American Medical Response

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Nov 9, 2010

34-CA-012465 (N.L.R.B. Nov. 9, 2010)

JD(NY)–45–10
Avon, CT
Southington, CT
Waterbury, CT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
NEW YORK BRANCH OFFICE
AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE OF Case Nos. 34-CA-12465
CONNECTICUT, INC. 34-CA-12466
34-CA-12467
and 34-CA-12471
34-CA-12499
34-CA-12500
NATIONAL EMERGENCY MEDICAL 34-CA-12514
SERVICES ASSOCIATION 34-CA-12515
34-CA-12520
34-CA-12551
Thomas E. Quigley, Esq., Hartford, CT
for the General Counsel
Miguel A. Escalera, Jr. and Lisa D. Lazarek, Esqs.,
(Kainen, Escalera & McHale, P.C.), Hartford, CT
for the Respondent.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
MINDY E. LANDOW, Administrative Law Judge. Based upon a series of unfair labor
practice charges and amended charges filed by National Emergency Medical Services
Association (NEMSA or the Union) against American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc.
(the Employer or Respondent)1, between September 28 and November 17, 20092 an Order
Further Consolidating Cases, Amended Consolidated Complaint and Notice of Hearing (the
complaint) issued on March 29, 2010, alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1)(3) and (5) of the Act.
The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated the Act by: prohibiting employees from
using a bulletin board to post Union-related materials; threatening employees with the loss of an
annual wage increase because of their support for the Union; prohibiting employees from
wearing Union lapel pins and decals and threatening them with discipline should they do so;
surveilling employees and prohibiting the possession of Union materials on company time and
property; discriminatorily refusing to allow employee Michael Gerrity to attend a company
meeting on paid time and making a series of unilateral changes in terms and conditions of
employment including: failing to make contractually required upgrade, tuition reimbursement
and recertification payments, modifying overtime distribution procedures, failing to post the bi-
annual shift bid and failing to grant a scheduled annual wage increase. The Respondent filed

1 At times, the parties also referred to the Employer as AMR, although that designation was also
used to indicate a national entity as well. Unless otherwise specified, the use of the term AMR will refer to
the Respondent herein.
2 All dates are in 2009 unless otherwise specified.
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an answer to the complaint which denied that it had violated the Act, as alleged.3
A hearing in this matter was held before me in Hartford, Connecticut on April 14 and 15,
2010. At the hearing, Counsel for the General Counsel moved to amend paragraphs 11 and 12
of the complaint to allege that certain unfair labor practices had occurred on dates consistent
with the testimonial evidence. Respondent did not oppose this motion, and it was granted. After
the close of the hearing, but before briefs were filed, Respondent moved to reopen the record to
introduce into evidence an arbitration award concerning the discharge of James Gambone, a
NEMSA organizer and one of the General Counsel’s witnesses. I granted that motion by order
on June 7, 2010. In conjunction with the filing of its post-hearing brief, Counsel for the General
Counsel moved to amend the transcript in various respects. Respondent responded with two
proposed and unopposed clarifications, and the General Counsel’s motion as modified by
Respondent is hereby granted.
Based upon the entire record, the briefs filed by Counsel for the General Counsel and
the Respondent and my assessment of the evidence including my evaluation of the credibility of
the witnesses,4 I make the following
Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction
Respondent is a domestic corporation with various facilities in the State of Connecticut.
Respondent admits and I find that during the 12-month period ending February 28, 2010,
Respondent purchased and received at its Connecticut facilities goods valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from points located outside the State of Connecticut. Respondent further
admits, and I find that at all material times, it has been an employer in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act. Respondent additionally admits, and I find, that
at all material times the Union has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
A. Background
1. Overview of operations
The Employer provides emergency and non-emergency medical transportation services
in the State of Connecticut. This case involves the so-called “Waterbury Division” which consists
of facilities located in Avon, Southington and Waterbury. The headquarters of the Waterbury
Division are located in Waterbury, and this facility is sometimes referred to as “Company 2.” The
Waterbury Division employs approximately 162 employees. Since 1999, Robert Retallick has
been its General Manager. Retallick supervises, among others, employees in human resources,

3 Although Respondent admitted those paragraphs of the complaint alleging that it had modified its
overtime distribution procedures applicable to unit employees and that it failed to post the bi-annual shift
bid for unit employees it denied that by doing so it violated the Act.
4 Credibility resolutions have been made based upon a review of the entire record and all exhibits in
this proceeding. Witness demeanor and inherent probability of the testimony have been utilized to assess
credibility. Testimony contrary to my findings has been discredited on some occasions because it was in
conflict with credited testimony or because it was inherently incredible or unworthy of belief.
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business development, payroll and scheduling. The Waterbury Division’s lead supervisor, Mark
Hughson, oversees approximately five field supervisors who, in turn, directly supervise all
employees in the relevant bargaining unit. National Vice President for Labor Relations David
Banelli is responsible for all labor relations policies, programs, practices and contract
negotiations for Emergency Medical Services Corporation (EMSC) which is a parent corporation
to American Medical Response5 and all of its subsidiaries (including the Respondent herein.)6
2. The NEMSA organizing campaign
On September 21, 1998, following a Board-conducted election, the Waterbury
Emergency Services Union (WESU) was certified as the collective-bargaining representative of
a unit of all full-time and regular part-time paramedics, emergency medical technicians (EMTs),
chair car drivers, school bus drivers and livery drivers employed by the Employer at its
Waterbury and Southington facilities. WESU was an independent union which solely
represented employees of the Employer in the Waterbury division. WESU thereafter affiliated
with the International Union of Police Association (IUPA). The first collective agreement
between the Employer and WESU was effective from late 1999 through October 2002.
Thereafter, a successor agreement was entered into by the parties, effective from November 1,
2002 to October 30, 2006. A subsequent collective-bargaining agreement was effective by its
terms from October 31, 2006 to October 30, 2010 (the 2006 collective-bargaining agreement or
WESU agreement).
According to the testimony of Raymond Caruso, Jr., a paramedic in the Waterbury
division and former WESU treasurer, IUPA, a union which primarily represents police officers,
had a servicing agreement with WESU. In the summer of 2007, IUPA notified WESU that it no
longer wished to represent employees in the private sector, and wanted to concentrate on
organizing and representing employees in municipal police departments, and the service
agreement was severed. WESU then signed a service agreement with the International
Association of EMTs and Paramedics (IAEP), but that agreement ended in late 2008 or early
2009. At this time, the WESU officials were President Mike West, Vice-President and paramedic
Michel Gerrity and Caruso.7
In January 2009, WESU sought to sign a servicing agreement and affiliate with NEMSA,
but Respondent opposed such an affiliation. In late-May or early June, NEMSA began an
organizing campaign and solicited authorization cards from employees. Thereafter, on July 10,
NEMSA filed a petition for an election with the Board. After a hearing, the Regional Director
directed an election in the following unit:
All full-time and regular part-time and per diem paramedics, emergency medical
technicians and chair car drivers employed by the Employer at its Waterbury,
Southington and Avon, Connecticut facilities, but excluding all other employees, office
clerical employees and guards, professional employees and supervisors as defined in
the Act.

5 American Medical Response is a corporation with facilities nationwide which employs approximately
18 thousand employees, about 50 percent of which belong to a labor organization.
6 Retallick, Hughson, Banelli and human resources representative Anthony Cardenales testified in
this proceeding for the Respondent.
7 Gerrity and Caruso testified herein, West did not. Also testifying for the General Counsel were
paramedic Robert Velletri and NEMSA organizer James Gambone.
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After receiving the election petition, Scott Rowencamp, the Employer’s employment and
labor counsel, sent an e-mail to West, which in pertinent part, provides as follows: “I just
received NEMSA’s petition for an NLRB election. Does WESU intend to be on the ballot in the
event there is an election?” West replied: “No, WESU does not intend to seek placement on the
ballot in the event of an election.”
Thereafter, on July 31, West sent an e-mail to General Manager Retallick and Vice-
President of Human Resources Robert Zagami which states in relevant part:
WESU’s communications with the NLRB have been very clear. While WESU disclaimed
interest in being on the upcoming ballot, we specifically stated that WESU would
continue to represent the employees of this division until such time as an election was
held.
It is undisputed that Respondent campaigned against the selection of NEMSA as
bargaining representative. To this end, it distributed literature to its employees at the workplace
and conducted group meetings, both mandatory and voluntary, as will be discussed below. The
election was held on September 4 and the Union prevailed with a vote of 82 employees voting
for representation and 55 employees voting against.8 Thereafter, on September 15, NEMSA
was certified as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the above-described unit.
3. Subsequent correspondence
After the election, on September 6, West sent the following e-mail addressed to Vice
President Banelli and Retallick:
You seem to be operating under some various misconceptions about the intentions or
actions of WESU regarding our representation of the employees in the Waterbury
Division. Please let me disabuse you of those notions.
-WESU informed Melissa Barrows/NLRB that WESU was not seeking a place on the
ballot.
-In response to a direct question from Melissa Barrows/NLRB, WESU maintained that it
would continue to represent the employees of the Waterbury Division throughout the
election process.
-WESU never informed any representative of AMR of any intention to disavow the unit or
cease our representation of our members.
-WESU has continued to operate as the representative of our members in all appropriate
fashions, and has been recognized by local AMR management in the carrying out of
these duties.
-The NLRB has continued to recognize that WESU is the duly elected representative of
the unit, as evidenced by certain findings that you are well aware of.
[Conclusory paragraph omitted]
Thereafter, on September 14, NEMSA’s labor attorney Timothy K. Talbot sent the
following letter to Banelli:9

8 There were four challenged ballots, a number insufficient to affect the results of the election.
9 The letter contains multiple case citations which are omitted here.
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We understand that AMR managers in the Waterbury Connecticut operation are advising
bargaining unit members that AMR will not adhere to any provisions contained in the
WESU labor agreement between AMR and WESU. Most recently, AMR managers
refused to pay annual stipends provided by the labor agreement.
As an initial matter, we previously expressed our position that AMR has impermissibly
refused to recognize WESU’s status as the exclusive bargaining representative pending
resolution of the representation election. While WESU advised the NLRB that it did not
wish to be on the election ballot and continue representing the bargaining unit following
the election process, WESU remains the exclusive representative until the NLRB
certifies NEMSA as the new exclusive representative. AMR’s assertion that WESU
disclaimed interest in representing the bargaining unit as of the date ballots were cast
rather than following completion of the election process is disingenuous. AMR’s refusal
to recognize WESU as the exclusive representative and to honor all terms and
conditions of the WESU labor agreement until the NLRB certifies NEMSA as the
exclusive representative is an unfair labor practice.
Following NEMSA’s certification as the exclusive bargaining representative, AMR is
required to continue the terms and conditions of employment established by the WESU
labor agreement and maintain all other existing working conditions pending negotiations
with NEMSA. AMR’s obligation to maintain the status quo precludes the company from
altering or eliminating terms and benefits established by the WESU labor agreement
until the parties bargain for a new contract or reach an impasse in negotiations. While
AMR is not required to arbitrate grievances arising under the WESU labor agreement
with NEMSA or extend agency shop provisions to NEMSA, AMR is required to honor the
remaining provisions of the WESU labor agreement.
The annual stipends provided under the WESU labor agreement are part of the status
quo that AMR is obligated to maintain. The annual stipends are automatic increases to
which AMR has already committed itself. Even where annual wage increases involve
both automatic and discretionary elements, an employer is obligated to bargain with the
union before discontinuing entirely the practice of granting annual wage increases. The
NLRB has made it clear that an employer may not unilaterally discontinue an established
practice of granting stipends or merit increases without agreement from the union.
Consequently, AMR commits an unfair labor practice by unilaterally discontinuing annual
stipends that are fixed as to timing, criteria and amount.
Moreover, in Arizona Portland Cement the NLRB adopted an administrative law judge’s
finding that the employer was obligated to honor the union’s rights provisions (e.g. union
release time, bulletin boards, etc.) in a labor contract negotiated with a preceding labor
organization. The ALJ specifically rejected the employer’s contention that it could refuse
to honor provisions of the former agreement relating to “the employer-union rather than
the employer-employee relationship.” The ALJ went on to find that the employer was
required to extend the same union rights provisions contained in the former labor
contract to the new union, even though those provisions were negotiated with the former
union.
We trust there will not be any lingering confusion or misunderstanding on the part of
AMR management concerning its obligation to maintain the status quo and honor the
terms and conditions established by the WESU labor agreement. We expect AMR will
immediately pay employees their annual stipends as required by law and make
employees completely whole for all losses. WESU has advised us that it will pursue all
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legal remedies available to it against AMR and its managers for these violations.
NEMSA, as you know, will do likewise.
On September 16, Banelli replied, in relevant part, as follows:
I am in receipt of your letter of September 14, 2009 and your email of September 16
pertaining to the newly organized Waterbury operation. Please accept this
communication as our response to both your assertions in your September 14 letter and
your request to roll over the former WESU agreement to its original expiration date.10
It appears that your office has suffered a communication breakdown with your client
NEMSA, as shortly after receiving your request this morning to rollover the former
WESU agreement; I received a letter from Jason Herring requesting to begin bargaining.
While I may have seriously considered the potential of rolling over the former agreement,
the pure fact that you would have the audacity to seek to rollover the Agreement and at
the same time put forth a request to begin negotiation is not only ingenuous but clearly
bad faith intentions. Therefore, I decline your request to rollover the former agreement.
Pertaining to your various assertions in your September 14 letter allow me to address
them individually. First, your allegation that Waterbury managers are advising unit
employees that AMR will not adhere to any provision of the former WESU agreement
are as usual union rumor as you provide no specificity and as such are unfounded and
inaccurate.
Regarding WESU’s representation status and your position that AMR has impermissibly
refused to recognize WESU is once again a misrepresentation by the union of the facts.
AMR’s position is and always has been predicated based on WESU’s (Mr. West)
statements and position to the NLRB clearly indicating that WESU as of the date of the
election would cease representing the employees of Waterbury. Therefore, your
position, again is unfounded and without basis or fact
While I appreciate your desire to provide me with an extended level of education on the
requirements of maintaining the “status quo” pertaining to wages, hours and conditions
of employment please be assured that I am as equally versed as you in such matters. To
that point, it appears we have and shall continue to have a difference of opinion as it
relates to the payment of stipends. We believe those payments are not wages; hours or
conditions of employment and like other aspects of the former collective bargaining
agreement are not withheld within the “status quo” doctrine and therefore will not be
maintained.
In response to your concern related to bulletin boards and union release time, allow me
to be clear on our position. First, the bulletin board in the Avon operation was purchased
by WESU and is rightfully WESU’s property and as such has been removed and
returned to WESU. Upon certification of the election, NEMSA will have access to the
general employee bulletin boards until such time as that matter is addressed in a new
collective bargaining agreement. Pertaining to the issue of union release time, as WESU
has disclaimed interest (referenced earlier in this communication) and NEMSA has not
named any individuals as officers or stewards in the matter of union release time is
moot.

10 The issue of the proposed “roll over” of the WESU agreement is discussed below.
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After NEMSA’s certification, the parties commenced bargaining in mid-December. At the
time of the hearing, the parties had met for three sessions totaling nine days and negotiations
were ongoing. Both Gerrity and Caruso are on the negotiating committee for NEMSA, as is
Gambone.
It is apparently undisputed, and the record reflects, that the Employer took the position
that if NEMSA won the election, the WESU agreement would be “null and void.” This position
was articulated at the hearing by various witnesses, including human resources representative
Cardenales and Banelli. Additionally, in responding to a grievance filed by NEMSA in January
2010 regarding the Employer’s failure to grant wage increases to employees, Zagami, who
answered the grievance replied, in pertinent part: “As of September 4, 2009, the Collective
Bargaining Agreement became null and void.”
4. The parties’ bargaining history at other AMR facilities
In defense to certain allegations of the complaint, in particular those relating to the failure
to grant employees an annual wage increase, Respondent relies in part on the conduct of
bargaining at other AMR facilities nationwide. In particular, Banelli testified that NEMSA
represents eleven other bargaining units of AMR employees and has, on eight occasions, won
elections where there was an existing unit and exclusive representative already in place. In
three of these eight cases, there were collective-bargaining agreements in effect due to expire
subsequent to the date of NEMSA’s certification as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative. According to Banelli, NEMSA never took the position in any of those cases that
those prior agreements continued in effect. Rather, NEMSA and AMR negotiated to “roll over”
the extant agreements, or to continue them through their original terms with NEMSA replacing
the former representative in enforcing the agreement. Each of these “roll over” agreements
contains language reflecting the fact that AMR and NEMSA agreed to “continue the wages,
hours and all other terms and conditions of employment.” Thus, the predecessor’s agreement
became the operative collective bargaining agreement governing terms and conditions of AMR
employees going forward. I note, however, that there is no evidence that the parties’ practice at
other facilities as binding upon the Waterbury Division.
To the contrary, as noted above, after NEMSA was certified for the Waterbury unit,
Talbot requested a “roll over” of the existing WESU collective-bargaining agreement, but Banelli
refused to do so in this instance. According to Banelli, this decision was reached due to a
change in the economic and operational conditions in Waterbury which had occurred since the
WESU agreement was first negotiated. Thus, the parties entered into negotiations for a new
agreement in December 2009. At the outset, to avoid forfeiting future bargaining over the issue,
NEMSA submitted a wage proposal. Consistent with the parties’ agreed-upon practice,
however, economic proposals were to be addressed after non-economic matters were resolved
and, as Banelli testified, had not been discussed as of the date of the hearing.
B. The Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(1)
1. The alleged prohibition on the use of a bulletin board to post Union materials
The complaint alleges that since on or about July 1, Respondent has prohibited
employees at its Waterbury facility from using a bulletin board to post Union related items.
Respondent has denied this allegation.
Article V of the WESU agreement contains the following provision:
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The Employer shall furnish a portion of a bulletin board at all stations for the posting of
proper Union notices. The Union shall be responsible to see that posted matters involve
only Union affairs, are business-like, and contain no material disparaging the Employer
or its clients.
The record establishes that there was a bulletin board provided for WESU at the
Waterbury facility. It is also not disputed that WESU posted materials in support of NEMSA on
this bulletin board. For example, Retallick acknowledged seeing the following memorandum
posted to WESU members:
On behalf of Mike, Ray, Nikki and myself I want to take this opportunity to make it clear
that the Board’s decision to support NEMSA in the upcoming election is rooted solely in
our deep desire to advance the concerns of us all.
While WESU has served Waterbury well these past ten years, it has become
increasingly apparent that the corporate changes at AMR call for a change in how we
represent ourselves. AMR has become increasingly hostile to our concerns, pushing the
clearest of issues to arbitration rather than agreeing to settle our issues in a mutually
respectful manner. WESU has offered on many occasions to work with AMR to better
our work environment and increase the spirit of cooperation. This new AMR that we face
chooses argument over agreement and derisiveness over unity. The best choice we
have for representation in this new environment is NEMSA.
NEMSA has proven itself effective against this new corporate giant AMR. NEMSA has
been successful in its negotiations with AMR, representing thousands of unionized EMS
professionals across the country. As an important cornerstone to NEMSA’s success
against AMR is that NEMSA is 100% EMS, start to finish. Obtaining better contracts
through their better understanding of the needs of EMS workers has become a hallmark
of NEMSA. NEMSA is exactly what we need.
We have all heard various opinions about what WESU might or might not have done
differently or better. The truth is, WESU has been extremely effective in its
representation of our members. It is also true that, going forward, our members will need
the backing of a large and strong EMS union. That is NEMSA. While I have entertained
many questions about the Board’s endorsement of NEMSA, I have not heard one
question that would make me think that going without a union would be beneficial to any
of us.
We strongly encourage each and every one of you to vote “NEMSA” at the upcoming
election. WESU can show AMR our continued solidarity by a 100% endorsement of
NEMSA. With a complete rejection of AMR’s propaganda, and a unified voice in support
of NEMSA, we can show AMR that we will continue to stand as one.11
The record establishes that the union bulletin board at the Waterbury facility was under a
locked glass cover and could only be accessed with a key. Those having copies of this key
included members of the Employer’s supervisory staff as well as WESU officials West, Gerrity
and Caruso.

11 This posting, dated August 25, was signed by West, Caruso, Gerrity and WESU Secretary Nicole
Weber.
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Both Caruso and Gerrity testified that, during the campaign, they posted pro-NEMSA
literature on the Waterbury bulletin board and that while WESU material would remain posted,
NEMSA literature would quickly disappear. Caruso testified that if he put pro-NEMSA literature
up on the weekend, it would be gone by Monday or sometimes even the same day. Neither
Caruso nor Gerrity ever saw anyone remove literature from this bulletin board. Caruso testified
that sometime after the election, but prior to NEMSA’s certification, a supervisor named Joseph
Spagna instructed him to remove an item from the bulletin board; however, Caruso did not
identify what this item was.12
Gerrity testified that he asked both Caruso and West whether they had removed the
NEMSA literature and they denied doing so. He further stated that this sort of thing had not
happened in the past, and that during the course of his employment with the Employer he had
never seen any supervisor or manager remove notices from the WESU board. Paramedic Rob
Velletri, who works out of the Southington (Company 6) facility, testified that, while there was no
specific bulletin board designated for such a purpose, union communications would be posted
on the wall next to the punch-in system. When pro-NEMSA literature was posted, it would be
removed shortly thereafter. Velletri was unable to identify, however, who had removed such
literature.
Retallick testified that he saw the above-described notice encouraging WESU members
to support NEMSA posted on the WESU board. There is no evidence as to how long this
document remained on the WESU board or whether it was removed at any point. He further
testified that at some point prior to the election, the WESU sign was removed from the bulletin
board located at Company 2 and a NEMSA sign put up in its stead. Retallick did not feel that the
substitution was appropriate because the Employer, which owned the bulletin board, had
allowed WESU to use it for its own purposes and not for NEMSA. At some point after the
election, the WESU board was taken down inasmuch as that union no longer represented
employees at the facility.
According to Retallick, the Waterbury facility also contains a large employee information
center, which is primarily for company use; however, employees may request permission to post
notices in this area. In addition, there is an area near the employee punch-in phone where
notices of immediate interest to employees are posted. As Retallick testified, the Employer has
allowed employees to post information there as well. However, neither Retallick nor any other
company witness offered specific testimony as to what materials have been posted at such
locations or whether the Employer gave employees permission to post NEMSA material there.
On cross-examination, Caruso confirmed that WESU would post material on the wall next to the
punch-in system. When asked whether NEMSA material was posted at that location, Caruso
stated that he could not recall.
Hughson testified generally that employees were permitted to post union information
next to the punch-in phone. Hughson offered no specific testimony that NEMSA literature had
been posted there or whether the Employer’s permission was required before employees could
do so. Cardenales was asked whether pro-NEMSA literature was put up on “take down walls” or
the WESU board and relied “I believe so.”
On cross-examination, Banelli was asked whether he was aware of the fact that, during
the NEMSA campaign, one of the Employer’s supervisors removed some literature pertaining to

12 The parties stipulated at the hearing that Spagna is a statutory supervisor.
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that labor organization from the WESU bulletin board. Banelli replied:
I am, and in my affidavit I referenced the reason why it was removed is the bulletin board
was owned by WESU, and so therefore they had the limited, they were the exclusive
organization who could post the material on that bulletin board.
The record further reflects that, at the time of the hearing, all of the bulletin boards in
Company 2 had been removed due to ongoing renovations of the garage area.
2. The alleged threat of loss of an annual wage increase
The complaint alleges that, on or about August 1, the Employer threatened employees
with the loss of their annual wage increase if they voted for the Union. Respondent has denied
this allegation of the complaint.
The WESU agreement provides, inter alia, that EMTs, paramedics and drivers “shall on
the first pay period that encompasses the effective date listed below have their base hourly
wage increased as identified below over the course of the life of this Agreement.” For the
calendar year 2010, the effective date was January 1, as it had been for the prior three years of
the contract. EMTs and paramedics were scheduled to receive a base hourly wage increase of
3.5 percent and drivers an increase of 3 percent. The testimony of employee witnesses
establishes that going back to the period of time prior to the 2006 collective-bargaining
agreement, raises might not have been granted in January of any particular calendar year;
nevertheless employees consistently received an annual wage increase.
During the election campaign, in August, the Employer circulated a letter from Retallick
to employees entitled: “Here are our answers. . . Where are yours?” which stated, in pertinent
part:
Last week –we received an unsigned letter from WESU/NEMSA, asking us to answer
“TEN QUESTIONS.” Well, our Answers are set out below. No excuses/no bull. Now that
we’ve offered honest answers to the union’s questions – maybe they’ll provide straight
answers to our 10 questions to them from last week.
Question number 8, as posed by WESU/NEMSA is as follows:
“Will you, right now, guarantee in writing the pay raises that you say we will get if were to
vote “no union?”
Retallick’s written response was:
I never said that Waterbury employees would get pay raises if the new union is voted
down. In fact – the union tossed out your 1-1-2010 pay increases when Mike West told
the Labor Board that the current CBA would end when the NLRB election was held. Do
the non-union employees in Bridgeport get regular raises? Yes. Do they make more than
we do – even with our union contract? Yes.
The General Counsel alleges that this communication constitutes an unlawful threat to
employees that they would not receive the January 2010 wage increase due to their union
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activities.13
3. The alleged prohibition on wearing Union lapel pins.
The complaint alleges that in or about August, Hughson prohibited employees at the
Waterbury facility and at the EMS room at Waterbury Hospital from wearing a Union lapel pin.
Respondent has denied these allegations of the complaint.
Caruso testified that in about August, NEMSA organizer Gambone gave employees
NEMSA literature and other material such as pens, notepads and lapel pins. The pins that were
distributed to employees are approximately one inch in diameter and are fastened by a stopper
at the rear so to prevent someone from being inadvertently stuck by its sharp point. Upon
receiving the pin, Caruso placed it on the lapel of his uniform. Caruso was at the Waterbury
facility at the time and testified that approximately one hour later Hughson saw him wearing the
pin and asked him to please remove it. Caruso, who did not want to be charged with
insubordination, complied. Caruso wore the pin later that month, prior to the election. Once
again Hughson asked Caruso to remove the pin, and he did.
Caruso additionally testified that at some point after the election, in about September, he
was at Waterbury Hospital, a major client of the Employer, in the EMS room where employees
complete paperwork after they bring patients to the hospital. Again, he was wearing a NEMSA
pin and Hughson, who was present, asked him to remove it. Caruso testified that Hughson
never specified why he was making such a request and that he did not reference any safety
concerns.
Caruso further testified that in his 13 years as an AMR employee he had worn other
union pins, in particular those designating IUPA and IAEP, and had never been told to remove
them. Caruso stated that he has also observed employees wearing other sorts of pins such as
American Flag, breast cancer awareness and military pins. Hughson was not asked and offered
no testimony about this matter. 14
EMSC has a dress code applicable to employees of the Employer. There are lists and
illustrations of attire that is appropriate for men and women as well as lists and illustrations of
inappropriate attire. The latter includes: hiking boots, jogging suits, leggings or stirrup pants,
shorts and crop pants, slippers and house shoes, flip flops or “thong” sandals, athletic-style
shoes, beachwear, team jerseys, casual t-shirts, “crocs” or jellies shoes, Birkenstocks, halter
and tank tops, visible piercings other than earrings, athletic sweatshirts, pants or yoga pants,
bare shoulder dresses or shirts, visible tattoos, hats, denim. With regard to jewelry in general,
the dress code provides: “Jewelry may be worn provided it is professional in appearance. One
earring on each ear on the bottom lobe is appropriate. Jewelry related to any other body
piercings is not acceptable.” There is no express prohibition on lapel or other pins.
On August 12, Cardenales sent a memorandum to members of the supervisory staff

13 Caruso testified that, after the election, both Cardenales and supervisor Mike Popyk told
employees that employees would not be receiving raises insofar as the WESU labor contract was “null
and void.” Gerrity testified that Popyk told him essentially the same thing. Cardenales acknowledged
making such statements to employees after, but not before, the election. These statements were not
alleged as independent unfair labor practices.
14 Velletri similarly testified that employees regularly wear other types of pins such as breast cancer
awareness, Connecticut Children’s Medical Center and stork pins, among others.
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pertaining to attempts by Gambone to visit with employees on company property and at client
locations.15 Of relevance to the discrete issue under consideration here, is Cardenales’
admonition as follows: “Employees are expected to adhere to the company “Approved Uniform”
policy with each of its respective components as such. No unauthorized pins, stickers etc.
allowed for display.”
Cardenales testified that an authorized pin or sticker was an item approved by the
company, given directly to an employee by the company and that these are the only types of
pins or stickers allowed at work. Cardenales denied that employees wore WESU stickers or
pins, although he acknowledged that they have worn American Flag pins. When asked whether
those were kept and distributed by the company he replied, “I won’t necessarily say that we
have not given it out,” but acknowledged that he had not distributed such pins to employees.
4. The alleged surveillance of employees and prohibition on possession of union
materials on company time and company property.
The complaint, as amended at the hearing, alleges that on or about August 11 or 12
Hughson engaged in surveillance of employees’ Union activities and that, on those same dates,
Respondent prohibited employees from possessing Union materials on company time and
property. Respondent has denied these allegations of the complaint.
Respondent maintains a no-solicitation and no-distribution policy which is set forth in its
employee handbook, which provides:
It is the policy of the company to prohibit solicitation and distribution by non-employees
on Company premises and through Company mail and e-mail systems, and to permit
solicitation and distribution by employees only as outlined below. The Company limits
solicitation and distribution on its premises because, when left unrestricted, such
activities can interfere with the normal and orderly operations of the Company, can be
detrimental to efficiency, and can pose a threat to safety and security.
Solicitation of others regarding the sale of material goods, contests, donations, etc. is to
be limited to approved announcements posted on designated break room bulletin
boards. Use of the electronic mail system for solicitation is strictly prohibited. Distributing
literature and circulating petitions in work areas at any time is also prohibited. Solicitation
and distribution by any person who is not employed by the Company are prohibited at all
times on Company property and throughout all Company operated facilities.
The Company on occasion may approve certain charitable or informational campaigns
(e.g. related to employment benefits). At no time, however, will you be required to
donate or participate as a condition of employment.16
Respondent additionally relies upon the following language, contained in Article V of the WESU
agreement:
Nothing in this Agreement shall abridge the rights of employees to engage in Union
activities in accordance with the law. However, there shall be no discussion of Union

15 Gambone’s visit and Cardenales’ subsequent memorandum will be discussed in further detail
below
16 It is not alleged that this no-solicitation, no-distribution policy is unlawful.
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affairs on the premises of accounts or facilities serviced by the Employer. Employees
may confer with representatives of the Employer in the administration of this Agreement
at times mutually agreed upon b the employee and the Employer. Employees with Union
investigation responsibilities shall seek the permission of the Employer to investigate
grievance matters during working hours and the Employer’s permission shall not be
unreasonably withheld. However, there shall be no Union meetings on the Employer’s
premises without the Employer’s permission. The names of Union employees with
investigation responsibilities are to be specified by the Union in writing and delivered to
the Employer at the beginning of each contract year.
Gambone testified that on either August 11 or 12 he visited the Employer’s Waterbury
facility. 17 Gambone drove a NEMSA vehicle which he characterized as a “rolling billboard” as
the Union’s name was prominently featured. By that point, NEMSA had obtained a sufficient
number of authorization cards to support its petition and the purpose of Gambone’s visit was to
speak with employees and answer any questions they might have. He stated that did not
contact anyone to seek their permission to enter the facility or meet with employees.18
Gambone stated that he arrived at Company 2 at about 10:00 or 10:30 am and parked
his vehicle in the parking lot where employees typically park their cars. He entered the
premises through the garage and proceeded to a picnic table situated in the facility where
several crews (approximately six to eight employees) were located. As Gambone entered the
building he saw Cardenales, but the two did not speak at this time. He proceeded to the picnic
table, spoke with employees and offered them some materials consisting of pens, stickers and
notepads bearing the NEMSA logo.
As Gambone testified, shortly thereafter, Cardenales and Hughson came over to the
picnic area and told Gambone he did not have permission to be there and should leave.
Hughson then began confiscating the materials Gambone had distributed to employees.
Gambone had given one employee a box of pens and other items to distribute to coworkers. As
this employee was sitting in her ambulance, which was parked in the garage at the time,
Hughson walked over and collected the materials. Gambone went over to Hughson and asked
that they be returned to him, and Hughson complied with his request.
At this point, Gambone left the premises and drove a short distance to a local Dunkin’
Donuts franchise. In the store, he encountered two of the crew members who had been at
Company 2 during his visit, who came in after he was in line.19 He spoke with the employees,

17 During his testimony, Gambone acknowledged that this date differed from the date specified in his
pre-hearing affidavit, and that a review of documents before the trial had refreshed his recollection as to
when the events in question had actually occurred.
18 During Gambone’s direct examination, Counsel for the General Counsel appeared to suggest that
Gambone had an ongoing employment relationship with Respondent. In fact, Gambone had been
previously employed by American Medical Response of Massachusetts, Inc. He had been terminated on
August 9, 2007 and both a grievance and an unfair labor practice charge relating to his discharge was
pending at the time of the hearing. On May 20, an arbitration decision was issued on his discharge finding
that he had been discharged for cause and denying the grievance. In particular, the arbitrator concluded
that Gambone had made false statements in a patient care report regarding a call involving a minor and
again in a subsequent interview about the incident. Respondent suggests that I rely upon these findings
to discredit Gambone’s testimony.
19 Gambone denied planning to meet the crew members there, and stated that it was merely a
coincidence. As Respondent has noted, however, in his pre-trial affidavit, Gambone stated that he went to
Continued
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and gave them his business card. At this point Hughson entered the restaurant and interrupted
their conversation, telling the employees that they had a pending call. They replied that they did
not hear any call and Hughson responded that they were about to get one and needed to get on
the road. Gambone purchased coffee and left the restaurant as the employees were still waiting
for their order.
Gambone then proceeded a short distance to Waterbury Hospital. He observed that
some employees were situated in the staging area, which is where employees await dispatch.
Gambone parked next to one of the ambulances, exited his vehicle, spoke with two employees
who were waiting in the area and offered them NEMSA materials. Hughson pulled up. It
appeared to Gambone that he instructed the other crews in the staging area to leave. Gambone
then left the facility. As he was doing so, he observed Hughson approaching the crew he had
been speaking with and confiscating the materials Gambone had given to them. Gambone’s
visit at Waterbury Hospital had lasted only a few minutes.
Gambone next drove over to Saint Mary’s Hospital, another major client, approximately
five minutes away. He parked on a public street near the ambulance bay. As Gambone sat
there, one of the crews situated in the ambulance bay exited the hospital and parked in front of
him. Gambone walked over to their vehicle and asked if they were on a call. The employees
stated that they were not and were waiting for an assignment. Gambone spoke with them and
offered them NEMSA materials. At this point in time Hughson arrived and took the materials
from the employees. Gambone returned to his vehicle and waited. Approximately five minutes
later, two members of hospital security came over and instructed him to leave the vicinity, which
he did.
Hughson testified that Gambone’s visit to the facility did not occur until noon.20 He was
notified that a NEMSA vehicle had pulled in to Company 2 and entered the garage where he
observed someone speaking with employees. At the time, Hughson did not know Gambone. He
approached the picnic table, and asked Gambone to step over to the soda machines, about 15-
20 feet away. The two men introduced themselves. Hughson asked Gambone if he had
permission to be on the property, and as Hughson testified, Gambone stated that Cardenales
had given him permission. At this point Cardenales arrived and stated that Gambone was not
authorized to be on the premises and, according to Hughson, Gambone replied, “Why don’t you
just tell me to get the ‘F’ off the property.” Gambone also said that this would make the
newsletter. 21
Hughson testified that two ambulance crews and at least one or two transportation
crews22 were present in the garage at the time, and that this was an unusual circumstance
because crews are usually either out at posting locations or transporting patients. The garage is
not a post location. Cardenales similarly testified that it was unusual to have so many
_________________________
the Dunkin’ Donuts to meet with two of the employees that had been at the garage. Respondent asserts
that it was clear that Gambone must have arranged the meeting with that crew while he was at the
garage.
20 Cardenales offered no specific testimony about the timing of the events in question. On cross-
examination, he responded affirmatively to a question from Counsel for the General Counsel which
placed Gambone’s visit as occurring in the “morning.”
21 According to Cardenales, Gambone stated, “Why don’t you just throw me the hell out then.”
Cardenales replied that it was not necessary to be rude, but that Gambone was not authorized to be on
the premises. Gambone then stated that “it was going to be on the website, anyway,”
22 Transportation crews provide non-emergency services, such as transporting clients to the doctor.
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employees present in the garage at any particular time. According to Cardenales, the
employees also seemed “very nervous,” which he found to be “strange.”
While the three men were speaking, employees had dispersed and returned to their
vehicles. Gambone was in the process of exiting the garage, and handed a box of material to an
EMT employee who was getting ready to deploy. Hughson approached the employee and
asked for the material. Hughson then returned the articles to Gambone, asking him to “refrain
from stopping and taking to the employees during work hours. You have their names. You have
their phone numbers. You have their e-mails. You have regular union meetings. Those are your
time[s] that you could talk to employees. Please don’t disrupt business and our daily
operations.” Hughson then escorted Gambone to his vehicle and he drove off.
Hughson and Cardenales discussed Gambone’s visit and, decided to go to Waterbury
Hospital, to reassure the client that the Employer’s operations would not be compromised by
any organizing activity. Hughson and Cardenales testified that, as they were driving over, they
heard one of the ambulances getting a call over the radio for an out-of-town transfer, with no
response. They then noticed that this particular vehicle was parked at Dunkin’ Donuts, as was
the NEMSA vehicle. Hughson informed dispatch that he would get the crew to log on to respond
to the call. According to Hughson, he then pulled over and entered the Dunkin’ Donuts to speak
with the crew. He told the crew that they had a call and asked them not to delay any further, it
was business as usual.23 Hughson gave the employees permission to remain behind long
enough to purchase coffee. While they were waiting, Gambone returned to his vehicle and
drove off.
Respondent introduced into evidence a record referred to by Hughson as a “CAD report”
for the transfer call referred to above which shows the time of dispatch, the time the vehicle
went en route to the call and the time it arrived at the scene. According to this document, the
crew was contacted by dispatch and given the assignment to transport a patient to a dialysis
facility at 13:34 (or 1:34 pm) and departed for the call at 13:37 (or 1:37 pm).
Cardenales and Hughson then proceeded to Waterbury Hospital. As the two men
entered the parking lot, they noticed the NEMSA vehicle in the ambulance parking area. As they
approached, the vehicle left the area. Contrary to Gambone, neither Hughson nor Cardenales
offered any testimony regarding any confiscation of pro-NEMSA material from employees at this
time or location. However, they also did not specifically deny Gambone’s testimony that this had
occurred.
Cardenales and Hughson then entered the hospital and spoke with Employer’s on-site
transportation coordinator and asked him to report any service delays or unusual activity within
the parking lot to the duty supervisor. The men then spoke next with the hospital’s Director of
Security, Oscar Herrera. Hughson explained that there was an organizing campaign, reassured
the hospital that patient services would remain a priority, and requested that the hospital be alert
to unauthorized visits from NEMSA representatives. Herrera stated that the hospital maintained
a no-solicitation policy.
The visit to Waterbury Hospital took about 20 to 30 minutes. After that Hughson and
Cardenales proceeded to Saint Mary’s Hospital. They noticed the NEMSA vehicle parked on a
public street in an area which typically is used for patient drop off, and which is adjacent to the
hospital emergency room parking lot. One of the company’s vehicles was also parked in that

23 These crew members had been present at the garage during Gambone’s visit.
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location, in a manner which partially blocked both the sidewalk and the street. Hughson spoke
with the crew and instructed them to move their vehicle. He saw that they had NEMSA materials
in the ambulance and removed them. One of the employees asked Hughson whether she could
keep a sticker and he replied that she could get one on her own time. At this time, it did not
appear to Hughson that Gambone was in his vehicle. As Hughson proceeded to the emergency
room, Gambone returned to his vehicle and drove off. Hughson and Cardenales then spoke with
hospital security and told them that there was a union vote upcoming, that AMR did not want
any union activity within the parking lot that would disrupt the flow of traffic or interfere with the
drop off area and requested that the hospital contact the duty supervisor if any problems
developed. As Hughson testified, he and Cardenales returned to Company 2 by 3:00 pm.
Later that day, Hughson returned to Waterbury Hospital. As he testified, Gerrity and his
partner had been dispatched to a critical care transport from that facility.24 Hughson testified
that due to the nature of the call, he decided to proceed to the hospital to make sure that
“everything was going to be business as usual.” When he arrived he saw Gerrity in his vehicle
on the telephone, with the stretcher still in the car. At that time, Gambone’s vehicle pulled into
the driveway, and then immediately drove off. Gerrity then took the stretcher out of his vehicle
and proceeded with the call. The CAD notes produced by the Employer with regard to this
assignment show that the vehicle was dispatched at 15:44 (or 3:44) pm and en route seven
minutes later.
After the events of this day, Cardenales wrote the memorandum to the Employer’s
supervisory personnel which has been discussed, in part, above. The document notes
“repeated attempts” by Gambone to stop and talk with crews, “either at Company 2 or facilities
where we do business” and that “NEMSA informational material has been removed from the
employee and discarded appropriately and also returned back to the NEMSA rep when
requested.” Supervisors were also instructed to be diligent in making rounds to remove
“unauthorized materials and persons from our facilities.”
Gerrity testified that at some point prior to the election, Hughson told him he could not
have pro-NEMSA literature in his vehicle. On another occasion he attempted distribute a
NEMSA t-shirt to a coworker and Hughson told him that he was not allowed to distribute it on
company property. Hughson did not rebut this testimony. 25
5. Alleged prohibition on wearing Union decals and the related threat of discipline
The complaint alleges that in February 2010, Hughson prohibited employees from
displaying a Union decal while working and further, that he threatened employees with discipline
if they refused to remove the decal. Respondent has denied these allegations of the complaint.
Velletri, who works as a paramedic at Respondent’s Southington facility, is also an
elected steward for NEMSA. He testified that in about November, Gambone gave him NEMSA
stickers. He placed one on his vehicle and another on the company radio holder which he wears
across his chest.

24 A critical care transport is one where a patient is being sent to another facility which offers a higher
level of care.
25 Gerrity also testified that in the past, he had distributed WESU T-shirts and stickers, and had never
been told he could not do so.
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Velletri wore the sticker on his radio holder without incident for some period of time. On
February 9, 2010, he was working out of the Waterbury facility and had occasion to encounter
Hughson in the office. As Velletri testified, Hughson told him that there was nothing official with
NEMSA yet, that the parties were still in negotiations, and that he should remove the sticker or
go home. Velletri replied that he did not think he had to remove the sticker, but Hughson
insisted, so Velletri removed the sticker from his radio holder and placed it on his wallet.
Hughson acknowledged asking Velletri to remove the sticker from his radio holder.
According to Hughson, Velletri “went on a little, little rampage, very small, couldn’t even tell you
what it was. Didn’t say too much. Walked out of the office and that was the end of the
conversation.” Hughson was asked generally whether he “communicated any threat” to Velletri
and he denied doing so but he did not specifically deny that he told Velletri that if he did not
remove the sticker he would have to go home. Although Hughson did not offer specific
testimony about the date of this incident, he confirmed that it happened “recently.”
C. The Alleged Violation of Section 8(a)(3)
The complaint alleges that during the week of August 17 or 24 Respondent unlawfully
refused to allow Gerrity to attend a company meeting on paid time. Respondent has denied this
allegation of the complaint.
Gerrity has been a paramedic with AMR for over 15 years. He served as vice-president
of WESU for four years including the period of time NEMSA was campaigning to represent
employees. As noted above, during the NEMSA campaign he attempted to distribute pro-
NEMSA materials to employees and was told by Hughson he could not do so.
He currently serves as a steward26 and secretary of NEMSA and is a member of the
bargaining committee.
The record establishes that during the month of August, Respondent held various
meetings with employees regarding the upcoming election which were conducted by Retallick
and Hughson. Some were mandatory, and others voluntary.
At some point during August, Retallick circulated the following memorandum to
employees:
IN RESPONSE TO DOZENS OF REQUESTS, Mark and I will be conducting
informational meetings for all employees over the next few days.
We will schedule meetings so you can attend while on duty. If in the event you can not
make a meeting during your shift you are welcome to attend another time slot. All we ask
is please SIGN IN upon arrival. You will be paid for your time while at the meeting.
The memorandum sets forth various times for meetings which were scheduled at two-
hour intervals on Wednesday, August 19 through Friday, August 21. It further provides that
more meetings will be added as necessary and requests that employees contact a company
representative to schedule a meeting time.
Gerrity works the 3:00 pm to 11:00 pm shift on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday. He

26 There are approximately 10 elected stewards.
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testified that on Thursday, August 20, he arrived one hour early for his shift and planned to
attend the 2:00 pm meeting scheduled for that day. According to Gerrity, he went up to the
supervisors’ window in the garage and asked where the meeting was being held. Hughson and
another supervisor named Bryan Reynolds told him that the meeting had been cancelled.
The following morning Gerrity, who does not work on Fridays, came to the facility to
attend a meeting scheduled for 8:00 am. When he arrived at the facility, at about 7:45 am, he
went up to the conference room and was met by Hughson and Cardenales. No one else was
present. According to Gerrity, Hughson stated that, “the meeting wasn’t for me, and that I wasn’t
welcome” and that Gerrity had “already made up [his] mind.” Gerrity testified he argued with the
two supervisors for approximately a half-hour before leaving the facility. No other employee
arrived for a meeting during this period of time. Gerrity further testified that that if he had been
allowed to attend the meeting, he would have received two hours of pay. Gerrity’s payroll
records show that he did not receive any pay for the date of August 21. Gerrity testified that he
subsequently complained to the payroll department that he was owed two hours of pay for that
date.
On August 25 and 26, the Employer scheduled mandatory meetings for all employees in
the bargaining unit. Gerrity attended such a meeting on August 25, where Banelli spoke, and
was paid. There is no claim here that Gerrity or any other employee was excluded from or not
paid for their attendance at these mandatory meetings.
During Gerrity’s cross-examination, Counsel for Respondent failed to address his
account of what had occurred on August 21. Rather, Gerrity was asked whether he attended a
half-hour meeting with Cardenales and Hughson on August 11, for which he was paid. Gerrity
replied that he did not believe that he was at a meeting on August 11. Gerrity was then shown
his time and attendance records for the week from August 8 to August 14 which indicate that on
August 11 he punched in at 2:36 pm, or 24 minutes prior to the start of his shift. Gerrity
acknowledged that typically he would not have been allowed to punch in early for his shift which
began at 3:00. Gerrity’s payroll record further confirms that he was paid for the half-hour period
which preceded his regularly scheduled shift. After being shown these records, Gerrity was
asked again whether this reflected the time when he met with Cardenales and Hughson, but
Gerrity insisted that he was referring to events which occurred on August 20 and 21. He stated
that he did not know why he had punched in early on August 11. When questioned further on
this issue by the General Counsel, Gerrity stated that he had, in fact, been instructed to punch
in prior to the start of his shift on other occasions for various reasons such as to relieve an
employee who had to leave early, or make preparations such as getting a car ready for the next
crew or to place a stretcher in the back of an ambulance.
Respondent similarly questioned both Cardenales and Hughson about events which
occurred on August 11, but not about August 20 or 21. According to Cardenales, Gerrity came
for a meeting scheduled for 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm on August 11. When he arrived, he punched in
about 30 minutes prior to the start of his shift at 3:00 pm and was then informed that the
meeting was cancelled. Gerrity asked if he should punch out, and was told that it was not
necessary. According to Cardenales, he and Hughson met with Gerrity for about one half hour
and he was paid for his time. Cardenales denied that Gerrity was excluded from any employee
meeting in August 2009, and further testified that he never received a complaint from Gerrity
that he had not been paid for attending an employee meeting.
On cross-examination, Cardenales acknowledged that he was not aware of any notice to
employees or other document which had been distributed advising employees that the
Employer had planned or scheduled an informational meeting for August 11. He further
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admitted that some drivers tend to show up early for their shifts and that it would have not been
out of the ordinary for Gerrity to have arrived for his shift 25 minutes early. Cardenales further
acknowledged that employees may be asked to punch in and begin their shifts prior to their
official start time.
On cross-examination, Cardenales was also asked what he remembered discussing with
Gerrity during their meeting on August 11. He responded:
I remember Mr. Gerrity had a lot of questions concerning things that he became aware
of but was unclear, namely Mr. Gambone’s background, he was discussing. He wasn’t
aware Mr. Gambone was no longer employed by AMR or was, at one time, employed
with AMR and no longer employed. His concern with – he, quite frankly, told us he was
unsure whether or not there should be a union in place. He didn’t know.
Hughson was also asked about this issue during his cross-examination. He initially
responded in the affirmative when asked whether he knew, during the time-frame of August
2009, that Gerrity was in favor of unionization. He then stated, however, that at their 20-minute
meeting, Gerrity was “confused” and that Hughson did not know what his vote would be.
Hughson further testified that Gerrity was not excluded from attending any company
meeting in August 2009 and that he was paid for the meetings that he did attend. According to
Hughson, the meeting scheduled for 2:00 p.m. on August 11 had been cancelled and Gerrity
“wasn’t notified for whatever reason.” Gerrity arrived at the facility between 2:15 and 2:30 and
asked if the meeting was still taking place. He was informed that it was cancelled due to lack of
participation. Retallick, who was on a conference call at the time and had been designated to
conduct the meeting, was unavailable. According to Hughson, “[w]e asked if it was okay,
because Rob wasn’t going to be present, if he wanted to talk to Tony and myself, and he did
agree to it.” The three men spoke for 15 to 20 minutes. Hughson denied telling Gerrity that he
was not permitted to attend an employee meeting.
Retallick, who had issued the memorandum informing employees of the meetings to be
held on August 19 through August 21, and who was designated to conduct these meetings with
employees, testified generally that employee meeting were held in August in connection with the
Union campaign and that AMR paid employees for their attendance at such meetings. He
further stated that AMR wanted employees to attend such meetings so that they could get the
information that the company thought they needed to make their decision. Retallick testified that
he was not aware of Gerrity having been excluded from any employee meeting in August 2009.
Retallick was not asked and offered no specific testimony regarding any meeting which may
have been scheduled for employees on August 11 or August 21.
D. The Section 8(a)(5) Allegations
The General Counsel has alleged that Respondent has engaged in several post-
certification unilateral changes in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, thereby removing or
delaying certain contractual benefits affecting terms and conditions of employment. Respondent
has admitted certain allegations of the complaint, and there are few disputed facts here.
Respondent generally maintains, however, that it has not violated the Act, as alleged.
1. The alleged unlawful delay in processing recertification, tuition reimbursement
and upgrade payments
Article XVII (Training) of the WESU agreement provides that the Employer “shall pay
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tuition costs for any courses which are required” for full-and part-time EMTs not receiving such
reimbursement from another employer which are necessary for the employee to retain his or her
certification. In addition, eligible unit employees are entitled to annual recertification payments in
the amounts of $1750 for paramedics and $300 for chair car drivers. 27 The applicable
provision further provides for other tuition reimbursements to employees. Under the 2006
collective-bargaining agreement, employees are additionally eligible for “upgrade pay.”
The General Counsel has alleged that, in September, shortly after the election and the
certification of NEMSA, the Employer, taking the position that the WESU agreement was “null
and void,” ceased processing such payments without notice to or bargaining with the Union and
only reinstituted making such payments in late-December and early-January 2010, after unfair
labor practice charges were filed.
Cardenales testified that he is responsible for submitting recertification and tuition
reimbursement requests and to process upgrade payments to employees.28 The requisite
paperwork is sent to the corporate office in Colorado, which then issues the payment to the
employee in question or takes other appropriate action, usually within two weeks of submission.
Cardenales acknowledged that during the period after NEMSA’s certification up until December
2009, when the Employer resumed processing payments to employees, he took the position
that these benefits were part of the WESU agreement which had become “null and void” and
that he communicated this position to employees.
Gerrity testified that he submitted a request for recertification payment in September 2009,
but did not receive it until January 2010. Cardenales testified, contrary to Gerrity, that no
request was received from him until November 15 and that Gerrity had not received or
submitted appropriate documentation to support his request until shortly prior to that date.29
Cardenales submitted Gerrity’s request in late-December.
In support of its contention that the Employer unlawfully discontinued processing
recertification payments to employees, the General Counsel adduced evidence that Laurie
Jackson submitted her request on September 9, but was not paid until January 8, 2010. Mark
DeFonce requested his recertification payment on October 19, but was not paid until January 8,
2010. Gabriel Cozmuta was eligible for her recertification payment on November 10, but was
not paid until January 8, 2010.
The record also shows that DeFonce was due for a tuition reimbursement of $1500 on
May 30, but that it was not submitted for payment until December 18. Foley was due under the
contract for tuition reimbursement on November 25 and was not paid until December 18.
Employee Lisa Landino was eligible for a pay upgrade in late-August, but did not receive
it until December 24. Joseph Nolan was due for an upgrade in June 2009, but similarly did not
receive it until December 24.

27 Employees are required to recertify their qualifications annually, within 90 days of their anniversary
date. The 2006 collective-bargaining agreement sets forth what is required for an employee to be eligible
for a recertification payment.
28 Respondent has not argued that any of these employees were not owed the amounts as claimed
by the General Counsel.
29 According to Cardenales, employees are required to have a letter of good standing from the
employee’s sponsor hospital stating that they are in good standing for medical control purposes.
Waterbury Hospital did not issue Gerrity a required letter of good standing until November 5, 2009.
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At some point in mid- to late-December the Employer resumed processing the
recertification, tuition reimbursement and upgrade payments owed to employees. According to
Cardenales, he conducted a review of all requests for recertification, tuition and upgrade step
increases after September 2009 and that, as of the date of the hearing, all such amounts have
been processed and paid by the Employer. Specifically, Cardenales testified that since
December 18, all requests for tuition reimbursement submitted by Waterbury Division
employees have been processed and paid in the normal course; that he resumed processing
requests for grade step increases after December 10 and all recertification payments have been
processed since the third week in December.
2. Alleged changes to the overtime procedure
The complaint alleges that since on or about October 1, Respondent modified overtime
distribution procedures applicable to unit employees. In its answer, Respondent admits this
allegation, but denies the conclusion that such conduct amounts to an unfair labor practice.
Both Caruso and Gerrity testified that, in the past, employees seeking to work overtime
could sign up for open assignments as soon as the schedule for any given month came out,
which was usually during previous month.30 The assignment was not guaranteed however: an
employee could be “bumped” from a desired shift if a part-time employee wanted it. Caruso
testified that this had been the practice during the 13 years he had been employed for the
Employer.
Both Caruso and Gerrity testified that in October employees were told that they would
not be able to sign up for overtime until 24 hours prior to any given shift. Then, in November,
Caruso saw supervisor Amanda Rochette31 post a notice on the wall of the Waterbury facility.
Dated November 15, it states as follows:
Due to the changing nature area codes in CT, InfoRad is being updated.
We are currently unable to page out open shifts (or anything for that matter) from OPS
so I have received permission to change the OT policy until further notice. All
Supervisors have been notified.
OT Policy
72 Hours (3 DAYS)
before shift
Velletri testified that he saw this memorandum posted at both the Southington and
Waterbury facilities.
Retallick testified that, in October 2009, overtime was high for the division, and
consequently the Employer instituted a procedure by which full-time employees could no longer
put their names on the schedule for an open shift. They could, however, place their name at the

30 Caruso testified that “the second or third week of the previous month they’ll have the next following
month out.”
31 Caruso testified that Rochette is a supervisor on his shift at the Waterbury facility. Rochette did not
testify in this proceeding. There is no evidence that she is no longer employed by Respondent.
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bottom of the schedule to indicate their availability. In the event the desired shift was not
claimed by a part-time employee 48 hours prior to the start of the shift, it went to the full-time
employee who had placed his name on the bottom of the schedule. According to Retallick, this
change was put into place because “it got to be to the point where the supervisors would look at
the schedule and just see that the schedule was full, and not really be looking at who was
working the overtime. So, our overtime hours were, were spiraling, you know, way out of control
because we didn’t see where the open spots were on the schedule for the part-timers to take,
and nor did the part-timers really see or know how many hours that a full-timer was working.
And it wouldn’t give them the option to bump a full-timer because they didn’t know if they were
in that position or not.” When asked whether this was a change which he felt was prudent from
an operational perspective, Retallick replied: “Absolutely, It was a financial reason. Our call
volume was going down. Our costs were going up. Our, like I said before, our overtime
percentage was going up. And it was something that I had to do as part of the business.”
When asked about the memo posted by Rochette, Retallick replied that he had never
seen it. 32
Caruso testified that employees do not work as much overtime as they had previously
and were affected by the change. Caruso, however, does not work overtime and failed to offer
any specific evidence to support these assertions. Velletri testified that in 2009 he worked as
much as 30 to 40 hours of overtime per week, that now he was “down to a lot less than that”
and that not being able to schedule overtime has affected his income. Responding to this
testimony from General Counsel’s witnesses, Retallick stated that certain operational factors
affected the amount of overtime available to full-time employees. In particular, he testified that
the facility hired approximately 15 part-time and per diem employees. In addition, the facility
experienced a decrease in call volume.
Bargaining committee members Gerrity Caruso and Gambone testified, without rebuttal,
that no notice was given to the Union prior to any change in the Employer’s overtime distribution
policy.
3. Alleged change to the shift bid process.
The complaint alleges that since on or about November 1, Respondent has failed to post
the bi-annual shift bid for unit employees. In its answer, Respondent admitted this allegation of
the complaint, but denied the conclusion that it constitutes an unfair labor practice.
As Caruso testified, employees bid on shifts by seniority and bids are posted twice per
year. Article IV, Section 9 of the WESU agreement provides in relevant part that “the bidding
process shall occur two (2) times annually. . . Bid selection shall start on November 1st and be
posted on December 1st for the months of January-June.”
According to Caruso, this practice had been followed for the 13 years he had been
employed by the Employer. He further testified that the Employer never posted the November
2009 bids for the January 2010 shifts and that this issue was not raised in bargaining. Similarly
Gambone also testified that this issue never came up during bargaining.
4. Alleged failure to grant the January 2010 wage increase

32 The exemplar of this notice in evidence has a partial signature. No witness who testified could
identify it.
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The record establishes that for many years employees have received wage increases
every year. In the past such increases were given to employees in the months of September,
October and/or January.33 Under the 2006 collective-bargaining agreement, the Employer was
obliged, “on the first pay period that encompasses the effective date listed below” to increase
employees’ base hourly wages by a designated percentage. For the effective date of January 1,
2010, EMTs and paramedics were to receive a 3.5 percent increase and drivers a 3 percent
increase.
It is undisputed that the January 2010 annual increases were not given to unit
employees. This had been communicated to employees on a number of occasions beginning
with the August campaign memorandum where it was stated that WESU had “tossed out your 1-
1-2010 pay increase.” After the election, Cardenales and Popyk told employees that they would
not be receiving the January 2010 raises. At the hearing, Banelli testified that it is the
Employer’s position that the annual wage increases set forth in the 2006 collective-bargaining
agreement were not due because that labor agreement became null and void as a result of the
certification of NEMSA as the collective-bargaining representative of the Waterbury Division
employees. Banelli further testified as of the date of the hearing, the parties had not bargained
over that issue, or over the issue of wages generally.
On January 14, Caruso filed a grievance alleging that Respondent “failed to give all
EMTs and Paramedics their wage increases. AMR has also failed to give transportation
employees their lump sum payments.” Vice President Zagami answered the grievance as
follows: “As of September 4, 2009 the Collective Bargaining Agreement became null and void.
In addition there is a pending ULP case. Grievance denied.”
III. Analysis and Conclusions
A. The Section 8(a)(1) Allegations
1. The prohibition on using a bulletin board to post Union materials
The record establishes that Respondent provided WESU with a bulletin board to use for
union business and that, prior to the NEMSA campaign, there was no apparent effort to censor
or remove the material posted by employees on that board. The record further establishes that
during the Union campaign, Caruso and Gerrity posted pro-NEMSA literature on the WESU
bulletin board. This material was quickly removed by persons unknown. Three WESU officials
(Caruso, Gerrity and West) along with various management personnel had access to the board
so as to enable them to remove such materials. Both Caruso and Gerrity testified that they did
not do so, and West did not testify in this matter.34
In addition, Banelli acknowledged his awareness and apparent approval of the fact that,

33 The 1999-2002 collective bargaining agreement provided for raises to be given in January and
October of each year and the 2002-2006 agreement for annual raise increases in September of each
year of the contract.
34 Gerrity offered hearsay testimony that West denied removing NEMSA items from the bulletin
board. I give weight to this testimony as it is corroborated by other record evidence including admissions
from Respondent’s agents. I additionally note that in the August 25 memorandum posted on the WESU
bulletin board, all the WESU officers, including West, encouraged employees to vote for representation by
NEMSA; thus, it would be improbable that West would have removed such literature.
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during the election campaign, a supervisor had removed NEMSA literature from the WESU
board because the Employer took the position that the board was designated for WESU and
was not for use by NEMSA. The evidence further establishes that subsequent to the election
supervisor Spagna instructed Caruso to remove certain unspecified material from the WESU
board.
Moreover, as noted above, on August 12, Cardenales issued a memorandum in which
he advised Respondent’s supervisory personnel that NEMSA informational materials had been
confiscated from employees and instructed supervisors to remove such “unauthorized
materials” from the facility.
In its post-hearing brief, Respondent argues that there is no evidence to establish that
NEMSA materials were removed from the Waterbury facility when they were posted in general
employee posting areas. In this regard, Respondent echoes Banelli’s testimony and apparently
concedes that NEMSA items were removed when they were posted on the WESU bulletin board
insofar as it argues: “[t]his does not constitute unlawful employer conduct, because NEMSA had
no right to post materials on a bulletin board dedicated to the use of another union.” In support
of the foregoing position, Respondent argues that had WESU been on the ballot for the election,
NEMSA would have had no right to post its election notices on WESU’s bulletin board and the
fact that WESU was not on the ballot does not change this analysis.
In support of its argument that employees were permitted to post pro-NEMSA material in
general posting areas, in particular by the time clock, Respondent relies upon Caruso’s
“equivocal, at best” testimony that he “could not recall” if NEMSA had posted materials there, as
well as Hughson and Cardenales’ testimony that employees could, with permission, post items
in this location. Respondent failed to adduce, however, any evidence that such permission had
been granted or that any specific item of pro-NEMSA literature was allowed to be posted in any
location where employee notices are customarily posted. In fact, the only specific evidence
presented regarding the posting of such campaign literature relates to the letter in support of
NEMSA signed by WESU officials, which Retallick saw posted on the WESU board. In this
regard, however, there is no evidence that the notice Retallick saw remained posted for any
appreciable period of time.
More to the point however, is the fact that Respondent admittedly considered pro-
NEMSA material to be “unauthorized material” subject to removal or confiscation and so
instructed its supervisory personnel.
An employer is under no obligation to permit employees to use its bulletin boards to post
pro-union materials or literature, even where the employer itself uses the same bulletin boards
to post its own anti-union messages. Register- Guard, 351 NLRB 1110, 1114, 1118 (2007).
However, if the restrictions on employees’ use of bulletin boards are discriminatorily enforced or
promulgated with anti-union motivation, then an employer has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. Register-Guard, supra; see also Roadway Express, 279 NLRB 302, 304 (1986)(removal of
bulletin board a violation of Section 8(a)(1) when action motivated by the posting of union
material.) Applying these principles here, I conclude that the evidence establishes that the
Employer unlawfully promulgated and discriminatorily enforced a prohibition against employees’
use of its Waterbury bulletin board to post pro-NEMSA literature.
In Register-Guard, supra, the Board modified extant Board law concerning what
constitutes discriminatory enforcement of policies and rules, such as the use of bulletin boards.
Pursuant to Register-Guard, the Board will find discriminatory enforcement if the disparate
treatment relates to activities and communications of a similar character because of their union
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status. While the Board did not define precisely what communications or activities are of “a
similar character” to union activities or communications, it did provide some examples of where
discrimination would be construed as unlawful and along Section 7 lines. For example, and of
particular relevance to the instant case, the Board found that an employer would clearly violate
the Act if it permitted employees to use e-mail (and by extension, other property such as bulletin
boards) to solicit for one union but not another. In such an instance, the employer has drawn a
line between permitted and prohibited activities on Section 7 grounds. Register-Guard, supra at
1118.
Here the evidence shows that the employer was contractually obliged to and regularly
permitted employees the use of its property for postings related to WESU. It is also the case
that it was apparent that WESU in its representational capacity showed support for the NEMSA
election campaign. Once indicia of such support became apparent, as the Employer has
conceded, it was removed from the WESU board. Thus, the Employer undertook to censor
WESU’s communications to employees, as well as employees’ communications among
themselves, along Section 7 grounds. Such discriminatory enforcement of its existing policies
and rules is unlawful.35
Moreover, as the Board has made clear, it continues to find that if the evidence shows
that the employer’s motive for the line drawing was antiunion then the action would be unlawful.
Register Guard, 331 NLRB 1118 at fn.18. Here, there is no evidence that the Employer had
imposed restrictions on the posting of material on the so-called WESU board until pro-NEMSA
material began appearing there. Moreover, there is no evidence that any other material was
removed from the employee board during the relevant period of time. Further, contrary to the
Employer’s suggestion, there is no specific evidence that the Employer countenanced the
posting of NEMSA literature at any other location where any notices to and by employees were
customarily posted. To the contrary, supervisors were instructed to remove such materials from
Respondent’s facilities. Thus, the record supports a finding that the alleged restrictions on the
employees’ use of the bulletin board designated for their use was motivated by antiunion
considerations.
Accordingly, I find that by prohibiting employees at its Waterbury facility from using a
bulletin board to post certain Union-related items, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
2. The threat to employees that they will lose an annual wage increase if they vote
for the Union.
The complaint alleges that since on or about August 1, Respondent has threatened
employees with the loss of their annual pay increase if they voted for the Union. Respondent
has denied violating the Act, as alleged. While Respondent does not specifically address this
allegation in its post-hearing brief, it argues generally that it could not lawfully give employees a
raise in January 2010, a contention that will be discussed in detail below.
It is undisputed that in August, Retallick issued a memorandum to employees where he
stated that: “the union tossed out your 1-1-2010 pay increases when Mike West told the Labor
Board that the current CBA would end when the NLRB election was held.” As an initial matter, I

35 In disagreement with the Employer, I do not find that WESU’s decision not to appear on the ballot
countenances Respondent’s censorship of employees’ use of the bulletin board upon which employees
had freely been allowed to post materials relating to their Section 7 rights.
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note that there is no evidence in this record which would suggest, let alone establish that West,
WESU or NEMSA ever took such a position with the Board, the Employer or members of the
bargaining unit.
In agreement with the General Counsel, I find that by issuing this statement Respondent
tied its refusal to grant the January 2010 raise to the Union campaign and the Board-held
election. Thus, the Employer advised its employees that its course of action in regards to the
January 2010 raises, i.e. the withholding of benefits, would be prompted by their concerted,
protected activity. As will be discussed in detail at a later point in this decision, Respondent’s
employees had consistently received and had every reason to expect an annual wage increase.
Accordingly, by threatening employees with a loss of benefits and less favorable treatment
because of their protected conduct, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Wellstream
Corp., 313 NLRB 698, 707 (1994)(“When an employer attributes to the [u]nion its failure to
grant a pay raise, it violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act”)(citing Centre Engineering, Inc., 253
NLRB 419, 421 (1980)); More Truck Lines, Inc., 336 NLRB 772 (2001), enfd. 324 F.3d 735
(D.C. Cir. 2003), (employer violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it informed employees that
if a new union was elected, the old union contract would be “null and void” thereby freezing
employee wage levels and denying them the annual wage increases contained in the
predecessor’s contract); First Student, Inc., 341 NLRB 136, 141 (2004).
3. The prohibition on wearing union pins
The complaint alleges that in or about August 2009, Hughson prohibited employees from
wearing a Union lapel pin. Respondent has denied this allegation of the complaint and asserts
that the company does not permit employees to wear unauthorized pins or other items on their
AMR uniforms. Notwithstanding this assertion, Caruso’s testimony, as corroborated by Velletri
and Gerrity, and which I credit, is that employees have historically worn a variety of pins on their
work clothes, including other union pins, those in support of a variety of charitable causes,
American flag36 and military pins. As noted above, Respondent’s dress code does not
specifically ban the wearing of pins. Here, the evidence demonstrates that on three occasions
where Hughson saw Caruso wearing a small NEMSA pin he instructed Caruso to remove it. At
no time did Hughson explain to Caruso why he had issued such a directive; nor did he do so at
the hearing.
It is well established that employees generally have the right to wear union insignia while
at work. Republic Aviation Corp., v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 801-803 (1945). It is also true,
however, that this right is not without limitation. The Board is charged with balancing the
conflicting rights of employers to manage their businesses safely and efficiently. Id. at 797-798;
Sam’s Club, 349 NLRB 1007, 1010 (2007). “Thus, an employer may limit or ban the display or
wearing of union insignia at work if special circumstances exist and if those circumstances
outweigh the adverse effect on employees’ Section 7 rights resulting from the limitation or ban.”
Id. (citing Albis Plastics, 335 NLRB 923, 924 (2001); Macks Supermarkets, 288 NLRB 1082,
1098 (1988)). “The Board has found special circumstances justifying the proscription of union
insignia when its display may jeopardize employee safety, damage machinery or products,
exacerbate employee dissention, or unreasonably interfere with a public image which the

36 In its post-hearing brief, Respondent asserts that the company has authorized its employees to
wear American Flag lapel pins. Cardenales testified merely that he “[wouldn’t] necessarily say that we
have not given [them] out.” As neither he nor any other manager who testified asserted that such pins
were approved or distributed by management, I do not find that they were authorized as the Employer
suggests.
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employer has established as part of its business plan, through appearance rules for its
employees.” United Parcel Service, 312 NLRB 596, 597 (1993) (citing Nordstrom, Inc., 264
NLRB 698, 700 (1982)); see also Sam’s Club, supra, (limitations on the wearing of union
insignia have been approved based upon safety concerns and on the employer’s need to have
neatly uniformed employees as part of its public image). Conversely, limitations that are based
merely upon an employee’s contact with customers or that are overly broad have been found to
be invalid. Id.
Respondent has failed to substantiate its claim that Hughson’s demand that Caruso
remove the NEMSA pin was because it was in violation of Respondent’s dress code, or
otherwise related to a requirement that only company authorized pins are allowed to be worn by
employees. Notably, not one witness who testified on behalf of Respondent pointed to any
specific provision of the dress code as a rationale for the restriction imposed. While it may be
apparent that Respondent desires that its employees present a certain image to the public, the
record establishes that the company countenances the wearing of other buttons and pins.
Further, as the Board has held, customer exposure to union insignia, standing alone, is not a
special circumstance which allows an employer to prohibit the display of such insignia. United
Parcel Service, supra at 597 (citing Nordstrom, Inc. 264 NLRB 698 (1982)). Moreover, even
where a legitimate need exists, discriminatory enforcement of a dress code has been found to
be violative of the Act. Holladay Park Hospital, 262 NLRB 278, 279 (1982).
In its post-hearing brief, Respondent suggests that the situation at the Waterbury
Division is analogous to a hospital setting and argues that the Board has determined that
potential for disruption of patient care or health care operations constitutes a legitimate reason
to restrict employee solicitation or distribution of union materials. Respondent cites no legal
support for drawing the analogy between its operations and those of a health care institution. In
any event, while it is the case that the Supreme Court has recognized that a hospital (or other
health care institution) “may be justified in imposing somewhat more stringent prohibitions than
are generally permitted,” with respect to union activity at its premises, Beth Israel Hospital v.
NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 495 (1978), this is to “accommodate the special needs of patients for a
tranquil environment.” Eastern Maine Medical Center v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1981).
Absent a demonstration of such need, the Board and courts uniformly hold that union activity
such as the display of union insignia is protected, and that a rule prohibiting it violates Section
8(a)(1). Asociation Hospital Del Maestro, Inc. v. NLRB, 824 F.2d 575 (1st Cir. 1988), enfg. 283
NLRB 283 NLRB 419 (1987); Cogburn Healthcare Center, Inc., 335 NLRB 1397, 1412
(2001)(and cases cited therein).
In support of its contentions, Respondent relies upon NLRB v. St. Francis Healthcare
Center, 212 F.3d. 945, 961 (6th Cir 2000). However, in that case the court affirmed the Board’s
finding that the employer had violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and in so doing, found that the
employer had not articulated, much less demonstrated, any special circumstance to justify its
restriction on union pins. In particular, there was no evidence that the restriction was necessary
to maintain production, reduce employee dissension, or maintain employee safety or discipline.
Likewise, the employer failed to make an affirmative showing that the union pins would harm the
employer’s public image. Finally, the court noted that the employer did not consistently enforce
its uniform policy. To the contrary, substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that the
employer regularly tolerated non-union pins and buttons on employee uniforms.
Here, too, Respondent has neither asserted nor proven any need or special
circumstance, nor does it cite any legitimate safety concern which would warrant a restriction on
the wearing of a small union pin. Moreover, Hughson instructed Caruso to remove his NEMSA
pin when he was in the office at Company 2 and, subsequently in a room at Waterbury Hospital
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designated for employees to complete paperwork. Thus, Respondent’s restriction on the
wearing of NEMSA insignia apparently applied regardless of whether the employee was in
contact with patients, performing other tasks or between calls. The Board has found that a rule
which fails to take similar circumstances into account is overbroad. See Albertsons, Inc., 272
NLRB 865, 966 (1984). Moreover, there is substantial evidence that prior to the NEMSA
campaign Respondent allowed employees to wear a variety of other pins, including union pins,
regardless of whether they were obtained from the company or elsewhere.
Accordingly, I find that by instructing Caruso to remove the NEMSA pin from his uniform,
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The surveillance of employees and prohibition on the possession of Union
materials on company time and property.
The General Counsel alleges that on or about August 11 or 12, Respondent engaged in
unlawful surveillance of its employees’ Union activities. The evidence establishes that Gambone
visited and attempted to meet with employees at Respondent’s Waterbury facility. After an
interaction with Cardenales and Hughson, Gambone was directed to and did leave the facility. It
is undisputed that Hughson confiscated NEMSA materials from employees at this time.
Respondent then determined that it would go to client facilities because of its concern that
continued union activity created a potential for disruption of operations at these locations. Their
first stop, however, was not at any client facility but at the nearby Dunkin’ Donuts, where both
NEMSA and AMR vehicles were spotted. After speaking with employees who were purchasing
coffee, Hughson and Cardenales proceeded to visit Respondent’s two major clients in the area.
Respondent’s suspicion that Gambone would continue to attempt to meet with employees was
confirmed when he was seen at or nearby these other facilities. Gambone testified that at two
points during the day, at Waterbury Hospital and on a public thoroughfare adjacent to Saint
Mary’s Hospital, Hughson confiscated Union materials from employees. Hughson admitted
confiscating material at one location (Saint Mary’s) and did not deny that he removed NEMSA
materials from employees stationed in an ambulance at Waterbury Hospital37
Respondent contends that the General Counsel is relying upon mere suspicion and has
failed to meet its burden to prove that Respondent alleged in unlawful surveillance, as alleged.
In particular, Respondent argues that the evidence shows that on the date in question it was
“merely doing that which it had an unfettered right to do: ensuring that its business operations
were not disrupted.” In this regard, Respondent argues that it has a right to monitor its
employees’ conduct during work hours and to pay regular visits to its biggest customers to
assure that the Union campaign would have no negative impact on operations. The Employer
further contends that as all employees’ break periods are on paid time, all hours on the clock
are work hours and employees are not entitled to ignore their duties while being paid by the
company.
Whether an employer is engaged in unlawful surveillance of its employees’ union
activities depends on the specific circumstances in each case, including the nature and duration
of the employer’s observations. In Aladdin Gaming, LLC, 345 NLRB 585 fn. 2 (2005), the Board
held that while an employer’s “routine observation” of open, public union activity on or near its
property does not constitute unlawful surveillance, an employer violates the Act when it “surveils
employees engaged in Section 7 activity by observing them in a way that is ‘out of the ordinary’

37 Cardenales admitted that such materials had been confiscated from employees in his August 12
memorandum, but did not specify where this occurred.
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and thereby coercive.” As indicia of coerciveness, the Board looks to factors such as “the
duration of the observation, the manager’s distance from employees while observing them, and
whether this was an isolated incident or the employer engaged in other coercive conduct during
its observation.” Id, citing Sands Hotel & Casino, San Juan, 306 NLRB 172 (1992), enf. sub nom
mem. S.J.P.R., Inc. v. NLRB, 993 F.2d 913 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
Respondent defends its actions by noting that Gambone’s presence in its facility was
unauthorized and alleges that he disrupted the work flow and created a risk to public safety. I
am in agreement with Respondent that Gambone did not have the authority to enter its
premises to meet with employees or distribute material on its property and that Respondent
could lawfully monitor his presence at that time. However, there is no direct evidence to support
Respondent’s claim that Gambone’s presence at Company 2 interrupted the work flow of
Respondent’s operations or interfered with patient care. There is similarly insufficient evidence
to support Respondent’s assertion that Gambone interfered with company operations at any
other time during the course of the day.38
In support of its argument that its conduct was not unlawful, Respondent relies upon
Aladdin Gaming LLC, supra and Airport 2000 Concessions, LLC, 346 NLRB 958 (2006) where it
was held that where a supervisor’s presence in a particular work area is not out of the ordinary it
does not constitute unlawful surveillance. However, neither case is apposite to the
circumstances here.
In Aladdin Gaming, a supervisor observed an employee engaged in Section 7 activity in
a dining area frequented by managers and employees, approached the employee, waited two
minutes, and interrupted the employee to express the supervisor’s views on unionization. A
Board majority found no surveillance because the supervisor’s presence in the dining area was
not out of the ordinary and therefore not coercive. Similarly, in Airport 2000 Concessions, the
same Board majority dismissed an allegation that a supervisor unlawfully surveilled an
employee when she interrupted a break time conversation between a union organizer and an
employee in the dining area adjacent to food service counters. Again, the Board found that it
had not been shown that the supervisor’s presence in the dining area was out of the ordinary. In
both of these cases, the Board relied upon the fact that that the supervisor’s conduct in each
instance was unaccompanied by coercive conduct.
Here, it is undisputed that Hughson approached employees and confiscated Union-
related items which had been distributed to them, both on Respondent’s property and on public
property. I additionally credit Gambone’s testimony that he observed the confiscation of
materials in the ambulance bay at Waterbury Hospital and note that it was not specifically
rebutted by Respondent. 39

38 The crew purportedly meeting with Gambone at Dunkin’ Donuts was en route three minutes after
receiving the transfer call. Similarly, there is insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Gambone
was responsible for any alleged delay in Gerrity’s response to the critical care call later that day. To the
contrary, the evidence adduced by Respondent demonstrates that Gambone and his partner had
collected the patient for transfer and were en route within seven minutes of receiving the assignment in
question. Respondent presented no evidence to show that these are not appropriate response times.
39 Respondent points to the fact that, in denying the grievance based upon Gambone’s discharge,
the arbitrator concluded that Gambone had filed a false report and had given false testimony at an
investigatory interview. Accordingly, Respondent argues, Gambone is a witness who has a propensity to
proffer false testimony. It is the case, however, that with few exceptions which are explained above, my
findings with regard to what occurred on August 12 are based generally on uncontested evidence, or
Continued
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Employees have the right to possess and display union insignia on the job absent
special circumstances. Republic Aviation Corp. v NLRB, supra at 802 fn. 7 (interference with
production, safety or discipline.) Here, there is no evidence that the material confiscated by
Hughson interfered in any way with the employees’ performance of their work duties or the
operations of company trucks. Rather, for the most part they were small personal items such as
pens and notepads and stickers which could be easily maintained by employees in out-of-the
way areas or on their persons. I further note that no special circumstances have been pled or
alleged by the Respondent and there is no evidence that employees were otherwise prohibited
from carrying personal items with them on the job. Under similar circumstances, the confiscation
of union materials from employees has been found to be a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Brandeis Machinery & Supply Co. 342 NLRB 530, 538 (2004), Alle-Kiski Medical Center, 339
NLRB 361, 366 (2003). See also NRC Corp., 313 NLRB 574, 577 (1993)(confiscation of union
material is unlawful even where distributed in violation of a valid no-distribution rule, where the
company has no basis for taking such action).
I conclude therefore, that by approaching employees and demanding that they give to
him Union materials in their possession, Hughson engaged in conduct which was sufficiently
coercive to extend beyond permissible “routine observation” and therefore constitutes unlawful
surveillance within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.40
Moreover, I do not credit Hughson and Cardenales that their stop at the Dunkin’ Donuts
was precipitated by an unanswered transport call, and find this reason to be pretextual.
Gambone testified that he arrived at the Employer’s facility at approximately 10:00 or 10:30 am.
Hughson, contrary to Gambone, testified that Gambone did not appear at Company 2 until
about noon. For various reasons I conclude that Gambone’s account, on whole, is more
credible. As an initial matter, I note that even though the timing of events clearly was at issue,
Cardenales did not specifically testify about this matter and thus failed to corroborate Hughson
or explain why he could not do so. Further, during his cross examination, Cardenales responded
affirmatively to a question which contained, as its premise, the assertion that Gambone had
visited Respondent’s facility in the morning.
Moreover, Hughson’s account of events contains certain inherent improbabilities which
lead me to question its veracity. Thus, according to Respondent, the call which purportedly
triggered the stop at Dunkin’ Donuts was issued at 1:34 pm, more than an hour and a half after
Gambone’s initial visit to the Waterbury facility. I note that neither Cardenales nor Hughson
accounted for what may have occurred during this interval. It is uncontested that the Dunkin’
Donuts is located a mere few minutes’ drive from Company 2. Further, I find it highly unlikely
that Gambone’s unwelcome presence at Respondent’s facility coupled with the presence of six
to eight of Respondent’s employees who were not at their assigned posts would have gone
unnoticed for one hour or more. Moreover, it is apparent from the testimony of both Hughson
_________________________
evidence which has been adduced by the Respondent.
40 I recognize that the complaint does not specifically allege that Respondent violated the Act by
confiscating Union materials from its employees. However, it does allege that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by prohibiting the possession of Union materials on company time and property.
Moreover, Hughson testified to this matter and admitted to confiscating such materials from employees.
Under these circumstances, I find that the issue is closely related to the subject matter of the complaint
and has been fully litigated. Dickens, Inc., 352 NLRB 667 fn. 2, 671 (2008) (and cases cited therein).
However, even if I were to find that this particular issue was not sufficiently related to the complaint or had
not been fully litigated, the fact remains that Hughson’s conduct in this instance went beyond permissible
observation of open union activity.
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and Cardenales that they decided to visit their clients’ facilities within minutes of Gambone’s
departure from the facility.
I conclude therefore, that the ambulance call cited by Respondent did not occur until
some point later in the day, subsequent to the stop at Dunkin’ Donuts, and was not the reason
why Hughson stopped his vehicle and entered the restaurant. Respondent has proffered no
other lawful reason for Hughson to have made such a stop. I find, therefore, that by following
employees to and into the Dunkin’ Donuts, to observe their encounter with Gambone, Hughson
was engaging in conduct out of the ordinary which amounted to unlawful surveillance of
employees’ union activities. Nueva Engineering, 269 NLRB 999, 1004 (1984); Kosher Plaza
Market, 313 NLRB 74, 86 (1993).
With regard to the complaint allegation relating to Respondent’s prohibition on the
possession of Union materials on company time and company property, Respondent, relying
upon S.E. Nichols, Inc., 284 NLRB 556, 579 (1987), contends that inasmuch as it may lawfully
prohibit all solicitation and distribution by nonemployees on its premises, it may also forbid
employees to accept material from outsiders on its property. In S.E. Nichols, supra, the
administrative law judge read the rule under consideration there as forbidding employees only
from receiving literature on company premises and only directly from outsiders and as not
prohibiting employees from accepting literature from other employees merely because it may
have originated with nonemployees. Given that construction, the judge found the rule was
permissible. 41
Here, however, Respondent’s announced policy went beyond the specific confiscation of
materials which Gambone had distributed during his unauthorized visit to Company 2. Rather,
as Cardenales made clear in his memorandum to supervisors, Respondent considered all
NEMSA material unauthorized, and subject to confiscation. In this regard, I note that Hughson
failed to rebut Gerrity’s testimony that Hughson prohibited him from possessing NEMSA
literature in his vehicle and distributing a NEMSA T-shirt to a coworker. As has been discussed
above, as a general matter, employees have a protected right to have access to such materials
in the workplace. Accordingly, I find that Respondent’s policy prohibiting the possession of
Union materials on company time and property, as announced in Cardenales’ memorandum,
and as implemented by Hughson, was impermissibly overbroad in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
5. Restrictions on the wearing of a Union sticker and related threat of discipline
As Velletri testified, at some point in November he placed a Union sticker on his vehicle
and another on his radio holder, which is worn across his chest.
Thereafter, on February 9, 2010, Hughson noticed the sticker and instructed Velletri to
remove it. Velletri and Hughson got into a discussion about the matter and, as Velletri testified,
Hughson offered him the option of taking off the sticker or going home. I credit Velletri’s version
of events.42 Although Hughson generally denied communicating a “threat” to Velletri, he did not
specifically deny telling him that if he did not remove the sticker he should go home.

41 The relevant rule read as follows: “Employees shall not accept any literature distributed, for any
purpose, by persons not employed by the Company inside Company buildings or on Company property.”
42 Velletri’s status as current employee testifying against the interests of his employer is a factor
which I may, and do, consider in evaluating and crediting his testimony. See e.g. Flexsteel Industries, 316
NLRB 745 (1995)(and cases cited therein).
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Velletri further testified, without contradiction, that during his two years of employment
with AMR he has seen other types of pins worn by other employees such as breast cancer
awareness pins. He was not aware of any circumstance where employees were instructed to
remove such pins.
There is no dispute that Velletri placed his stickers on company property. Nevertheless, I
do not find that factor to be determinative under the circumstances here.
In Malta Constriction Co., 276 NLRB 1494, 1495 (1985), the Board found that in the
absence of any special circumstances based upon legitimate production or safety concerns, an
employer’s rule prohibiting the placement of union stickers on distinctive colored hard hats
interfered with the right to wear union insignia on personal apparel, even though the hard hats
had been supplied by the company and were not the property of the employee. Subsequently, in
Eastern Omni Constructors, 324 NLRB 652, 656 (1997), the Board adopted the decision of an
administrative law judge who rejected an employer’s contention that so long as it permitted
employees to wear union buttons or stickers on their clothing, it could prohibit them from
wearing such items on a company-supplied hard hat. By contrast, the Board found no violation
where there was a threat of discharge relating to the posting of numerous stickers on the walls,
windows, bathrooms and bulletin boards in the company facility. Due to the difficulty of removal
and the number of stickers posted, they constituted a defacement of company property. Minette
Mills, Inc., 305 NLRB 1032, 1035 (1991), enfd. 983 F.2d 1056 (4th Cir. 1993).
Here, the Employer has neither pled nor shown special circumstances or that the
placement of the sticker on Velletri’s radio holder would somehow compromise the operation or
integrity of its property. Accordingly I find that Velletri’s conduct was protected under the
rationale of Malta Construction Co., supra, and Hughson’s instruction that he remove the sticker
violated the Act. See St. Luke’s Hospital, 314 NLRB 434 (1994). I further find that his
admonition to Velletri that, if he did not remove the sticker he should go home, amounted to a
threat of discipline for protected conduct, again in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
American Screen Products Co., 138 NLRB 87, 90 (1962).
B. The discriminatory refusal to allow Gerrity to attend a Union meeting on paid time
The complaint alleges that in or about the week of August 17 or August 24, Respondent
discriminatorily refused to allow Gerrity to attend a company meeting on paid time. Respondent
denies that it excluded Gerrity from any meeting whatsoever and that he was paid for all
meetings he attended during that period.
1. The Wright Line Standard
Allegations of discrimination which turn on Employer motivation are analyzed under the
framework set forth in Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981),
cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982). To establish a violation of Section 8(a)(3) under Wright Line,
General Counsel must first show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employee
engaged in protected concerted activity, the employer was aware of that activity, and the activity
was a substantial or motivating reason for the employer's action. Wright Line, supra; Naomi
Knitting Plant, 328 NLRB 1279, 1281 (1999). Proof of an employer's motive can be based upon
direct evidence or can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, based on the record as a
whole. Ronin Shipbuilding, 330 NLRB 464 (2000); Robert Orr/Sysco Food Services, 343 NLRB
1183 (2004); enfd. mem. 179 LRRM (BNA) 2954 (6th Cir. 2006); Embassy Vacation Resorts,
340 NLRB 846, 848 (2003). The Board has long held that where adverse action occurs shortly
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after an employee has engaged in protected activity an inference of unlawful motive is raised.
See McClendon Electrical Services, 340 NLRB 613, fn. 6 (2003) (citing La Gloria Oil, 337 NLRB
1120 (2002), enfd. mem. 71 Fed Appx. 441 (5th Cir. 2003) (Table)). As part of its initial showing,
the General Counsel may offer proof that the employer’s reasons for the personnel decision
were pretextual. Pro-Spec Painting, Inc., 339 NLRB 946, 949 (2003); see also Laro
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 56 F.3d 224, 229 (D. C. Cir. 1995). In addition, proof of an
employer’s animus may be based upon circumstantial evidence, such as the employer’s
contemporaneous commission of other unfair labor practices. Amptech, Inc., 342 NLRB 1131,
1135 (2004).
Once the General Counsel has made out the elements of a prima facie case, the burden
of persuasion then shifts to the employer to “demonstrate that the same action would have
taken place even in the absence of the protected conduct.” Septix Waste, Inc., 346 NLRB 494,
496 (2006); Williamette Industries, 341 NLRB 560, 563 (2004); Wright Line, supra. To meet its
Wright Line burden, “[a]n employer cannot simply present a legitimate reason for its action but
must persuade by a preponderance of the evidence that the same action would have taken
place even in the absence of the protected activity.” W.F. Bolin Co., 311 NLRB 1118, 1119
(1993), petition for review denied 70 F.3d 863 (6th Cir. 1995), enfd. mem. 99 F.3d 1139 (6th Cir.
1996). See also Manno Electric, Inc., 321 NLRB 278, 280 fn. 12 (1996).
2. Application of the Wright Line standards
Respondent has argued that the General Counsel has failed to make out a prima facie
case that Gerrity was discriminated against because of his union activities. It is not disputed,
however, that Gerrity, as a WESU official, was a well-known union supporter generally.
Hughson initially admitted that it was known that Gerrity was in favor of unionization. I further
note that Hughson did not dispute Gerrity’s testimony that he told Gerrity that he could not have
NEMSA literature in his vehicle or distribute NEMSA t-shirts to a coworker. Moreover, it cannot
be disputed that it was apparent that WESU supported NEMSA in the election. Thus, contrary to
Cardenales’ assertion that Gerrity expressed doubts about whether the facility should be
unionized, I find that Gerrity’s course of conduct throughout the pre-election period
demonstrated that he supported the NEMSA campaign, and that this would have been apparent
to Respondent.
Respondent further argues that no adverse employment action has been shown.
Respondent argues that Gerrity was paid for any time he spent in meetings with managers,
either voluntary or mandatory. The evidence fails to support Respondent’s contentions in this
regard.
In this case there is testimony regarding three dates: August 11, August 21 and August
25. There is no dispute that Gerrity attended a mandatory company meeting held on August 25,
and was paid for his attendance at this meeting. The dispute between the General Counsel and
the Respondent concerns what may have occurred on August 11 and subsequently on August
21.
Respondent asserts in its brief that an “impromptu” meeting occurred on August 11
among Gerrity, Hughson and Cardenales, and that Gerrity was paid for his time in attendance at
this meeting. According to the testimony of Respondent’s witnesses, Gerrity arrived early for
work on that date, thinking a meeting had been scheduled, but upon arriving was told that it had
been cancelled. Gerrity then asked if he should punch out, and was told no. According to
Hughson and Cardenales, they then spoke with Gerrity until the commencement of his shift.
Gerrity’s time records confirm that he punched in at 2:36 pm on that day, even though his
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scheduled shift did not begin until 3:00 pm. Gerrity acknowledged that he punched in early on
that day, but stated that he could not recall why he did so. Cardenales acknowledged that
drivers will show up early for their shifts and it would not have been unusual for Gerrity to have
done so.
As an initial matter, I note that the memorandum distributed by Respondent to its
employees regarding its planned voluntary meetings states that they would be held between the
dates of August 19 and August 21. There is no evidence of any other notice to employees
setting dates and times for voluntary meetings. Cardenales admitted that he had not put out a
notice to such effect and did not know of any written notification of meetings to be held on
August 11. Respondent adduced no evidence to show that such a meeting had been scheduled.
Retallick offered no testimony whatsoever regarding specific dates when meetings were to be
held. Inasmuch as Retallick testified that the company wanted employees to attend such
meetings to obtain information regarding the Union campaign, I find it inherently improbable that
Respondent would schedule a meeting for its employees for August 11, but never issue a notice
to such effect.
Moreover, the account offered by Respondent’s witnesses of what occurred during the
purported August 11 meeting is similarly improbable. In particular, Cardenales testified that
Gerrity had a lot of questions about Gambone and was unsure whether there should be a union
in place. Hughson similarly testified that Gerrity was “confused.” I find it hard to believe that
Gerrity, who was at the time a WESU official, would have voiced such doubts to Respondent, or
that Respondent would have taken any such “doubts” seriously. After all, it was no secret that
WESU supported the NEMSA campaign, going so far as to withdraw from the election ballot.
Respondent was aware that WESU posted NEMSA literature on its bulletin board and Gerrity
had, in fact, attempted to distribute NEMSA materials to employees. I find it unlikely that Gerrity
would have supported and engaged in such actions if, in fact, he harbored doubts about
whether there should be a union at the Employer’s facility. I therefore discredit the testimony of
Respondent’s witnesses regarding what occurred the purported August 11 meeting.
To the contrary, I credit Gerrity’s testimony regarding what occurred on August 20 and
21. The evidence establishes that Respondent planned to hold meetings with employees on
those dates, and so notified them. I additionally credit Gerrity’s testimony that when he arrived
for the August 21 meeting he was told that it was not for him, and he had already made up his
mind. The record further establishes that Respondent had promised its employees that they
would be compensated for the time spent in these meetings, and that Gerrity received no
compensation for a meeting scheduled for August 21, which he sought to attend.
Respondent argues that Gerrity should not be credited due to a faulty recollection of
events. In particular, Respondent notes that in Gerrity’s pre-hearing affidavit, he stated that the
meeting resulting in the alleged unlawful conduct took place at some time during the week of
August 10 or August 17. Respondent additionally challenges Gerrity’s veracity because the
charge, as filed, alleges that Gerrity was excluded from a mandatory rather than a voluntary
meeting. I do not find Gerrity’s initial inability at the time this matter was investigated to recall the
precise date of the meeting from which he was excluded to constitute a sufficient basis upon
which to discredit his testimony, which was otherwise specific and clear.43 Nor do I find that the

43 I note that it was the General Counsel who sought to bring forward the relevant portions of
Gerrity’s affidavit for the purpose of rebutting a challenge to Gerrity’s veracity and that Respondent
objected to its use at the time. In its brief, Respondent has now reversed course and claims that it would
be error for me not to consider it.
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alleged discrepancy between the charge as filed and the evidence adduced at hearing would
warrant a similar result.44
Although both Cardenales and Hughson testified generally that Gerrity had not been
excluded from any meetings during August, I find this to be insufficiently probative. Respondent
failed to adduce specific testimony to rebut Gerrity’s testimony regarding the events of August
21. An adverse inference is warranted where a witness does not deny, or only generally denies
without further specificity, certain adverse testimony from an opposing witness. Asarco, Inc.,
316 NLRB 636, 640 fn. 15 (1995), modified on other grounds 86 F.3d 1401 (5th Cir. 1996).
Accordingly, I infer from Respondent’s failure to adduce specific testimony regarding the events
of August 21, that had Cardenales and Hughson had been questioned in this manner and they
had testified truthfully, that their testimony would have been adverse to Respondent.45
Respondent further argues that there is no evidence of discriminatory motive. In
disagreement with Respondent, I find that there is sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of
discriminatory motive here. As the Board has found, “[u]nlawful motive may be demonstrated
not only by direct evidence but by circumstantial evidence, such as timing, disparate or
inconsistent treatment, expressed hostility toward the protected activity, departure from past
practice and shifting or pretextual reasons being offered for the action.” Real Foods Co., 350
NLRB 309, 312 fn. 17 (2007).
As an initial matter, I have found Respondent’s account of an August 11 meeting is false.
There is no evidence that a meeting was scheduled for that date or that employees were so
notified. While Gerrity may have punched in early on that date, there could have been any
number of reasons why he had been authorized to do so, and Cardenales admitted that such an
occurrence would not have been unusual. As the Board and courts have found, the proffer of a
false, pretextual defense supports an inference of an unlawful motive. Kentucky River Medical
Center, 355 NLRB No. 129, slip op. at 3 (2010)(and cases cited therein).
I further find evidence of unlawful motive in Respondent’s commission of
contemporaneous unfair labor practices such as the discriminatory prohibition of the posting of
pro-NEMSA literature, the prohibitions on wearing and distribution of Union insignia and
materials and the unlawful surveillance of employees. See St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare
Centers, 350 NLRB 203, 204 (2007), enfd. 519 F.3d 373 (7th Cir. 2008)(unfair labor practices
committed during an organizing campaign constitute evidence of animus for purposes of Wright
Line analysis.)
In addition to the inferences drawn above, I find that the General Counsel had adduced
direct evidence of both knowledge and animus. Thus, Gerrity arrived for a meeting to which all
employees had been invited and was told that it was not for him and that he had already made
up his mind. I credit this specific account over the general denials of Respondent’s witnesses. In
this regard, I find it unlikely that Gerrity would have fabricated this testimony, which could have
been (but was not) easily rebutted by mutually corroborative specific denials on the part of
Hughson and Cardenales. Accordingly, I find that Gerrity’s testimony is evidence that the
decision to exclude him from a scheduled meeting on August 21 meeting was prompted by to

44 In this regard I note that the applicable charge was not filed or signed by Gerrity, but rather by
Gambone.
45 In this regard, even if I were to find that Gerrity, Cardenales and Hughson had a discussion about
the Union on August 11, and that Gerrity was paid for the time spent in that discussion, this does not
necessarily provide a basis to discredit Gerrity regarding what he alleges to have occurred on August 21.
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unlawful considerations, i.e. his support for the NEMSA organizing campaign.
Thus, I find that the General Counsel has met its initial burden under Wright Line of
showing discriminatory motivation by proving protected activity, the employer’s knowledge of
that activity and animus against such protected activity. Accordingly, the burden of persuasion
shifts to the Respondent to prove that it would have taken the same action toward Gerrity even
in the absence of protected activity. St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Centers, supra at 203 (and
cases cited therein). I find that Respondent has failed to meet this burden. As noted above, the
record establishes Respondent wanted employees to attend its meetings and provided
numerous opportunities for them to do so. There is no evidence that any other employee was
barred from attending such a meeting or not paid for his attendance.46
Accordingly, I find that by refusing to allow Gerrity to attend a company meeting on paid
time, thereby denying him of two hours of pay to which he otherwise would have been entitled,
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
C. The Alleged 8(a)(5) Violations
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by making a
series of unilateral changes without affording the Union notice or an opportunity to bargain over
such changes. These are: a failure to make contractually required upgrade, tuition
reimbursement and recertification payments; the modification of overtime distribution
procedures; a failure to post the bi-annual shift bid and a failure to grant scheduled annual wage
increases. Respondent has posed a series of defenses to these allegations, as discussed
below.
1. Applicable Legal Principles
It is settled law that when employees are represented by a labor organization their
employer may not make unilateral changes in their terms and conditions of employment. See
NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962). An employer violates the Act’s proscription against
unilateral changes when it makes material, substantial and significant changes in employees’
conditions of employment or working conditions without notice or bargaining with the
representative about such changes. Illiana Transit Warehouse Corp., 323 NLRB 111, 122
(1997). The duty to maintain the status quo imposes an obligation upon an employer not only to
maintain that which has already been given to employees, but also to “implement benefits which
have become conditions of employment by virtue of prior commitment or practice.” Alpha
Cellulose Corp., 265 NLRB 177, 178 fn. 1 (1982), enfd. mem. 718 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1983);
More Truck Lines, 336 NLRB 772 (2001), enfd. 324 F.3d 735 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Jensen
Enterprises Inc., 339 NLRB 877 (2003). Either an explicit employer commitment or a regular
practice can generate such expectations and transform a future benefit into a present term and
condition. See e.g. Illiana Transit Warehouse Corp., supra at 122 (examples of terms and
conditions established by practice).
2. The upgrade, tuition reimbursement and recertification payments

46 Respondent argues that it makes no sense to conclude that it barred Gerrity from a voluntary
meeting on August 21 when it required him to attend one on August 25. I find this argument to be
unpersuasive in light of the evidence which otherwise meets the General Counsel’s burden under Wright
Line, and Respondent’s failure to rebut it.
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There is no dispute that these payments were contractually required under the WESU
agreement, that bargaining unit employees had been routinely submitting requests for such
payments to the Employer and that they had been processed expeditiously. The evidence
shows that, after NEMSA won the representation election, the Employer ceased processing
claims submitted after that date for employees for several months.47
Respondent initially took the position that it was not obligated to make such payments.
As Banelli wrote to Talbot on September 16, 2009: “Those payments (the stipends) are not
wages, hours or conditions of employment and like other aspects of the collective bargaining
agreement are not withheld under the ‘status quo’ doctrine and therefore will not be maintained.”
Cardenales similarly testified that the Employer took the position that the payments were not
due because the WESU agreement had become “null and void” as a result of NEMSA’s
certification.
Respondent argues in its brief that it had a “reasonable belief” that by making such
payments it would be violating its obligations to maintain the status quo until a new collective
bargaining agreement was reached with NEMSA and further, that all payments due have now
been issued. Respondent thus argues that under a “totality of the circumstances” there should
be no violation found.
Regarding Respondent’s assertion of reasonable belief that making such payments
would violate its duty to maintain the status quo, I note that the Union had agreed to the
continuance of existing terms and conditions, which included making contractually mandated
payments to employees.48 Moreover, it is well-settled that an employer violates Section 8(a)(5)
of the Act if it makes unilateral changes in wages, hours or working conditions without first
bargaining with a majority representative of its employees, regardless of its motive in doing so.
NLRB v. Katz, supra.
Here, the upgrade, tuition reimbursement and recertification payments set forth in the
WESU agreement were established monetary terms and conditions of employment. Moreover,
employees had come to expect such remuneration, and by Respondent’s own admission the
delay in processing such payments were due to its stated position that the 2006 collective-
bargaining agreement was null and void. Accordingly, I find that the delay of several months in
processing these payments was a material and substantial change in terms and conditions of
employment. The unrebutted testimony of the General Counsel’s witnesses is that Respondent

47 Contrary to the General Counsel, I do not find that Gerrity submitted a claim for recertification
payments in September. Rather, the record establishes that he was not prepared to do so until
November.
48 As noted above, on September 14, Talbot advised the Employer that:
Following NEMSA’s certification as the exclusive bargaining representative, AMR is required to
continue the terms and conditions of employment established by the WESU labor agreement and
maintain all other existing working conditions pending negotiations with NEMSA. AMR’s obligation to
maintain the status quo precludes the company from altering or eliminating terms and benefits
established by the WESU labor agreement until the parties bargain for a new contract or reach an
impasse in negotiations.
It is thus apparent that NEMSA made clear from the outset that it consented to the continuance of the
existing terms and conditions of employment, including those promised under the WESU agreement,
while bargaining for a successor agreement was taking place.
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never provided the Union with notice or an opportunity to bargain over this matter. Accordingly,
by ceasing such payments without appropriate notice and bargaining, Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
3. Overtime distribution procedures
In its answer to the complaint, Respondent admitted that since on or about October 1,
2009, it has modified overtime distribution procedures applicable to unit employees. This
admission was referenced by Counsel for the General Counsel in his opening statement and I
note that at no time during the hearing did Respondent seek to amend its answer in this regard.
In its post-hearing brief, Respondent contends that there was no change in the
procedure for overtime distribution, and that the General Counsel has not proven that one
occurred.
As an initial matter, I consider Respondent’s answer to constitute a confessionary
admission that such a change was made. Consolidated Bus Transit, 350 NLRB 1064, 1065 fn. 6
(2007). Moreover, I find that the General Counsel has otherwise adduced sufficient evidence,
corroborated by the testimonial admissions of the Respondent, to show that the overtime
distribution procedure was altered on at least one, if not two occasions without notice to or
bargaining with the Union.
Both Caruso and Gerrity testified that in the past employees could sign up for open shifts
during the previous month, although they could be bumped from such an assignment if it were
sought by a part-time employee. They further testified that at a point in time after the election,
this procedure changed and that full-time employees were told that they could not sign up for
overtime until 24 hours prior to a shift. Retallick did not specifically deny this testimony, rather
he testified that in October 2009 a change occurred because of the high level of overtime being
paid to employees whereby the Employer put into place a procedure where the full-time
employees could no longer sign up for a specific shift but rather could indicate their availability
for overtime at the bottom of the monthly schedule. The point of the change was to make it
apparent to the supervisors and part-time employees that there were shifts available for part-
time employees to claim.
As for the alleged change in November, Caruso testified he saw supervisor Amanda
Rochette post a notice to employees announcing a “change” in the overtime policy whereby
employees could now sign up for overtime work 72 hours prior to the start of the shift. Velletri
testified that he saw this memorandum at both the Southington and Waterbury facilities. I credit
the mutually corroborative testimony of these current employees. Flexsteel Industries, supra.
While there is no definitive evidence as to who might have signed this notice, the fact remains
that there is employee witness testimony that was posted by an individual with ostensible
supervisory authority at Respondent’s Waterbury facility. This is specific evidence which could
have easily been rebutted by Respondent. However, Respondent did not call Rochette and has
failed to explain why it did not or could not do so. In this regard, I do not find Retallick’s
testimony that he was had not seen this notice to be sufficient to rebut Caruso and Velletri’s
account of events.
The evidence further shows that there was no notice to the Union or bargaining over
these adjustments to the Employer’s overtime distribution policy.
Respondent suggests that since full-time employees always could have been bumped
from the schedule there was no significant change. Further, Respondent argues the General
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Counsel could not establish that this purported change resulted in less overtime for employees.
In this regard, Respondent points to the fact that there were other operational factors which
affected the amount of available overtime, such as the hiring of additional part-time and per
diem employees, coupled with a decrease in call volume. It is true that the evidence proffered
by the General Counsel on this issue was based upon hearsay evidence and the subjective
observation of employees rather than on specific documentation regarding hours of overtime
worked by bargaining unit members. The force of Respondent’s argument however, is
undermined by Retallick’s clear admission that the October change was specifically instituted to
reduce the amount of overtime that the Employer was paying to its full-time employees and to
increase overtime opportunities for part-time employees. I note that both categories of
employees are in the bargaining unit, and the fact that a change may benefit certain employees
does not excuse Respondent’s bargaining obligation. See Carrier Corp., 319 NLRB 184, 195
(1995). This prospective change in the availability of overtime (and therefore compensation) for
employees is sufficiently material and substantial to warrant bargaining. See Keeler Brass Co.,
327 NLRB 585, 589 (1999).
Accordingly, I find that by failing to provide notice and the opportunity to bargain with the
Union over the changes in the manner in which employees may bid for overtime shifts,
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, as alleged.
4. Discontinuance of the shift bid process
The record establishes that the Respondent provided its employees with an opportunity
to bid for shifts on a bi-annual basis, in January and June. This was not only a matter of past
practice; it had been memorialized in the WESU collective-bargaining agreement. As such, it
was a term and condition of employment on which employees had come to rely. In its answer,
Respondent admitted that since on or about November 1, it has failed to post the shift bid. As
Caruso testified, without rebuttal, this issue had not been brought up by the Respondent during
bargaining. The failure to follow the bidding procedure which had previously been in place
clearly has an effect on employees’ hours and other terms and conditions of employment and is
therefore a mandatory subject of bargaining. See e.g. Raven Government Services, Inc., 331
NLRB 651, 659 (2000). Accordingly, by discontinuing its past practice of allowing employees to
bid on shifts on a bi-annual basis, without notice to or bargaining with the Union, Respondent
has violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
5. Failure to grant the January 2010 wage increase
There is no dispute that Respondent did not give its employees a wage increase in
January 2010. Respondent has proffered several arguments in support of its contention that it
was not obliged to grant such a wage increase to employees and that its failure to do so was not
an unlawful unilateral change.
The Employer first argues that granting employees such a wage increase would have
deprived the Union of its legal right to engage in full collective bargaining on all mandatory
subjects. Respondent further argues that even assuming argendo that the Employer had a legal
duty to provide the Union with notice and an opportunity to bargain about its decision not to
implement a wage increase for 2010, there is no evidence that he Union did not receive such
notice and, moreover, there is no evidence that Respondent has refused to bargain in good faith
regarding this matter. Respondent argues that the record establishes that the Union had
received ample notice that the Employer did not intend to raise wages in January 2010 and that
the Union has had every opportunity to engage in collective bargaining over future and
retroactive wage increases.
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In addition, Respondent has argued that inasmuch as WESU disclaimed interest in
representing the unit, and the existing collective bargaining agreement was voided as of the
date of NEMSA’s certification, it had no obligation to pay a wage increase which had been
negotiated to occur in the future with WESU. As Respondent argues, such an obligation was
contingent on WESU remaining the collective bargaining agent and the contract continuing in
effect as of the date such wage increases were due. In support of this contention, Respondent
relies upon language contained in Article VIII that employees “shall have their base hourly wage
increased as identified below over the course and life of this Agreement.”
As an initial matter, I find that the record does not support Respondent’s assertion that
WESU disclaimed interest in representing the bargaining unit at any time prior to the election or
the certification of NEMSA. It is well established that the Board requires such a disclaimer to be
clear and unequivocal. Based upon the record evidence relied upon by Respondent, which
consists solely of the decision of WESU to not appear on the ballot in the representation
election, a disclaimer of interest cannot be inferred. Even if I were to conclude, which I do not,
that WESU’s stated decision not to appear on the ballot in the representation election was
tantamount to a statement of disclaimer, the fact remains that the Board has long held that a
union's bare statement of disclaimer is not sufficient to establish that it has abandoned its claim
to representation if the surrounding circumstances justify an inference to the contrary. The
union's conduct must not be inconsistent with its alleged disclaimer. Sweetner Products, 268
NLRB 1106, 1111 (1984); International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO (Texlite,
Inc.) 19 NLRB 1792, 1798 (1958). In this regard, I note that there is no evidence that WESU
abandoned any of its responsibilities as the bargaining representative of unit employees prior to
the September 4 election or NEMSA’s subsequent certification.
Respondent’s contention that NEMSA was properly afforded notice and an opportunity
to bargain regarding its decision to refrain from granting an annual wage increase in January
2010 must be rejected as inconsistent with the record evidence. In this regard, on September
14, NEMSA’s labor attorney clearly stated the Union’s position that the Employer was obliged to
continue terms and conditions of employment under the WESU contract. Rather than providing
notice and any opportunity to bargain over prospective changes, Respondent admittedly took
the position that the contract was “null and void” and was not obliged to abide by it or (certain of)
its terms. Moreover, Banelli conceded that there had been no bargaining with the Union over
this issue.
Any argument that the Union waived its right to bargain over the Employer’s failure to
implement the January 2010 wage increase is unpersuasive. The waiver of a right under the Act
will not be found in the absence of clear and unambiguous evidence to such effect. Metropolitan
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983). In Ciba-Geigy Pharmaceutical Division, 264
NLRB 1013, 1017 (1982) the Board held that when notice is given to a union of a proposed
change, and it is apparent that the employer has no intention of changing its mind, that notice is
nothing more than a “fait accompli.” Such notice has been found to be merely informational and
fails to satisfy the requirements of the Act, Gannett Co., 333 NLRB 355 (2001) (citing Ciba
Geigy Pharmaceutical Division, supra). Here, it is apparent that any purported “notice” provided
by Respondent regarding its intentions as to the January 2010 increase was presented as such
a “fait accompli.” Thus, Retallick told employees that WESU had “tossed out” their January raise
and Cardenales and Popyk told employees that they would not be receiving wage increases as
the WESU agreement was “null and void.” This position which was echoed by Zagami in his
response to NEMSA’s grievance. Thus, the Union could reasonably conclude that Respondent
had made up its mind and that it would be futile to object to the failure of the Respondent to
grant the pay raises. See Burrows Paper Corp., 332 NLRB 82, 83 (2000). Moreover,
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Respondent has failed to show that the Union was ever afforded an opportunity to bargain over
this issue prior to its implementation.
Respondent further asserts that insofar as the General Counsel has predicated its theory
of the case upon More Truck Lines, supra, such reliance is misplaced because that case
involved a threat, not the duty to bargain, and that the statements found to be unlawful were
made by the employer during a campaign in which the union who had negotiated the agreement
did not voluntarily terminate its representation of bargaining unit employees and thereby
abandon the contract it had negotiated.
Respondent’s arguments regarding the inapplicability of More Truck Lines, supra, are
beside the point. While that case did, as Respondent asserts, decide only whether a particular
series of statements amounted to an unlawful threat under the Act, the underlying issue was
whether the employer in that case was authorized to take the action contemplated by such
statements. There, the company made various oral and written campaign statements to the
effect that, should the Teamsters win a runoff election between the Teamsters and the
incumbent union, the extant collective-bargaining agreement would be “null and void” and the
employer would freeze its drivers' wages while it negotiated with the Teamsters. The employer
argued to the Board that while the previously implemented terms of an incumbent contract
continue as terms and conditions of employment after a challenger union is certified, its
uneffectuated terms do not. Specifically, the employer argued that it was not obliged to provide
any further raises dictated by the contract after the new union’s certification date.
The Board found that the uneffectuated raises in the predecessor union’s contract had
become terms and conditions of employment, “by prior commitment or practice.” Alpha
Cellulose Corp., 265 NLRB 177, 178 fn. 1 (1982), enfd. mem. 718 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1983). As
such wage increases were reasonably expected by the drivers, the employer would be required
to follow the contract's wage provisions until it reached agreement or impasse with the
Teamsters. See Liberty Telephone & Communications, supra at 318 (“conditions of
employment” include not only what the employer has already granted, but also what it proposes
to grant and are comprised of the normal foreseeable expectations arising out of the
employment relationship, including “announced or expected benefits.”); Jensen Enterprises,
Inc., supra at 877 (“[b]y withholding customary increases during the potentially long period of
negotiations for an agreement covering overall terms and conditions of employment an
employer, in effect, changes existing terms and conditions without bargaining to agreement or
impasse, in violation of Section 8(a)(5).”) See Lee’s Summit Hospital and Health Midwest, 338
NLRB 841 (2003)(unlawful for employer to discontinue past practice of granting annual wage
adjustment during bargaining for initial contract); Deaconess Medical Center, 341 NLRB 589,
590 (2004)(deciding objection to an election). See also Arc Bridges, Inc., 355 NLRB No. 199,
slip op. at 4, fn. 8 (2010) (citing More Truck Lines, supra).
In More Truck Lines, therefore, it was precisely because the Employer was not
authorized to withhold the annual wage increase promised in the contract it had with the
predecessor union, that its statement to employees that it would freeze wages constituted an
unlawful threat in violation of Section 8(a)(1)of the Act.
I further note that in that case the employer argued, as Respondent does here, that
implementing the annual, nondiscretionary wage increase would have constituted unlawful
unilateral action on its part. The Board, citing Alpha Cellulose Corp., supra, rejected such an
argument as “unfounded”: “As explained above, established law dictates that the Respondent
could have, and should have implemented those predetermined increases.” 336 NLRB at 773.
Respondent further attempts to distinguish More Truck Lines by arguing that the nature
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of the contractual obligation imposed there was different. In particular, Respondent points to
Article VIII of the WESU Agreement which provides that employees “shall have their base hourly
wage increased as identified below over the course of the life of this Agreement.” Thus,
Respondent argues, once the WESU Agreement became “null and void” it ceased to have “life”
and the January 1 increase did not vest or accrue within the meaning of Litton Financial Printing
Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190 (1991). Litton however fails to support Respondent’s position insofar
as it stands for the proposition that the Act, independent of any contract, requires preservation
of existing terms and conditions of employment. 501 U.S. at 198, 206-207; see also NLRB v.
Katz, supra at 747.
In More Truck Lines, the employer, like the Respondent herein, relied upon an assertion
that the agreement with the predecessor union was “null and void” to justify its conduct. The
Board rejected this defense, finding that the phrase “null and void”:
cannot be read literally to mean that an employer may treat the terms and conditions of
employment established under an agreement with a defeated incumbent union as if they
never existed. To do so would allow, or arguably compel, an employer to reset
employees’ then existing conditions of employment to those that were in effect prior to
the final employer-incumbent agreement.
The Board then went on to state that the phrase “null and void” meant that a successful
intervening union:
must be afforded an opportunity to negotiate a new contract rather than being saddled
with the one entered into by the defeated incumbent. Thus, if a challenging union is
certified, then the contract between the employer and the incumbent becomes void but,
as usual, the employer must abide by the then existing terms and conditions of
employment until such time as it reaches an agreement with the new union or a lawful
impasse occurs.
336 NLRB at 772-773 (emphasis and internal citations omitted).
Respondent has pointed to no authority or propounded any theory in law as to why this
analytical framework should not apply to the case at hand: that is, where the incumbent union
was not defeated but rather has not sought placement on the election ballot.49
In further support of its contention that it was not required to grant a wage increase to
employees in January 2010, Respondent relies upon American Seating Co., 106 NLRB 250
(1953) and Consolidated Fiberglass Products Co., 242 NLRB 10 (1979). These cases stand for
the proposition that when a union which is party to a collective-bargaining agreement is
decertified, the succeeding union is not bound by a prior contract, and the employer has an
obligation to bargain with the new union even if the old contract has not yet expired. As the
Second Circuit has observed, however, it does not follow from this reasoning that until an
agreement is reached with the new bargaining representative, the old agreement, or at least
those portions thereof necessary for the continuation of the employer-employee relationship,

49 I additionally note that even in the absence of specific contractual language defining an employer’s
obligation, where there is unequivocal evidence of an established past practice that reaches beyond the
scope of a collective-bargaining agreement, the Board has held that it is unlawful for an employer to
institute a unilateral change which conflicts with such a past practice. See e.g. Rosdev Hospitality,
Secaucus, LP, 349 NLRB 202 (2007).
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automatically cease to exist or should not be followed. Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234,
1244 (2d Cir. 1970). In any event, as noted above, in this case the Union consented to the
continuance of the existing contractual terms pending bargaining.
Accordingly, I conclude that Respondent’s failure to grant a promised wage increase to
its bargaining unit employees in January 2010, a decision that was undertaken as a “fait
accompli” without affording the Union notice and an opportunity to bargain, was an unlawful
unilateral change in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
Conclusions of Law
1. Respondent, American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc., is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), 2(6) and (7) of the Act
2. The Union, National Emergency Medical Services Association (NEMSA) is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act and the exclusive bargaining
representative of employees in the in the following appropriate bargaining unit:
All full-time and regular part-time and per diem paramedics, emergency medical
technicians, and chair car drivers employed by the Employer at its Waterbury,
Southington and Avon Connecticut facilities, excluding all other employees, office
clerical employees and guards, professional employees and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
3. By the following conduct, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act:
(a) Threatening employees with the loss of their annual pay raise because of their Union
activities.
(b) Surveilling employees’ Union activities.
(c) Prohibiting employees from possessing Union materials on company time and
property.
(d) Prohibiting employees from using a bulletin board to post Union-related items.
(e) Prohibiting employees from wearing a Union lapel pin.
(f) Prohibiting employees from displaying a Union decal while working and threatening
employees with discipline if they refused to remove the Union decal
4. By refusing to allow Michael Gerrity to attend a company meeting on paid time,
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
5. By the following conduct, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act:
(a) Unilaterally and without notice and bargaining with the Union failing to make upgrade
pay, tuition reimbursement payments and recertification payments to eligible bargaining unit
employees.
(b) Unilaterally and without notice and bargaining with the Union modifying overtime
distribution procedures applicable to bargaining unit employees.
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(c) Unilaterally and without notice and bargaining with the Union failing to post the bi-
annual shift bid for bargaining unit employees.
(d) Unilaterally and without notice and bargaining with the Union failing to grant EMTs,
paramedics and drivers a scheduled annual wage increase.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I
recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. I further recommend that Respondent be ordered
to reimburse and otherwise make whole Gerrity for any loss of earnings and other benefits
suffered by virtue of its discrimination against him, Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682
(1970), enfd. 444 F.2d 502 (6TH Cir. 1971), with interest to be computed as set forth in Kentucky
River Medical Center, 356 NLRB No. 8 (2010.
I further recommend that Respondent be ordered to, upon request, rescind all unilateral
changes found herein and to place into effect all terms and conditions of employment which
were in existence on or prior to September 4, 2009, and to maintain those terms until a new
contract is concluded, the parties have bargained to a valid impasse or the Union has agreed to
the changes. Provided, however, that nothing in my recommended Order is to be construed as
requiring that Respondent cancel any unilateral changes that benefited unit employees without
a request from the Union. I also recommend that the Respondent be ordered to make whole
current and former unit employees for any loss of wages or other benefits they suffered as a
result of Respondent’s unlawful unilateral changes in the manner prescribed Ogle Protection
Service, supra with interest to be computed as provided for in Kentucky River Medical Center,
supra. This includes reimbursing employees for any expenses resulting from Respondent’s
unlawful unilateral changes to their terms and conditions of employment as set forth in Kraft
Plumbing & Heating, 252 NLRB 891 fn. 2 (1980), affd. 661 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1981) with interest
as set forth in Kentucky River Medical Center, supra.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended50
ORDER
The Respondent, American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc., Waterbury
Connecticut, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening employees with the loss of their annual pay raise because the engage
in Union activities.
(b) Surveilling employees’ Union activities.
(c) Prohibiting employees from possessing Union materials on company time and
property.

50 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
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(d) Prohibiting employees from using a bulletin board to post Union-related items.
(e) Prohibiting employees from wearing a Union lapel pin.
(f) Prohibiting employees from displaying a Union decal while working and threatening
employees with discipline if they refuse to remove the Union decal.
(g) Discriminatorily refusing to allow its employees to attend a company meeting on paid
time.
(h) Unilaterally and without notice and bargaining with the Union failing to pay eligible
bargaining unit employees upgrade pay, tuition reimbursement payments and recertification
payments.
(i) Unilaterally and without notice and bargaining with the Union modifying overtime
distribution procedures applicable to bargaining unit employees.
(j) Unilaterally and without notice and bargaining with the Union failing to post the bi-
annual shift bid for bargaining unit employees.
(k) Unilaterally and without notice and bargaining with the Union failing to grant EMTs,
paramedics and drivers a scheduled annual wage increase.
(l) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act
(a) Make Michael Gerrity whole for any losses he may have suffered as a result of
Respondent’s discriminatory refusal to allow him to attend a company meeting on paid time,
with interest as set forth in the Remedy section of this decision.
(b) Upon request of the Union, rescind the unilateral changes made on or after
September 4, 2009 to the terms and conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees
and restore the status quo as it existed as of that date until a new contract is concluded, the
parties have bargained to a valid impasse or the Union has agreed to the changes.
(c) Make whole its affected former and current unit employees for losses they suffered
by virtue of Respondent’s unlawful unilateral changes in the manner set forth in the Remedy
section of this Decision.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional
Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the
Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel
records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facilities in Waterbury,
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Southington and Avon, Connecticut copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”51 Copies
of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 34, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. In addition to the physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be
distributed electronically, such as by e-mail, posting on an intranet or an internet site and/or
other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by
such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of
these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in
these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the
notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since August 1, 2009.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C., November 9, 2010.
____________________
Mindy E. Landow
Administrative Law Judge

51 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
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APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT threaten you with the loss of your annual pay raise because you engage in
Union activities.
WE WILL NOT surveil your Union activities.
WE WILL NOT prohibit you from possessing Union materials on company time and property.
WE WILL NOT prohibit you from using a bulletin board to post Union-related items.
WE WILL NOT prohibit you from wearing a Union lapel pin.
WE WILL NOT prohibit you from displaying a Union decal and threaten you with discipline if you
refuse to remove it.
WE WILL NOT discriminate against you because of your Union or other concerted, protected
activities by refusing to allow you to attend a company meeting on paid time.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally and without notice or bargaining with the Union fail to pay eligible
bargaining unit employees upgrade pay, tuition reimbursement payments and recertification
payments.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally and without notice and bargaining with the Union modify overtime
distribution procedures applicable to bargaining unit employees.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally and without notice and bargaining with the Union fail to post the bi-
annual shift bid for bargaining unit employees.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally and without notice or bargaining with the Union fail to grant EMTs,
paramedics and drivers a wage increase scheduled for January 2010.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed to you by Section 7 of the Act.
JD(NY)–45–10
WE WILL make Michael Gerrity whole for any losses he may have suffered as a result of our
discriminatory refusal to allow him to attend a company meeting on paid time, with interest.
WE WILL, upon request of the Union, rescind the unilateral changes made on or after
September 4, 2009 to the terms and conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees
and restore the status quo as it existed as of that date until a new contract is concluded, the
parties have bargained to a valid impasse or the Union has agreed to the changes.
WE WILL make whole our affected former and current bargaining unit employees whole for
losses they suffered by virtue of our unlawful unilateral changes to their terms and conditions of
employment
AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE OF
CONNECTICUT, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
A. A. Ribicoff Federal Building and Courthouse
450 Main Street, Suite 410
Hartford, CT 06103-3022
Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
860-240-3522.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 860-240-3528.