at issue were not coercive in nature, but rather, the execu-
tive director’s reinforcement of the organization’s open-door
policy.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by

1 29 U.S.C. § 151–169.
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates hereafter refer to the 2018 cal-
endar year.
3 Jarrar testified that he was unlawfully suspended and subsequently
terminated on July 28 in retaliation for an unspecified reason. Although
the circumstances of his suspension and termination were not an issue in
the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent is a non-profit organization with an office
and place of business in Washington, D.C., where it engages in
the business of lobbying for and advocating for human rights
causes. During the 12-month period ending August 31, the Re-
spondent derived gross revenues more than $250,000, and pur-
chased and received goods at its Washington, D.C. location val-
ued in excess of $5000 from points outside of the District of Co-
lumbia. Accordingly, the Respondent admits, and I find, I that
the Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Respondent’s Operations
Respondent is a non-profit grassroots organization with six of-
fices throughout the United States, including Washington, D.C.
(the DC office) and 210,000 members/volunteers. The mission
of the organization is to protect human rights, as broadly defined
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Re-
spondent’s work, within that broad mandate, includes direct ad-
vocacy with federal officials, petitions, and other forms of activ-
ism, and staff members are assigned to work on specific cam-
paigns and programs.
The Respondent employs approximately 100 individuals, in-
cluding 25 employees in the DC office. Margaret Huang, the
Respondent’s executive director since January 2014, is the high-
est-ranking employee within the organization. She is overseen
by the Respondent’s Board of Directors and manages the organ-
ization along with an executive team comprised of unit and
group managers. Joanne Lin, as national advocacy director, su-
pervises the government relations unit. At the relevant times in
2018, Bart Ianantuoni was the Respondent’s interim head of hu-
man resources.
The Charging Party, Raed Jarrar, was employed as advocacy
director for the Middle East and North Africa from September
11, 2017 until July 20. In this role, he was responsible for the
organization’s lobbying efforts on issues pertaining to these re-
gions, as well as other in-house tasks. Jarrar and Ryan Mace, a
grassroots advocacy refugee specialist, were assigned to the gov-
ernment relations unit supervised by Lin.
During his relatively short tenure with the Respondent, Jarrar
was an active member of the Communication Workers of Amer-
ica, Local 1189 (the Union). He served on the Union’s six-mem-
ber team that negotiated with the Respondent over a new collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. Jarrar attended several meetings be-
fore he was suspended on or about June 5. Forty-five days later,
on July 20, Jarrar was terminated.3
The Respondent’s employee handbook, effective April 2018,
the case, the Respondent sought to impeach him by introducing his ter-
mination letter, which alleged specific misconduct as the basis for the
adverse action. Jarrar was afforded limited leeway to introduce docu-
mentary evidence confirming that he previously claimed retaliation as
the basis for his removal. As such, and although he incorrectly referred
to the date as July 28, the termination letter did not diminish Jarrar’s
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
lists classifications for full and part-time employees; temporary
employees, interns/fellows, consultants and member volunteers.
Interns/Fellows, the classification at issue, are defined as fol-
lows:
An intern is an individual who performs work on an unpaid or
stipend basis for the individual's own purposes, which includes
but is not limited to meeting educational requirements or ex-
pectations for a degree being pursued by the individual, and/or
providing support for human rights initiatives/causes.4
AIUSA currently offers a number of fellowships typically to
recent graduates or activists relatively new to the human rights
field. These include the Ladis Kristoff Fellow, the Youth Lead-
ership Fellow, and the Styron Fellow. Individuals awarded a
fellowship often work on special projects that are designed to
align with the organization's priorities. A fellow may be con-
sidered a full-time, exempt employee.
Interns/Fellows are subject to all AIUSA policies that apply to
employees during the period of their internship/fellowship, as
appropriate for the duties they are assigned.
The handbook also states the Respondent’s requirement to
designate employees as either nonexempt or exempt under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) wage and hour laws:5
Non-exempt employees are paid on an hourly basis and are el-
igible to receive overtime.
Non-exempt employees do not meet the qualifications for ex-
emptions from the minimum wage and overtime requirements
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
Exempt employees are paid on a salaried basis and meet the
qualifications for exemption from the minimum wage and
overtime requirements of the FLSA.
Since 2009, the Respondent has voluntarily recognized the
Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of all
nonsupervisory regular full-time and regular part-time clerical
and professional employees. Pursuant to the 2015 collective-
bargaining agreement (CBA), which expired on June 30, the fol-
lowing classifications were excluded: “consultants, casual em-
ployees, canvassers, seasonal employees, interns, volunteers,
work-study students, temporary employees, managerial employ-
ees, confidential employees, and guards and supervisors as de-
fined in the National Labor Relations Act.”6 On October 10, the
Respondent and the Union agreed to a successor CBA for the
period of July 1, 2018 through June 30, 2021. The recognition
provision of covered and excluded classifications remained the
same.
B. The Intern Program
The Respondent regularly employs interns and fellows that
perform work for the organization on an unpaid basis or stipends

credibility as to his assertion that he was retaliated against. (Tr. 13–14,
47–48; A:LJ Exh. 1-2; R. Exh. 1; CP Exh. 1–2.)
4 In contrast to interns and fellows, members and volunteers are indi-
viduals who have supported the organization over long or indefinite pe-
riods of time. Some interns subsequently become members or volun-
teers, and vice versa (Tr. 88–89, 92–94.)
5 29 U.S.C. § 201–219.
from outside sources. As of April, there were about 30 to 40
interns each academic term (fall, spring, or summer) nationwide,
including approximately 15 interns in the Washington, D.C. of-
fice.
The intern recruitment process is initiated by employees with
the assistance of the human resources department. Once se-
lected, interns/fellows usually serve for an academic semester
and are assigned to staff members or teams to work on specific
projects. Depending on their academic requirements, weekly
schedules range from 1 day per week to every day.
The U.S. Department of Labor’s “Fact Sheet #14A: Non-
Profit Organizations and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)”
provides guidance regarding the utilization of volunteers:
The FLSA recognizes the generosity and public benefits of vol-
unteering and allows individuals to freely volunteer in many
circumstances for charitable and public purposes. Individuals
may volunteer time to religious, charitable, civic, humanitarian,
or similar non-profit organizations as a public service and not
be covered by the FLSA. Individuals generally may not, how-
ever, volunteer in commercial activities run by a non-profit or-
ganization such as a gift shop. A volunteer generally will not
be considered an employee for FLSA purposes if the individual
volunteers freely for public service, religious or humanitarian
objectives, and without contemplation or receipt of compensa-
tion. Typically, such volunteers serve on a part-time basis and
do not displace regular employed workers or perform work that
would otherwise be performed by regular employees. In addi-
tion, paid employees of a non-profit organization cannot vol-
unteer to provide the same type of services to their non-profit
organization that they are employed to provide.7
Since the Respondent does not employ paid administrative as-
sistants, staff members also rely on interns/fellows to perform
various administrative tasks, note-taking and other functions;
some staff members, including Jarrar, relied heavily on interns
to accomplish their work goals. In the government relations unit,
interns were assigned to attend Congressional hearings or meet-
ings with coalition partners, report back on those events and par-
ticipate in devising responsive strategies, including drafting arti-
cles for publication in print and electronic media.
After discussing the issue for over a year, the executive team
decided to change its intern policy and compensate them for their
work. The timing of the change was on the executive team’s
agenda for discussion at its meeting on April 4. A major item of
consideration was the likely reduction in interns from a virtually
unlimited supply of unpaid interns to one based on available
funding for a limited number of interns. The expectation, based
on prior discussions, was that the change would roll out in 2019
to facilitate an orderly transition with staff.8
6 The grievance procedure, described in Article 10, permits but does
not require informal resolution before a grievance is filed. The first step
of the procedure requires a written grievance. (Jt. Exh. 5.)
7 https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs14a.htm.
8 Huang’s credible testimony regarding the executive team’s previous
decision to compensate interns, while vague as to the details, was not
disputed. (Tr. 53, 94–99, 117.)
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL OF THE USA, INC. 9
C. The Petition
In February, Jarrar was approached by a group of interns
working in the DC office who complained that they were not be-
ing compensated for their work. Jarrar had several conversations
with these interns and they decided to submit a petition request-
ing compensation for interns. Jarrar assisted the interns after
they drafted a petition by providing feedback and editing. Along
with Emily Walsh, another unit employee and a shop steward for
the Union, Jarrar helped to collect signatures by walking around
the DC office with Walsh and/or an intern and encouraging other
employees to sign the petition.9
On April 2, the government relations unit held its weekly
meeting. Approximately 10 advocacy directors, including Jar-
rar, participated in the meeting; about 5 or 6 were physically pre-
sent, while the rest participated by conference call. During this
meeting, Huang shared the results of an annual employee satis-
faction survey. After the presentation, she invited questions and
Jarrar raised one regarding the interns. He proposed that the Re-
spondent consider paying its interns and articulated the princi-
ples and moral grounds justifying a change in policy. Huang re-
sponded positively, explaining that the issue was an important
one that the Respondent’s executive team had been reviewing
during the past year and was scheduled to discuss its implemen-
tation later that week. Lin, Jarrar’s supervisor and a former at-
torney with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), was
familiar with the subject and discussed the legal risks in not com-
pensating interns because they were actually being engaged as
team members, were delivering services and the organization re-
lied on them. During the ensuing discussion with staff members
about the transition to a paid intern system, Huang explained that
the change would reduce the number of interns from dozens to
three for the entire organization.10
Notwithstanding Huang’s statements about a looming paid in-
tern system, the interns pressed forward with a petition in support
of such a change. On April 3, Huang received an email from an
intern on behalf of the DC office interns:
We hope this email finds you well. As a group of Amnesty
International USA interns united for the aim of achieving re-
munerated quality internships within the organization, we are
submitting this letter to you with the intention of highlighting
our concerns about management’s policy of not offering finan-
cial compensation for our labor. As the youngest contributors
to Amnesty International, we strongly believe in and are com-
mitted to the values of our organization. We therefore wish to
align the working conditions of interns with the values Am-
nesty International stands for, which in our view are

9 Jarrar credibly testified that employees supported the petition, and
none expressed any reluctance in signing (Tr. 19–20). His testimony was
corroborated by Mace, an employee called by the Respondent, who tes-
tified that he signed because he “supported the spirit” of the petition. (Tr.
53.) When confronted by Huang at the April 9 meeting, however, Mace
and Amanda Armstrong apologized for signing the petition. In Arm-
strong’s case, she attributed her sudden regret to the fact that Jarrar pre-
sented her with the petition accompanied by Walsh, the shop steward.
(Tr. 125–127; ALJ Exh. 3.)
10 I credited Huang’s testimony that she responded positively over Jar-
rar’s vague assertion that she “pushed back” against the idea of paying
undermined by the status quo. Inspired by your commitment
to youth empowerment, we would like to engage in a construc-
tive dialogue with you and your team at your earliest conven-
ience to discuss concrete proposals to improve the quality of
internships at Amnesty International.
Attached in this letter, you will find the scanned copy of our
petition along with the signatures of both interns and staff
members. Please kindly acknowledge receipt or the email mes-
sage.
The petition was signed by 14 “DC interns” and “[s]upported
by” the additional signatures of 21 staff members in the Re-
spondent’s DC office, including Jarrar:
We, the interns in the DC office of Amnesty International
USA, are writing to express our concerns about management's
policy of not offering financial compensation for our work.
With 12 interns currently in the office contributing hundreds of
hours a week, we are an essential aspect to the work and per-
formance of our organization, but unlike other peers in similar
organizations we do not get paid.
While we have elected to intern for Amnesty despite the lack
of compensation, because we believe in the work and mission
of Amnesty International, it still does not seem fair and just that
we would not be compensated for our contributions.
Amnesty criticizes exploitative labor practices around the
world and we believe itshould be held to the same standard
within the organization. We believe that labor is valuable, and
people should be compensated fairly for their work. It seems
incongruent that Amnesty should uphold these values and fail
to apply them to members of their own community and work-
place.
Furthermore, compensation for our labor would allow us to
commit more time and energy to our work here. As many of
us are currently or recently students, we have many costs we
need to cover, including tuition, housing, and other costs of liv-
ing. As a result, we must find other methods to sustain our-
selves financially, taking away from hours that we could be
contributing the great work of this organization.
Providing compensation for internships would demonstrate
true commitment to making Amnesty an equal opportunity em-
ployer and creating a diverse workplace. Amnesty Interna-
tional's commitment to human rights should be proven from
within first. It is a basic human right to be able to seek employ-
ment and the lack of monetary compensation in this position
restricts the ability to carry out that right. Without pay,
interns. It is undisputed that Huang explained during that discussion that
the change meant that the Respondent would only be able to afford three
paid interns for the entire organization—a specific calculation clearly re-
sulting from prior discussions. It is also undisputed that Lin, Jarrar’s
supervisor, endorsed his proposal, citing the legal exposure presented by
an unpaid intern system and their vital roles as team members. Moreo-
ver, Mace credibly corroborated Huang’s testimony that she explained
that the executive team was already in the process of planning such a
change. (Tr. 20–23, 44–46, 52–53, 94–95.)
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
AIUSA's internships are more available to students of higher
socioeconomic status, which serves to limit racial and socioec-
onomic diversity. In order to create a more diverse and varied
work environment it is imperative that Amnesty help include
those people who cannot afford to live without a fair and stand-
ardized pay.
As demonstrated by Board Member Janet Lord's statements in
December, improving the diversity, equity, and inclusion
standards from within an organization is about committing to
each of these qualities. “A commitment to equity, especially,
within a human rights framework entails working actively to
challenge and respond to bias . . . it also entails proactively ad-
vancing, from an institutional perspective, policies and prac-
tices of equal opportunity for all persons." This means not only
making statements in support of DEI, but also committing to
taking action to remedy any shortcomings with each factor.
We would be happy to comply with a contract outlining mini-
mum hours so that we ensure that we are justly compensated
for our labor, or even to have this agreement included in the
union contract that is currently being negotiated with manage-
ment. We are also willing to accommodate an agreement that
would provide even a partial monetary compensation to start.
For example, a system where we are encouraged to volunteer a
set number of hours but are getting paid for the remainder.
We write you this letter and deliver this petition with a passion
for the work that Amnesty does and gratitude for the oppor-
tunity to take part in this organization. We also write with the
belief that Amnesty should seek to actualize its values through-
out the world and at home–even, and perhaps especially–
within the organization itself.
Upon reading the petition, Huang was disappointed that it had
been signed by many of the employees who met with her the
previous day. She was clearly dismayed by the suggestion of
hypocrisy on the part of the Respondent, a human rights organi-
zation, with respect to its use of unpaid interns and concerned
that it was “not something that [she] want[ed] people outside of
the organization to believe about the [Respondent].” Huang im-
mediately forwarded the email to the executive team for consid-
eration at its meeting the next day.
The executive team’s previous discussions anticipated a
rollout of a paid intern program in 2019 for several reasons.
Based on available funding, the number of interns available to
support employees throughout the organization would be re-
duced from dozens to three. The reduced intern support would
require many employees to adjust their goals and program objec-
tives. The government relations unit, for example, heavily relied
on interns to cover Congressional hearings and attend meetings

11 Huang’s assertion that she, Lin and the Board of Directors perceived
the petition as threatening legal action, is not supported by its language.
The petition did not reference the FLSA or any other statute or regula-
tion, but rather, alluded to principles of fairness, morality, equity, diver-
sity, inclusion and an interest in collective bargaining. (Tr. 99, 104–105,
109, 114–116.)
12 This finding is based on Jarrar’s credible and undisputed testimony
regarding the Respondent’s meeting practices, and corroborated by
Mace’s credible testimony that, upon receipt of the invitation, he felt
with coalition partners. A final determination in that regard,
however, depended on the availability of members/volunteers to
alleviate the shortfall.
After Huang shared the interns’ petition with the executive
team, the organization decided to accelerate the transition to paid
interns. Having already hired its complement of interns for the
summer, however, the executive team decided to begin hiring
paid interns in the fall of 2018. The decision to pay three interns
was based on available funding and the belief that hiring any
more would force the organization to reduce its number of paid
staff positions.11
D. The April 9 Meeting
Sometime later that week, Huang sent an Outlook calendar in-
vite to an April 9 meeting to all of the paid employees who
signed the interns’ petition. This invite was atypical because it
did not specify the purpose of the meeting and because of its for-
mality; the Respondent’s customary practice had been to send an
informal email asking to meet and discuss an issue, rather than
the more formal approach in an Outlook calendar invitation.12
On April 9, Huang initially met with the DC office interns.
She informed them of the Respondent’s previous plans to pay its
interns and, due to their petition, to implement that change for
the fall 2018 term. That change, however, had no bearing on the
interns in attendance, since their internships were ending in the
next several months.
Huang and Ianantuoni then met with the employees who
signed the petition. Huang informed the employees that the Re-
spondent would be implementing a paid internship program.
However, based on available funding, the Respondent would
only be able to hire three interns for the entire organization.
Huang also explained that the deployment of the three interns
would be determined based on employee applications for their
services. Her announcement evoked complaints from employees
who relied on interns for their programs. Clearly frustrated,
Huang said she was disappointed because she had an open-door
policy and would have expected employees to discuss their con-
cerns with her or request a meeting with the executive team be-
fore resorting to a petition. She characterized the action as ag-
gressive and litigious. Regarding the impact that the loss of in-
tern support would have, employees would have to reset their
program goals with the likely reduction in the number of projects
that could be satisfactorily carried.
Notwithstanding their unequivocal support for the petition
when presented with it, several employees responded to Huang’s
comments by apologizing or expressing regret for signing it.
One employee, Amanda Armstrong, insisted that the only reason
she signed the petition was because Jarrar was accompanied by
Walsh when he presented it to her.13
“[c]urious, if anything, about what the conversation would be.” (Tr. 22–
23, 54–56.)
13 Aside from confirming Huang’s disappointment with the petition, I
did not credit Ianantuoni’s conclusory denial and vague recollection of
the meeting. (Tr. 78-80.) Nevertheless, I credit Huang’s denial over
Jarrar’s assertion that she told employees that the DC office would be
assigned only one paid intern. Mace credibly corroborated her version
by recalling that she discussed the staff’s need to reset goals during the
transition. Second, Jarrar’s testimony on this point is inconsistent with
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL OF THE USA, INC. 11
On April 12, Huang sent out an email to the whole organiza-
tion, outlining a new policy regarding interns:
As many of you will recall, we have been discussing the option
of moving forward to paid internships for some time, particu-
larly within the context of our DEI commitment. We want to
ensure that individuals from underrepresented communities
have the opportunity to work with Amnesty International and
learn more about our mission—something that can be too dif-
ficult if the work is unpaid.
Recently, the issue was raised again by interns in the DC of-
fice, who made a strong case for the organization moving to paid
internships. Last week, the Eteam made the decision to do this
starting in the fall of this year.
The email then outlined the new policy, which would have
three paid internships across the organization for each term
(spring, summer, and fall). She also stated that she wanted the
program to be “a thoughtful pipeline into our organization where
we proactively recruit for these positions from communities of
color and folks from other marginalized backgrounds.”14
E. The May 9 Meeting
Concerned about retaliation for his role with the petition be-
cause the Respondent was investigating him for other matters,
Jarrar arranged to meet with Huang in her office on May 9.15
Jarrar recorded most of the conversation on his telephone.16
During this conversation, Jarrar expressed concerns that, be-
cause of the tension during the April 9 meeting, some employees
feared retaliation for supporting the petition. Although he did
not fear for his job at the meeting, he became concerned after
Huang informed Lin about his role in collecting the signatures.
Lin then asked Jarrar what was going on and asked staff for their
notes about meeting with Jarrar. Jarrar also explained that
Huang and Lin mischaracterized the petition as litigious or
threatening legal action. Huang replied that she, Lin and the
board of directors considered the petition adversarial, adding that
some staff told her at that meeting that they felt pressured to sign
the petition. She also clarified that no one would be fired or oth-
erwise retaliated against for supporting the petition. Huang,
noted, however, that she was disappointed and “very embar-
rassed” that no one spoke to her about their desire to change or-
ganizational policy beforehand.17 She also considered it
“strange” that no one told her about the interns’ interests and said
it “would have been really helpful . . . to tell the interns to give
me the heads-up to let me know it’s coming.”18
At one point during the conversation, Jarrar acquiesced to

his subsequent statements to Huang on May 9 about the April 9 meeting
when he expressed concerns that her remarks were perceived as a threat
to employees’ job security and made no mention about the distribution
of interns. Lastly, whether the DC office would be assigned one or more
interns was not the problem; those in attendance were dismayed by the
drastic reduction of approximately fifteen interns at the DC office and
the competitive process for their services that would result. (Tr. 23–25,
54–60, 99–105, 118–121.)
14 Jt. Exh. 3.
15 Allegations of retaliation are not an issue in this case. (Jt. Exh. 7;
Tr. 26.)
Huang’s insistence that he “try talking to us before you do an-
other petition.”19 Huang conceded that petitions could be an ef-
fective tactic, but asserted that it would be inappropriate where
there is no goal to be attained by the action:
If the demand can be met without applying that pressure,
there’s no reason to do the petition. So if somebody came to
you and said we should do a petition because we should have,
I don't know, something that, you know, that the organization
would be willing to consider, it doesn’t make sense to do the
petition, strategically. It actually sets off a more adversarial re-
lationship. Look, so I'm not telling you, you should never tell
somebody you shouldn't do the petition . . . But I would advise
especially interns who don't know that strategically you might
get further if you request a meeting with management. That's
appropriate. . . But what I'm trying to say is tactically it doesn't
make sense to spring it on me the next day. So part of the ad-
vice to the interns could have been, you know, we just heard
from Margaret yesterday, or whenever it was, that they're con-
sidering this, so maybe the first step is to share this but to say
we--and ask for a meeting rather than present this . . . And I
know you don't perceive it as adversarial, but it was really
clearly not asking for a meeting or not asking for an initial con-
versation . . . So tactically it felt very strange to me . . . This is
not something I oppose clearly because we actually did exactly
what they wanted us to do . . . which was to move to paid in-
ternships. But it felt coerced. It didn't feel like a positive expe-
rience for me, either. I came out of this feeling like, wow, I
don't have the kind of relationship with staff . . .20
After Jarrar acknowledged that some staffers now regretted
the petition, Huang continued with her mixed message of assur-
ance and depiction of the petition as a negative tactic:
I would like to discuss moving forward in a way that like gives
all staff the assurances that, you know, we're whole on what
happened and like there was some—it was a negative experi-
ence but no one is going to pay a price. No one is going to be
like punished because of it, and these are the steps that we’re
going to take moving forward. Like this conversation that I
have with you now made me feel very good about the situa-
tion.21 . . . I just wanted to be clear I don't want to – I don't
know that we'll agree, ultimately, that some people are going to
say I'm glad I signed the petition, I'd do it again. And other
people are going to say I wish we hadn't done it. Ultimately,
that's really not the point . . . What I really want is a context in
which people feel comfortable when they do see problems . . .
16 The flash drive containing an audio recording of this meeting was
received as GC Exh. 2. With the agreement of all parties, a transcript of
that recording was received in evidence as ALJ Exh. 3.
17 While expressing support for the petition’s goal, Huang was disap-
pointed that no one had come to talk with her prior to delivering the pe-
tition. She also testified that the petition was “unnecessarily demanding”
and “a tactic that create[d] a sense of both urgency and anxiety on the
part of management.” (Tr. 108–109; ALJ Exh. 3 at 5–14, 17–22, 34, 37,
40, 43.)
18 ALJ Exh. 3 at 22.
19 Id. at 33.
20 Id. at 33–38.
21 Id. at 40–42.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD12
That they come forward . . . and they do it constructively . . .
So I could see that wasn't their intention . . . to sort of levy a
threat, the way it felt.22 . . . You reach out first. I know . . . But
we didn't get that this time . . . it wasn't just theirs. I mean once
you and Emily started collecting signatures, it became yours
collectively.23
Jarrar acknowledged that, from Huang’s perspective that she
was “blindsided” by the petition but noted that a petition is a fre-
quently used by the organization as a campaign tool. Huang re-
plied that a petition, however, “isn’t usually happening against
your employer though . . . For all the reasons that it’s caused all
this anxiety, it’s significant.” Jarrar concurred:
I hear what you are saying. I’m just saying about how people
felt about it. People felt like it’s a low threshold to ask, and
then they felt that there was an overreaction. . . And I think
some people were like intimidated. There was like a chilling
effect. They’re like, oh my God, I’m going to lose my job, like
why did I join, I want to take my name out, you know, like three
interns now, we’re getting punished. So it’s like, so there was
like anxiety on like our side as well.
Huang and Jarrar concluded by agreeing to set up a followup
meeting with staff to address the anxiety persisting from Huang’s
comments at the April 9 meeting.24
Legal Analysis
I. THE NATURE OF THE CONCERTED ACTIVITIES AT ISSUE
To be protected under Section 7 of the Act, employee conduct
must be both concerted and engaged in for mutual aid and pro-
tection. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565 (1978). Petitions
that relate to terms and conditions of employment—such as a
petition for better wages—are a form of protected concerted ac-
tivity. E.g., Sam’s Club, 322 NLRB 8, 14 (1996) (holding that
circulating a petition protesting labor conditions and soliciting
signatures to the petition is concerted activity). Concerted activ-
ity undertaken solely for the benefit of or in solidarity with other
employees is also protected. Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Mar-
ket, 361 NLRB 151, 155 (2014) (“Congress created a framework
for employees to band together in solidarity to address their
terms and conditions of employment…even if only one of them
has any immediate stake in the outcome.”) (internal quotation
omitted). However, concerted activity is not for mutual aid or
protection when it solely communicates concerns “on behalf of
nonemployee third parties.” See Five Star Transportation, Inc.,
349 NLRB 42, 44 (2007) (“merely raising safety or quality of
care concerns on behalf of nonemployee third parties is not pro-
tected under the Act.”); See also WBAI Pacifica Foundation, 328
NLRB 1273, 1275 fn. 3 (1999) (an individual who is not paid
and has no legal expectation of being paid deemed a nonem-
ployee third party).

22 Id. at 43–45.
23 Id. at 46–47.
24 Id. at 48–49.
25 The record evidence suggests that internships are typically served
during academic terms but does not indicate whether they are used as a
A. The Interns’ Employment Status
The FLSA uses a “primary beneficiary test” in determining
whether unpaid interns should be classified as employees. The
analysis considers whether the intern or the employer is the pri-
mary beneficiary of the relationship. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight
Pictures, 811 F.3d 528, 538 (2d Cir. 2015) (“the proper question
is whether the intern or the employer is the primary benefi-
ciary…”); accord Benjamin v. B&H Education, Inc., 877 F.3d
1139 (9th Cir. 2017); Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, 803 F.3d
1199, 1211–1212 (11th Cir. 2015), Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanita-
rium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 529 (6th Cir. 2011).
Glatt identifies a number of factors that may be useful to such
a consideration: whether there is an expectation of compensa-
tion; whether the internship provides training; whether the in-
ternship is tied to a formal education program and accommodates
the intern’s academic calendar; and whether the intern displaces
work done by paid staff or merely complements it; and whether
there is the likelihood of a post-internship hire or whether the
internship’s duration is limited to a period providing the intern
with beneficial learning. See id. However, this list is not exhaus-
tive, and each factor should only be given weight to the extent it
sheds light on the underlying question of who the primary bene-
ficiary in an employer-intern relationship is. Id. at 536–537 (“we
propose the above list of non-exhaustive factors to aid courts in
answering [the] question [of whether the intern of employer is
the primary beneficiary].”) (emphasis added); see also United
States Department of Labor, News Release: U.S. Department of
Labor Clarifies When Interns Working at For-Profit Employers
are Subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 18-0043-NAT
(“The Wage and Hour Division will update its enforcement pol-
icies to align with [appellate court rulings] . . . and provide the
Division’s investigators with increased flexibility to holistically
analyze internships on a case-by-case basis.”).
Several factors identified in Glatt weigh against finding the
interns employees, and others weigh in favor. On the one hand,
the evidence established that the internships are filled by students
for academic terms, are not compensated and, although some
continue as volunteers, interns are not typically hired as employ-
ees upon completion of the internship.25 In addition, although
interns perform some functions that would be performed by ad-
ministrative assistants, they do not displace such employees be-
cause the Respondent does not employ any.
On the other hand, there is no evidence that the Respondent
provides interns with training, but its employees rely heavily on
them to accomplish their program objectives and work goals; in-
terns engage in integral tasks such as attending and taking notes
at Congressional hearings, and publishing blog posts and articles
relating to human rights campaigns. Some of these tasks—such
as writing and publishing blog posts—are the same as those en-
gaged in by the Respondent’s paid employees, indicating that in-
terns have been partially displacing the advocacy work of em-
ployees. Mark v. Gawker Media, LLC, 2016 WL 1271064
vehicle for paying jobs elsewhere as was the case in WBAI Pacifica, 328
NLRB at 1274 (concerted activities by applicants not currently receiving
any form of compensation from the employer, but “seeking entry to
wage-paying jobs,” could be covered by the Act).
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL OF THE USA, INC. 13
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) at 11 (holding that a jury could find interns’
work, in writing blog posts, displaced the work of paid employ-
ees where interns did pay writers’ work “at least part of the
time.” ).
Looking at the relationship holistically, it is evident that the
Respondent has benefited the most from its relationship with in-
terns. The drastic reduction of available interns would require
employees to reduce the number of projects or campaigns that
they work on. In addition, the transition to paid interns will force
Respondent to hire administrative assistants for the first time.
These factors clearly shed the greatest amount of light as to the
severe impact that the reduction of available interns will have on
the Respondent’s operations. Based on those consequences, it is
evident that the Respondent has benefitted from its interns to
such an extent that it is the primary beneficiary in that relation-
ship. See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, 811 F.3d at 536–
537.
B. The Relationship of Interns to Employees’ Terms and Con-
ditions of Employment
Aside from the employee status of interns, the process by
which the Respondent’s employees selected and utilized them is
in and of itself a condition of their employment. See NLRB v.
Wooster Division or Borg Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958)
(subjects that directly concern or settle an aspect of the relation-
ship between the employer and employees are conditions of em-
ployment). An appropriate analogy is that relating to concerted
activity over hiring practices, which the Board has held to be
protected. See Houston Chapter, Associated General Contrac-
tors of America, Inc. (Local 18, Hod Carriers),143 NLRB 409,
411 (1963) (the word “employment” in the phrase “terms and
conditions of employment” connotes the initial act of employing,
in determining that a hiring hall relates to the conditions of em-
ployment); Dave Castellino & Sons, 277 NLRB 453 (1985) (em-
ployee engaged in protected concerted activity by refusing to
cross picket line protesting failure to hire local residents).
Prior to the petition, the intern selection process was initiated
by employees desiring help on projects. With the assistance of
the human resources department, the employee would post a so-
licitation for interns and make the selection. With the shift to a
process involving only three paid interns for the entire organiza-
tion, the employee’s control over the intern selection process
ceased. The transfer of duties previously done by employees
constitutes a change in a condition of employment. See St.
John’s Hosp., 281 NLRB 1163, 1166 (1986) (a change in em-
ployee’s duties is a mandatory subject of bargaining and em-
ployer was obligated to bargain over a transfer of certain work
duties from secretaries to nurses’ assistants). As previously dis-
cussed, an intern’s role also directly correlated to employee per-
formance since it dictated how many projects or campaigns the
employee could handle. Thus, for better or worse, the petition
seeking to compensate interns necessarily and directly affected
the terms and condition of employment of Respondent’s employ-
ees.
C. Whether Respondent’s Speech had the Potential to Coerce
Future Concerted Activity
Lastly, employer conduct in response to employee activity
that is unprotected—or arguably unprotected—may still violate
Section 8(a)(1) if the conduct would tend to restrain future pro-
tected concerted activity. See Keller Ford, 336 NLRB 722, 722
(2001) (employer’s threat against employee for speaking about
insurance copayment with coworkers was unlawful whether or
not the employee had stated his intent to engage in bona fide
concerted action) (citing K Mart Corp., 297 NLRB 80, 80 fn. 2
(1989)). This can be true even when the employer’s actions are
directly related to activity that is only questionably protected.
See Ellison Media Co., 344 NLRB 1112, 1113–1114 (2005). In
Ellison Media Co., the Board found that even where an employer
had forbidden employees from engaging in unprotected gossip,
the employer violated the Act because the employer’s speech had
the potential to be interpreted by employees as applying more
broadly to encompass concerted activity.
Here, although Huang’s speech was made in response to the
petition relating to unpaid interns, it referred to petitions gener-
ally. During the April 9 meeting, she expressed a desire that em-
ployees make use of an open-door policy not merely with regards
to the present petitions, but all similar future actions. The disap-
pointment she expressed was not with the particular request
made, but with the form in which it was made—by formal peti-
tion, rather than an informal meeting or conversation. Likewise,
during the May 9 meeting, Huang made references to petitions
generally, making forward-looking statements to Jarrar that he
should “try talking” to her before “doing another petition.” Thus,
even if the interns were nonemployee third parties, the state-
ments made by Huang, which encompassed future, protected ac-
tivity, would still be unlawful if they were coercive. For the rea-
sons discussed below, they were.
II. HUANG’S STATEMENTS TO STAFF
A. The Legal Standard
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in their exercise of
their protected right to concerted activity. In determining
whether an employer’s actions violate Section 8(a)(1) the em-
ployer’s motivation is immaterial; what matters is whether the
employer’s conduct, viewed from the perspective of a reasonable
person, tends to interfere with the free exercise of employee
rights. E.g., Crown Stationers, 272 NLRB 164, 164 (1984) (the
test for interference or coercion is whether the conduct may rea-
sonably be said to tend to interfere with the free exercise of em-
ployee rights); Hanes Hosiery, Inc., 219 NLRB 338, 338(1975)
(“we have long recognized that the test of interference, restraint
and coercion . . . does not turn on Respondent’s motive, cour-
tesy, or gentleness . . . the test is whether Respondent has en-
gaged in conduct which reasonably tends to interfere with the
free exercise of employee rights under the Act.”).
Section 8(c) of the Act affords an employer the right to ex-
press its personal negative views about concerted activity to its
employees, but only so long as such expression does not contain
an express or implied threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit. Wal Mart Stores, Inc., 352 NLRB 815, 822 (2008) (em-
ployer had the right to encourage use of its open-door policy as
a superior alternative to representation). A threat need not be
explicit; it may be implied. Pomona Valley Hospital Medical
Center, 355 NLRB 234, 235 (2010) (holding that where words
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD14
could reasonably be construed as coercive, they may violate the
Act).
B. The April 9 Meeting
When a supervisor expresses personal disappointment about
an employee’s concerted activities, it is reasonable for an em-
ployee to read an implied threat of future reprisal into the em-
ployer’s statements, making such statements coercive. Print
Fulfillment Services, LLC, 361 NLRB 1243, 1243–1244 (2014)
(finding a violation where employer informed employee that the
employer felt “disappointed” in the employee’s prounion activ-
ity). Suggesting that an employee’s protected concerted activity
is an act of disloyalty to the employer is also coercive. Sogard
Tool Co., 285 NLRB 1044, 1047–048 (1987) (employer who
conveyed belief that union activity was inimical to the em-
ployer’s interests by comparing it to cancer acted unlawfully).
Huang’s April 9 statements were precisely the kind that the
Board has found unlawful. They were made during an unusually
scheduled meeting where to which only those employees who
signed the interns’ petition were invited, even though Huang’s
announcement—that the Respondent would be moving to a paid
internship program—would be of import to all employees, not
just the petition’s signatories. The fact that only a specific group
of employees was singled out for her announcement reasonably
suggested to those present that they had been branded as disloyal.
See Westwood Health Center, 330 NLRB 935, 941–942 (2000)
(employer unlawfully implied during a private conversation with
employee that she would consider her disloyal if she supported a
union); Tito Contractors, Inc., 366 NLRB No. 47, slip op. at 1
(2018) (supervisor violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by depicting concerted
activity as a personal betrayal and considered employees who
engaged in a protected lawsuit to be “stabbing [him] in [the]
back.”)
During this meeting, Huang indicated that she believed the pe-
tition was adversarial, aggressive, and litigious—even though
the petition was expressed in moral terms and neither referred to
litigation nor regulations. These expressions are like those made
in Sogard Tool Co., in that they indicate that concerted activity—
here, a petition—is hostile to the employer’s interests. 285
NLRB at 1047. Huang also expressed her own disappointment
that the assembled employees had not made use of her open-door
policy, a coercive statement of personal affront like that found
unlawful in Tito Contractors, Inc. 366 NLRB No. 47, slip op. at
1.
The remaining allegation, however—that Huang’s statements
were coercive because they impliedly threatened to increase em-
ployees’ workload as a result of the petition—is not supported
by the record. Huang did not say that there would be an in-
creased workload, only that employees would need to adjust
their goals to account for the reduced number of interns available
to work on projects. In essence, employees’ workloads were to
be reduced as a result of their concerted action – a development
neither alleged nor shown to be averse to their terms and condi-
tions of employment. See, e.g., Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d
1127, 1131 (2002) (adverse employment actions are those where
a reasonable trier of fact could find objectively tangible—as op-
posed to purely subjective—harm) (citing Burlington Indus., Inc.
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). Accordingly, that
allegation is dismissed.
Under the circumstances, with the exception of the alleged
statements that workloads would increase, Huang’s statements
to staff at the April 9 meeting were coercive in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
C. The May 9 Meeting
“[A]n employer may not interfere with an employee's right to
engage in Section 7 activity by requiring that the employee take
all work-related concerns through a specific internal process.”
Valley Hospital Medical Center, 351 NLRB 1250, 1254 (2007);
Kinder-Care Learning Centers, Inc., 299 NLRB 1171, 1171–
1172 (1990) (“an employer may not impose procedural prereq-
uisites to the exercise of Section 7 rights.”); compare Wal Mart
Stores, Inc., 352 NLRB No. 103 at 8 (2008) (employer was found
not to be acting unlawfully by encouraging use of an open door
policy as an alternative to union representation).
Here, Huang coerced Jarrar by attempting to dictate her own
procedural process for collective action, in violation of his Sec-
tion 7 rights. Although Huang stopped short of outright com-
manding Jarrar to cease using petitions and only use the Re-
spondent’s open-door policy, her statements cannot be taken as
the mere expression of an opinion as to the benefits of an open-
door policy, as in Wal-Mart Stores. Huang told Jarrar that he
should “try talking” to her before “doing another petition,” that
“the first step” should be to ask for a meeting rather than present
a petition, and that “strategically you might get further if you re-
quest a meeting with management.” Simply wording such in-
structions in a slightly less compulsory manner than they might
otherwise be phrased does not serve to change their compulsory
effect; statements need not be phrased as a direct command to
constitute a directive. Boeing Co., 362 NLRB 1789, 1791–1792
(2015) (previously mandatory policy that was altered to use word
“recommend” was still considered a directive); Heck’s, Inc., 293
NLRB 1111, 1114, 1119 (1989) (statement that the “company
requests you regard your wage as confidential” was still restric-
tive of employees’ Sec. 7 activity). In Boeing Co., the employer
was unable to make otherwise unlawful directives lawful simply
by couching them as being recommendations; neither does
Huang’s use of ambiguous phrases like “you might get further”
conceal the fact that these words conveyed the message that em-
ployees are expected to make use of an open-door policy before
submitting a petition. 362 NLRB at 1791–1792.
Furthermore, just as she did during the April 9 meeting, Huang
characterized the petition in hostile terms, telling Jarrar “I know
you don’t perceive it as adversarial . . . tactically, it felt very
strange to me” and stating that “it felt coerced;” she described
the petition as “a negative experience” and even “a threat.” As
discussed at length above, an employer’s speech tends to coerce
employees when it suggests that concerted activity is hostile to
the employer’s interests, or a personal attack. Such speech tends
to suggest to an employee the threat of future reprisal. E.g., West-
wood Health Center, 330 NLRB at 941–942 (implications of dis-
loyalty suggest threats of future reprisal). While it is true that
Huang assured Jarrar that no one would be punished because of
the petition that was already circulated, her strongly-worded dis-
approval, coupled with her repeated calls to use the Respond-
ent’s open-door policy, suggested that some sort of unknown
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL OF THE USA, INC. 15
reprisal might occur in the future.
Finally, Huang told Jarrar that it was “strange” to her that no
one had thought to share with her that the interns were interested
in compensation and that it “would have been helpful” if the in-
terns had been told to give her advance notice of the petition. As
previously discussed, Huang considered Jarrar and other em-
ployees to have acted collectively with the interns in actions re-
lating to their conditions of employment. As such, Huang’s
statement encouraged Jarrar to inform on the protected concerted
activity of others in violation of Section 8(a)(1). See, e.g., Ryder
Transportation Services, 341 NLRB 761, 761–762 (2004) (un-
lawful for employer to instruct that employees report in writing
if they subjectively felt harassed by coworkers soliciting for the
union because such an instruction effectively encouraged em-
ployees to report the identity of union card solicitors); Arcata
Graphics/Fairfield, Inc., 304 NLRB 541, 542 (1991) (same).
For the foregoing reasons, Huang’s statements tended coerce
Jarrar in the exercise of his Section 7 rights in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in interstate com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act on
April 9 and May 9, 2018 by: (a) instructing employees to com-
municate complaints to management orally before submitting
complaints in writing; (b) threatening employees with unspeci-
fied reprisal because they engaged in protected concerted activ-
ity; (c) equating protected concerted activity with disloyalty; and
(d) requesting employees to report to management employees
who are engaging in protected concerted activity.
3. All other complaint allegations not specifically described
above are dismissed.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I shall order it to cease and desist therefrom
and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended26
ORDER
The Respondent, Amnesty International of the USA, Inc,
Washington, D.C., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Instructing employees to communicate complaints to
management orally before submitting complaints in writing.
(b) Threatening employees with unspecified reprisal because
they engaged in protected concerted activity.
(c) Equating protected concerted activity with disloyalty
(d) Requesting employees to report to management

26 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Or-
der shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
employees who are engaging in protected concerted activity.
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Washington, D.C. copies of the attached notice marked
“Appendix.”27 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 5, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Re-
spondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices,
the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email,
posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic
means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its em-
ployees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. If, during the pendency of these
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed
the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all
current employees and former employees employed by the Re-
spondent at any time since April 9, 2018.
(b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. March 18, 2019
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT instruct you to make complaints orally to us be-
fore you make complaints in writing.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with unspecified reprisal because
of your protected concerted activity, including participating in
27 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National
Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor
Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD16
group petitions about your terms and conditions of employment.
WE WILL NOT equate your protected concerted activity, includ-
ing participating in group petitions about your terms and condi-
tions of employment, with disloyalty.
WE WILL NOT request you to report to us employees who en-
gage in protected concerted activity, including participating in
group petitions about your terms and conditions of employment.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you
by Section 7 of the Act.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL OF THE USA, INC.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/05-CA-221952 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from
the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015
Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202)
273-1940.