American Oil Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 18, 1971

189 N.L.R.B. 3 (N.L.R.B. 1971)

AMERICAN OIL COMPANY 3
American Oil Company and International Brotherhood
of Service Station Operators of America. Case
20-CA-6007
March 18, 1971
DECISION AND ORDER
By CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND BROWN
On October 28, 1970, Trial Examiner William F.
Scharnikow issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in
and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the
attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial Exam-
iner further found that Respondent had not engaged
in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the
complaint and recommended dismissal as to them.
Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief, and the
General Counsel filed cross-exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and cross-excep-
tions, the briefs, and the entire record in the case, and
hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner insofar as they are
consistent herewith.
The complaint in this case alleges 8(a)(3) violations
based upon Respondent's action against employees
stemming from a burglary at its MacArthur Street
service station which occurred shortly after the Union
had obtained signed authorization cards from a
majority of the station attendants at that location. The
Trial Examiner found that Respondent had not
violated the Act by suspending Will Berry, Lonnie
Williams, and Herman Carter following the burglary;
but that it violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by
continuing Williams' and Carter's suspensions and
Respondent 's exceptions directed to the credibility resolutions of the
Trial Examiner are without merit. The Board will not overrule the Trial
Examiner 's resolutions a, to the credibility unless a clear preponderance of
all relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect . On the entire
record , such a conclusion is not warranted herein . Standard Drr Wall
Products, Inc.. 91 NLRB 544, enfd . 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3).
2 All dates refer to 1970, unless otherwise indicated.
:1 The safe had two compartments entered by unlocking two locked,
insisting that they take polygraph tests before they
could return to work.
The facts show that, beginning in early March
1970,2 the Union began organizing the attendants at
the MacArthur Street service station. By March 14,
the Union had secured signed authorization cards
from Berry, Williams, and Carter. The next day it
wrote Respondent claiming that it represented a
majority and demanding bargaining. In a telephone
conversation on March 18, after Respondent had
received the Union's letter, the Union advised Jack
Rogers, Respondent's marketing representative in
charge of about 30 area stations, that it represented
the attendants at MacArthur Street, that negotiations
were desired, and that there might be a strike if the
employees received no satisfaction from Respondent.
Rogers then indicated that the Company did not want
a union and the men could strike if they wanted.
Sometime between 11 p.m. Thursday, March 19,
when the MacArthur Street station closed, and 6 a.m.
the following morning, when it reopened, the station's
safe was burglarized and $2,000 in cash and credit
card receipts were stolen.3 At the time of the burglary,
Carter, Williams, and Station Manager Wayne
Melton had keys t-) the top compartment; Melton also
had the key to the bottom compartment. The other
two attendants, Will Berry and Floyd Fletcher, did
not have a key to either compartment although Berry
had keys to the front door and the cash box. Because
of the circumstances surrounding the burglary,
including the fact that the two lids had been removed
without breaking the locks, the police report made
shortly after discovery of the theft indicated that the
perpetrator was "probably an employee or ex-em-
ployee."
Jack Rogers learned of the robbery Friday morning
when he visited a nearby station and received a
message from Melton. When Rogers called back,
Melton told him what had transpired and that the
police suspected that keys had been used to open the
front door and safe and that it was an "inside job";
Rogers told Melton to pick up all keys held by
employees and to "terminate or suspend" the employ-
ees until he could speak to them on Saturday or
Monday, when he expected to return from a business
trip to Los Angeles. Shortly thereafter, Fletcher and
Berry reported to the station. Because he had no keys
at all, Fletcher was allowed to work; Melton,
however, took Berry's keys to the front door and the
removable lids: the top compartment consisted of the space between the
top lid and the bottom lid: the bottom compartment consisted of the space
between the bottom lid and the ground , to which the safe was attached.
The bottom lid. which could be reached and unlocked only after the top lid
had been removed, had a slit through which credit card receipts and cash
could be dropped into the bottom compartment . Each lid had a different
key: the bulk of the money was stolen from the bottom compartment.
189 NLRB No. 2
4 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
cashbox and told him that he was suspended "until
further notice." Berry immediately went to the other
station where he found Rogers about to depart for Los
Angeles; when he told Rogers that he had no keys to
the safe and protested his suspension, Rogers told him
to return to work and informed Melton of this
decision over the telephone. When Williams arrived at
the station at 8:30 that morning, Melton took his keys
to the front door, the cashbox, and the top compart-
ment of the safe and informed him that he was
suspended. Williams then went to Carter's home and
both returned to the MacArthur station where Carter
surrendered his keys to the front door, the cashbox,
and the top compartment of the safe and was told by
Melton that he could not return to work until he had
spoken with Skrederstu, Respondent's senior field
sales manager, or Rogers, both of whom had already
left for Los Angeles.
On Friday, March 20, Carter and Williams went to
Morley, the Union's business agent, and told him that
they had been suspended. That afternoon, and on the
following Saturday and Monday, Morley, Williams,
Carter, and another union member picketed the
MacArthur station carrying signs stating "employees
on strike" and "don't patronize unfair establishment."
Rogers returned from Los Angeles on Saturday
afternoon and went to the station where he saw the
picket line. He told Melton that Melton and the
attendants who had keys would be required to take a
polygraph test. On Saturday or Monday, Rogers
asked Carter and Williams to take the test and told
them they would be reinstated if they passed. Carter
refused to take the test but Williams agreed. On the
afternoon of Wednesday, March 25, Melton took the
polygraph but neither Williams, who knew of the
appointment to take the test, nor Carter appeared
We agree with the Trial Examiner that the suspen-
sion of Berry, Carter, and Williams pending investiga-
tion of the burglary was a reasonable step unrelated to
union activity and did not violate Section 8(a)(3).
However, the Trial Examiner further found that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) by insisting as a
condition of continued employment that Carter and
Williams take the polygraph tests. Respondent ex-
cepts to this finding, contending that its insistence
upon the polygraph, in the circumstances, was
reasonable and not related to the employees' union
activity. We find merit in Respondent's exception.
The Trial Examiner himself stated that, except for
one fact, he would conclude that Respondent
"decided .. . to require Williams and Carter to take
lie detector tests in order to weigh the possibility of
their having been involved in the robbery and not
because of their apparent support of the Union." The
sole determinative fact for the Trial Examiner was
that he did not believe testimony of Respondent's
witnesses that the keys held by Williams and Carter
had been altered to fit both compartments of the safe.
Having rejected this testimony as unbelievable, the
Trial Examiner concluded that Respondent's insist-
ence on the polygraph was prompted by its belief that
Williams and Carter had joined the Union and might
participate in the strike. Without quarreling with the
Trial Examiner's resolution of credibility, we do not
believe rejection of Respondent's testimony concern-
ing the alteration of the keys is sufficient to convert
the discharge of Williams and Carter upon their
refusal to take the polygraph test into an unlawfully
motivated discharge.
There is no dispute that the circumstances sur-
rounding the burglary strongly suggested "an inside
job" placing all employees with keys under suspicion.
Melton, Williams, and Carter, being in possession of
keys to the safe, were prime suspects. After an earlier
robbery at the station, the locks to the two lids of the
safe were changed in the first week of March 1970.
Melton had keys to both lids of the safe; Williams and
Carter each had a key to the top lid, which was found
to have been removed undamaged and which yielded
access to the bottom lid, which was similarly removed.
Both Williams and Carter were new employees who
had been hired after brief interviews: Williams was
hired in early February and Carter was hired on
Williams' recommendation in the middle of that
month. Carter, who had worked the last shift on
Thursday, March 19, had closed the station alone at
11 P.M.
Although a requirement that employees take poly-
graph tests may in certain circumstances be unreason-
able, the circumstances here, as outlined above,
persuade us that, as was true of the original suspen-
sions, Respondent required Williams and Carter to
take the lie detector test as an understandable and
permissible measure to learn whether either of the two
or both had been involved in the burglary. It is true
that said action was taken against the employees
shortly after the Union organized the station. Yet the
element of timing, in the circumstances of this case,
furnishes a slim basis even for a suspicion of unlawful
motivation. If Respondent relied upon the burglary as
a pretextual ground in order to conceal an antiunion
purpose, the burden was upon the General Counsel to
establish that fact. The record is barren of any such
proof We find that the General Counsel has not
established by a preponderance of the evidence that
Respondent required the polygraph test as a reprisal
for the union activities of Williams and Carter.
Accordingly, it is our opinion that Respondent has
not been shown to have violated Section 8(a)(3)
through the termination of Williams and Carter and,
as we agree with the Trial Examiner in all other
respects, we shall dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
AMERICAN OIL COMPANY 5
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint be,
and it hereby is, dismissed.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM F. SCHARNIKOW, Trial Examiner: The com-
plaint alleges, but the answer of the Respondent denies,
that the Respondent, American Oil Company, has engaged
in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) and 2(6) and (7) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C., Sec.
151, et seq. (herein called the Act), by discharging
employees Will Berry, Herman Carter, and Lonnie
Williams on March 20, 1970, because of their membership
in or activities on behalf of International Brotherhood of
Service Station Operators of America (herein called the
Union), or because they engaged in other concerted
activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held in San Francisco,
California, on June 30, and July 1, 1970, before me. The
General Counsel and the Respondent appeared by counsel
and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine
and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence
upon the issues. Since the hearing, counsel for the General
Counsel and for the Respondent have submitted briefs
which have been duly considered.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my
observation of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent, American Oil Company, a Maryland
corporation with a place of business in Oakland, California,
is in the business of refining petroleum products and the
retail sale of gasoline and oil. During the past year, the
Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business
operations, purchased and received products valued in
excess of 50,000 which were shipped to it in the State of
California directly from suppliers located outside the State
of California. During the same year, the Respondent, in the
course and conduct of its business operations, had total
sales in excess of 500,000. I find, as the Respondent admits,
that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the
Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to
entertain jurisdiction of this case.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Brotherhood of Service Station Operators
of America, herein called the Union, is a labor organization
within the meaning of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
In this case, the General Counsel contends, but the
Respondent denies, that the Respondent discriminatorily
discharged Lonnie Williams and Herman Carter on or
about March 20, 1970, and at the same time discriminatori-
ly suspended Will Berry, because these three men, who
were attendants employed by the Respondent at its
company-operated gasoline service station at the corner of
MacArthur and West Streets in Oakland, had joined and
supported the Union in its claim to represent the
Respondent's employees. Although the general skeleton of
relevant events is clear from the evidence , the details of this
evidence bearing directly upon the Respondent 's motives,
are studded with conflicts and, more significantly, with
inconsistencies and apparent uncertainties , principally in
the evidence given by the Respondent's witnesses for the
purpose of making the Respondent 's treatment of the three
employees seem reasonable and plausible and unrelated to
any union activity on their part.
A. The MacArthur Station Attendants and the
Union Activity Involving Them
Charles Morley, secretary- treasurer of the Union with a
post office box mailing address in Berkeley , also serves as a
representative of an Oakland employment agency. In
December 1969 and January 1970,1 Morley made several
telephone calls to Robert King , then the Respondent's
marketing representative in the San Francisco Bay area,
and, saying that he was making surveys of various oil
companies (but without further identifying himself), spoke
to King about pricing and manpower in the Bay area. In
these telephone conversations, King told Morley that he
needed "good qualified dealers" and Morley said he had
several prospects. As a result, Morley met with King and
King's superior, Senior Field Sales Manager R. L.
Skrederstu, in an Oakland coffee shop in late January,
recommended Lonnie Williams as a prospective lessee of
the Respondent's MacArthur station, discussed with them
the initial necessary financing of Williams ' dealership, and
said that he would try to arrange a loan for Williams.
Morley testified that in the coffee shop conversation, he
not only gave King and Skrederstu both his card as
representative of the employment agency and his card as
secretary -treasurer of the Union, but told the two men that
"eventually we [the Union] planned to organize every
station in the State" although he admitted that King and
Skrederstu "didn't pay much attention to it, I don't think."
But Skrederstu and King testified, and I credit their
testimony and find, that Morley referred only to his
representation of the employment agency and did not
mention his representation of the Union.
King interviewed Lonnie Williams in February and hired
him as an attendant at the MacArthur station since
Williams needed a job immediately and King believed that
his working at the station would give the Respondent an
opportunity to judge his acceptability as a dealer when and
if Morley was able to get him a loan for a takeover of the
station . Will Berry was then the manager of the station but.
I Unless otherwise indicated , all events took place in 1970.
6 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
following a robbery at the station in February, was
demoted to an attendant's job and although he had not
been charged with the robbery, began paying for the loss
and a salary advance out of his attendant's wages. Wayne
Melton thereupon became manager in the beginning of
March, and operated the station with Williams and Berry
as two of his attendants, and with Herman Carter, a third
attendant, who was hired on Williams' recommendation.
Union Secretary Morley visited the MacArthur station
three or four times about 3 p.m. on each occasion between
March I and 14, and spoke with Williams, Berry, and
Carter whose shifts overlapped at these times. On these
visits, Morley drove either a white Mustang or a white
Cadillac with a small sign board bearing the Union's name
hung on the cars' doors. On only one of these visits when he
spoke to the attendants outdoors on the station's premises
did Morley see Melton who was identified by one of the
men as the station's manager. Melton was in the office and
about to leave at the end of his shift, and, according to
Morley he simply "nodded" to Melton but Melton "didn't
nod back." lvlanager Melton testified, and I credit his
testimony, that the first time he recalls seeing Morley, or
having any idea who he was, was when Morley and the
attendants began picketing the station on March 20 the day
that the three attendants were suspended following a
robbery at the station. Melton further testified, and I credit
his testimony, that he first saw a white Mustang on the
same occasion during the picketing and that he had never
seen any car with a union sign on its door.
In the three or four visits to the MacArthur station
between March 1 and 14, Morley spoke to Williams, Berry,
and Carter about joining the Union gave Williams union
cards for them to sign and a form of contract to show what
the Union would try to get for them. Williams signed one of
the cards and Berry and Carter signed their cards, giving
them to Williams who, according to his testimony,
absentmindedly left them in the station office next to the
credit card imprinter before putting them in his car the next
morning and delivering them to Morley on his next visit to
the station a few days later.
On Sunday, March 15, Morley mailed a letter on the
Union's stationery to Jack Rogers, who had succeeded
Robert King as the Respondent's local marketing repre-
sentative in the San Francisco Bay area. The letterhead
listing the Union's officers in the margin included Morley
as its secretary-treasurer, and was addressed to Rogers at
the Respondent's company-operated station at 8th Street
and Broadway in Oakland, which served as a local working
base and mail and message drop for both Rogers and his
superior, Senior Field Sales Manager R. L. Skrederstu. The
letter to Rogers was the following:
During the past few days, I have made an effort to
contact you by telephone, however, it has been without
results.
As you may know, the majority of company operated
service stations in this area are under contract with one
of several labor unions. I wish to inform you that we
now represent a majority of your employees in
company operated units, and as their bargaining agent,
I have been instructed to seek a contract settlement with
your firm within the next ten days, with the effective
date of April 1, 1970.
If you are in a position to handle the preliminary
negotiations , please advise me before noon Friday,
March 20. If someone else in your company will be
representing the company with this organization, please
advise me as to who that party may be.
We hope an agreement may be reached as quickly as
possible and with the slightest amount of effort by both
parties.
In the meantime , although Williams had been under
consideration by Skrederstu as the possible lessee of the
MacArthur station, Rogers had hired an additional
attendant, Floyd Fletcher, at the MacArthur station and
had discussed with Fletcher the possibility of his taking
over the MacArthur dealership. On Monday evening,
March 16 (the day after Morley had written his letter to
Rogers about negotiating with the Union), Skrederstu
telephoned Morley at his home and, after a discussion of
possible dealers in San Jose, told Morley that Williams
"had gone sour" and was "not going to work out as a
dealer."
Rogers did not receive Morley's March 15 letter until
Wednesday, March 18, when it was given to him by one of
the attendants at the Broadway station On either the same
evening (Wednesday, March 18) or the next evening
(Thursday, March 19), Morley and Rogers talked with each
other over the telephone about Morley's letter But their
testimony is conflicting as to the substance of this
conversation and whether it took place on Wednesday or
Thursday evening Before this conflict can be intelligently
considered and resolved, however, it is necessary to
consider the bewildering testimony of Rogers and Skreder-
stu as to their reaction to Morley's letter For the
uncertainties, implausible complications, and inconsisten-
cies in this testimony of Rogers and Skrederstu weigh
heavily against their general credibility in the case.
Rogers testified that he did not know who Morley was,
that he had no training, experience, or authority in dealing
with unions, that he thought the writer of the letter was
trying to organize him as well as the employees, and that,
seeing no references in the letter to the AFL or CIO or to
anything "that made it a personalized official letter," he
thought the letter was "a joke" and threw it into the trash.
However, according to both Rogers' and Skrederstu's
testimony, Rogers spoke by telephone to Skrederstu about
other matters that same night (Wednesday, March 18), and
in the course of this conversation he mentioned the letter to
Skrederstu, saying that "he had received a letter from some
kind of union or something" but had thrown it away. Both
Rogers and Skrederstu also testified that Rogers told
Skrederstu he could not remember who had signed the
letter, and that, on Skrederstu's instruction, Rogers
retrieved the letter from the trash the next morning and
mailed it to Skrederstu. On further examination, Rogers at
first testified that it was not until Saturday, March 21, when
he and Skrederstu returned from a business trip to Los
Angeles that Skrederstu said the writer of the letter was
apparently the Charles Morley who was sending him dealer
prospects. But then later in his examination, Rogers
testified that Skrederstu had in fact made this statement to
AMERICAN OIL COMPANY 7
him about Morley on Thursday night (March 19) before
they went to Los Angeles together. On his further
examination, Skrederstu was also inconsistent on the point.
At first he testified that he realized who Morley was and
told Rogers during their trip to Los Angeles but then, upon
being confronted by his pretrial affidavit, he admitted that
Rogers had told him in their first telephone conversation
about the letter on Wednesday, March 18, that it was
Morley who had sent the letter and that he (Skrederstu)
then told Rogers that he knew who Morley was.
Upon consideration of this testimony of Rogers and
Skrederstu alone, it appears (especially from the
last-mentioned element of Skrederstu's testimony), and I
accordingly find that, as early as Wednesday evening,
March 18, the Respondent's two representatives knew at
least that there was union activity among its employees,
that some of the employees had signed union cards, and
that the Union represented by Morley was asking the
Respondent to bargain with it as the representative of these
employees. But Morley's testimony as to his telephone
conversation with Rogers on Wednesday night, which I
credit despite its variance with Rogers' testimony, goes even
further than this by showing that in this conversation
Morley made it clear to Rogers that the Union claimed to
have succeeded in organizing the few employees working at
the MacArthur station and might vote to strike on
Thursday (March 19), to which Rogers replied that the
Company did not want a union and the men could strike if
they wanted.
In this particular conflict of testimony, Rogers testified
that he did have a telephone conversation with Morley, but
that Morley called him and that it was on Thursday night
(March 19); that Morley asked him whether he had done
anything about the letter; that Rogers told Morley he
thought the Union "wanted to organize me" as well as the
Respondent's employees, and that "he didn't want to
become a member of any union"; that Morley said that it
was the employees who were being organized by the Union;
and that Rogers replied that he did not "handle that type of
thing" and referred Morley to the Respondent's regional
office in Salt Lake City.
But, as I have already indicated, I credit Morley's
testimony as to this conversation and specifically find, as
Morley testified, that on Wednesday evening, March 18, he
received a message to call Rogers at Rogers' home and did
so; that he told Rogers that he was the representative of the
Union and was returning Rogers' call; that Rogers said he
had called Morley because of the letter Morley had sent to
him; that Morley said he "represented the employees at the
MacArthur and West unit"; that Rogers said he did not
want to join the Union; that Morley replied he did not want
Rogers to join but was "talking about the employees at the
station"; that Rogers said, "Well, we don't want a union at
the station"; that Morley said, "Well, you've got one
whether you want one or not" and Morley "had all the
attendants signed up as members" and wanted to enter into
contract negotiations; that Morley also told Rogers that on
the following night (Thursday, March 19) he was to meet
with the employees and "there was a good possibility that
they may vote to strike if we don't get some kind of
satisfaction from the company"; that Rogers said, "Well,
let them strike, we don 't want a union , we are not going to
have one"; and that Rogers added that he did not handle
these matters anyway and that "if [Morley ) wanted to call
L. A. or Salt Lake, or Chicago, go ahead."
B. The MacArthur Station Robbery and the
Suspension of the Station Attendants
Between closing time at I l p.m. on Thursday, March 19,
and opening time at 6 a.m. on Friday, March 20, more than
2,000 in cash, as well as credit card receipts, was stolen from
the safe of the Respondent's MacArthur station. On
opening the station that Friday morning, Station Manager
Wayne Melton found the bay window in the office broken,
a cigarette machine overturned, and each of the two
removable lids containing the locks of the station's dual
compartment cylindrical floor safe lying on the floor, with
the compartments emptied but neither the compartments
nor the lids or their locks broken. The cylindrical floor well
itself constituted the walls of both compartments with a
removable lid fitting into the well part way down to form
the lower compartment and the base of the upper
compartment, a second removable lid fitting in at the top of
the well to form the upper compartment. Each of the lids
had a key-operated lock. The lid to the lower compartment
was also fitted with a slot so that credit card receipts and
cash receipts over a normal 50 balance for change-making
purposes, could be dropped into the usually locked lower
compartment without opening it.
At the time of the robbery, the station, in addition to
Manager Melton, employed four attendants on overlapping
shifts. Manager Melton ordinarily opened the station at 6
a.m. and was at the station until 3 p.m. Attendants Will
Berry and Floyd Fletcher (a newcomer) reported an hour or
so after Melton, and worked the so-called morning shift.
Attendant Lonnie Williams came to work on the evening
shift at 2 p.m. and attendant Herman Carter, working an
evening shift beginning at 3 p.m., closed the station at 11
p.m. On closing the station, Carter would leave about 50 in
cash in the upper safe compartment for the next morning's
change, and drop the balance of cash receipts and the credit
card receipts through the slot in the locked lower
compartment.
Manager Melton had two sets of keys, for both the upper
and the lower compartments. He kept one set himself and
his wife kept the spare set for emergencies. None of the
attendants had a key to the lower compartment and only
two of them (Lonnie Williams and Herman Carter) had
keys to the upper compartment as well as keys for the door
of the station and the cash till used during business hours.
There is no evidence that the newly hired morning
attendant, Floyd Fletcher, who was being considered as a
possible lessee for the station, had any keys. Will Berry, the
other morning attendant, although he had a key to the
station's door and the till, had no key to the locks on either
of the safe's compartments. Berry, as has already been
noted, had been manager of the MacArthur station until
sometime in February when, following a previous robbery,
he had surrendered his safe keys and the locks had been
changed.
On discovering the robbery, Manager Melton locked the
station door and went to the Respondent's nearby
8 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
company-operated station on Broadway which, as has been
noted , served as a local working base and mail and message
drop for his superiors, Senior Field Sales Manager R. L.
Skrederstu and his assistant marketing representative, Jack
Rogers. About 6.30 a.m , Melton left word for these two
men with the Broadway station manager that the MacArt-
hur station had been robbed. At the same time he reported
the robbery by telephone to the Oakland police
Manager Melton then returned to the MacArthur station
where he met Officer Strelo, an Oakland policeman Officer
Strelo examined the station and, in answer to his questions,
Melton said that the station had been closed at II p.m the
previous night and that Herman Carter had been the night
man. Officer Strelo called in another policeman who also
examined the station and the broken glass, dusted for
fingerprints, and then said he had found no evidence.
Before leaving the station, Officer Strelo told Melton that
"the way everything was done he assumed that it was an
employee" who had committed the robbery, and gave
Melton a telephone number to call if he discovered any new
evidence.2
Marketing Representative Rogers had arranged to fly to
Los Angeles at 9.30 that Friday morning on an overnight
business trip with Sales Manager Skrederstu whom he met
at the Broadway gas station Receiving Manager Melton's
message concerning the robbery before he left the
Broadway station on his trip, he telephoned Melton who
told him that the police had already been at the MacArthur
station and, although a window had been broken, had
thought that keys had been used to open the front door and
the safe, and that it was an "insidejob." Rogers told Melton
to pick up all keys held by employees and "terminate or
suspend" these employees until Rogers could see and speak
to them after his return from Los Angeles either on
Saturday or Monday morning. That this was Rogers' initial
spur-of-the-moment decision and instruction to Melton
before he left for Los Angeles that Friday morning appears
from Rogers' as well as Melton's credible testimony on the
point It was only later, after Rogers and Skrederstu had
discussed the matter, that "because [they] couldn't think of
anything else to do" they also decided that the men with
keys should take a lie detector test and Rogers, after his
return from Los Angeles, so informed Manager Melton and
Williams and Carter.3
Fletcher and Berry were the first employees to come to
the MacArthur station that Friday morning after Melton
had received his instructions from Rogers As noted,
Fletcher had no keys and was permitted to stay and go to
work. At Melton's request, Berry, who had no key to the
safe, surrendered his keys to the cash till and the front door
Melton told him, according to Berry's uncontradicted
testimony on the particular point, that until Melton could
look into the robbery, "everyone was suspended until
further notice " But Berry went immediately to the
Broadway station and, catching Rogers there before he left
for his plane , protested his suspension since , as Rogers
2 Although Melton did not know the policemen's names, Officer
Strelo made a consistent police report which is in evidence
' I credit Rogers testimony to this effect although Carter (but not
Williams nor Berry ) testified that Manager Melton told him on Friday
morning that he would have to take a lie detector test
+ Rogers testified that he thought he spoke to Melton on Monday but
knew , Berry had no key to the safe Rogers told him to tell
Melton to let Berry go to work , and either Rogers or
Skrederstu also gave Melton the same instructions over the
telephone. Berry thereupon returned to the MacArthur
station , went to work , and since that time has continued in
the Respondent 's employment first at the MacArthur
station and more recently at another company-operated
station of the Respondent.
Thursday, March 19, had been Williams' day off and he
was not due to report for work until 2 p.m. on Friday, the
20th. But he came to the MacArthur station at 8:30 a.m. on
Friday to get his pay. Manager Melton told him of the
robbery the preceding night and of his instructions from
Skrederstu or Rogers at the Broadway station that Melton
was to pick up the employees' keys and to tell them they
were to see Skrederstu . Williams gave Melton his keys for
the outside door, the cash till, and the top part of the safe,
and then went to the Broadway station but was told there
that Skrederstu had left for Los Angeles and would not be
back until the next day, Saturday. Williams then went to
the home of Carter, who was scheduled to work at 3 p.m.
and, with Carter, returned to Melton at the MacArthur
station. Melton told Carter of the robbery and at Melton's
request, Carter surrendered his keys for the front door, the
cash till, and the top of the safe. Melton also told Carter
that before he could come back to work, he would have to
speak to Melton's "boss," apparently referring to Skreder-
stu or Rogers.
Williams and Carter reported what had happened to
Union Secretary Morley, and that Friday afternoon,
Morley, Williams, and Carter and another union represent-
ative began picketing the MacArthur station, and did so
again at least on Saturday and the following Monday.
Marketing Representative Rogers returned to Oakland
from Los Angeles at 12:30 p . m. on Saturday and, visiting
the station both on Saturday and Monday, saw the
picketing Rogers talked first with Manager Melton on
Saturday and told him that both he and the attendants who
had keys would be required to take a lie detector test.4 On
either Saturday or Monday when the men were on the
picket line, Rogers also asked Williams and Carter in
separate conversations to take the test.5 Although some-
what doubtful , I credit the testimony of Rogers despite
Williams' and Carter's denials and find that, in making the
request of each of them that they take the test, Rogers told
them that if they were cleared by the test, they could have
their jobs back . It is clear , however, from the uncontradict-
ed testimony of Rogers on the particular point, that he did
not tell either of the men (as he and Manager Melton later
testified at the hearing in a line of evidence which will be
considered below) that Melton had discovered that the two
keys in the safe surrendered by the two men had been
altered to fit the bottom as well as the top locks of the safe
In these conversations with Rogers , it is undisputed that
Carter refused to take the lie detector test but Williams
agreed to do so on the following Wednesday at 3:30 p.m.
Melton testified that his first conversation with Rogers after the latter's
return from San Francisco took place on Saturday
Rogers could not be sure whether his conversations with Williams and
Carter took place on Saturday or Monday Carter testified that he spoke
with Rogers on Saturday and Williams testified that his conversation took
place on Monday
AMERICAN OIL COMPANY 9
Furthermore, Rogers testified without contradiction and I
credit his testimony and find that Rogers had arranged to
have the test administered by a man whose name he had
found listed in the classified yellow pages of the telephone
directory, and that he told both Williams and Carter that he
would pick them up at the MacArthur station at 3 p.m. on
Wednesday and take them for the test. Finally, it is clear
from the testimony, and I find that, although Manager
Melton took the test, neither Williams nor Carter appeared
and therefore they did not take the test. Accordingly,
neither Williams nor Carter has since worked for the
Respondent. In explanation of why he did not appear to
take the test, Williams testified that he was offered and
accepted a job with another employer on Monday
afternoon.
C. The Keys and the Conversations with the Police
A central issue in this case is whether the Respondent
required Williams and Carter to take a lie detector test after
the robbery, merely as an understandable and permissible
measure to learn whether either of the two employees had
been involved in the robbery, or as a reprisal for their
having joined and supported the Union in its recent
bargaining demand. From the evidence thus far discussed,
it appears only that Williams and Carter were employed at
the MacArthur station and had keys to the front door and
the upper part of the safe at the time of the robbery. To
show additional circumstances indicating a stronger ground
for suspecting the two men and therefore a more substantial
and credible reason for the Respondent's requiring them as
well as Manager Melton to take the lie detector test, the
Respondent attempted to prove through the testimony of
Manager Melton and Sales Representative Rogers that one
of the keys surrendered by Williams and Carter to Melton
had been filed and the other bent; that each of these keys
opened the bottom as well as the top of the safe; and that,
when informed of this over the telephone first by Melton on
Friday and then by Rogers on Monday or Tuesday, the
Oakland police refused to investigate the matter further
because the robbery was apparently an "inside job."
In the Respondent's presentation of this evidence, Rogers
appeared as a witness before Melton testified concerning
Melton's original discovery of the alteration of the keys and
his first call to the police. Then, it later appearing that
Rogers' testimony had been inconsistent in several
important respects with that given by Melton and in square
conflict with the apparently credible testimony of Police
Sgt. Hooper with whom Rogers had first said he had talked,
Rogers was twice recalled as a witness and modified his
testimony in an attempt to eliminate the inconsistency with
Melton and the square conflict with Hooper. A summary of
Melton's and Rogers' testimony (in that order) will indicate
the basis of these observations concerning the inconsistency
and weakness of the Respondent's evidence on this aspect
of the case.
Manager Melton testified that when Williams and Carter
turned in their keys for the top of the safe on Friday
morning, March 20 he at first noticed nothing wrong with
them but later in the morning he noticed that one was filed
and the other bent, and that, upon trying them in the locks
in the presence of attendants Fletcher and Berry and his
brother, David Melton,6 he found each of the keys
unlocked both the top and the bottom lids. David Melton
corroborated his brother's testimony concerning the
condition of the keys and Manager Wayne Melton's
opening both compartments with them. Attendant Fletcher
in his testimony could recall only that one key was bent and
that it unlocked the bottom of the safe. Berry was not called
on to testify as to whether he observed the condition of the
keys or any demonstration of their use in opening the locks
on the bottom as well as the top of the safe.
According to Manager Melton, he put through a
telephone call that Friday morning to the telephone
number Officer Strelo had given him for use if he
discovered any new evidence. Melton testified that he did
not know the identity of the man who took his. call; that he
told the man (whoever he was) that "the keys [he] got from
both employees . . . [unlocked) both compartments" of the
safe; and that the man said he should change the lock, show
the locksmith the keys, and then get rid of the old keys
because "they would be no longer good" and it "wouldn't
do [Melton ] no good" to keep them.
Manager Melton further testified that, following this
advice, he had a locksmith change the locks and provide
new keys between 2 and 3 o'clock that Friday afternoon,
but that after the locks had been changed, a trial of the new
key provided for the top lid also turned the lower lock three
quarters of the way although it did not spring the bolt nor
therefore open the lower lock. In addition, Melton testified
that when Rogers appeared at the MacArthur station on
Saturday, he showed Rogers the bent and filed keys
surrendered by Williams and Carter, told Rogers that the
altered keys had opened the bottom as well as the top lock,
but that he could not demonstrate this to Rogers because
the lock had already been changed. Instead (according to
Melton) he demonstrated to Rogers the partial turning. of
the new lock for the bottom with the new key provided by
the locksmith for the top lock. Finally, according to
Melton's testimony he kept Williams' and Carter's altered
keys only for a week and then threw them away.
In his main appearance as a witness before Melton had
given his testimony to the foregoing effect, Sales Represent-
ative Rogers testified that he was "sure" that on Saturday
or on Monday (and before Rogers had spoken to Williams
or Carter), Manager Melton had shown him the bent and
filed keys of the two men and, in Rogers' presence, had
used each of the keys to open both the upper and lower
parts of the safe. But then, after Melton had testified,
Rogers was recalled to the stand by the Respondent's
counsel and testified that, having heard Melton's testimo-
ny, his recollection had been refreshed and that the
demonstration given to him by Melton was not the use of
Williams' and Carter's keys on the old lock, but, as Melton
had testified, in the use of the new keys on the new locks.
In his original testimony concerning his alleged telephone
conversation or conversations with the police, Rogers
(without suggestion by counsel or previous appearance by
6 David Melton was the manager of another of Respondent's stations
and, on his brother's telephoning him that morning, had come to the
MacArthur station to advance cash for change-making purposes.
10 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Sgt. Hooper at the hearing or any previous mention of
Hooper's name in the evidence), volunteered the informa-
tion that it was Sgt. Hooper with whom he had talked. He
testified in substance that on either the Monday or Tuesday
after the robbery, he called the telephone number the police
had given Melton; that he explained that he "wanted to talk
to someone who handled the burglary and robbery division
and . . to talk to somebody who had handled the
burglary" at the MacArthur station; that he was connected
with Sgt. Hooper; that during their conversation, and
possibly in a second telephone conversation, either Rogers
or Hooper (Rogers could not remember which of them it
was) mentioned the fact that one of the keys to the top part
of the safe was bent or filed and also opened the bottom
part; that Hooper did not ask whose keys they were, but
said merely that he (Hooper) had no suspects although,
without knowing their names, he thought "one of [the]
employees" had committed the robbery and "that it was an
inside job"; that Rogers did not recall whether he told
Hooper whom he suspected; and finally that Hooper told
Rogers, "We are too busy with homicides and bigger things
to worry about insidejobs like this seems to be and you will
have to police yourselves on these kinds of things."
As will be noted in greater detail below, Sgt. Hooper of
the burglary division of the Oakland police later testified as
a witness for the General Counsel concerning a single
telephone conversation he had with Manager Melton on
Friday but denied having any conversation with Rogers or
having made anything resembling statements attributed to
the police by either Melton or Rogers. After Hooper had
testified, Rogers was recalled to the stand a second time. On
this last appearance by him as a witness, Rogers testified
that he had "thought it was Sgt. Hooper [with whom he had
talked] but evidently it wasn't," and that he could not say
why he had thought it was Hooper except to say that "I got
Sgt. Hooper's name from somewhere."
Even aside from the inherent weaknesses and inconsis-
tencies of the Respondent's witnesses' testimony, credible
testimony given by the General Counsel's witnesses refutes
the Respondent's contentions that Williams' and Carter's
keys had been altered so that they would unlock both
compartments of the safe and that, although this was
reported to the police, the police refused to investigate the
robbery. In their testimony, Williams and Carter each
denied that the key turned in by him had been bent or filed.
Furthermore, upon an examination and comparison of the
spare top and bottom keys to the safe which Melton's wife
had in her possession at the time of the robbery and gave to
Respondent's counsel at the time of the hearing, William
Walters, a locksmith employed by the firm which changed
the locks and keys and who himself had changed the lock
and provided these keys on March 3, testified that the key
for the top of the safe could not have been altered so that it
would also open the bottom.
Sgt. Hooper of the burglary division of the Oakland
Police Department testified in substance as a witness for
the General Counsel that he received the police report on
the station robbery about 8 o'clock on the morning of
Friday, March 20; that between 8 and 10 o'clock in the
morning he telephoned the MacArthur station and spoke
with Manager Melton; that he remembered speaking only
with Melton; that he did not recall "talking to anybody else
from American Oil on the Monday following the burgla-
ry;" that if he had, he would have made a note of it; and
that he did not "know anything about Mr. Rogers." Hooper
further testified that in his conversation with Melton on
Friday, March 20, he and Melton discussed the "possibility
[implied in the police report] of an employee or ex-
employee using a key to gain entry to the service station,
and to open the top and the bottom part of the floor safe.
.."; that Hooper told Melton, however, that "on the basis
of the [police] report there was no legal evidence .. .
against any employee"; that Melton did not tell Hooper in
that conversation or at any time (nor did any representative
of the Respondent tell him) that Melton or the Respondent
had in their possession any altered keys that would open
both parts of the safe; and that Hooper did not tell Melton
or any representative of the Respondent in substance,
"Look, we can't help you, we've got too much to do, you'll
have to do what you can by yourself."
Upon consideration of the foregoing evidence and the
observations made in summarizing it, I find and conclude,
upon Williams', Carter's, and locksmith Walters' testimony,
and contrary to the testimony of Manager Way Melton, his
brother David Melton, and attendant Fletcher, that the
keys for the top of the safe turned in by Williams and
Carter had not been bent or filed and would not open both
of the safe compartments. I further find and conclude upon
the testimony of Sgt. Hooper, contrary to the testimony of
Manager Melton and Rogers that neither Melton nor
Rogers informed the police-Sgt. Hooper or anyone else on
the police telephone-that the two employees' keys had
been altered and would open both compartments, and that
neither Sgt Hooper nor anyone else in the police
department informed Melton or Rogers in substance that
since the MacArthur station robbery was an "inside job"
and the police had more important work, the police would
conduct no further investigation but would leave it to the
Respondent to "police" its own "inside" robberies. But I do
find, upon Sgt. Hooper's testimony, that, not having been
told that the employees' keys had been altered, he did tell
Manager Melton on Friday that "on the basis of the
[police ] report there was no legal evidence . . . against any
employee" and that, having said this, he did not tell Melton
that there was to be any further police investigation.
D. Conclusions
Upon the evidence, I have found that in a telephone
conversation on Wednesday evening, March 18, Union
Secretary Morley and Marketing Representative Rogers
discussed the Union's bargaining demand made in the
letter of March 15, that Morley told Rogers that the Union
had signed up and represented all the attendants at the
MacArthur station and might vote to strike at a meeting to
be held the next night, Thursday, March 19, "if we don't get
some kind of satisfaction from the company"; and that
Rogers replied, "Well, let them strike, we don't want a
union, we are not going to have one."
The primary question presented by the rest of the
evidence is Rogers' motivation in suspending Berry,
Williams, and Carter immediately after the robbery at the
MacArthur station and requiring Williams and Carter to
AMERICAN OIL COMPANY 11
take lie detector tests before they would be permitted to
come back to work. If, as Rogers in effect testified, the
suspensions and the insistence that two of the men take lie
detector tests were motivated by the men's possible
involvement in the robbery and a desire to give the
Respondent time to make a reasonable attempt to
determine this, then neither the suspensions nor the
requirement of lie detector tests discriminated against the
men because of their apparent support of the U.-ion and
would therefore not have been violative of Section 8(a)(3)
or (1) of the Act as charged in the complaint. If, on the
other hand, the suspension of any one or more of the three
men was motivated by the employees' support of the
Union, then it did violate the Act even in Berry's case
although he was almost immediately reinstated and still
works for the Respondent. If, in addition, the insistence
upon lie detector tests in the cases of Williams and Carter
was motivated by their apparent support of the Union, then
the requirement that they take the test and the resulting
termination of their employment because Carter refused
and Williams failed to take the test, also constituted
discrimination in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act.
Upon a limited view of the facts, Rogers' decisions first to
suspend the attendants who had keys and then to require a
lie detector test of Manager Melton and attendants
Williams and Carter who alone had keys to the safe and the
outside door might appear to have been reasonable
precautions taken under stress against continuing the
employment of men who might have been involved in the
robbery even though Williams and Carter had only keys to
the top of the safe. For, as Sgt. Hooper testified (despite his
denial of other elements of Melton's and Rogers' testimo-
ny), he told Manager Melton on Friday, March 20, that "on
the basis of the [police] report there was no legal evidence
. . . against any employee." And, as Rogers testified, he
made his decisions with respect to the suspensions and the
lie detector test "because [we] couldn't think of anything
else to do." If this were all to the case, I would find, without
going further, that Rogers decided to suspend the three men
and to require Williams and Carter to take lie detector tests
in order to weigh the possibility of their having been
involved in the robbery and not because of their apparent
support of the Union.
The Respondent itself prevented such an easy disposition
of the case in its favor by introducing Manager Melton's
and Rogers' testimony to the effect that Williams and
Carter appeared to them to be particularly strong robbery
suspects because their keys had been altered to fit both
compartments of the safe and that, although given this
information, the police refused to investigate the matter
because it was an "inside job" and thus made it necessary
for Rogers to take the only independent precautionary
action open to him by suspending Williams and Carter and
insisting that they take a lie detector test. The Respondent
and its principal witnesses thereby chose to advance as their
reason for the suspensions and the lie detector test, not the
simple basis just suggested-i.e., the fact of the robbery as
an "inside job" and the possession of keys to the front door
and one part of the safe by two of the employees-but the
special additional circumstances which they say the police
ignored but which they say indicated to them the likelihood
that Williams and Carter had altered their keys to fit both
safe compartments and had actually been involved in the
robbery. But, upon careful consideration of Manager
Melton's and Rogers' testimony to this effect, I have
rejected it because of its vacillations and internal inconsis-
tencies and its general implausibility when weighed against
Williams', Carter's, and Sgt. Hooper's simple and credible
denials and locksmith Walters' clear testimony concerning
the impossibility of effectively altering the keys in the
manner described by Melton and Rogers. Not only have I
thus rejected the Respondent's attempt through Melton's
and Rogers' testimony to bolster the innocence of Rogers'
reasons for suspending the three men and requiring the lie
detector tests in Williams' and Carter's cases, but I have
also earlier found that Melton's and Rogers' testimony was
equally unsatisfactory and unreliable concerning their
reaction to Union Secretary Morley's bargaining request in
the letter of March 15, and the substance of Morley's and
Rogers' telephone conversation two nights before the
robbery. In short, I have found completely incredible both
Melton's and Rogers' testimony as to the reasons for
Rogers treating the three men as he did and as to Rogers'
antagonistic reaction when he had been informed by
Secretary Morley of the MacArthur station employees'
support of the Union's bargaining request and the
possibility that they might strike.
As a result, Respondent's production of Melton's and
Rogers' highly implausible and obviously unacceptable
testimony in the apparent belief and hope that it was
necessary to its defense , and would be accepted by the
Board as showing the reason for Rogers' action, completely
discredits and eliminates any broad, general justification of
Rogers' treatment of the three employees as a natural and
simple consequence of the "inside" robbery at the
MacArthur station where the three men worked and two of
them had keys to the outside door but only a key to one
compartment of the safe. In addition, the incredibility of
Melton 's and Rogers' testimony as to the reasons for
Rogers' treatment of the men as he did , gives added
significance and importance to Rogers' statement of his
and the Respondent's opposition to the unionization of the
Respondent's employees in his telephone conversation with
Union Secretary Morley two nights before the robbery
when, upon being told by Morley that the MacArthur
employees had joined the Union and might strike to compel
the Respondent to bargain, Rogers replied, "Well, let them
strike, we don't want a union, we are not going to have
one."
Upon this view of the evidence, I find that the original
suspensions of Berry, Williams, and Carter may have been
motivated by the men's possible involvement in the robbery
and a desire to give the Respondent time to make a
reasonable attempt to determine this. Giving the Respon-
dent the benefit of this possibility, I therefore conclude that
Berry's temporary suspension and Williams' and Carter's
original suspensions were not motivated by their apparent
support of the Union nor therefore violative of Section
8(a)(3) or (1) of the Act. Since this conclusion disposes
competely of the allegation of the complaint that the
Respondent discriminatorily discharged Berry in violation
12 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, I shall dismiss this
allegation of the complaint.
But Rogers' continuation of Williams' and Carter's
suspensions and his insistence that they take lie detector
tests before they would be permitted to come back to work,
present an entirely different situation. Rogers and Melton
attempted to justify this separate treatment of Williams and
Carter in testimony charging them with the alteration of
their safe keys and I have found that this testimony and the
reason it advanced for Williams' and Carter's treatment by
Rogers, were incredible. I find, instead, that the reason for
the continuation of Williams' and Carter's suspensions and
Rogers' insistence that they take lie detector tests was that,
as Rogers believed, these two men had joined the Union
and might participate in a strike these two men had joined
the Union and might participate in a strike for the Union's
recognition. I further find and conclude that, when the men
failed or refused to take the lie detector test thus
discriminatorily and illegally imposed by Rogers as a
condition of reinstatement, the resulting termination of
their employment constituted a discriminatory discharge
on Monday, March 23, 1970, the date Rogers insisted upon
the men's taking the test. In sum, I find and conclude that
Rogers' continuation of Williams' and Carter's suspensions,
his insistence upon their taking lie detector tests, and their
resulting discharges on March 20, 1970, constituted
discrimination against them by the Respondent in their
employment in order to discourage membership in the
Union, and was an unfair labor practice within the meaning
of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the business operations
of the Respondent described in section 1, above, have a
close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic,
and commerce between the several States and tend to lead
to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and
(3) of the Act, I will recommend that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that the Respondent discriminatorily
discharged employees Herman Carter and Lonnie Williams
on March 23, 1970, I will recommend that the Respondent
offer each of them immediate and full reinstatement to their
former or substantially equivalent positions, without
prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges,
and make them whole for any loss of earnings suffered by
reason of the discharge by payment to each of them of a
sum of money equal to that which they normally would
have earned from the aforesaid date of their discharges to
the date of the Respondent's offer of reemployment, less
their net earnings during said period. The backpay shall be
computed in accordance with the formula stated in F. W.
Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289. Furthermore, it will be
recommended that the Respondent pay interest on the
backpay due to each of these employees, such interest to be
computed at the rate of 6 percent per annum and, using the
Woolworth formula, to accrue immediately with the last day
of each calendar quarter of the backpay period on the
amount due and owning for each quarterly period. Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co, 138 NLRB 716
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and
upon the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. International Brotherhood of Service Station Opera-
tors of America (herein called the Union), is a labor
organization within the meaning of the Act.
2. Respondent, American Oil Company, a Maryland
corporation, is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of the Act
3. By suspending employees Lonnie Williams and
Herman Carter on March 20, 1970, insisting that they take
lie detector tests as a condition of reinstatement, and
discharging them on March 23, 1970, because these two
men had joined the Union and might participate in a strike
for the Union's recognition, the Respondent discriminated
against them in their employment in order to discourage
membership in the Union, and thereby committed unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act
4 The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. The Respondent did not commit unfair labor
practices in suspending nor (as alleged in the complaint) in
discharging employee Will Berry.
[Recommended Order is omitted from publication ]