American Medical Response of Connecticut

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 28, 2013

359 N.L.R.B. 1301 (N.L.R.B. 2013)

AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE OF CONNECTICUT, INC. 1301

359 NLRB No. 144
American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc. and
Adam Cummings and Shannon Smith. Cases
34–CA–013051 and 34–CA–065800
June 28, 2013
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS GRIFFIN
AND BLOCK
On November 20, 2012, Administrative Law Judge
Raymond P. Green issued the attached decision. The
Respondent, American Medical Response of Connecti-
cut, Inc., filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the
Acting General Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board
1
has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings,
2

findings,
3
and conclusions,
4
modify the remedy,
5
and
adopt the recommended Order as modified and set forth
in full below.
The judge found that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by unilaterally changing its
procedures to require that employees check their vehi-

1 The Respondent contends that the Board does not have a valid
quorum under Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013),
cert. granted 81 USLW 3629, 1774240 (U.S. June 24, 2013). For the
reasons stated in Bloomingdale’s, Inc., 359 NLRB No. 113 (2013),
these arguments are rejected.
2 The Respondent has excepted to the judge’s denial of its motion to
dismiss pursuant to Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971). We
affirm the judge’s ruling. Deferral to a contractual grievance and arbi-
tration procedure is inappropriate where the interests of charging par-
ties are in apparent conflict with the interests of the union and its offi-
cials, as well as with the interests of the respondent. Kansas Meat
Packers, 198 NLRB 543, 543 (1972). Here, Charging Party Adam
Cummings filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Union, the
National Emergency Medical Services Association (NEMSA), which
was settled prior to the start of the hearing. Additionally, unrebutted
testimony and documentary evidence establish the strong hostility of
NEMSA Representative Toby Sparks towards Cummings. Therefore,
“considerations of elemental fairness” bar application of the Board’s
Collyer deferral policy to the present case. General Motors Corp., 218
NLRB 472, 476 (1975), enfd. mem. 535 F.2d 1246 (3d Cir. 1976).
3 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
4 The judge’s conclusions of law state, among other things, that the
Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) by discharging Adam Cum-
mings. Because there is neither an allegation nor a contention that
Cummings’ discharge violated Sec. 8(a)(5), we shall delete the judge’s
inadvertent reference to Sec. 8(a)(5).
5 As described in the amended remedy section set forth below, we
shall modify the judge’s order to conform to our standard remedial
language and to comply with our recent decision in Latino Express,
Inc., 359 NLRB 518 (2012).
cles’ oil and coolants and complete a checklist certifying
that they had inspected the vehicle. The judge also found
that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by
discharging Union Steward Adam Cummings because of
his union and other concerted, protected activities. For
the reasons that follow, we agree with the judge that the
Respondent’s implementation of the new procedures and
its discharge of Cummings violated the Act.
6

I. THE VEHICLE INSPECTION REQUIREMENT
The Respondent provides ambulance and medical
transportation services. From 2008 to 2011, the National
Emergency Medical Services Association (NEMSA)
represented the emergency medical technicians (EMTs)
and paramedics in the Respondent’s Greater Hartford
Division. The Respondent and the Union executed a col-
lective-bargaining agreement on April 2, 2009. As envi-
sioned by the collective-bargaining agreement, the Re-
spondent and the Union thereafter met to discuss the Re-
spondent’s Standard Operating Procedures. On February
23, 2010, the Respondent sent the Union a draft
7
of the
Standard Operating Procedures. Section 2.22 of that draft
specified that employees were to check their vehicle’s oil
level, start the vehicle, and complete a vehicle checklist
at the start of each shift. The Respondent asked that the
Union advise it if anything in the draft Standard Operat-
ing Procedures needed to be corrected. The Union did
not respond to this request.
For more than 1 year after sending the draft, the Re-
spondent did nothing to implement section 2.22. Then,
on April 6, 2011,
8
it circulated a new vehicle checklist.
The new checklist required employees to check fluid
levels under the vehicle’s hood, check the operability of
safety lights, check the operability of vehicle equipment,
and record any existing damage to the vehicle. On April
8, employees received a memo advising that they were to
begin using the new inspection sheet at the start of each
shift. In May, the Respondent issued warnings to 116
employees for failing to turn in the vehicle checklist. The
Respondent issued another 50 warnings in June.
The judge found that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) by unilaterally changing its start-of-shift
policies because he found no evidence that NEMSA had

6 As explained below, we find it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s
finding that the Cummings discharge violated Sec. 8(a)(3) of the Act, in
addition to Sec. 8(a)(1).
There are no exceptions to the judge’s finding that the Respondent
did not violate Sec. 8(a)(3) and (1) by failing to transfer Field Opera-
tions Supervisor Shannon Smith to the bargaining unit as a full-time
paramedic.
7 In its brief, the Respondent refers to this document as a “final
draft.”
8 All dates are in 2011, unless otherwise specified.
1302 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

ever agreed to adopt the Standard Operating Procedures,
including section 2.22. On exception, the Respondent
contends that it did not unlawfully implement the Stand-
ard Operating Procedures, including the vehicle inspec-
tion requirement, because they were agreed to or, alterna-
tively, because the Union waived its right to bargain over
them. We find the Respondent’s contentions are without
merit.
It is undisputed that the Respondent did not begin en-
forcing section 2.22 until April 2011, approximately 14
months after it gave the draft of the Standard Operating
Procedures to the Union. It is also undisputed that be-
tween February 2010 and April 2011, not all employees
were checking their vehicles’ fluid levels at the start of
each shift or completing a checklist, and no employees
were disciplined for their failure to do so. It was only
after it circulated the new checklist in April 2011 that the
Respondent began enforcing its start-of-shift procedures
and issuing discipline for employees’ failure to comply
with the procedures. Thus, even assuming that section
2.22 was properly adopted in February 2010, as the Re-
spondent contends, the facts show that on April 8, 2011,
the Respondent unilaterally changed its practice from no
enforcement to strict enforcement of these start-of-shift
procedures.
Such a change in enforcement must be bargained over.
See, e.g., Vanguard Fire & Security Systems, 345 NLRB
1016, 1017 (2005), enfd. 468 F.3d 952 (6th Cir. 2006). In
Vanguard, the respondent started billing employees for
charges incurred when they exceeded their allotted cell
phone minutes in December 2002. Although the re-
spondent had a written policy, promulgated in December
2001, requiring employees to pay overages, the Board
found that the respondent unlawfully began enforcing the
requirement, after a year of nonenforcement, without first
bargaining with the union. Id. Here, as in Vanguard, the
Respondent never enforced its policy in the 14 months
between its purported adoption and the promulgation of
the new checklist in April 2011.
9
The Respondent never
told employees during this lengthy period to complete
these procedures and never disciplined an employee for
failing to do so, even though (according to the Respond-
ent) employees were supposed to be completing them
daily upon completion of each shift. Therefore, the Re-
spondent’s implementation of the start-of-shift proce-
dures changed the status quo of employees’ daily work
life in a markedly apparent way, and the Respondent had

9 In view of this lack of enforcement over the 14-month period, we
find it unnecessary to pass on either the Respondent’s contention that
the Union agreed to this change in February 2010 or the judge’s contra-
ry finding.
a duty to bargain about that change before implementing
it on April 8.
10

The Respondent alternatively contends that it was priv-
ileged to implement the start-of-shift procedures as it did
because the Union waived its right to bargain about
them. This contention is without merit. Under the
Board’s long settled “clear and unmistakable waiver”
standard, the burden is on the party asserting waiver to
establish that the parties “unequivocally and specifically
express[ed] their mutual intention to permit unilateral
employer action with respect to a particular employment
term.” Provena St. Joseph Medical Center, 350 NLRB
808, 811 (2007). The Respondent did not meet this heavy
burden.
The record shows that the Respondent first circulated
its new vehicle checklist to its supervisors and field train-
ing officers on April 1. Before April 1, the Respondent
gave no indication that it would start requiring employ-
ees to check fluid levels or the operability of the vehi-
cle’s systems at the start of each shift. The Respondent
circulated the final draft of its vehicle checklist on April
6, and employees were told to start checking the vehicle
and completing the checklist when they arrived for work
on April 8. It was only later on April 8, after employees
had been told to check their vehicles and complete the
checklist, that the Respondent emailed the memo that
accompanied the new vehicle checklist to the Union’s
representative.
Under these facts, the Respondent failed to provide the
Union with adequate notice of its plan to change the
start-of-shift procedures. “‘[A]n employer must at least
inform the union of its proposed actions under circum-
stances which afford a reasonable opportunity for counter
arguments or proposals.’” Pontiac Osteopathic Hospital,
336 NLRB 1021, 1023 (2001) (quoting NLRB v. Citizens
Hotel Co., 326 F.2d 501, 505 (5th Cir. 1964)). Here, the
Respondent did not notify the Union until April 8, after
the change had already been implemented earlier that
day. This communication was nothing more than an in-

10 The Respondent has not excepted to the judge’s finding that the
Respondent’s change to the start-of-shift procedures was a material,
substantial, and significant change to employees’ terms and conditions
of employment. In any event, we find that it was such a change: The
Respondent did not merely introduce a new way of monitoring compli-
ance with existing procedures. See, e.g., Rust Craft Broadcasting of
New York, Inc., 225 NLRB 327, 327 (1976) (respondent did not violate
Sec. 8(a)(5) by installing timeclocks to more dependably monitor its
longstanding rule that employees record their in and out times). Rather,
the Respondent interposed a new ground for discipline and discharge of
its employees. See Pratt Industries, 358 NLRB 413, 421 (2012); Goya
Foods of Florida, 351 NLRB 94, 96 (2007), enfd. mem. 309 Fed.
Appx. 422 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE OF CONNECTICUT, INC. 1303

formational notice about a fait accompli. See Pontiac
Osteopathic Hospital, supra.
The Respondent argues that the Union received suffi-
cient notice on April 1, when it emailed a draft of the
vehicle checklist to the field training officers, who are
bargaining unit members. “Notification to unit employ-
ees, however, is not equivalent to providing notice to
their collective-bargaining representative.” Bridon Cord-
age, Inc., 329 NLRB 258, 259 (1999). In these circum-
stances, the Respondent did not afford the Union an op-
portunity for bargaining before implementing the new
start-of-shift procedures, and the Union therefore could
not have waived its right to bargain about that change.
In sum, we find that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by unilaterally tightening its
previously lax—indeed, nonexistent—enforcement of the
start-of-shift procedures and imposing discipline as part
of that enforcement, without giving the Union notice and
an opportunity to bargain.
II. ADAM CUMMINGS’ DISCHARGE
Like other employees, EMT and Union Steward Adam
Cummings learned that the Respondent would be requir-
ing employees to complete the new start-of-shift proce-
dures when he arrived for work on April 8. Cummings
emailed General Manager Sean Piendel to ask about the
new policy and to express his concern that the new pro-
cedures would require untrained employees to go under
vehicles’ hoods to check fluid levels. On April 11,
Cummings and Union Steward Bree Eichler sent emails
to Piendel and HR Director Robert Zagami about the
start-of-shift procedures. Cummings stressed that he and
other employees in his hire class had never been trained
on how to check fluid levels, that it was not safe for em-
ployees to check fluid levels, and that the Respondent
needed to provide training before asking employees to
complete these procedures. Cummings added that until
training was provided, he would “be advising the em-
ployees to have a mechanic check the trucks to protect
the equipment and the employees.” Piendel responded,
“Am I to understand that you are initiating a concerted
job action against AMR?” Piendel instructed Cummings
to respond, and Cummings replied, “Have at it if you feel
that is [what] my response entailed . . . .” Piendel replied
that he had asked for a yes or no answer, but that Cum-
mings had not given him one. Cummings then replied
that he felt he had made his concerns and intentions quite
clear, but that he hoped the Respondent would meet and
confer with the Union on this matter.
After this exchange, Cummings returned to his normal
EMT shift. As explained above, the Respondent warned
116 employees in May and 50 employees in June for
failing to turn in the vehicle checklist. On May 12,
NEMSA Representative Toby Sparks sent Piendel a let-
ter disavowing NEMSA’s involvement in any “Bad Faith
charge” Cummings potentially faced. On June 1, after he
returned from a vacation, Cummings attended a discipli-
nary meeting with Piendel, Zagami, and HR employee
Kelly Gauthier. At the meeting, Zagami asked Cum-
mings to explain the NEMSA letter. Cummings said that
he could not explain the letter, and the Respondent would
have to ask Sparks about it. At the end of the meeting,
the Respondent placed Cummings on administrative
leave and, on June 3, discharged him for violating sec-
tion 17.01 of the collective-bargaining agreement, the
section prohibiting strikes, slowdowns, and other con-
certed work stoppages.
In these circumstances, involving discharge for alleged
misconduct while acting in the capacity of a union stew-
ard, the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Burnup &
Sims, 379 U.S. 21 (1964), provides the analytical frame-
work to be followed. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc.,
355 NLRB 197, 204, 215 (2010), enfd. 427 Fed. Appx.
838 (11th Cir. 2011). Under that framework, when the
credited evidence establishes that an employer has dis-
charged an employee for conduct during the course of
protected activity, the burden shifts to the employer to
prove that it acted with an honest belief that the employ-
ee had engaged in misconduct. When the employer has
established such a good-faith belief, the burden shifts
back to the General Counsel. At this point, if the General
Counsel proves that the asserted misconduct did not, in
fact, occur, the discharge will be found to violate Section
8(a)(1). Id.; Accurate Wire Harness, 335 NLRB 1096,
1097 (2001), enfd. 86 Fed. Appx. 815 (6th Cir. 2003).
Applying this framework, we find that Cummings’
discharge violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
There is no dispute that Cummings was engaged in
protected activity when he told Piendel that he would be
advising employees to have a mechanic check fluid lev-
els in the ambulances. Cummings, as a union steward,
expressed his disagreement with the Respondent’s start-
of-shift procedures, conveyed his concerns about em-
ployee safety, and requested that the Respondent meet
with the Union about this matter. Cummings’ steward
activity in this regard “embodies the essence of protected
concerted activities.” General Motors Corp., 218 NLRB
472, 477 (1975). Therefore, we find that the record
shows that Cummings was discharged for his conduct
during the course of his protected activity. See, e.g.,
Pepsi-Cola Co., 330 NLRB 474, 474–475 (2000) (stew-
ard was engaged in protected activity of holding a union
meeting when he allegedly advised employees to boycott
an employer meeting in violation of the parties’ no-strike
provision). The burden, therefore, shifts to the Respond-
1304 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

ent to establish that it held an honest belief that Cum-
mings engaged in misconduct.
The Respondent contends that it had an honest belief
that Cummings, the shop steward, initiated a contractual-
ly prohibited work stoppage. We find it unnecessary to
pass on the Respondent’s contention because, even as-
suming it held an honest belief about Cummings’ con-
duct, and the burden thus shifted to the Acting General
Counsel to establish that Cummings did not actually ini-
tiate a work stoppage, the Acting General Counsel met
that burden.
11
The Acting General Counsel presented six
employees at the hearing who testified that Cummings
never told them, or any other employee to their
knowledge, not to fill out the vehicle checklist or other-
wise comply with the start-of-shift procedures. No wit-
ness, including those testifying for the Respondent, con-
tradicted these employees, and the judge implicitly cred-
ited their testimony, as he found no evidence that Cum-
mings ever urged an employee not to perform any work
function. Further, Cummings himself testified that he
never told an employee not to fill out the checklist or
check the fluid levels; rather, he told employees that the
Union was grieving the issue and that they should com-
ply with the procedures in the meantime. In contrast, the
Respondent presented no testimony that Cummings had
told employees to boycott the vehicle checklist, refuse to
check the fluid levels, or ignore any of the other proce-
dures.
The Respondent contends that its belief that Cum-
mings incited a work stoppage is confirmed by the issu-
ance of 166 warnings for failing to turn in vehicle check-
lists in May and June. But, as found by the judge, some
employees’ completed checklists were discarded by one
of the Respondent’s clerical employees. Further, the rec-
ord shows that other employees were disciplined for fail-
ing to turn in checklists on days when they did not even
work. Finally, some employees testified that they forgot
to comply with the new requirement. In these circum-
stances, the low completion rate of vehicle checklists
does not support a finding that Cummings orchestrated a
work action.
Finally, we accord no probative weight to the May 12
letter from Sparks to Piendel, which disavowed
NEMSA’s involvement in any bad-faith charge facing
Cummings. The Respondent admits that it did not rely on
the letter when forming its conclusion that Cummings
incited a work stoppage. Moreover, the letter itself does

11 See, e.g., Augusta Bakery Corp., 298 NLRB 58, 58 (1990), enfd.
957 F.2d 1467 (7th Cir. 1992) (assuming without deciding that re-
spondent held an honest belief that employees engaged in strike mis-
conduct).
not even reference a work action—it only refers to a po-
tential “Bad Faith charge.”
Given the Acting General Counsel’s evidence that
Cummings did not incite a work action, and the almost
complete lack of evidence to the contrary, we find that,
even assuming the Respondent honestly believed that
Cummings incited a work stoppage in the course of his
duties as shop steward, the Acting General Counsel met
his burden, under Burnup & Sims, supra, of showing that
Cummings did not engage in the purported misconduct.
Therefore, we find, in agreement with the judge, that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by discharging
Cummings. We find it unnecessary to determine whether
the Respondent also violated Section 8(a)(3) because
such a finding would not affect the remedy. See, e.g.,
Roadway Express Inc., 355 NLRB at 204 (citing Burnup
& Sims, 379 U.S. at 22).
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Replace the judge’s Conclusion of Law 2 with the
following paragraph
“2. By discharging Adam Cummings because of his
protected activity as union steward, the Respondent has
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.”
2. Delete the judge’s Conclusion of Law 3, and re-
number the subsequent paragraphs.
AMENDED REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
Specifically, having found that the Respondent unilat-
erally changed its policies regarding the checking of oil
and coolants and filling out daily checklists, and disci-
plined employees pursuant to those changes, we shall
order it to rescind the unilateral changes and to rescind
all discipline issued pursuant thereto.
Having found that the Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(1) by discharging Adam Cummings, we shall order
it to offer him reinstatement and to make him whole for
any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a re-
sult of its unlawful action against him.
12
The backpay
due shall be computed as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth
Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest at the rate pre-

12 The Respondent contends that Adam Cummings is ineligible for
reinstatement and backpay because of a Facebook comment he posted
after his discharge. The comment, on another employee’s Facebook
photo, stated that things will not change at the Respondent until it re-
places its management team, and it included Cummings’ customary
Facebook avatar, which showed him holding a gun. Contrary to the
Respondent, we do not construe Cummings’ Facebook comment as a
threat of violence, and thus find that it provides no basis to render him
ineligible for reinstatement and backpay.
AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE OF CONNECTICUT, INC. 1305

scribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB
1173 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed in Ken-
tucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010).
In addition, in accordance with our recent decision in
Latino Express, Inc., 359 NLRB No. 44 (2012), we shall
order the Respondent to reimburse Cummings in an
amount equal to the difference in taxes owed upon re-
ceipt of a lump-sum backpay payment and taxes that
would have been owed had there been no discrimination
against him. Further, we shall order the Respondent to
submit the appropriate documentation to the Social Secu-
rity Administration so that when backpay is paid, it will
be allocated to the appropriate periods.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified and set forth in full below and orders that the
Respondent, American Medical Response of Connecti-
cut, Inc., West Hartford, Connecticut, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Changing the terms and conditions of employment
of its unit employees concerning start-of-shift procedures
without first notifying the employees’ collective-
bargaining representative and giving it an opportunity to
bargain.
(b) Warning or otherwise disciplining unit employees
pursuant to its unlawful unilateral changes.
(c) Discharging employees because of their protected
activity as union steward.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the unilateral changes it has made to the
terms and conditions of employment of unit employees
concerning start-of-shift procedures.
(b) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from its files any reference to the unlawful warnings is-
sued to its unit employees pursuant to the unlawful uni-
lateral changes found herein, and within 3 days thereafter
notify those employees in writing that this has been done
and that the discipline will not be used against them in
any way.
(c) Before implementing any changes in wages, hours,
or other terms and conditions of employment of unit em-
ployees, notify and, on request, bargain with the collec-
tive-bargaining representative of employees in the fol-
lowing bargaining unit:

All full-time and regular part-time emergency medical
technicians (EMTs) and paramedics employed by the
Employer at or out of its West Hartford, Enfield, Put-
nam, and Rockville, Connecticut facilities.

(d) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer
Adam Cummings full reinstatement to his former job or,
if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to his seniority or any other
rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
(c) Make Adam Cummings whole for any loss of earn-
ings and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrim-
ination against him, in the manner set forth in the
amended remedy section of this decision.
(f) Compensate Adam Cummings for the adverse tax
consequences, if any, of receiving a lump-sum backpay
award, and file a report with the Social Security Admin-
istration allocating the backpay award to the appropriate
calendar quarters.
(g) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from its files any reference to the unlawful discharge of
Adam Cummings, and within 3 days thereafter, notify
the employee in writing that this has been done and that
the discharge will not be used against him in any way.
(h) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel rec-
ords and reports, and all other records, including an elec-
tronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form,
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under
the terms of this Order.
(i) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its West Hartford, Connecticut facility copies of the at-
tached notice marked “Appendix.”
13
Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
1, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous plac-
es, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of
paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically,
such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet
site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent
customarily communicates with its employees by such
means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-

13 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
1306 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

ent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. If the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed the facility involved in
these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all cur-
rent employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since April 8, 2011.
(j) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 1 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

WE WILL NOT change your terms and conditions of
employment concerning start-of-shift procedures without
first notifying your collective-bargaining representative
and giving it an opportunity to bargain.
WE WILL NOT warn you or otherwise discipline you
pursuant to our unlawful unilateral changes.
WE WILL NOT discharge you because of your protected
activity as a union steward.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL rescind the unilateral changes we made to the
terms and conditions of employment for our unit em-
ployees concerning start-of-shift procedures.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, remove from our files any reference to the unlaw-
ful warnings issued to unit employees pursuant to the
unlawful unilateral change in your terms and conditions
of employment, and WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter,
notify those employees in writing that this has been done
and that the warnings will not be used against them in
any way.
WE WILL, before implementing any changes in wages,
hours, or other terms and conditions of employment of
unit employees, notify and, on request, bargain with the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of our
employees in the following bargaining unit:

All full-time and regular part-time emergency medical
technicians (EMTs) and paramedics employed by us at
or out of its West Hartford, Enfield, Putnam, and
Rockville, Connecticut facilities.

WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, offer Adam Cummings full reinstatement to his
former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substan-
tially equivalent position, without prejudice to his senior-
ity or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Adam Cummings whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits resulting from his discharge,
less any net interim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL compensate Adam Cummings for the adverse
tax consequences, if any, of receiving a lump-sum back-
pay award, and WE WILL, file a report with the Social
Security Administration allocating the backpay award to
the appropriate calendar quarters.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, remove from our files any reference to the unlaw-
ful discharge of Adam Cummings, and WE WILL, within
3 days thereafter, notify him in writing that this has been
done and that the discharge will not be used against him
in any way.

AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE OF CONNECTI-
CUT, INC.

Jennifer Dease, Esq. and Claire T. Sellers, Esq., for the General
Counsel.
Edward F. O’Donnell, Jr., Esq. and Meredith G. Diette, Esq.,
for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
RAYMOND P. GREEN, Administrative Law Judge. I heard this
case in Hartford, Connecticut, on 8 days in April, May, and
July 2012. The charge and the amended charges in Case 34–
CA–013051 were filed by Adam Cummings on July 20, Sep-
tember 19, and October 31, 2011. The charge in Case 34–CB–
067936 was filed by Cummings on October 31, 2011. The
charge in Case 34–CA–065800 was filed by Shannon Smith1 on
September 29, 2011. A consolidated complaint was issued on
December 30, 2011, and alleged as follows:

1 Prior to the hearing, a settlement was executed by the National
Emergency Medical Services Association, (NEMSA), in Case 34–CB–
067936. That case was severed and the caption is hereby amended to
reflect this fact.
AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE OF CONNECTICUT, INC. 1307

1. That on or about April 8, 2011, the Employer began re-
quiring employees to perform the following tasks.
(a) Complete and submit vehicle checkoff sheets on a daily
basis.
(b) Check, maintain, and add to the engine oil and coolant
levels of the Employer’s vehicles.
2. That between April 8 and June 3, 2011, Cummings as the
Union’s shop steward complained to the Employer about the
foregoing actions.
3. That on or about May 11 and June 10, 2011, the Employer
disciplined employees because they allegedly failed to perform
the tasks described above.
4. That on June 3, 2011, the Employer discharged Cummings
because of his union and protected concerted activity. It also is
alleged that the Employer violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (the Act) by acceding to the Union’s
attempt to cause his discharge because of his internal union
activities.
5. That on September 9, 2011, the Respondent accepted
Smith’s resignation of her position as a “Field Operations Su-
pervisor” and refused her request to be reassigned to her former
job in the unit as a paramedic. It is contended that the Respond-
ent’s motivation was because of her past activities as a shop
steward for District 1199.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed, I
make the following2
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The parties agree and I find that the Company is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
A. The Company’s Operations
The Respondent (AMR) is a nationwide provider of ambu-
lance and medical transportation services. The facility involved
in the present case is located in West Hartford and it is part of
the Respondent’s Greater Hartford Division. The Division
provides services in an area encompassing Hartford, West Hart-
ford, Windsor, Newington, and Bloomfield, Connecticut.
There are about 300 employees who report to the West Hart-
ford facility, mainly consisting of paramedics and emergency
medical technicians also known as EMTs. The facility has a
garage with a head mechanic and three to five other mechanics
who service the vehicles. The vehicles consist of about 30 to

2 At the hearing I denied the Respondent’s motion to defer, pursuant
to Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971), the 8(a)(1) and (3)
allegations concerning Cummings. This argument was again raised in
the Respondent’s brief. I reiterate my ruling because the grievance
involving Cummings was filed by a labor organization that no longer
represents him or any of the other employees in the bargaining unit.
That union having been replaced, there is no assurance that it would
adequately represent Cummings in an arbitration proceeding. Moreo-
ver, there was evidence of animus by that union against Cummings
relating to his activity in its internal affairs.
40 ambulances, 30 wheelchair transport vehicles, and about 15
SUVs that are called “fly cars” and which are used by paramed-
ics to go to a scene when needed. Typically but not always, an
ambulance or a wheelchair vehicle will have a two-person
complement, usually consisting of an EMT and a paramedic. A
fly car will have a one-person crew. It should be noted that in
more recent years, the Company has begun to use gasoline
vehicles instead of diesel powered vehicles. The newer vehi-
cles use more oil than the older diesel models and therefore
need to be checked more often for oil levels. Ambulances are
used on a 24-hour basis and when one crew finishes another
takes over.
The general manager of the West Hartford facility is Sean
Piendel. Under him are a group of field operations supervisors
who schedule and deal with the EMTs and paramedics who are
assigned to their respective shifts. At the time of these events,
the supervisors were Duane Drouin, Chris Chaplin, Chris Han-
del, Jason Kane, and Henley Solomon. Shannon Smith, one of
the Charging Parties, was also a field operations supervisor
until September 22, 2011. In her case, the General Counsel
alleges that when she chose to give up her supervisory position
in September, the Respondent refused to allow her to resume
her previous job as a paramedic because of her prior union
activities.
The Company has a human resources department and its di-
rector for Connecticut is Robert Zagami. Also, an actor in this
case was Kelly Gauthier who is employed in the human re-
sources department.
The Company and its employees in the Hartford area have
had a somewhat unique history of collective bargaining. Before
2002, these employees were represented by the Greater Hart-
ford Emergency Medical Technician Association (GHEMTA).3
However, in 2002 another union, New England Health Care
Employees Union, District 1199, took over from GHEMTA.
This new relationship didn’t last very long since a third union,
NEMSA, won a Board-conducted election in 2008. Two of the
Company’s employees, James Gambone and Jim Misercola,
were that Union’s representatives until they left the Company’s
employ. At that point their union functions were taken over by
an individual named Toby Sparks. Finally, in September 2011,
still another union, Local 559, Teamsters, filed an election peti-
tion and it was certified on November 1, 2011.
At the time that the events in this case occurred, the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement in effect was between the Company
and NEMSA. This contract was executed on April 2, 2009, and
contains a number of provisions that are relevant to various
issues in this case. (These will be described in the context of the
particular issue to which a provision is relevant.) After ratifica-
tion, the parties continued to meet to resolve certain issues as to
how the Company’s standard operating procedure (SOP) was to
be interpreted and/or implemented in light of the collective-
bargaining agreement. Such meetings were held in the autumn
of 2009 and the winter of 2010. During these meetings the
parties discussed the checklist policies set forth in the standard
operating procedure. In this regard, the Company contends that

3 The Respondent recognized GHEMTA when it took over the oper-
ations of a predecessor company.
1308 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

a new checklist was emailed to Union Representative Gambone
on February 23, 2010, and that the Union agreed to changes
which included a provision at section 2.22 entitled “Start of
Shift Procedures” that required employees to:

Report to the vehicle and complete a “Vehicle Inspection”
sheet and include it in the daily paperwork. Ensure that the
vehicle is ready to respond by checking the oil level and start-
ing the vehicle. Any vehicle failures shall be promptly re-
ported to the Operations Supervisor.

However, contrary to the Respondent’s contention, the evi-
dence does not establish that this was, in fact, agreed to by
NEMSA. At best, the evidence shows that the SOP was
emailed as an attachment to Gambone who did not respond.
There was no testimony by any witness that would show that
Gambone or anyone else representing NEMSA ever agreed to
the proposed new SOP or the checklist procedure described
above. Gambone was not called as a witness and although
Piendel testified that he was told by his superior, Zagami, that
the Union agreed to the new SOP, Zagami was not called as a
witness in this proceeding. There is in fact, no document, email
or other memorandum indicating that the Union assented to the
proposed standard operating procedure and I find that it did not.
B. Prior NLRB Cases
In American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc., 356
NLRB No. 155 (2011), the Board approved the judge’s findings
that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) by:

1. Threatening employees with the loss of annual pay increas-
es because they engaged in union activities.

2. Engaging in surveillance of employees’ union activities.

3. Prohibiting employees from possessing union materials on
company time and property.

4. Prohibiting employees from using a bulletin board to post
union-related items.

5. Prohibiting employees from wearing a union pin.

6. Discriminatorily refusing to allow an employee to attend a
company meeting on paid time.

7. Unilaterally and without notice to or bargaining with the
Union, failing to pay eligible bargaining unit employees up-
grade pay, tuition reimbursement payments, and recertifica-
tion payments.

8. Unilaterally and without notice to or bargaining with the
Union, failing to post the biannual shift bid for bargaining unit
employees.

9. Unilaterally and without notice to or bargaining with the
Union, failing to grant EMTs, paramedics, and drivers a
scheduled annual wage increase.

In American Medical Response of Connecticut Inc.,
JD(NY)–I5–11, I concluded in a case not yet decided by the
Board, that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by solicit-
ing employees to file a decertification petition and that it vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by unilaterally changing a poli-
cy regarding outside employment.
C. The Alleged Unilateral Change Involving
Vehicle Checklists and Daily Checks of
Oil and Coolant
Over the years, the Company has utilized checklists in rela-
tion to the operation of its vehicles. For ambulances, there is a
checklist that sets forth the medical supplies that are supposed
to be in the vehicle at all times. Employees when they take
over an ambulance, have always been required to utilize this
checklist and make sure that they have the right supplies for
their shift.
During the period from about 1996 to 2001, the Company al-
so used a document called a pretrip inspection ambulance ser-
vice driver checklist. With this list, the ambulance crew was
supposed to check off, inter alia, that they inspected the vehi-
cle’s exterior, checked oil levels, windshield washer fluid, and
engine coolant. The testimony was that this checklist was used
during that period of time and was then discontinued. There
was a variety of testimony given by employees. Some testified
that they checked the oil and coolant on a regular basis as a
matter of course. Others testified that they did not do this but
left it to the mechanics who inspected the vehicles on a regular
schedule. Still others testified that they checked the oil when
the engine started to sound bad. In all cases, the testimony was
that since 2001, they did not check oil and coolant on a daily
basis and that no employees were ever required to document
that they did so or were disciplined for failing to do so.
Before 2010, the ambulances were diesel powered. The
Company then started to buy as replacements, gasoline pow-
ered ambulances which use more oil. The testimony was that
in a gasoline powered engine, as opposed to a diesel engine, the
lack of oil can result in a catastrophic engine failure. There is
no question but that with a gasoline powered vehicle, it is nec-
essary to check the oil on a more frequent basis.
In an email dated January 24, 2011, the Respondent advised
fleet managers about excessive oil consumption in the Ford
V10 6.8L gasoline engines. The email states: “It is very im-
portant to check oil levels daily. A low oil level in a gasoline
engine can be more damaging than a diesel.”
By email dated April 1, 2011, from Duane Drouin to the
field supervisors and field training officers, he attached a new
proposed “pretrip inspection” form and asked for their feed-
back. This form is somewhat similar to the form used before
2001 and has a space for employees to indicate whether the oil
and coolant levels are low or full.
By email dated April 6, 2011, Drouin sent a new checklist to
the supervisors. He stated: “Please start utilizing them asap.
We will need to work on tracking them. We have had 2 situa-
tions this past week with vehicles extremely low on oil. We
don’t need to blow another engine . . . 913 and 903 both were
found to be 4+ quarts low.”
When employees arrived at work on April 8, 2011, they were
advised that they had to use the new checklists on a daily basis.
Soon thereafter, a notice was posted that perhaps for emphasis,
had a picture of the grim reaper with the caption, “Don’t let him
catch us off guard.” The remainder of the notice read in perti-
nent part:

AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE OF CONNECTICUT, INC. 1309

There have been some questions raised regarding the
check sheets. The check sheets are not new to us. There
have been many different versions over the years they
have been redesigned and updated.
We are requiring one for each shift worked. This is
important to our operations due to the fact that we have
discovered several vehicles very low on oil. We cannot af-
ford to damage another engine needlessly.
There has been an increase in unknown damage to the
vehicles and we will use these forms to protect employees
from being held responsible for damage that isn’t caused
by them.4
Checklists are required for every vehicle used and are
to be completed at the beginning of each shift or as soon
as otherwise possible and turned in by the end of the shift.
The process of completing this/these forms (s) provides an
orderly process to check the vehicle’s readiness, equip-
ment location and to ensure adequate medical supplies.
Both members of an ambulance crew are responsible for
and must work together in completing the check. A full
description of any vehicle problem is required to properly
diagnose the problem. Unsafe conditions should be re-
ported t to the Supervisor immediately and an incident re-
port filed.

On April 19, 2011, Adam Cummings, a shop steward, filed a
written grievance alleging that the implementation of the new
checklist violated the collective-bargaining agreement because
it was done without giving the employees and the Union proper
notice. The contract requires that during the life of the Agree-
ment, the Company must notify the Union of any proposed
additions, deletions, or modifications to existing operational
policies, procedures, and work rules.
During the period from May 9 to 11, 2011 (about 1 month
after the policy was first implemented), the Company issued
formal disciplinary warnings to 116 unit employees for failing
to turn in the checklists on various dates in April and early
May. Thereafter, on June 10, 2011, the Respondent issued
disciplinary warnings to 50 employees for not turning in check-
lists during the period from May 21 to 29. In some cases, the
employees acknowledged that they had not turned in the check-
lists on the dates alleged, whereas others denied that they had
failed to do so. In this regard, some employees testified that
they had received a warning for dates that they were not even
working whereas others contested the warnings stating that they
had, in fact, turned in the checklists. There also was some cred-
ible testimony that during the first 2 months, the procedure for
collecting the checklists was chaotic and that some were even
disposed of by a person in the billing department because the
employees were inserting them into folders that were used for
another purpose. In either case, the evidence establishes that
the policy of requiring the employees to document and check
the oil and coolant levels on a daily basis was being enforced
by means of disciplinary measures.

4 I am assuming that this remark relates to the part of the form where
employees can show dents to the vehicle.
The issue here, is not whether the requirement that employ-
ees check oil and coolant levels on a daily basis and confirm
doing so by submitting a checklist, is a good, bad, or indifferent
idea. (As one of the General Counsel’s witnesses testified,
such a rule is probably a good idea.) Rather, the issue is
whether this requirement constitutes a material change in the
employees’ terms and conditions of employment; whether the
Union has waived its right to bargain about the change; and
whether under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, the Company must
first notify the Union about it and afford an opportunity to bar-
gain before its implementation.
In my opinion, the evidence shows that since 2002, the
Company has not required its employees to check the fuel
and/or coolant levels on vehicles on a daily basis and has simi-
larly not required them to document that they did so. It there-
fore is my opinion that the requirements that were put into ef-
fect on April 8, 2011, constituted a unilateral change in em-
ployees’ terms and conditions of employment. I also conclude
that this change was sufficiently material as to require the
Company to first notify and bargain with the Union before
implementation. See Carbonex Coal Co., 262 NLRB 1306,
1313 (1982) (change in shift schedule affecting three employ-
ees); Mitchellace, Inc., 321 NLRB 191, 195 (1996) (change in
hours held to be nontrivial change in shift starting times); Blue
Circle Cement Co., 319 NLRB 954 (1995) (change in start
times); Carpenters Local 1031, 321 NLRB 30 (1996) (change
requiring employee to work one-half hour more per day).
I also conclude that the Respondent has not demonstrated
that the Union waived its right to bargain over this change. Its
assertion that after the contract was ratified, the Union never-
theless agreed to a new standard operating procedure allowing
the Company to require these procedures and checklists was
not, in my opinion, supported by any competent evidence.
Inasmuch as I conclude that the unilaterally implemented re-
quirements that employees check fuel and coolants on a daily
basis and turn in checklists was unlawfully implemented, it
follows that any disciplines issued to employees for failing to
follow these procedures would also be unlawful. Randolph
Children’s Home, 309 NLRB 341 (1992). I therefore conclude
that the disciplines issued to employees from May 9 to 11,
2011, and on June 10, 2011, violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
D. The Discharge of Adam Cummings
The General Counsel contends that the Respondent dis-
charged Cummings because of his activity as a union shop
steward, particularly in relation to his concerted actions in pro-
testing and filing a grievance about the unilateral change de-
scribed above. Alternatively or concurrently, the General
Counsel contends that the Respondent discharged Cummings at
the behest of his Union because of his internal union activities.
(As previously noted, a complaint had been issued against
NEMSA but it agreed to a settlement and that charge was sev-
ered from the instant cases.)
The Company’s defense is that after the change was institut-
ed, Cummings in an email urged employees to protest the
change by engaging in a work stoppage which, in conjunction
with the contractual grievance/arbitration provisions, is prohib-
ited by a no-strike clause in the collective-bargaining agree-
1310 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

ment. (Art. 17 of the contract.) If the Company is correct in its
contention that Cummings instigated a work stoppage, even in
the context of a concerted protest over the unilateral changes,
then this would, in my opinion, be a sufficient defense under
either of the General Counsel’s two theories. For if Cummings
did instigate a contractually prohibited work stoppage, this
action would not be protected under the Act and would have
been an independent and valid reason to discharge him even if
the Union had asked for his discharge for reasons relating to
Cumming’s internal union activities. In NLRB v. Sands Mfg.
Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939), the Court ruled that where striking
employees violate or repudiate the provisions of a collective-
bargaining agreement, the Act does not prohibit an employer
from discharging them. And in Chrysler Corp., 232 NLRB 466
(1977), the Board upheld the discharge of a union steward for
his leadership of an unauthorized work stoppage violating the
agreement’s no-strike clause. On the other hand, if his com-
munications are not construed as an incitement to engage in a
work stoppage, they would then constitute legitimate union
activity and also would be construed as protected concerted
activity. In such circumstances, it would be concluded that
Cummings’ discharge would violate Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Act.
On April 8, Cummings as a union shop steward, sent an
email to Sean Piendel with copies to the Bree Eichler, the chief
steward, and to two other union stewards. This expressed con-
cern about the requirement that crews check the oil and coolant
levels. He also asked if this was a new policy and requested
more information about it.
Piendel responded via email and referred to the standard op-
erating procedure, implicitly claiming that the Union had
agreed to the reinstitution of a vehicle checklist policy. Piendel
also stated that supervisors had been told to advise employees
that if they didn’t know how to check oil and coolant levels,
they should seek out the maintenance department for a demon-
stration. Human Resource Director Zagami was copied on this
email.
With respect to the claim that the Company had the right to
implement the procedure pursuant to the standard operating
procedure, Toby Sparks, a newly appointed union business
agent, sent an email to the stewards stating his belief that the
Company had the right to implement these rules. However, I
have already concluded that the evidence shows that the stand-
ard operating procedure, relied on by the Respondent, was nev-
er actually agreed to by the Union. As such, I conclude that the
email from Sparks (who did not testify), was mistaken at best.5
On April 10, Cummings spoke to Chris Chaplin, a field op-
erations supervisor, and said that he was concerned that em-
ployees could get hurt when the engine was hot if they were not
familiar with the different types of ambulance engines. (Since
there is almost an immediate turnaround of crews when an
ambulance comes back to the yard, the engines are hot most of
the time.)
On April 11, Zagami sent an email telling Cummings that he
should have reviewed the manuals before making any accusa-

5 The General Counsel has a more sinister theory about why Sparks
sent this email.
tions. About 20 minutes later, Eichler sent a response to all of
the persons in the chain, repeating Cummings safety concern
and stating that vehicle checklists and fluid checks had never
been previously enforced. She also stated that some employees
were not skilled in checking engine fluids. Finally, she stated
that in accordance with article 15 of the collective-bargaining
agreement, a notice of implementation should have been posted
for 30 days and that safety classes should be set up to deal with
this issue.
Cummings then entered the email chain and stated that the
checklist policy had not been enforced during his 6 years at the
Company. Although stating that he was aware that checking the
engine fluids was important, he asked that a meeting be set up
between the Company and either himself or Eichler to discuss
the need for employee training.
In response, Piendel sent an email to Eichler with copies to
the others and stated that if employees were uncomfortable
checking engine fluids, they should see a supervisor or a me-
chanic for proper guidance. At the same time, Piendel asserted
that employees, as part of their regular training, had already
received training.
Eichler replied that the Union’s priority was to ensure safety
and stated that requiring employees to check engine fluids had
not been enforced during the 8 years that she had been em-
ployed. She stated that the regular training that she had received
did not include matters “under the hood” of the vehicles. She,
like Cummings, also asked for a meeting with management.
Soon thereafter, another steward, Dennis, sent an email into
the chain, stating, in substance, that the new gasoline powered
ambulances used a lot of oil; that the supervisors were not able
to assist the crews in how to check the oil; and that on some
vehicles it was difficult to see the fluid reservoir levels.
Later on April 11, Piendel replied to Dennis and stated that
he wanted to know which ambulance crews operating the gaso-
line powered ambulances did not know how to check the en-
gine fluids.
In response, Cummings sent an email into the chain, stating
that he was driving one of the newer ambulances and had never
received any training about how to check the fluids. In this
escalating set of email messages, Cummings also wrote the
following statement:

I can assure you that my hire class had no training what so ev-
er in regards to checking anything under the hood. What you
have asked the employees to do is among other things not
safe. You need to provide everyone with the proper training
before asking anyone to do these tasks. Until then, I will be
advising the employees to have a mechanic check the trucks
to protect the equipment and the employees.

Piendel responded by stating:

Am I to understand that you are initiating a concerted job ac-
tion against AMR? Please respond and based on your re-
sponse, I will take the necessary action immediately!

About 15 minutes later, Cummings replied to Piendel and
made the following statement:

AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE OF CONNECTICUT, INC. 1311

Have at it if you feel that is [what] my response entailed, and
you feel that is a more appropriate response than meeting with
the union about this situation.

Piendel then sent an email to Cummings, with copies to the
others, wherein he stated that he had asked Cummings for a yes
or no answer and that Cummings had not given him one.
Cummings response was as follows:

I feel that I have made my concerns and intentions quite clear.
I also think that it is clear that the other stewards feel as I do.
Do with that knowledge as you will. I should hope that you
will meet with the union and confer on this matter.

As previously noted, the Company issued disciplinary warn-
ings to 116 employees who it contends did not fill out and file
the vehicle checklists during the period from April 9 to early
May. Additionally, on June 10, 2011, the Respondent issued
disciplinary warnings to 50 employees for allegedly not turning
in checklists during the period from May 21 to 29.
On May 12, 2011, Union Representative Toby Sparks sent a
letter to the Company purporting to disavow an unauthorized
work stoppage which he implied was instigated by Cummings.
The Company thereupon requested that this letter be posted at
the facility and Chief Steward Eichler refused to do so.
On June 1, Cummings, accompanied by Eichler, was called
to a meeting with Piendel, Zagami, and Gauthier. At this meet-
ing, Cummings was confronted with the May 12 Sparks letter
and asked if he could explain the contents. Cummings replied
that he didn’t write the letter and that he did not instigate a
work stoppage. The company representatives did not confront
Cummings with any other evidence that he had been responsi-
ble for a work stoppage other than the assertions made by
Sparks.6
The evidence does not show that any employees were ever
advised or solicited by Cummings or any other shop steward to
not do the oil and coolant checks or to refuse to turn in the
checklists. To the contrary, the evidence presented at this hear-
ing was that there were (a) some employees who simply forgot
to submit the checklists; (b) some employees who did submit
checklists which were either lost or discarded by office person-
nel; and (c) some employees who were given warnings for not
turning in checklists on days that they were not actually work-
ing. The Respondent did not produce a single person who testi-
fied that Cummings ever asked him or her either to not check
oil and coolant levels or to refuse to turn in the checklists. On
the other hand, the General Counsel produced multiple witness-
es who testified that they were never told by Cummings to re-
fuse to do these tasks.
On June 3, 2011, the Company sent Cummings a letter stat-
ing that he was being terminated because he violated section

6 There is in fact no evidence, apart from the April 8 and 11 email
chains, to show that Sparks had any knowledge of or made any inquir-
ies of unit employees as to whether Cummings had instigated any kind
of work stoppage. On June 2, Anthony Calhoun wrote to Sparks and
stated that Cummings had not incited a work stoppage and that any
claim that he had done so was false. And since Sparks was not called
to testify, he did not provide the basis for his assertion in his May 12
letter that a work stoppage had occurred.
17.01 of the collective-bargaining agreement. Basically, it is
the Respondent’s assertion that it fired Cummings because he
instigated a work stoppage in violation of the no-strike clause
in the contract.
Shannon Smith testified that upon her return to full duty in
early June 2011, she had a conversation with Duane Drouin
about Cummings. According to her credible testimony, she
asked Drouin if it was true that he got Cummings fired, where-
upon Drouin responded by saying: “Well it takes a little bit
more time to set the smart ones up.”
In my opinion, the evidence does not support the Respond-
ent’s contention that Cummings incited a work stoppage. The
only evidence that might arguably support such a conclusion is
emails from Cummings on April 11, where he notified Piendel
that he would advise employees “to have a mechanic check the
trucks to protect the equipment and the employees.” And alt-
hough Cumming avoided a direct response to Piendel’s email
asking if he was initiating a concerted job action, there is noth-
ing in any of these emails, which in my opinion, can reasonably
be described as a call for employees to engage in a work stop-
page of any kind. In my opinion, Cummings’ initial remarks
about advising employees to see a mechanic were basically
consistent with Piendel’s previous email to Eichler stating that
if an employee didn’t know how to check the oil or fluids, he or
she should ask a mechanic for a demonstration. In my opinion,
the email chains on April 8 and 11, show an escalating form of
exasperation by representatives of both parties and demon-
strates how a relatively small matter can blow up into a large
misunderstanding.7
The Respondent asserts that it decided to discharge Cum-
mings because of his alleged instigation of a work stoppage as
evidence by his emails on April 11 and because of what it per-
ceived to be the refusal of employees to turn in the checklists in
April and May 2011. There was, however, no evidence that
Cummings ever actually urged any employees to engage in a
work stoppage. Nor was there any evidence that Cummings
urged or solicited any employees to not perform any of their
work functions, including the new and unilaterally established
rules requiring daily oil and coolant checks and the submission
of checklists. And because his April emails related to his con-
tentions, inter alia, that the rules were not adopted in accord-
ance with the notice provisions of the collective-bargaining
agreement, his communications, as a shop steward, to manage-
ment and to the other shop stewards must be construed both as
union activity and protected concerted activity. Interboro Con-
tractors, 157 NLRB 1295 (1966), enfd. 497 F.2d 679 (6th Cir.
1986). As such, a subjective belief that Cummings was inciting
a work stoppage is insufficient to constitute a defense where, as
here, that belief is not supported by the objective facts. See
NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, 379 U.S. 21 (1964).
I therefore conclude that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) and (3) by discharging Cummings because of his union
and protected concerted activities. Having reached this conclu-
sion, it is unnecessary for me to address the alternative theory

7 This may have been exaggerated because all of the communica-
tions were conducted by email and there were no meetings where peo-
ple could sit down together and discuss the issue, face-to-face.
1312 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

that the Company’s discharge of Cummings was violative of
the Act because it was the result of unlawful actions of the
Union to cause Cummings’ discharge in violation of Section
8(b)(2) of the Act.
E. The Refusal to put Shannon Smith Back into the
Bargaining Unit as a Full-Time Paramedic
Shannon Smith began her employment as an EMT in 1996
with the Company’s predecessor. In 1998 she became a para-
medic and in 2002 she became a shop steward for GHEMTA,
the union that then represented the EMTs and paramedics.
When Local 1199 replaced GHEMTA, Smith became a dele-
gate for that union. From all accounts, she was a diligent, ag-
gressive, intelligent, and fair minded union representative who
effectively acted as the bargaining unit’s chief steward. She
participated in contract negotiations and handled employee
complaints mainly with Piendel. According to Smith, she and
Piendel were usually able to come to an agreement on griev-
ances and that she therefore did not have to file many formal
grievances with the Union. Testimony revealed that while she
was aggressive in her dealings with management, she also
would tell employees when their grievances did not have merit.
In July 2008, Local 1199 was voted out and NEMSA was
voted in. When that happened, Smith decided that she did not
want to support NEMSA and chose not to continue as a union
representative. From that date, Smith has had no connection
with union activities and has played no role either in internal
union affairs or in representing employees in their dealings with
management.
In May 2010, Smith was offered and accepted a position as a
field operations supervisor and acted in that capacity until she
finally sought to give up that position and return to being a
paramedic in September 2011. Again, from all accounts, Smith
seems to have been an effective supervisor. In that position, she
was paid a salary and was no longer in the bargaining unit.
Prior to her decision to return to the unit, she was among eight
other supervisors.
On September 9, 2011, Smith sent an email to Piendel stat-
ing that she was resigning as a supervisor and asked that she be
transferred back to a full-time paramedic position. One of the
reasons she did this was because the Company had ceased pay-
ing bonuses to the supervisors and she felt that she could make
more money, with overtime, as a paramedic. Piendel responded
that he was disappointed with her decision.
The General Counsel showed that over the years, it was not
unusual for people who were field operations supervisors to ask
for and be transferred back to their former positions either as
EMTs or paramedics. In this regard, she provided evidence of
numerous such transactions since 2006.
However, as of September 2011, there were no full-time par-
amedic positions open in this region. In this regard, the local
managers do not have discretion to determine the number of
paramedic or EMT positions; that being a matter determined by
the Company’s corporate office. Moreover, in April 2011, the
Respondent lost an account with the Windsor Volunteer Ambu-
lance Service and this resulted in the loss of five paramedic
positions that were transferred to other operations.
In the meantime, the Company had already allowed for sev-
eral EMTs to train to become paramedics before Smith sent her
June letter. In this regard, the process by which an EMT be-
comes a paramedic involves the completion of a course of in-
struction at a College and then an apprenticeship type of pro-
gram which is undertaken by the Employer and has to be suc-
cessfully completed. The evidence shows that once agreeing to
embark on an apprenticeship program (called precepting), the
Company essentially makes a commitment to promote that
person to a paramedic position, if the program is successfully
completed and if a position is available at the time of comple-
tion. This involves a substantial investment in a person who is
being trained and if he or she successfully completes the pro-
gram, the Company will reimburse for a portion of the college
course work. The record shows that when an individual named
Roper completed his precepting, he was offered and accepted a
position as a paramedic after September 2011. Another individ-
ual, named Kashetta also successfully completed his precept-
ing, but was only offered a part-time paramedic position in
January 2012.
In my opinion, the General Counsel has not made out, pursu-
ant to Wright Line,8 a prima facie case regarding the Respond-
ent’s failure to transfer Supervisor Smith back into a unit job
because of her prior union activities.9 Although the evidence
shows that Smith was a very active Local 1199 delegate, her
union activities ceased in 2008. Moreover, in 2010 she was
offered and accepted a supervisory position and in that job, she
seems to have brought the same intelligence and zeal as when
she was a union delegate. There was, in my opinion, little or no
reason for the Company to be concerned about her past union
activities, which were long past.10 Moreover, Smith was not
involved in any activities on behalf of Local 559 Teamsters and
there is no evidence that the Company believed that she was
involved with that labor organization.
Although the evidence showed that it was usual for the
Company to agree to transfer supervisors back into unit jobs
when asked, the facts in the present case tend to show that at
the time that Smith asked to be transferred (in September
2011), there were, except for the precepting employees, no
immediate prospect for full-time paramedic positions to be
open in the foreseeable future. And except for Roper and
Kashetta, no new paramedics were employed after September
2011. (As noted above, in Kashetta’s case, he was only given a
part-time schedule, much to his chagrin).

8 Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083, 1089 (1980), enfd 662 F.2d 899 (1st
Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
9 The Respondent contends that as a supervisor, any alleged dis-
charge of Smith must be dismissed pursuant to the Board’s decision in
Parker-Robb Chevrolet, 262 NLRB 402, 403 (1982), affd. Automobile
Salesmen’s Union Local 1095 v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
The General Counsel disagrees and asserts that the violation here is
analogous to a refusal to hire an employee because of his or her union
activities.
10 I don’t place any weight on the testimony that Smith was de-
scribed by Druin as “a pain in the butt” in connection with her past role
as a delegate for District 1199. This was, in my opinion, too remote in
time.
AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE OF CONNECTICUT, INC. 1313

I must say that I was impressed with Smith as a witness and
as a person, and I suspect that the Company lost a valuable
employee when it chose not to transfer her back into the bar-
gaining unit. But based on the evidence in this case, this does
not mean that I can conclude that her separation from the Com-
pany was motivated by illegal reasons. I therefore conclude
that in this respect, the Respondent has demonstrated that it had
a legitimate reason for accepting Smith’s resignation and for
not transferring her back to the position of a full-time paramed-
ic. In this regard, I shall therefore recommend that this aspect
of the complaint be dismissed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By unilaterally changing its policies regarding the check-
ing of oil and coolants and the requirement that employees fill
out daily checklists, the Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
2. By discharging Adam Cummings because of his union and
protected concerted activities, the Respondent has violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
3. By discharging Adam Cummings because of his union and
protected concerted activities, the Respondent has violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.11

11 The Respondent contends that post discharge conduct by Cum-
mings requires a finding that he should forfeit the right to reinstatement
and backpay. This consists of a comment made by Cummings on an-
other person’s face book page that stated, next to Cummings’ own face
book profile picture of him aiming a rifle: “Until AMR gets rid of the
management team up to and including Zagombi, nothing will change.
Only crews and patients will suffer.” In my opinion, the Respondent
reads far too much into this picture and comment and I do not construe
his statements with his profile picture as constituting a threat of vio-
4. The Respondent has not violated the Act in other manner
encompassed by the complaint.
5. The aforesaid violations affect commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.12
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent having discriminatorily discharged an em-
ployee, it must offer him reinstatement and make him whole for
any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of
the discrimination against him. Backpay shall be computed in
accordance with F.W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB (1950), with
interest at the rate prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded,
283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed in
Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010).
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]

lence. In C-Town, 281 NLRB 458 (1986), a case involving an ethnic
slur, The Board concluded that the misconduct was not sufficient to
deny reinstatement and backpay. The Board stated:
[N]ot every impropriety deprives the offending employee of the pro-
tection of the Act. The Board looks at the nature of the misconduct
and denies reinstatement in those flagrant cases “in which the miscon-
duct is violent or of such character as to render the employees unfit for
further service.
12 In its Brief, the Respondent contends that this case should be dis-
missed because the Board, as currently constituted, does not have a
legitimate forum. This is way beyond the scope of my job description
and until it is found otherwise at the appropriate appellate level, I will
assume that the Board has the authority to act.